Filed 9/8/26 Moore v. Bd. of Civil Service Commissioners CA2/7 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
IVAN M. MOORE, B343850
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 24STCP00706)
v.
BOARD OF CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSIONERS, CITY OF LOS ANGELES,
Defendant and Respondent;
LOS ANGELES WORLD AIRPORTS, CITY OF LOS ANGELES,
Real Party in Interest and Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, James C. Chalfant, Judge. Reversed and remanded with instructions.
Ivan M. Moore, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant. Liebert Cassidy Whitmore, James E. Oldendorph and David. A. Urban for Real Party in Interest and Respondent Los Angeles World Airports, City of Los Angeles.
No appearance for Defendant and Respondent Board of Civil Service Commissioners, City of Los Angeles
________________________
INTRODUCTION
Ivan M. Moore filed a petition for writ of mandate challenging his discharge from employment with Los Angeles World Airports (LAWA), a department of the City of Los Angeles. He appeals the superior court’s judgment for respondent LAWA under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.1 The superior court determined Moore did not exhaust his administrative remedies under Los Angeles City Charter section 1017 because he did not file a demand for reinstatement with the City of Los Angeles Board of Civil Service Commissioners (Board).2 Moore argues he substantially complied with the filing requirement because he served the director of the Board with a petition for writ of mandate that attached his demand for reinstatement as an exhibit. We reverse the superior court’s order denying Moore’s petition because the court resolved factual disputes regarding service of the demand and proof of filing, which was improper on
1 Undesignated statutory references in this opinion are to the Code of Civil Procedure. 2 Undesignated city charter provisions are to the Los Angeles City Charter.
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a section 1094 motion.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Moore’s Discharge and Subsequent Administrative Proceedings Moore worked for LAWA as a custodian supervisor and was discharged for cause effective July 5, 2022. Moore appealed his discharge to the Board. On June 20, 2023, after a two-day hearing, a hearing examiner issued a report, decision, and recommendation to reinstate Moore. The Board considered the hearing examiner’s report, and on December 14, 2023, it adopted different findings and conclusions and sustained LAWA’s decision to discharge Moore.
On January 8, 2024, the Board sent a letter to Moore notifying him of its decision. The letter advised Moore that under charter section 1017, any “claim for compensation and demand for reinstatement must be filed within 90 days from the date of the decision of the Board.”
B. Writ Proceedings Proceeding in propria persona, Moore filed a section 1094.6 petition for writ of mandate in superior court in March 2024, which he amended in April 2024. Moore’s amended petition alleged the Board’s decision was “not supported by either the administrative findings or the weight of the evidence” and it was “arbitrary, capricious[,] and/or contrary to established law.” Moore asserted he had exhausted his administrative remedies by appealing to the Board, and that “[p]ursuant to the City’s Charter Section 1017, [he] has filed a Demand for Reinstatement
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(attachment Exhibit 2) with the Commission and a Claim for Compensation with the City’s Clerk (attachment Exhibit 3).” Moore asked the superior court to reverse the Board’s decision sustaining his discharge and order his reinstatement with full benefits and backpay.
Attached to Moore’s writ petition as Exhibit 1 was the letter from the Board notifying Moore of its final decision. Exhibit 2 to the petition was Moore’s demand for reinstatement directed to the Board and dated February 25, 2024. Exhibit 3 was a claim for compensation dated February 25, 2024, and addressed to the clerk of the City of Los Angeles. Neither the demand for reinstatement nor the claim for compensation had a dated file stamp.
LAWA answered the petition in June 2024. Among other grounds, LAWA argued that Moore failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, namely, that he failed to file a demand for reinstatement with the Board and a claim for compensation with the City clerk pursuant to charter section 1017.
Moore responded with a personal declaration attesting:
“Prior to filing the Verified Petition, I went with my wife (Ronique Moore) where she filed with the City of Los Angeles a Claim for Compensation, which I attached to the Verified Petition. I also went with my wife where she filed with the Board of Civil Service Commissioners a Demand for Reinstatement, which I also attached to the Verified Petition.”
LAWA moved for judgment under section 1094 on the basis that Moore did not exhaust his administrative remedies under charter section 1017. LAWA argued the superior court lacked jurisdiction over Moore’s petition, the Board did not receive due process, and that Moore’s attachment of the demand for
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reinstatement to his writ petition did not substantially comply with the filing requirements of charter section 1017. LAWA’s motion included two supporting declarations.
