Moore Custom Trailers v. Bryan J. Lynch (mem. dec.)

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: August 31, 2017
• Docket: 20A05-1611-SC-2520
• Status: Published

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION FILED Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 08/31/2017, 9:24 am this Memorandum Decision shall not be CLERK Indiana Supreme Court regarded as precedent or cited before any Court of Appeals and Tax Court court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE Alexander L. Hoover James A. Hanson Law Office of Christopher G. Walter, Fort Wayne, Indiana P.C. Nappanee, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Moore Custom Trailers, August 31, 2017 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 20A05-1611-SC-2520 v. Appeal from the Elkhart Superior Court Bryan J. Lynch, The Honorable Gretchen S. Lund, Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge Trial Court Cause No. 20D04-1607-SC-4261

Brown, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A05-1611-SC-2520 |August 30, 2017 Page 1 of 8 [1] Moore Custom Trailers (“Moore”) appeals from the judgment of the small

claims court in favor of Bryan J. Lynch in the amount of $6,000. Moore raises

three issues which we consolidate and restate as whether the judgment is clearly

erroneous. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In May 2015, Brian McKibben, the owner of Moore, hired Lynch to perform

RV service and repair. A written employment agreement was not completed.

In July 2016, Lynch voluntarily quit.

[3] On July 20, 2016, Lynch filed a notice of claim in small claims court alleging

that he was hired in April 2015, was told he would receive a wage of $1,000 a

week “plus 20% of all labor hours,” and that he had “not received any pay on

labor hours have accumulated $25,000.” Appellant’s Appendix Volume II at

13.

[4] On September 22, 2016, the court held a bench trial. Dinah, Lynch’s wife at

the time of the discussions regarding employment, testified that McKibben

offered Lynch a wage of $52,000 a year plus twenty percent of “billed labor,

billed service . . . .” Transcript Volume II at 6. She also stated that McKibben

“offered the percentage of his own accord because [Lynch] wanted actually like

75,000 to start and so he negotiated that.” Id.

[5] Lynch testified:

[McKibben] said he couldn’t afford that money, but what he could do, is he could do a certain amount per week or per year Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A05-1611-SC-2520 |August 30, 2017 Page 2 of 8 with a 20 percent of all the labor, 20 percent of all the dollar labor that came in, which mean, which means if $100.00 labor come in I get 20 percent of that $100.00.

Id. at 10. He testified that “[t]here was suppose to have been a contract drawn

up,” that McKibben said that he was working on it, and that “[e]very time I

would ask him about the contract he was always working on it.” Id. The court

admitted Plaintiff’s Exhibit A consisting of a completed work order list

regarding work from April 1, 2015, to June 1, 2015, which included a column

titled “Labor.” Plaintiff’s Exhibit A at 1. The court also admitted a completed

work order list for work from June 6, 2015, to May 5, 2016, which also

included amounts under the heading “Labor.” Plaintiff’s Exhibit B.

[6] During cross-examination, Lynch indicated there was no issue about

profitability. He also testified that he complained to McKibben on several

occasions about not receiving payment for any labor hours and that McKibben

responded by saying “he was going to get a contract signed up.” Transcript

Volume II at 18. He stated that he signed his 2015 income tax return verifying

he claimed all of his income and that he did not have any labor hours in 2015.

[7] McKibben testified that he offered Lynch $52,000 a year and a percentage of

the profit from the RV service center, and that he was very clear with Lynch

that it was a wage plus a percentage of profitability. He testified that he did so

as an incentive to Lynch to grow the business, but the RV center did not make

any profit. When asked if Lynch asked him about his “labor hours, profitability

commission,” he answered: “[Lynch] asked me about the profitability. I sat

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A05-1611-SC-2520 |August 30, 2017 Page 3 of 8 down with him and showed him. I said we’ve lost this much money during this

time period and I don’t have anything to pay on the profitability.” Id. at 26-27.

[8] On October 11, 2016, the court entered judgment in favor of Lynch in the

amount of $6,000. Specifically, the court’s order states:

The undisputed testimony is that [Lynch] was hired by [Moore] on May 4, 2015 to manage and develop the service department for [Moore]. The parties agreed that [Lynch] would receive an annual salary of Fifty Two Thousand and 00/100 Dollars ($52,000.00). The parties also agree that there was additional compensation that was to be provided by [Moore] to [Lynch]; however, the terms of the additional compensation is the crux of the dispute.

*****

The Court finds that [Lynch] has met his burden in proving that he had an agreement with [Moore] to receive twenty percent (20%) of the billed labor costs. In making its finding, the Court focused on the fact that [Lynch] presented corroborating evidence in the form of an additional witness and documentation to support his claim. The Court notes that even if [Moore’s] representative, Brian McKibben, is to be believed, that there was clearly an ambiguity in the offer that [Moore] made to [Lynch] and that the ambiguity should be construed against [Moore]. Additionally, the Court finds that both parties agree that [Lynch] raised the issue on at least two (2) occasions during the course of his employment. Lastly, the Court focused on the fact that [Lynch] obtained printouts of the work order list, the same of which are contained in Plaintiff’s Exhibits A and B, approximately two (2) months before he terminated his employment.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A05-1611-SC-2520 |August 30, 2017 Page 4 of 8 In calculating [Lynch’s] damages, the Court totaled the amounts listed in the labor cost columns of Plaintiff’s Exhibits A and B, commencing on May 4, 2015. In doing so, the Court derived a figure of Forty Six Thousand Seven Hundred Forty-Three and 82/100 Dollars (46,743.82). Twenty percent (20%) of said amount equals Nine Thousand Three Hundred Forty-Eight and 76/100 Dollars ($9,348.76). [Lynch] conceded at trial that his damages are capped at the jurisdictional limit of Six Thousand and 00/100 ($6,000.00). Judgment is now entered in favor of [Lynch] in the sum of Six Thousand and 00/100 ($6,000.00), with post-judgment interest to generate at the statutory rate, plus the costs of this action.

