Moore v. Clark County Coroner

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

3 * * *

4 ALAN MOORE, Case No. 2:25-cv-01358-GMN-EJY

5 Plaintiff, ORDER 6 v. AND

7 CLARK COUNTY CORONER, et al., REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

8 Defendants.

9 10 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) and 11 Civil Rights Complaint. ECF Nos. 1, 1-1. While Plaintiff’s IFP application is complete and, 12 therefore, granted below, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be 13 granted. 14 I. Screening Standard 15 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the reviewing court must identify any cognizable claims and 16 dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be 17 granted or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 18 1915(e)(2). 19 Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 20 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). A federal court must dismiss a claim if the action “is frivolous or 21 malicious[,] fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted[,] or seeks monetary relief against 22 a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The standard for dismissing 23 a complaint for failure to state a claim is established by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 24 When a court dismisses a complaint under § 1915(e), the plaintiff should be given leave to amend 25 the complaint with directions to cure its deficiencies unless it is clear from the face of the complaint 26 that the deficiencies cannot be cured by amendment. Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th 27 Cir. 1995). In making this determination, the court treats all allegations of material fact stated in the 1 complaint as true, and the court construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Warshaw 2 v. Xoma Corp., 74 F.3d 955, 957 (9th Cir. 1996). 3 Allegations of a pro se complainant are held to less stringent standards than pleadings drafted 4 by lawyers. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980). While the standard under Rule 12(b)(6) does 5 not require detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff must plead more than mere labels and conclusions. 6 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A formulaic recitation of the elements of a 7 cause of action is insufficient. Id. In addition, a reviewing court should “begin by identifying 8 pleadings [allegations] that, because they are no more than mere conclusions, are not entitled to the 9 assumption of truth.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). “While legal conclusions can 10 provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported with factual allegations.” Id. “When 11 there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine 12 whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint 13 states a plausible claim for relief ... [is] a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to 14 draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. 15 Finally, all or part of a complaint may be dismissed sua sponte if the plaintiff’s claims lack 16 an arguable basis either in law or in fact. This includes claims based on legal conclusions that are 17 untenable (e.g., claims against defendants who are immune from suit or claims of infringement of a 18 legal interest which clearly does not exist), as well as claims based on fanciful factual allegations 19 (e.g., fantastic or delusional scenarios). Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327–28 (1989); 20 McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991). 21 II. Discussion 22 A. Plaintiff’s Complaint. 23 Plaintiff’s Complaint asserts violations of his Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. 24 Factually, Plaintiff alleges the Clark County Coroner falsified a toxicology report to fit a prosecutor’s 25 misunderstanding and misstatements leading to his “illegal incarceration.” ECF No. 1-1 at 4. 26 Plaintiff says a deceased woman (which appears to be the factual predicate for Plaintiff’s current 27 incarceration) took drugs and committed suicide, he did not provide the drugs, and the deceased’s 1 submits there is “no certain proof” the deceased received drugs from him, he hired three different 2 attorneys to represent him and, despite promises from counsel that he would go “nowhere near jail,” 3 he is now in a maximum security prison with individuals serving lifetime sentences in violation of 4 equal protection. Id. at 7. 5 Plaintiff also contends he was told to plead guilty because (1) of his criminal record, and (2) 6 the evidence against him was insufficient to convict him. Id. at 8. Plaintiff says the judge assigned 7 to the case admitted the evidence against him was weak and that is why he received the sentence he 8 did. Id. Plaintiff submits he was maliciously accused and falsely prosecuted. Id. at 8-9. 