Moore v. American Loan & Trust Co.

80 F. 49, 1896 U.S. App. LEXIS 3053
CourtU.S. Circuit Court for the District of Minnesota
DecidedOctober 16, 1896
StatusPublished

This text of 80 F. 49 (Moore v. American Loan & Trust Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Minnesota primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Moore v. American Loan & Trust Co., 80 F. 49, 1896 U.S. App. LEXIS 3053 (circtdmn 1896).

Opinion

LOCHREN, District Judge

(orally). In this case, if there were any question as to the sufficiency of the complaint at this time, the evidence has been presented and the case tried upon the theory that it is an action to set aside this mortgage to the American Loan & Trust Company, on the ground that the same was a preference in favor of the electric corporation, and contrary to the insolvent laws of the state; and, if there were any defect in the complaint (which I do not determine), I think an amendment ought to be allowed, so as to present the case in the pleadings as the parties have chosen to present it in their evidence and in the argument before the court.

[50]*50I think that counsel for complainant is correct in his position that this is not in any sense an action to rescind the conveyance, hut to have it declared void upon the ground that it was made in contravention of the provisions of the state insolvent law. It is brought by the receiver, representing and in the interest of the creditors; and he is not obliged, as a condition for obtaining the relief sought, to place the other party in statu quo, nor to return the money or securities which were parted with in making this conveyance. It seems that the Great Western Manufacturing Company commenced business in the beginning of the year 1893; and in December, 1891, its business came to an end by an entire collapse or failure, accompanied at the time with attempts to give preferences to certain creditors,—-a Mrs. Lamb, in whose favor judgment had been confessed, and a Chicago creditor, to whom securities were turned over at the time. Therefore it is not strange that the creditors should look with suspicion upon a mortgage of this kind, given so recently before the failure, and in favor of a corporation which had been a creditor of the Great Western Manufacturing Company to a considerable amount. The conveyance, being executed so near the time of the collapse of the mortgagor, would naturally raise a suspicion as to the character of the conveyance itself. The question now before the court is as to the character of this conveyance, in view of the evidence in the case, which appears to be very full -and exhaustive. Our statute, as cited in complainant’s brief, recites that:

“Conveyances and payments made and securities given by any insolvent debtor or a debtor in contemplation of insolvency, within ninety days of making an assignment, as provided by section one of this act, with a view of giving a preference to any creditor upon a pre-existing debt, or to any persons under liability for such debtor, over another, shall be void as to all creditors or persons receiving the same, who shall have reasonable cause to believe that such debtor was insolvent.” Gen. St. Minn. 1894, § 4243.

In order to determine the character of the conveyance which is attacked in this suit, it is necessary to consider the condition of the parties, the negotiations between them, and the circumstances under which these negotiations were had. It appears that the Great Western Manufacturing Company was engaged in the manufacture of goods connected with the use of electricity, and was also trading in similar goods purchased from other manufacturers or dealers, and sold by the company in its stores in Chicago, St. Louis, and perhaps Duluth; so that it was to a certain extent a trading, and not exclusively a manufacturing, concern, and it is possible, therefore, that the law referred to by counsel as to technical insolvency would apply to a corporation of this kind,-—that is, it would not be necessary that it should not have sufficient assets to pay its liabilities in the ordinary course of business if they were carefully administered, but insolvency would occur where there was an inability to pay its debts as they matured and were demanded. That would be an act of insolvency in the case of a trader, and possibly in a case of this kind. The evidence does show that this corporation was, perhaps, during the entire negotiations resulting in this mortgage, or, at any rate, before the execution of the mortgage, technically insolvent in the latter

[51]*51sense, and also that the same was known to the agent of the electric corporation, the beneficiary of the mortgage, before the negotiations were completed. It is necessary, beyond the fact of insolvency, to show that the creditor had reason to know of the insolvency; and, further, it is necessary to show an intent to give a preference to the creditor. It is argued on the part of counsel for complainant that it is only necessary that this should be the motive actuating the mortgagor, and that it is immaterial that the creditor for whose benefit the mortgage is made had any such purpose, intention, or knowledge. It would be rather extraordinary that a debtor should give a preference to a creditor without the knowledge and consent or participation of the creditor. But I hardly think that in a case of this kind it would make much difference. It might possibly do so where the creditor was a relative of, or where confidential or personal relations existed between him and, the debtor, so that the latter might have a peculiar regard for the creditor, and, without consulting him, do an act for his benefit which the creditor might not have adopted. But that is something beyond the ordinary course of business in matters of this kind; so that, in determining whether this mortgage was given by the debtor, the Great Western Manufacturing Company, for the purpose or with a view of giving a preference to this particular creditor, we have to consider the relation of the parties, and the circumstances of the transactions at the time they occurred. There is nothing in the relations of these parties, as disclosed by the evidence, which would show a probability that the debtor would act in the manner I have indicated, as might be done in case of relationship, or something that might cause the debtor to feel a more than ordinary interest in the affairs of the creditor. In this case the evidence discloses nothing more than the ordinary relation of debtor and creditor, and no particular reason why the debtor should favor this particular creditor more than any other creditor, aside from business reasons.

Ordinarily, in cases of preference, the creditor is the one who urges the giving of the security; is anxious that it be given hastily, and the contract be made immediately, so that the matter may be closed up and got out of the way. This case does not seem to have any of these characteristics about it. It does not appear that at the time of these negotiations there was any apprehension on the part of the creditor with respect to the indebtedness, although it does appear there was an indebtedness of some $52,000, $24,000 of which was due, and that at the time Mr. Johnson came to Chicago, and had a conference with Mr. Gilman on the subject, he was informed that the company was not prepared to make a payment of that amount at that time, or any part of the debt. But this does not appear to have created any anxiety on the part of Mr. Johnson. The debt of the electric company at that time was not unsecured, but was secured by the indorsement of the directors of the Great Western Manufacturing Company. It was also secured by the bonds of the Pond du Lac Company, and I think there is nothing in the case which shows that the electric corporation did not at that time feel itself entirely safe and secured. There does not appear to be anything in the action of the company that Mr. Jolmson then represented, and Mr. Bartlett later, which dis[52]*52closes any anxiety on that point.

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80 F. 49, 1896 U.S. App. LEXIS 3053, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/moore-v-american-loan-trust-co-circtdmn-1896.