Moore v. Burgess

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Michigan
DecidedFebruary 23, 2024
Docket2:23-cv-11203
StatusUnknown

This text of Moore v. Burgess (Moore v. Burgess) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Michigan primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Moore v. Burgess, (E.D. Mich. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

MARIO MANDELL MOORE, #524955,

Petitioner, Case No. 2:23-cv-11203 HON. BERNARD A. FRIEDMAN v. SENIOR U. S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

MICHAEL BURGESS,

Respondent, ___________________________/

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING MOTION, HOLDING IN ABEYANCE THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, AND ADMINISTRATIVELY CLOSING THE CASE.

Mario Mandell Moore, (“petitioner”), confined at the Brooks Correctional Facility in Muskegon Heights, Michigan, filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his conviction for armed robbery, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.529. (ECF No. 1). Petitioner has now filed a motion to hold the petition in abeyance to permit him to return to the state courts to present additional claims that have not been exhausted with the state courts and that are not included in his current habeas petition. (ECF No. 11). The Court holds the petition in abeyance and stays the proceedings under the terms outlined in this opinion to permit petitioner to return to the state courts to exhaust his additional claims. The Court administratively closes the case. I. Background

Petitioner was convicted following a jury trial in the Wayne County Circuit Court. Petitioner’s conviction was affirmed on appeal. People v Moore, No. 350397, 2020 WL 6816976 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 19, 2020); lv. den. 509 Mich. 859

(2022); cert. den. sub nom Moore v. Michigan, 143 S. Ct. 146 (2022). On May 16, 2023, petitioner filed his application for writ of habeas corpus.1 (ECF No. 1). Petitioner seeks habeas relief on the claims that he raised in the state court on his direct appeal.

II. Discussion Petitioner has now filed a motion to hold the habeas petition in abeyance so that he can return to the state courts to raise claims that have not been exhausted with

the state courts and which are not included in the current petition. A federal district court has the power to stay a fully exhausted federal habeas petition pending the exhaustion of additional claims in the state courts. See Nowaczyk v. Warden, New Hampshire State Prison, 299 F.3d 69, 79 (1st Cir. 2002)

(holding that district courts should “take seriously any request for a stay”); Anthony

1 Under the prison mailbox rule, this Court assumes that petitioner actually filed his habeas petition on May 16, 2023, the date that it was signed and dated. See Towns v. United States, 190 F.3d 468, 469 (6th Cir. 1999). v. Cambra, 236 F.3d 568, 575 (9th Cir. 2000); Bowling v. Haeberline, 246 F. App’x 303, 306 (6th Cir. 2007) (a habeas court is entitled to delay a decision in a habeas

petition that contains only exhausted claims “‘when considerations of comity and judicial economy would be served’”) (quoting Nowaczyk, 299 F. 3d at 83); Thomas v. Stoddard, 89 F. Supp. 3d 937, 943 (E.D. Mich. 2015).

The Court grants petitioner’s motion to hold the petition in abeyance while he returns to the state courts to exhaust. The outright dismissal of the petition, even if without prejudice, might bar review of petitioner’s claims due to the expiration of the one year statute of limitations contained in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act (AEDPA). See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). A common reason for holding a habeas petition in abeyance arises when the original petition was timely filed, but a second, exhausted habeas petition would be time barred by the AEDPA’s statute

of limitations. See Hargrove v. Brigano, 300 F.3d 717, 720-21 (6th Cir. 2002). Other considerations support holding the petition in abeyance while petitioner returns to the state courts to exhaust his new claims. Specifically, the Court considers the consequences to the habeas petitioner if it were to proceed to adjudicate the petition and find that relief is not warranted before the state courts ruled on unexhausted claims. In that scenario, should the petitioner subsequently seek habeas relief on the claims the state courts rejected, he would have to clear the high hurdle of filing a second habeas petition. Thomas, 89 F. Supp. 3d at 942. Moreover, “if this Court were to proceed in parallel with state post-conviction proceedings, there is a risk of wasting judicial resources

if the state court might grant relief on the unexhausted claim.” Id. Other factors support the issuance of a stay. This Court is unable at the present time to determine whether petitioner’s new claims have any merit, thus, the Court

cannot conclude that petitioner’s claims are “plainly meritless.” Thomas, 89 F. Supp. 3d at 943. Nor, on the other hand, can the Court at this time find that petitioner’s new claims warrant habeas relief. Id. If the state courts deny post- conviction relief, this Court could still benefit from the state courts’ rulings on these

claims in determining whether to allow petitioner to amend his petition to add these claims. Id. Lastly, there is no prejudice to respondent in staying this case, whereas petitioner “could be prejudiced by having to simultaneously fight two proceedings

in separate courts and, as noted, if this Court were to rule before the state courts, [petitioner] would have the heavy burden of satisfying 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)’s second-or-successive-petition requirements” should he seek habeas relief on his new claims. Id.

Where a district court determines that a stay is appropriate pending exhaustion, the district court “should place reasonable time limits on a petitioner’s trip to state court and back.” Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 278 (2005). To ensure

that there are no delays by petitioner in exhausting state court remedies, this Court imposes time limits within which petitioner must proceed with his state court post- conviction proceedings. See Palmer v. Carlton, 276 F. 3d 777, 781 (6th Cir. 2002).

The Court holds the petition in abeyance to allow petitioner to initiate post- conviction proceedings in the state courts. This is conditioned upon petitioner initiating his state post-conviction remedies within sixty days of receiving this

Court’s order and returning to federal court within sixty days of completing the exhaustion of state court post-conviction remedies. Hargrove, 300 F. 3d at 721. Petitioner’s method of properly exhausting these claims in the state courts would be through filing a motion for relief from judgment with the Wayne County

Circuit Court under M.C.R. 6.502. See Wagner v. Smith, 581 F. 3d 410, 419 (6th Cir. 2009). Denial of a motion for relief from judgment is reviewable by the Michigan Court of Appeals and the Michigan Supreme Court upon the filing of an

application for leave to appeal. M.C.R. 6.509; M.C.R. 7.203; M.C.R. 7.303; Nasr v. Stegall, 978 F. Supp. 714, 717 (E.D. Mich. 1997). Petitioner, in fact, is required to appeal a denial of his post-conviction motion to the Michigan Court of Appeals and the Michigan Supreme Court in order to properly exhaust any claims that he would

raise in his post-conviction motion. See, e.g., Mohn v.

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Related

Rhines v. Weber
544 U.S. 269 (Supreme Court, 2005)
Henry Towns v. United States
190 F.3d 468 (Sixth Circuit, 1999)
Michael Anthony v. Steven Cambra, Jr., Warden
236 F.3d 568 (Ninth Circuit, 2000)
David Palmer v. Howard Carlton, Warden
276 F.3d 777 (Sixth Circuit, 2002)
Judah Hargrove v. Anthony J. Brigano
300 F.3d 717 (Sixth Circuit, 2002)
Wagner v. Smith
581 F.3d 410 (Sixth Circuit, 2009)
Nasr v. Stegall
978 F. Supp. 714 (E.D. Michigan, 1997)
Mohn v. Bock
208 F. Supp. 2d 796 (E.D. Michigan, 2002)
Bowling v. Haeberline
246 F. App'x 303 (Sixth Circuit, 2007)
Thomas v. Stoddard
89 F. Supp. 3d 937 (E.D. Michigan, 2015)

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Bluebook (online)
Moore v. Burgess, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/moore-v-burgess-mied-2024.