9 In addition to suing Clark County and the Clark County Coroner, Plaintiff sues Detective 10 Tim and Officer Phillip who are alleged to have “callously and maliciously” made Plaintiff the 11 “subject of prosecution.” Id. at 10. Plaintiff tells a tale of sitting in the car with the now deceased 12 woman who allegedly made statements about wanting to have sex with him, then allegedly repeating 13 that desire to her police officer boyfriend who became jealous and set Plaintiff up for the charge 14 leading to his conviction and incarceration. Id. at 10-11. 15 B. Plaintiff’s Claims Attacking his Incarceration. 16 To the extent Plaintiff attempts to allege a violation of the Constitution in an effort to attack 17 the validity of his underlying conviction his claim fails. The Civil Rights Act of 1871, codified as 18 amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1983, creates a private right of action for any party that has been deprived 19 of “any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” by any person “under 20 color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory.” 42 U.S.C. 21 § 1983. The Supreme Court, in analyzing which types of claims can be brought under 42 U.S.C. § 22 1983, held that habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or 23 duration of his confinement and seeks release. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481 (1994) (citing 24 Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 488-490 (1973)). A prisoner “has no cause of action under § 25 1983 unless and until the conviction or sentence is reversed, expunged, invalidated, or impugned by 26 the grant of a writ of habeas corpus.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 489. “It would wholly frustrate explicit 27 congressional intent” to allow plaintiffs to evade the exhaustion requirement of an application for a 1 Federal courts must work to prevent prisoners from relying on § 1983 to subvert the different 2 procedural requirements of habeas corpus proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Heck, 512 U.S. at 3 486-87; Simpson v. Thomas, 528 F.3d 685, 695 (9th Cir. 2008). 4 The Court finds that to the extent Plaintiff seeks to challenge the validity of his conviction, 5 his claims are barred by Heck. Plaintiff cannot obtain the relief he seeks in a suit brought under § 6 1983. Instead, the proper vehicle for Plaintiff’s requested relief is an application for a writ of habeas 7 corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 8 C. Plaintiff’s Claims Against Clark County. 9 To the extent Plaintiff’s claims against Clark County are not seeking to overturn his 10 conviction, the claims fail under Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs, 436 U.S. 658, 690-95 (1978), because 11 municipalities can only be liable for the infringement of constitutional rights under limited 12 circumstances not alleged in Plaintiff’s Complaint. A plaintiff asserting a constitutional claim 13 against a municipality like Clark County under Monell must, at a minimum, allege: (1) the plaintiff 14 had “a constitutional right of which he was deprived; (2) the municipality had a policy; (3) the policy 15 amounts to deliberate indifference to his constitutional right; and (4) the policy is the moving force 16 behind the constitutional violation.” Gordon v. County of Orange, 6 F.4th 961, 973 (9th Cir. 2021) 17 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Further, before a Monell claim will proceed to 18 litigation, a plaintiff must allege one of three liability theories. Thomas v. County of Riverside, 763 19 F.3d 1167, 1170 (9th Cir. 2014) (per curiam). A local governmental entity like Clark County may 20 be held liable when it acts “pursuant to an expressly adopted official policy.” Id. (citing Monell, 436 21 U.S. at 694); Lytle v. Carl, 382 F.3d 978, 982 (9th Cir. 2004). Alternatively, Clark County may be 22 held liable for a “longstanding practice or custom” that violates a constitutional right. Thomas, 763 23 F.3d at 1170 (citation omitted). Finally, Clark County may be liable under Section 1983 when “‘the 24 individual who committed the constitutional tort was an official with final policy-making authority’ 25 or such an official ‘ratified a subordinate’s unconstitutional decision or action and the basis for it.’” 26 Clouthier v. County of Contra Costa, 591 F.3d 1232, 1250 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Gillette v. 27 Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1346-47 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds by Castro v. County 1 Here, Plaintiff fails to allege (1) Clark County had an official policy, practice, or long 2 standing custom that violated the Constitution, (2) the individuals who violated his constitutional 3 rights were officials with final policy-making authority, or (3) an official with final policy-making 4 authority ratified the decision or actions of a subordinate. Thus, Plaintiff does not allege facts 5 sufficient to state a claim against Clark County under Monell.