Bruce Whidden, Executive Director of the Board, declared:
“After conducting a diligent search of Board records and reasonable inquiry into locating a demand for reinstatement filed or served by or on behalf of Mr. Moore I did not locate any such demand for reinstatement in connection with his discharge.” Whidden stated the only documents Moore filed with the Board were copies of his petition for writ of mandate and amended petition. Whidden explained, “I do not generally review court filed writ petitions filed or served on the Board office by employees or former employees who had an administrative case before the Board. If/when my office receives writ petitions, they are forwarded to the City Attorney’s Office for handling. [¶] I reviewed only the first page of the writ petitions that Mr. Moore filed with our office for the purpose of forwarding them to [the] City Attorney. They were immediately forwarded to the City Attorney’s Office. . . . The Board did not receive, review, or vote on the demand for reinstatement attached to any of Mr. Moore’s writ petitions.”
Melinda Novoa, Deputy City Clerk for the City of Los Angeles, declared that after “a diligent search and reasonable inquiry of the City of Los Angeles, City Clerk’s records . . . I did not locate any claim for compensation or claim for damages relative to Ivan M. Moore.” Novoa was able to locate “a writ petition entitled, Verified Petition for Writ of Mandate, served on the City on February 28, 2024” and an amended writ petition served April 16, 2024. (Italics omitted.) Novoa declared, “The City Clerk’s Office generally only reviews the title or cover pages
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(e.g., civil case cover sheet, notice of case assignment, etc.) of legal complaints and other similar legal documents like writs of administrative mandate petitions served on the City Clerk and then sends them to the City Attorney’s Office. This was done with Mr. Moore’s petitions, and they were then sent to the City Attorney’s Office.”
Based on these declarations, LAWA argued “Mr. Whidden and Ms. Novoa only received legal complaints (writ petitions) from [Moore], replete with all of the indicia that the document presented is a lawsuit, i.e., the first page is a caption page, contains a civil case cover sheet, contains a notice of case assignment, etc. . . . Neither Mr. Whidden nor Ms. Nov[o]a took the complaint to constitute the demand for reinstatement or claim for compensation, respectively . . . .”
Moore opposed LAWA’s section 1094 motion for judgment.
Moore argued that the Board “acknowledges having received the demand for reinstatement that was attached to the [a]mended writ petition however maintains that the demand for reinstatement was never received.” Moore asserted it was “unrealistic and unfair . . . to assert that because the representatives for the [Board] and the City Clerk’s office did not read the documents which they accepted as being given to them.” For this reason, Moore asserted he “did not fail to exhaust administrative remedies” and “he complied with the charter.”
Moore provided a sworn affidavit from his wife, Ronique.3 The affidavit stated:
3 For clarity, and without intending disrespect, we refer to Moore’s wife by her first name, Ronique.
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I, Ronique Moore, swear that I served the Demand for Reinstatement on behalf of the petitioner Ivan Moore to Mr. Bruce Whidden for the City of Los Angeles Board of Civil Service Commissioners.
On February 28, 2024, I went to the Board of Civil Service Commissioners located at 700 E. Temple Street Los Angeles, C[A] 90012 where I waited for someone from the Commission to meet me in the lobby.
I was told they were in a meeting, and it would be a while.
Mr. Whidden eventually came to the lobby, accompanied by a woman, and spoke to me. I informed him I was there to provide him with a request for reinstatement and a copy of the petition which would be filed with the court. Mr. Whidden indicated they do not typically accept those, and I informed him it was a request for reinstatement. He asked for whom at which time I responded for Ivan Moore.
Mr. Whidden repeated “yes Ivan Moore” and said “ok,” as he extended his hand to retrieve the paperwork from me. I handed him the document, which was in fact the document entitled Verified Petition for Writ of Mandate Reversing Administrative Decision and a Demand for
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Reinstatement Letter. I verbally informed him I was providing him with a demand for reinstatement and a copy of the documents which would be filed in court.
Mr. Whidden accepted the documents and stated they would deny it and then we could file a lawsuit or whatever we did at that point. I thanked him and walked away as he continued to speak with the woman who walked to the lobby with him.
