Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. v. United States

301 F.2d 342, 157 Ct. Cl. 259
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedApril 4, 1962
DocketNo. 572-57
StatusPublished

This text of 301 F.2d 342 (Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. v. United States, 301 F.2d 342, 157 Ct. Cl. 259 (cc 1962).

Opinion

WhttakeR, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a suit to recover compensation for the carriage of mails from ports on the east coast of South America to ports on the Atlantic coast of the United States. Plaintiff, a steamship company, whose vessels fly the flag of the United States, is the same corporation as was the plaintiff in Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. v. limited States, 119 Ct. Cl.473, cert. denied, 342 U.S. 876. In that suit plaintiff sought to recover [262]*262compensation for tbe carriage of outbound mails from ports of Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay for years prior to 1942, at which time plaintiff’s service was interrupted because of World War II.

In the earlier suit the entire claim as to the northbound mails from Argentina and part of the claim as to northbound mails from Uruguay were abandoned by plaintiff, pursuant to a stipulation between the parties, under which it was agreed that, since Argentina and, until 1940, Uruguay, required plaintiff to carry their mails without further charge, in consideration of the granting by those countries of certain packet privileges to plaintiff, no payment was due from the United States for the carriage of Argentine mails and, for the period prior to 1940, of Uruguayan mails. In 1940 Uruguay had suspended its packet privilege law, thereby relieving the plaintiff from the obligation of carrying its mails without charge and, hence, for the period subsequent to 1940 the United States conceded liability, under the Postal Union Convention, to pay the charges.

The parties also agreed that, if a Brazilian decree of June 3, 1941, required plaintiff to carry Brazilian mails gratuitously, then the United States was not liable to compensate plaintiff therefor. We construed the Brazilian decree as requiring the gratuitous carriage of the mails; hence, we held, pursuant to the stipulation, the United States was not liable for the carriage of these mails during the period this decree was in effect.

In Count I of its petition in this action plaintiff seeks to recover from the United States compensation for the carriage of outbound mails from ports of Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay for years subsequent to World War II, beginning in 1946 when plaintiff’s service was resumed, and ending on March 1, 1956, when the United States withdrew from the Postal Union.

In Count II plaintiff sues to recover expenses incurred in the cartage of incoming South American mails from its piers to post offices in the United States.

Count III is a claim for money plaintiff says it would have received for the carriage of mails had not the Post Office Department improperly diverted such mails to foreign ves-[263]*263seis. Plaintiff says this was in violation of section 405(a) of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, 49 Stat. 1985, which gave its vessels preference over those of foreign registry.

COUNT x

Except for the years 1942 through 1946, during which plaintiff’s vessels were operated by the United States, pursuant to requisition for use during World War II, plaintiff has been continuously engaged for many years in the carriage of mails between the ports of Eio de Janeiro, Brazil; Buenos Aires, Argentina; and Montevideo, Uruguay, and various ports on the Atlantic coast of the United States, particularly New York, on vessels flying the flag of the United States.

In accordance with 5 U.S.C. § 372, the Postmaster General of the United States negotiated and concluded with the governments of certain Central and South American countries, including that of Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, several postal conventions, which, beginning with the Second Congress of the Pan American Postal Union held in Mexico in 1926, became known as the Postal Union of the Americas and Spain.

The Convention of the Postal Union of the Americas and Spain of December 22,1936, ratified by the Postmaster General on August 12, 1937, and approved by the President on August 20,1937 (50 Stat. 16'57), provided in part:

ARTICLE 3
Free and gratuitous transit
1. The gratuity of territorial, fluvial and maritime transit is absolute in the territory of the Postal Union of the Americas and Spain; consequently, the countries which form it obligate themselves to transport across their territories and to convey by the ships of their registry or flag which they utilize for the transportation of their own correspondence, without any charge whatsoever to the contracting countries, all that which the latter may send to any destination.
2. In cases of reforwarding, the contracting countries are bound to reforward the correspondence by the ways and means which they utilize for their own dispatches.

[264]*264This provision was incorporated without change in the Postal Convention of September 25, 1946, ratified by the Postmaster General on February 20, 1947, and approved by the President on February 27,1947 (61 Stat. 3505).

The Postal Convention of November 9, 1950, ratified by the Postmaster General on June 7,1951, and approved by the President on June 22,1951, provided in part:

ARTICLE 3
Free and gratuitous transit
1. The gratuity of territorial, fluvial and maritime transit is absolute in the territory of the Postal Union of the Americas and Spain; consequently the countries which form it obligate themselves to transport across their territories and to convey by ships of their registry or flag, without any charge to the contracting countries, all the correspondence which the latter may send to any destination whatsoever. However, this gratuity of transit will not be applied to the subsequent maritime transmissions of correspondence destined for a third country which is not a member of the Postal Union of the Americas and Spain in cases where a reshipment or transfer may be necessary, or justified expenses of handling may arise.
2. Likewise, when services of foreign Administrations are required for the subsequent conveyance of the closed mails, collection can be made from the Administrations of origin of the same amounts which the intermediary Administrations may be compelled to pay therefor.
3. In cases of onward dispatch, the contracting countries bind themselves to forward the correspondence by the most rapid ways and means which they utilize for their own mails.
« $ $ $ $

The obligation of the United States to compensate plaintiff for the carriage of the mails in question, if any, arises under these postal conventions.

Plaintiff says that the United States, acting through the Postmaster General, by entering into the various postal conventions providing for “free and gratuitous transit” of convention mails on vessels of its flag and by the issuance of orders providing for payment for the carriage of such mails [265]*265by vessels of its flag, impliedly agreed to compensate plaintiff for tbe carriage of tbe mails in issue.

On tbe other band, since and before the decision in the first Moore-McCormack

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301 F.2d 342, 157 Ct. Cl. 259, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/moore-mccormack-lines-inc-v-united-states-cc-1962.