Moore v. City of Perry

Supreme Court of Oklahoma

Moore v. City of Perry

1925 OK 90, 234 P. 625, 110 Okla. 8, 1925 Okla. LEXIS 750

CourtSupreme Court of Oklahoma

DecidedFebruary 3, 1925

Docket15147

StatusPublished

Cited by7 cases

This text of 1925 OK 90 (Moore v. City of Perry) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Oklahoma primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Moore v. City of Perry, 1925 OK 90, 234 P. 625, 110 Okla. 8, 1925 Okla. LEXIS 750 (Okla. 1925).

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Opinion

Opinion by

LOGSDON, C.

At the threshold of this case the court is confronted by the question whether on the merits of the ease there is.any question remaining for decision othqr than an abstract and moot question of law disconnected with any relief or remedy. This question is raised by a motion of defendants to dismiss.

This action was commenced solely for in-junctive relief. No other judgment was sought than that of a permanent injuncth n. Upon the filing of plaintiffsr petition, and in the absence of the district judge from the county, the county judge granted a temporary injunction on October 10, 1923. On erial in district court beginning November 5, 1923, a decree was entered denying a permanent injunction, and an order was entered dissolving the temporary injunction theretofore granted by the county judge, to which action exception was reserved. No appeal was prosecuted from this order in the manner and within the time permitted by Oomp. Stat. 1921, section 809, which reads :

“When an order, discharging or modifying an attachment or a temporary injunction, shall be made in any case, and the party who obtained such attachment or injunction shall except to such order, for the purpose of having the same reviewed in the Supreme Court upon petition in error, the court or judge granting said order shall, upon appli-eatj< n of the proper party, fix the time’, not *9 exceeding thirty days from the discharge or modification of said attachment or ■ injunction, within which sc.eh petition in error shall be filed; and during such time the execution of said order shall be suspended, and. until the decision of the case upen the petition in error, if the same shall be filed; and the undertaking, given upon the allowance of the attachment, shall be and remain in force until the order of discharge shall take effect. If such, petition in error shall not be filed within the time limited, the order of discharge shall become operative and be carried into effect; and the certificate of the clerk of the Supreme Court that such petition is or is not filed, shall be evidence thereof.”

Motion for new trial was timely filed, duly presented January 19, 1924, and overruled February 4, 1924. Supersedeas bond in thej sum of $2,000 was filed and approved, and the petition in error was filed in this court February 27, 1924. As shown by an affidavit tf the city clerk incorporated in the motion to dismiss, the paving work sought to be Enjoined was completed according to plans and specifications, and was, on June 19, 1924, duly approved and accepted by the mayor and city council.

In its order overruling the motion for nejw trial the district court attempted to revive and continue in force the temporary injunction granted by the county judge, and which had been dissolved November 6, 1923, without appeal. This part of the order of February 4, 1924, was ineffectual for the reason that the temporary injunction had spent its force at the expiration of 30 days from November 6, 1923, no appeal having been taken. The trial court was without jurisdiction to extend the time beyond that period. Bales-Fulkerson Co. v. Freeman, 45 Okla. 798, 146 Pac. 1082; Kennedy Mercantile Co. v. Dobson et al., 40 Okla. 306, 137 Pac. 147: Reynolds v. Phipps et al., 31 Okla. 788, 123 Pac. 1125. But it is urged by plaintiffs that this order of the district court, notwithstanding its clear language, was not intended to revive the spent order of the county judge, but was an order of thq' district court itself granting a temporary injunction pending appeal. This contention is untenable for the reason that the district court after trial on the merits had determined that plaintiffs werE not entitled to injunctive relief, and on m< tion for new trial directed to the merits of the case, adhered to its original decision and denied the motion. Since the order attempting to revive the spent order of the county judge was ineffectual, the attempt to supersede the order of dissolution made after the expiration of 30 days is likewise ineffectual.

This leaves for consideration only the proceeding in error on the merits of the case, and since it appears that the acts sought to be enjoined have been completely performed and the paving used by the public for nearly a yeajr, it is apparent that a decision here on the merits would merely determine! an abstract and moot question of law wholly disconnected with any relief or remedy. Under such circumstances' it is thoroughly well settled by decisions of this court that such questions will not be decided here. Jones v. East, 33 Okla. 604, 127 Pac. 261; McCullough et al. v. Gilcrease, 40 Okla. 741, 141 Pac. 5; Parrish v. School Dist. No. 19, 68 Okla. 42, 171 Pac. 461; George et al. v. Robinson et al., 47 Okla. 623, 149 Pac. 1087; Oklahoma Pet. Co. v. Minnehoma Oil Co., 80 Okla. 245, 195 Pac. 759.