Appellant’s Appendix Volume II at 9-11.

Discussion

[9] The issue is whether the judgment of the small claims court is clearly erroneous.

Judgments in small claims actions are subject to review as prescribed by

relevant Indiana rules and statutes. Ind. Small Claims Rule 11(A); Eagle

Aircraft, Inc. v. Trojnar, 983 N.E.2d 648, 657 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). In the

appellate review of claims tried by the bench without a jury, the reviewing court

shall not set aside the judgment unless clearly erroneous. Ind. Trial Rule 52(A);

Eagle Aircraft, 983 N.E.2d at 657. The appellate tribunal does not reweigh the

evidence or determine the credibility of witnesses but considers only the

evidence that supports the judgment and the reasonable inferences to be drawn

from that evidence. Eagle Aircraft, 983 N.E.2d at 657. This deferential standard

of review is particularly important in small claims actions, where trials are

informal, with the sole objective of dispensing speedy justice between the

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A05-1611-SC-2520 |August 30, 2017 Page 5 of 8 parties according to the rules of substantive law. Id. We presume that the court

correctly applied the law. Id. However, “this deferential standard does not

apply to the substantive rules of law, which are reviewed de novo just as they

are in appeals from a court of general jurisdiction.” Trinity Homes, LLC v. Fang,

848 N.E.2d 1065, 1068 (Ind. 2006). A trial court’s findings control only as to

the issues they cover and a general judgment controls as to the issues upon

which there are no findings. Yanoff v. Muncy, 688 N.E.2d 1259, 1262 (Ind.

1997). A general judgment entered with findings will be affirmed if it can be

sustained on any legal theory supported by the evidence. Id. Findings will be

set aside only if they are clearly erroneous. Id. In order to determine that a

finding or conclusion is clearly erroneous, an appellate court’s review of the

evidence must leave it with the firm conviction that a mistake has been made.

Id.

[10] Moore argues that Plaintiff’s Exhibits A and B do not corroborate Lynch’s

claim that he was entitled to twenty percent of all labor hours. It also contends

that the court’s finding that both parties agreed that Lynch raised the issue on at

least two occasions during the course of employment was at best a

mischaracterization of the testimony given by McKibben. Moore’s position is

that there was no enforceable oral contract, there was no meeting of the minds,

and there was no written contract for the court to construe any terms against

Moore.

[11] Lynch’s position is that the small claims court properly found the evidence

supports the conclusion that the parties had originally agreed to labor as the

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A05-1611-SC-2520 |August 30, 2017 Page 6 of 8 variable in the original oral agreement. He contends that the court’s statement

about construing the ambiguity against Moore was made within the larger

context of the trial court’s explanation of its weighing of the evidence and

assessing the credibility of the testimony. He also argues that Moore was the

party charged with drawing up a written instrument and failed to complete that

task despite his repeated request.

[12] The basic requirements for a contract are offer, acceptance, consideration, and a

meeting of the minds of the contracting parties. Conwell v. Gray Loon Outdoor

Mktg. Grp., Inc., 906 N.E.2d 805, 812-813 (Ind. 2009). Whether a contract

exists is a question of law. Id. at 813. To be valid and enforceable, a contract

must be reasonably definite and certain. Id. All that is required to render a

contract enforceable is reasonable certainty in the terms and conditions of the

promises made, including by whom and to whom; absolute certainty in all

terms is not required. Id. Only essential terms need be included to render a

contract enforceable. Id. Thus, where any essential element is omitted from a

contract, or is left obscure or undefined, so as to leave the intention of the

parties uncertain as to any substantial term of the contract, the contract may not

be specifically enforced. Id. A court will not find that a contract is so uncertain

as to preclude specific enforcement where a reasonable and logical

interpretation will render the contract valid. Id.

[13] The record reveals that Dinah testified that McKibben offered Lynch a wage of

$52,000 per year plus twenty percent of “billed labor, billed service.” Transcript

Volume II at 6. Further, Lynch testified that McKibben “could do a certain

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A05-1611-SC-2520 |August 30, 2017 Page 7 of 8 amount per week or per year with a 20 percent of all the labor, 20 percent of all

the dollar labor that came in, which mean, which means if $100.00 labor come

in I get 20 percent of that $100.00.” Id. at 10. The court also referenced

Plaintiff’s Exhibits A and B, which consisted of completed work order lists

including amounts billed for labor. While these exhibits do not indicate that

Lynch was entitled to twenty percent of the amounts billed for labor hours, they

do set forth the amounts billed for labor hours during the relevant period. The

court calculated an amount of $46,743.82 for the labor billed and twenty

percent of that as $9,348.76, and Moore does not challenge these calculations.

To the extent Moore argues that Lynch testified he had no labor hours in 2015,

we note that Lynch testified that he “was not paid any labor hours for the

whole time I was there.” Id. at 19.

[14] Based upon the evidence which supports the judgment, and given our

deferential standard of review, we conclude that the small claims court’s

determination that the agreement between Lynch and Moore included a

provision that Lynch would receive twenty percent of the billed labor costs is

not clearly erroneous.

Conclusion

[15] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the small claims court.

[16] Affirmed.

May, J., and Pyle, J., concur.

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