6 D. Plaintiff’s Claims Against the Clark County Coroner, Detective Tim, and Officer Phillip Fail for Multiple Reasons. 7 8 1. Claims against the individual Defendants in their official capacities. 9 State officials sued for damages in their official capacities are not “persons” within the 10 meaning of § 1983. Doe v. Lawrence Livermore Nat’l Lab., 131 F.3d 836, 839 (9th Cir. 1997). 11 Rather, suits against them are no different than suits against the state itself, and the Eleventh 12 Amendment bars such suits. Id. Thus, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against the individual defendants 13 in their official capacities should be dismissed with prejudice. 14 2. The Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause. 15 To the extent Plaintiff seeks to assert a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment Equal 16 Protection clause he fails to do so. “To state a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for violation of the Equal 17 Protection Clause ‘a plaintiff must show that the defendants acted with an intent or purpose to 18 discriminate against the plaintiff based upon membership in a protected class.’” Thornton v. City of 19 St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1166 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 20 686 (9th Cir. 2001)). This means “that a defendant acted at least in part because of a plaintiff’s 21 protected status.” Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1082 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation 22 omitted) (emphasis in original). Plaintiff’s Complaint is silent with respect to any facts that would 23 support an Equal Protection claim. ECF No. 1-1. There is no identification of Plaintiff’s protected 24 class; nor, more importantly, any allegation that the individual defendant’s actions were motivated 25 by Plaintiff’s status as a member of a protected class. Id. In the absence of facts, Plaintiff cannot 26 state a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection clause. 27 3. Plaintiff states no facts supporting claims under the Sixth or Eighth 1 Amendments. 2 It is, at best, unclear what claims Plaintiff seeks to assert under the Sixth or Eighth 3 Amendments to the United States Constitution. A review of Plaintiff’s facts pertain to his arrest and 4 prosecution. ECF No. 1-1. Plaintiff states nothing relating to his post-conviction confinement. 5 Thus, there are no facts that supports an Eighth Amendment claim. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 6 386, 393 (1989) (holding that Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment 7 applies only after conviction and sentence). 8 To the extent Plaintiff is attempting to state a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, this 9 claim must be brought first through a direct appeal and then through a post-conviction habeas corpus 10 petition, not a § 1983 action. Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 643 (2004); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 11 411 U.S. 475, 477 (1973). To the extent Plaintiff is alleging his trial was fundamentally unfair, this 12 too must be brought through a habeas petition. See Pennywell v. Rushen, 705 F.2d 355, 357 (9th 13 Cir. 1983) (a habeas petitioner must show that an error of state law “rendered the trial so arbitrary 14 and fundamentally unfair that it violated federal due process”); Ahlswede v. Wolff, 720 F.2d 1108, 15 1111 (9th Cir. 1983) (to obtain relief for state law errors in federal court through a habeas petition, 16 the plaintiff petitioner must show that the errors “rendered the trial so fundamentally unfair as to 17 deny due process.”) (internal citation and quote marks omitted). 18 4. The Court cannot supply Plaintiff with elements of a claim. 19 Finally, Plaintiff bears the burden of pleading sufficient facts to state a claim; courts will not 20 supply essential elements of a claim that were not initially pled—even in the context of a pro se 21 plaintiff. Richards v. Harper, 864 F.2d 85, 88 (9th Cir. 1988); Ivey v. Board of Regents of University 22 of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are 23 very liberal as to pleading where a plaintiff is proceeding pro se, even a pro se complaint is subject 24 to dismissal if the pleading fails to reasonably inform the adverse party of the asserted cause of 25 action. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). 26 III. Order 27 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed in forma pauperis (ECF 1 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that to the extent Plaintiff seeks to state a claim against Clark 2 County under Monell, the claim is dismissed without prejudice and with leave to amend. 3 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that to the extent Plaintiff seeks to state a claim against the 4 Clark County Coroner, Detective Tim or Officer Phillip under a legal theory the Court did not 5 understand was intended, those claims are dismissed without prejudice and with one opportunity to 6 amend to clearly state a viable claim. 7 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court is ordered to file Plaintiff’s Complaint 8 (ECF No. 1-1), which is dismissed for the reasons ordered or recommended herein. 9 If Plaintiff elects to file an amended complaint, Plaintiff must title the document “FIRST 10 AMENDED COMPLAINT,” and it must be filed by August 29, 2025. The first amended complaint 11 must comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and it must state a cognizable claim for 12 relief against each defendant named. The first amended complaint must be complete in and of itself, 13 must not refer in any manner to any prior complaint, and must include: (1) all claims, and the factual 14 basis in support of all claims, and (2) all claims Plaintiff seeks to assert against the named defendants, 15 except for those recommended for dismissal with prejudice or without prejudice and without leave 16 to amend (these include claims against individual defendants for money damages, claims attacking 17 Plaintiff’s incarceration, claims attacking the fundamental fairness of his trial or convictions, and 18 any claim relating to the ineffective assistance of counsel). 19 IV. Recommendation 20 IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s claims, to the extent they attack his 21 incarceration, be dismissed with prejudice as barred by Heck v. Humphrey. 22 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that to the extent Plaintiff sues the individual 23 defendants in their official capacities for money damages, those claims be dismissed with prejudice. 24 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s claims, to the extent they seek to assert 25 a Sixth Amendment violation based on ineffective assistance of his counsel, the claim be dismissed 26 without prejudice, but without leave to amend in this case. Plaintiff must bring this claim through a 27 habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 1 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s claims attacking the fundamental 2 fairness of his trial or his conviction, such claim be dismissed without prejudice, but without leave 3 to amend in this case. Plaintiff must bring these claims through a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 4 2254. 5 Dated this 4th day of August, 2025. 6

7 ELAYNA J. YOUCHAH 8 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

9 10 NOTICE 11 Under Local Rule IB 3-2, any objection to this Report and Recommendation must be in 12 writing and filed with the Clerk of the Court within fourteen (14) days. The Supreme Court holds 13 the courts of appeal may determine that an appeal has been waived due to the failure to file objections 14 within the specified time. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 142 (1985). The Ninth Circuit also held 15 that (1) failure to file objections within the specified time and (2) failure to properly address and 16 brief the objectionable issues waives the right to appeal the District Court’s order and/or appeal 17 factual issues from the order of the District Court. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 18 1991); Britt v. Simi Valley United Sch. Dist., 708 F.2d 452, 454 (9th Cir. 1983). 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27