For the reasons herein stated, this cause should be dismissed.

By the Court; It is so ordered.

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Opinion by

LOGSDON, C.

At the threshold of this case the court is confronted by the question whether on the merits of the ease there is.any question remaining for decision othqr than an abstract and moot question of law disconnected with any relief or remedy. This question is raised by a motion of defendants to dismiss.

This action was commenced solely for in-junctive relief. No other judgment was sought than that of a permanent injuncth n. Upon the filing of plaintiffsr petition, and in the absence of the district judge from the county, the county judge granted a temporary injunction on October 10, 1923. On erial in district court beginning November 5, 1923, a decree was entered denying a permanent injunction, and an order was entered dissolving the temporary injunction theretofore granted by the county judge, to which action exception was reserved. No appeal was prosecuted from this order in the manner and within the time permitted by Oomp. Stat. 1921, section 809, which reads :

“When an order, discharging or modifying an attachment or a temporary injunction, shall be made in any case, and the party who obtained such attachment or injunction shall except to such order, for the purpose of having the same reviewed in the Supreme Court upon petition in error, the court or judge granting said order shall, upon appli-eatj< n of the proper party, fix the time’, not *9 exceeding thirty days from the discharge or modification of said attachment or ■ injunction, within which sc.eh petition in error shall be filed; and during such time the execution of said order shall be suspended, and. until the decision of the case upen the petition in error, if the same shall be filed; and the undertaking, given upon the allowance of the attachment, shall be and remain in force until the order of discharge shall take effect. If such, petition in error shall not be filed within the time limited, the order of discharge shall become operative and be carried into effect; and the certificate of the clerk of the Supreme Court that such petition is or is not filed, shall be evidence thereof.”

Motion for new trial was timely filed, duly presented January 19, 1924, and overruled February 4, 1924. Supersedeas bond in thej sum of $2,000 was filed and approved, and the petition in error was filed in this court February 27, 1924. As shown by an affidavit tf the city clerk incorporated in the motion to dismiss, the paving work sought to be Enjoined was completed according to plans and specifications, and was, on June 19, 1924, duly approved and accepted by the mayor and city council.

In its order overruling the motion for nejw trial the district court attempted to revive and continue in force the temporary injunction granted by the county judge, and which had been dissolved November 6, 1923, without appeal. This part of the order of February 4, 1924, was ineffectual for the reason that the temporary injunction had spent its force at the expiration of 30 days from November 6, 1923, no appeal having been taken. The trial court was without jurisdiction to extend the time beyond that period. Bales-Fulkerson Co. v. Freeman, 45 Okla. 798, 146 Pac. 1082; Kennedy Mercantile Co. v. Dobson et al., 40 Okla. 306, 137 Pac. 147: Reynolds v. Phipps et al., 31 Okla. 788, 123 Pac. 1125. But it is urged by plaintiffs that this order of the district court, notwithstanding its clear language, was not intended to revive the spent order of the county judge, but was an order of thq' district court itself granting a temporary injunction pending appeal. This contention is untenable for the reason that the district court after trial on the merits had determined that plaintiffs werE not entitled to injunctive relief, and on m< tion for new trial directed to the merits of the case, adhered to its original decision and denied the motion. Since the order attempting to revive the spent order of the county judge was ineffectual, the attempt to supersede the order of dissolution made after the expiration of 30 days is likewise ineffectual.

This leaves for consideration only the proceeding in error on the merits of the case, and since it appears that the acts sought to be enjoined have been completely performed and the paving used by the public for nearly a yeajr, it is apparent that a decision here on the merits would merely determine! an abstract and moot question of law wholly disconnected with any relief or remedy. Under such circumstances' it is thoroughly well settled by decisions of this court that such questions will not be decided here. Jones v. East, 33 Okla. 604, 127 Pac. 261; McCullough et al. v. Gilcrease, 40 Okla. 741, 141 Pac. 5; Parrish v. School Dist. No. 19, 68 Okla. 42, 171 Pac. 461; George et al. v. Robinson et al., 47 Okla. 623, 149 Pac. 1087; Oklahoma Pet. Co. v. Minnehoma Oil Co., 80 Okla. 245, 195 Pac. 759.

For the reasons herein stated, this cause should be dismissed.

By the Court; It is so ordered.

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1925 OK 90, 234 P. 625, 110 Okla. 8, 1925 Okla. LEXIS 750, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/moore-v-city-of-perry-okla-1925.

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