Moore v. Crocker

Supreme Court of North Carolina

Moore v. Crocker

141 S.E.2d 307, 264 N.C. 233, 1965 N.C. LEXIS 1160

CourtSupreme Court of North Carolina

DecidedApril 7, 1965

Docket456

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 141 S.E.2d 307 (Moore v. Crocker) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Moore v. Crocker, 141 S.E.2d 307, 264 N.C. 233, 1965 N.C. LEXIS 1160 (N.C. 1965).

Pincite

Opinion

PeR CuRiam.

There was plenary evidence that plaintiff was not present when the collision occurred; that Small had borrowed plaintiff’s Chevrolet; and that, when the collision occurred, Small was using the car for his own personal purposes.

In our view, there was sufficient evidence to support findings that the collision and plaintiff’s damage were proximately caused by the negligence of defendant and also by the negligence of Small. Whether the testimony of Small, plaintiff’s witness, discloses as a matter of law that negligence on his part was a proximate cause need not be decided. Assuming Small’s negligence was a proximate cause, unless defendant’s allegations of agency are established, such negligence of Small is not a bar to plaintiff’s right to recover. By reason of G.S. 20-71.1, the agency issue, the burden of proof being on defendant, was for determination by the jury under proper instructions. In this connection, see Whiteside v. McCarson, 250 N.C. 673, 110 S.E. 2d 295.

The judgment of nonsuit is reversed and the cause is remanded for trial on all issues raised by the pleadings.

Reversed.

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PeR CuRiam.

There was plenary evidence that plaintiff was not present when the collision occurred; that Small had borrowed plaintiff’s Chevrolet; and that, when the collision occurred, Small was using the car for his own personal purposes.

In our view, there was sufficient evidence to support findings that the collision and plaintiff’s damage were proximately caused by the negligence of defendant and also by the negligence of Small. Whether the testimony of Small, plaintiff’s witness, discloses as a matter of law that negligence on his part was a proximate cause need not be decided. Assuming Small’s negligence was a proximate cause, unless defendant’s allegations of agency are established, such negligence of Small is not a bar to plaintiff’s right to recover. By reason of G.S. 20-71.1, the agency issue, the burden of proof being on defendant, was for determination by the jury under proper instructions. In this connection, see Whiteside v. McCarson, 250 N.C. 673, 110 S.E. 2d 295.

The judgment of nonsuit is reversed and the cause is remanded for trial on all issues raised by the pleadings.

Reversed.

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Bluebook (online)

141 S.E.2d 307, 264 N.C. 233, 1965 N.C. LEXIS 1160, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/moore-v-crocker-nc-1965.

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