Moore also attached a copy of Whidden’s business card and a visitor badge with Ronique’s name dated February 28, 2024.
Ronique’s affidavit further stated that she “served the Claim for Compensation to the . . . Clerk for the City of Los Angeles.” According to Ronique, she visited the clerk’s office and “informed them that I was there to provide them with a copy of a lawsuit which was to be filed along with a Claim for Compensation for all backpay and benefits (including retirement benefits) for Ivan Moore. I handed the clerk a document entitled Verified Petition for Writ of Mandate Reversing Administrative Decision and a claim for compensation letter. I explained that the lawsuit had not yet been filed with the Court but would be. When the clerk stamped the copy handed to her I asked that she also stamp my copy[.]” Moore produced a copy of the first page of his writ petition file stamped by the city clerk on February 28 at 1:27 p.m.
On reply, LAWA argued that Moore “failed to comply with his administrative requirements under Charter Section 1017 by not filing/serving an independent, standalone demand for
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reinstatement with the Board of Civil Service Commissioners.” LAWA further asserted Ronique’s affidavit was not credible.
The court held a hearing on LAWA’s motion. At the hearing, Moore argued that Ronique delivered the demand for reinstatement as an attachment to the writ petition and “verbally stated [to Whidden] that the demand letter was included.” The court recognized Moore’s argument was “essentially [for] substantial compliance.” But the court stated that “exhaustion generally requires full compliance . . . . Not necessarily strict compliance but full compliance.” The court observed there was no proof of filing, i.e., “a received stamp on the demand for reinstatement.”
After the hearing, the superior court granted LAWA’s section 1094 motion for judgment. The court concluded, “Moore was required to file a standalone demand for reinstatement with the Board and [] attaching it as an exhibit [to the writ petition] does not suffice to meet the requirements of City Charter section 1017.” The court noted “ambiguity in Ronique’s affidavit” as to “whether she filed the demand for reinstatement as a standalone document,” but it observed “the Board and the City Clerk, respectively, do not have a standalone demand for reinstatement and a standalone claim for compensation in their files. They do have the Petition and the [amended petition], which suggests no standalone demand was filed. Moore also does not assert that the demand for reinstatement was a standalone document. In fact, he notes that the City argues that he did not file a demand for reinstatement with the Board but acknowledges that it received the demand for reinstatement that was attached to the Amended Petition. . . . He also states that it is unfair to him that he failed to file a demand for reinstatement simply
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because Whidden did not read the documents he had been given. . . . These arguments imply that no standalone document was delivered.” The court declined to address whether Moore filed a claim for compensation “as failure to file it is only a condition precedent to any recovery of wages or salary claimed to be due on account of Moore’s discharge” and “would not affect Moore’s right to be restored to his job.”
Moore filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that “Mr. Whidden was informed that the documents he was receiving were a Demand for Reinstatement as well as a copy of the then unfiled petition that would be filed with the Court. Thus, the Executive Director of the Board of Civil Service Commissioners had the responsibility to review the document and schedule a hearing to determine whether [Moore] would be reinstated.”
LAWA opposed, arguing Moore had not shown any new or different facts, circumstances, or law in support of the motion. The court agreed with LAWA, and it denied Moore’s motion.
Judgment was entered on November 14, 2024. Moore timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Governing Law and Standard of Review “Exhaustion of administrative remedies is ‘a jurisdictional prerequisite to resort to the courts.’ ” (Johnson v. City of Loma Linda (2000) 24 Cal.4th 61, 70, italics omitted.) “ ‘ “Under this rule, an administrative remedy is exhausted only upon ‘termination of all available, nonduplicative administrative review procedures.’ ” ’ ” (Hill RHF Housing Partners, L.P. v. City of Los Angeles (2021) 12 Cal.5th 458, 477.) “ ‘The exhaustion
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doctrine is principally grounded on concerns favoring administrative autonomy (i.e., courts should not interfere with an agency determination until the agency has reached a final decision) and judicial efficiency (i.e., overworked courts should decline to intervene in an administrative dispute unless absolutely necessary).’ ” (Coachella Valley Mosquito & Vector Control Dist. v. California Public Employment Relations Bd. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1072, 1080.)
