Moore v. Commissioner of Social Security

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Washington
DecidedJanuary 19, 2024
Docket3:23-cv-05030
StatusUnknown

This text of Moore v. Commissioner of Social Security (Moore v. Commissioner of Social Security) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Moore v. Commissioner of Social Security, (W.D. Wash. 2024).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 5 AT TACOMA 6 KEVIN M., Case No. 3:23-cv-05030-TLF 7 Plaintiff, v. ORDER REVERSING AND 8 REMANDING DEFENDANT’S ACTING COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL DECISION TO DENY BENEFITS 9 SECURITY, 10 Defendant. 11 12 Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for judicial review of 13 defendant’s denial of plaintiff’s application for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) 14 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73, and Local Rule 15 MJR 13, the parties have consented to have this matter heard by the undersigned 16 Magistrate Judge. Dkt. 3. Plaintiff challenges the Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) 17 decision finding that plaintiff was not disabled. Dkt. 4, Complaint. 18 On September 9, 2020, plaintiff filed an application for DIB, alleging a disability 19 onset date of March 15, 2019. AR 225-226. His application was denied initially and 20 upon reconsideration. On December 21, 2021, a hearing was held before ALJ Malcolm 21 Ross. AR 47-84. On February 2, 2022, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision finding 22 plaintiff not to be disabled. AR 22-42. The Appeals Council declined plaintiff’s request 23 for review. AR 7-9. 24 1 The date last insured is December 31, 2024. AR 50. The ALJ found plaintiff had 2 the severe impairments of cervical degenerative disc disease status post-fusion, 3 bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, right cubital tunnel syndrome, asthma, and 4 depression. AR 27. After presenting a hypothetical to the Vocational Expert, AR 73-77,

5 the ALJ determined plaintiff has the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light 6 work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) with the following additional limitations: never 7 climbing ladders, ropes or scaffolds; occasional bilateral overhead reaching and 8 frequent bilateral handling, fingering, and feeling; occasional exposure to hazards such 9 as unprotected heights and dangerous machinery; occasional exposure to concentrated 10 fumes, odors, dusts, gases and poor ventilation; and working in a work environment 11 without conveyor belt-paced production requirements and where standard work breaks 12 are provided AR 30. 13 The ALJ found that plaintiff would be unable to perform any past relevant work 14 but found that plaintiff had the RFC to perform the following light, unskilled work: (1)

15 Routing Clerk, (2) Marker, and (3) Cafeteria Attendant. AR 40-41. 16 The ALJ made an alternative finding, that even if plaintiff’s manipulative 17 limitations were credited, he could still perform the following light, unskilled work: (1) 18 School Bus Monitor, (2) Usher, and (3) Children’s attendant. AR 41. 19 STANDARD 20 Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court may set aside the Commissioner's 21 denial of Social Security benefits if the ALJ's findings are based on legal error or not 22 supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Revels v. Berryhill, 874 23 F.3d 648, 654 (9th Cir. 2017) (internal citations omitted). Substantial evidence is “‘such

24 1 relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 2 conclusion.’” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019) (internal citations 3 omitted). The Court must consider the administrative record as a whole. Garrison v. 4 Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1009 (9th Cir. 2014). The Court also must weigh both the

5 evidence that supports and evidence that does not support the ALJ’s conclusion. Id. 6 The Court may not affirm the decision of the ALJ for a reason upon which the ALJ did 7 not rely. Id. Rather, only the reasons identified by the ALJ are considered in the scope 8 of the Court’s review. Id. 9 DISCUSSION 10 1. Medical evidence. 11 Plaintiff acknowledges that no assessment of work-related limitations by a 12 treating physician appears in the medical records considered by the ALJ. See Dkt. 10 at 13 3. But plaintiff contends that the record supports his testimony about his functional 14 limitations. Id. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ “failed to develop the record by obtaining a

15 medical opinion from a treating or examining physician, and instead relied entirely on 16 the opinions of non-examining physicians employed by social security.” Id. 17 Although a plaintiff bears the overall burden of proving disability, the ALJ in a 18 social security case bears an independent and “‘special duty to fully and fairly develop 19 the record and to assure the claimant’s interests are considered.’” Smolen v. Chater, 80 20 F.3d 1273, 1288 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Brown v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 441, 443 (9th Cir. 21 1983)). Importantly, this duty extends not only to unrepresented claimants, but also to 22 cases where the claimant has representation. See id.; see also Celaya v. Halter, 332 23 F.3d 1177, 1183 (9th Cir. 2003).

24 1 The existence of ambiguous evidence triggers the ALJ’s duty to “conduct an 2 appropriate inquiry.” Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting 3 Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1288). “The ALJ may discharge this duty in several ways, including: 4 subpoenaing the claimant’s physicians, submitting questions to the claimant’s

5 physicians, continuing the hearing, or keeping the record open after the hearing to allow 6 supplementation of the record.” Id. (citations omitted). 7 The regulations additionally allow the ALJ to order further consultative 8 examinations to “resolve an inconsistency in the evidence or when the evidence as a 9 whole is insufficient to support a determination or decision.” 20 C.F.R. § 10 404.1519a(b). Further development of the record is required when the additional 11 evidence needed is not contained in the records of the claimant’s medical sources, and 12 when highly technical or specialized medical evidence not available from the claimant’s 13 medical sources is needed. See id. Once the duty to further develop the record is 14 triggered, failure to do so constitutes reversible error. See Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242

15 F.3d 1144, 1150-51 (9th Cir. 2001). 16 Plaintiff does not identify any specific assignment of error in the ALJ’s evaluation 17 of the state agency medical consultants Norman Stanley, M.D. and Dorothy Leong, 18 M.D. or state agency psychology consultants Rita Flanagan, Ph.D. and Stephen Drake, 19 Ph.D. The ALJ found the opinions of Dr. Stanley and Dr. Leong to be persuasive and 20 found the opinions of Dr. Flanagan and Dr. Drake to be generally persuasive. AR 38-39. 21 Plaintiff contends that the opinions are lacking in supportability and consistency but 22 does not argue how they are lacking. See Dkt. 10 at 6. 23

24 1 The ALJ found the opinions of Dr. Stanley and Dr. Leong to be persuasive on the 2 basis that (1) they were based on a thorough review of the available medical records 3 and a comprehensive understanding of agency rules and regulations, (2) physical 4 examinations found in the medical record revealed findings that are consistent with a

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Moore v. Commissioner of Social Security, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/moore-v-commissioner-of-social-security-wawd-2024.