The Board is an administrative agency which the Los Angeles City Charter vests with the power to review the discharge of Los Angeles civil service employees. (See La Prade v. Department of Water & Power (1945) 27 Cal.2d 47, 53; Valenzuela v. Board of Civil Service Comrs. (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 557, 560; see charter, art. X, § 1016.) As relevant, charter section 1017 provides:
Whenever it is claimed by any person that he or she has been unlawfully demoted, suspended, laid off or discharged, and that person has filed an application for a hearing [with the Board] . . . and reinstatement or restoration to duty has been denied, the person may file a written claim for compensation and a demand for reinstatement. The claim and demand must be filed within 90 days from the date of the decision of the board following a hearing . . . . The demand for reinstatement must be filed with the board and the claim for compensation must be filed with the City Clerk. Failure to file a demand for reinstatement with proof of filing with the board, within the time specified in this section, shall be a
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bar to any action to compel reinstatement. Proof of filing with the City Clerk of the claim for compensation within the time and in the manner specified shall be a condition precedent to any recovery of wages or salary claimed to be due on account of demotion, layoff, suspension or discharge.
This demand requirement “has been described as ‘somewhat analogous to the requirement of a petition for a rehearing addressed to the board.’ [Citation.] Filing the demand does not compel the board of Civil Service Commissioners to take any action. [Citation.] Rather, it affords the board an additional opportunity to consider the matter before the complainant resorts to litigation. [Citation.] It also serves to ‘fix[] a time limit and formalities necessary as a basis for court action.’ ” Schifando v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1074, 1083.)
Here, the superior court granted LAWA’s section 1094 motion for judgment, reasoning that the undisputed evidence showed Moore did not exhaust his administrative remedies under charter section 1017. Section 1094 provides that “[i]f a petition for writ of mandate . . . presents no triable issue of fact or is based solely on an administrative record, the matter may be determined by the court by noticed motion of any party for a judgment on the peremptory writ.” We review de novo the grant of a motion for judgment on undisputed facts (see Rasooly v. City of Oakley (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 348, 353; Skulason v. California Bureau of Real Estate (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 562, 566-567), including the court’s determination that Moore failed to exhaust
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his administrative remedies (see Carachure v. City of Azusa (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 776, 785; Wallich’s Ranch Co. v. Kern County Citrus Pest Control Dist. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 878, 883).
We also review the interpretation of a city charter de novo.
(City of San Diego v. Shapiro (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 756, 789; accord, Don’t Cell Our Parks v. City of San Diego (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 338, 349-350.) “Generally, the same principles of construction applicable to statutes apply to the interpretation of municipal charters. [Citations.] The courts must always look first to the express language of the [law] to ascertain its meaning.” (United Assn. of Journeymen v. City & County of San Francisco (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 751, 760; accord, Shapiro, at p. 789.)
B. The Superior Court Erred By Resolving Factual Disputes on the Section 1094 Motion Moore argues that he filed a demand for reinstatement within the meaning of charter section 1017 and, alternatively, that he substantially complied with charter section 1017. Citing Ronique’s affidavit, Moore contends he served a separate demand for reinstatement in addition to the unfiled writ petition. Moore further argues the document was “clearly marked as [a] demand for reinstatement . . . and w[as] hand delivered to [the] approved entity.”
LAWA responds that Moore did not comply or substantially comply with charter section 1017 because it is “undisputed” that Moore only filed a “court conformed copy of his initial writ petition . . . containing a demand for reinstatement attached as exhibit[] 2” and he “failed to file the demand for reinstatement in itself, as a standalone document.”
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As stated, section 1094 authorizes a court to enter judgment on a petition for writ of mandate that “presents no triable issue of fact.” (§ 1094.) “It is only where the [answer or] return to the alternative writ raises solely questions of law that the court is authorized to proceed to hear the matter upon the pleadings” under section 1094. (English v. City of Long Beach (1952) 114 Cal.App.2d 311, 316-317 (English) [reversing dismissal of widow’s writ petition challenging city’s denial of police pension under section 1094 because superior court failed to hold a hearing on disputed factual issues raised by the petition and city’s answer]; accord, Rodriguez v. Municipal Court (1972) 25 Cal.App.3d 521, 526 [“the hearing mentioned in . . . [section] 1094 is not one to try issues of fact but only questions of law”].) “[W]hen a question of fact is raised by an answer to a petition for writ of mandamus the matter is heard in the same manner as any other trial.” (Lotus Car, Ltd. v. Municipal Court of Southern Judicial Dist. (1968) 263 Cal.App.2d 264, 268; id. at p. 272 [“Ordinarily, when a question of fact is raised by a mandamus proceeding, findings of fact are required unless waived by the parties.”]; see also Lassen v. City of Alameda (1957) 150 Cal.App.2d 44, 48.)
Here, Moore and LAWA disputed various facts relating to Moore’s exhaustion of his remedies under charter section 1017. Specifically, a factual dispute exists regarding whether Ronique served a standalone demand for reinstatement on Whidden or whether the demand was attached to the writ petition as an exhibit. Ronique’s affidavit stated she handed Whidden “a request for reinstatement and a copy of the petition which would be filed with the court.” The superior court noted an “ambiguity in Ronique’s affidavit” as to “whether she filed the demand for
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reinstatement as a standalone document” and that it was “unclear from Moore’s evidence whether Ronique gave Whidden the Petition with the demand for reinstatement attached or as a standalone document.” Nevertheless, the court implicitly found the demand was not delivered as a separate document because “the Board . . . do[es] not have a standalone demand for reinstatement . . . in [its] files.” This resolution of disputed facts was improper on a section 1094 motion for judgment. (See English, supra, 114 Cal.App.2d at p. 316 [grant of motion for judgment was “clearly erroneous” where the “pleadings . . . tendered a factual issue which, if determined favorably to appellant, required the entry of judgment in her favor, [and] she was entitled as of right to a trial thereon”].)
Another factual dispute is whether the document (or documents) that Ronique handed to Moore was identifiable as a demand for reinstatement on its face. Ronique’s affidavit stated she delivered a “document entitled Verified Petition for Writ of Mandate Reversing Administrative Decision and a Demand for Reinstatement Letter.” But, through Whidden’s declaration, LAWA asserted that the “first page” of the document Whidden received only appeared to be a writ petition. The trial court did not appear to credit Ronique’s declaration on this point either, implicitly making a factual determination against Moore.
The court erred because these are material disputed facts relevant to assessing whether Moore actually complied or substantially complied with charter section 1017.4 (See 2710
4 LAWA argues that “Charter Section 1017 does not contain any provision allowing an employee or former employee to satisfy it through ‘substantial compliance.’ ” However, “ ‘substantial
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Sutter Ventures, LLC v. Millis (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 842, 860 [“Courts have applied the doctrine of substantial compliance with statutory requirements when, as a practical matter, they can reasonably conclude that partial compliance with a law has fully attained the statute’s objectives.’ ”]; accord, Troyk v. Farmers Group, Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1305, 1332-1333.) The superior court erred by resolving these factual disputes and making factual determinations in ruling on a section 1094 motion for judgment. (See English, supra, 114 Cal.App.2d at p. 316; Baumgardner v. City of Hawthorne (1951) 104 Cal.App.2d 512, 517 [superior court “properly heard and decided the case on the pleadings” under section 1094 where “[t]he material allegations of the petition [were] not denied,” “[t]he answer raised only questions of law,” and “[n]o evidence was required”].)
We therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings including, but not limited to, a trial or evidentiary hearing on the facts surrounding Moore’s exhaustion of administrative remedies and/or his entitlement to writ relief.5 (§ 1094.5.)
compliance is presumed to satisfy the intent of the [legislative body],’ even if a statute does not expressly permit substantial compliance.” (The Chemical Toxin Working Group, Inc. v. The Kroger Co. (2026) 120 Cal.App.5th 276, 290; see Knight v. Los Angeles (1945) 26 Cal.2d 764, 766 [substantial compliance doctrine can apply to claim provisions of Los Angeles City Charter].) 5 In light of our holding the court erroneously granted LAWA’s motion for judgment, we need not reach whether Moore also satisfied proof of filing with the Board within the meaning of charter section 1017. At oral argument, however, LAWA acknowledged there are unresolved factual issues as to proof of
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed. On remand, the superior court shall vacate its order granting the motion for judgment, enter a new order denying the motion, and conduct further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
MARTINEZ, P. J.
We concur:
FEUER, J. STONE, J.
filing, including whether the Board ordinarily file stamps documents it receives, whether Whidden could file stamp the document, and other factual issues relating to the Board’s filing procedures. These subjects may properly be explored at an evidentiary hearing.