Moore Accessory Structure

CourtVermont Superior Court
DecidedMarch 30, 2012
Docket161-8-09 Vtec
StatusPublished

This text of Moore Accessory Structure (Moore Accessory Structure) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Vermont Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Moore Accessory Structure, (Vt. Ct. App. 2012).

Opinion

STATE OF VERMONT

SUPERIOR COURT ENVIRONMENTAL DIVISION

} In re Moore Accessory Structure Permit } Docket No. 161-8-09 Vtec (Appeal of Smith and Siebeck) } }

Decision and Order on Remaining Issues

Appellants Gary Smith and Betsy Siebeck (Appellants) appealed from a July

18, 2009 decision of the Zoning Board of Adjustment (ZBA) of the Town of Pomfret,

Vermont related to property of A. David Moore located at 6872 Pomfret Road. The

ZBA decision upheld the Zoning Administrator’s grant of Permit #08-8 to construct

a new building on David Moore’s property to house a wood planer and to store

wood shavings. The ZBA decision also upheld the Zoning Administrator’s March

25, 2009 and April 15, 2009 determinations that the existing structures and uses on

David Moore’s property are in compliance with the Pomfret Zoning Ordinance.

Appellants are represented by Marsha Smith Meekins, Esq.; Appellees

A. David Moore, his sister Emily Moore Grube, and the Moore Family Partnership,

LP (Appellees) are represented by A. Jay Kenlan, Esq.; and the Town of Pomfret is

represented by Amanda S.E. Lafferty, Esq.

Procedural History

On October 11, 2010, the Court issued a decision resolving the cross-motions

for summary judgment filed in this case. In re: Moore Accessory Structure Permit,

No. 161-8-09 Vtec (Vt. Sup. Ct. Envtl. Div. Oct. 11, 2010) (Wright, J.) (hereinafter,

1 Summary Judgment Decision).1 A full description of the history and relationship of

the Moore family properties, together with a full history of the various state statutes

applicable to this matter, is found in the Summary Judgment Decision and is not

repeated in this decision.

In the Summary Judgment Decision, the Court resolved the issue of whether

any of the uses on the property are in violation. It determined that three of the

buildings are larger than the size eligible for exemption under Part 5 of the Zoning

Ordinance—the Newman Planer/Shavings building, the WoodMizer Sawmill Shed,

and the Lumber Drying Kiln—and therefore require zoning permits under Part 7 of

the Zoning Ordinance, unless Appellees were able to show at trial that the sawing of

logs and/or the drying and planing of lumber are considered to be “farming

practices” or “agricultural use[s].”

If those practices are farming practices or are practices associated with

farming, as farming is defined in 10 V.S.A. § 6001(22), then the buildings are exempt

from municipal permitting as farm structures under 24 V.S.A. § 4413(d).2 If those

buildings do not qualify for the 24 V.S.A. § 4413(d) exemption, but the practices are

considered to be agricultural uses within § 6.3 of the Zoning Ordinance, then the

buildings only require a non-discretionary permit from the Zoning Administrator

under § 6.3, rather than requiring ZBA approval under § 7 of the Zoning Ordinance.

Trial on these remaining issues was then postponed for a substantial period by

1 Appellants and Appellees also moved to alter or amend the judgment pursuant to V.R.C.P. 59(e). The Town took no position with respect to either the original motion for summary judgment or the motions to alter or amend. On February 17, 2011, the Court issued a decision denying both parties’ motions to alter or amend, but correcting footnotes 4 and 5 and the first paragraph on page 18 of the original summary judgment decision. 2 Neither the state Natural Resources Board nor the state Agency of Agriculture, Food, and Markets sought amicus curiae status to be heard on the interpretation of these state statutes.

2 agreement of the parties.

An evidentiary hearing was held in this matter before Merideth Wright,

Environmental Judge, to take evidence on the remaining issues. The parties were

given the opportunity to submit written memoranda and requests for findings.

Upon consideration of the evidence and of the written memoranda and requests for

findings filed by the parties, the Court finds and concludes as follows.

The Farm-related Properties

As more fully described in the Summary Judgment Decision, and as borne

out in the evidence presented at trial, the three adult siblings—David Moore, John

Moore, and Emily Grube—jointly manage the Farm-related Properties as a whole

farm operation. See, generally, Summary Judgment Decision at 6-7. The Farm-

related Properties consist of the Partnership Property, the Johnson Parcel, the Grube

Parcel, and nine of the ten acres of the David Moore Parcel, exclusive only of the

Organ Shop and Garage/Storage Building. The cultivated portion of the David

Moore Parcel is used for hay. The Farm-related Properties include approximately

850 acres of forested land, exclusive of the sugarbush, none of which is located on

the David Moore Parcel. Together, all of the Farm-related Properties, including all

of the David Moore Parcel except for the Organ Shop and the Garage/Storage

Building constitute “the farm” for the purposes of the present analysis.

Based on the evidence produced at trial, the Court finds that Appellees, and

in particular David Moore, harvest logs from the Farm-related Properties for lumber

and firewood for use on the Farm-related Properties. On the David Moore Parcel,

David Moore saws those logs into lumber, and planes and kiln dries the lumber, for

use in constructing and maintaining buildings on the Farm-related Properties. The

waste products of that processing are slab wood, sawdust, and shavings. The slab

wood is used on the Farm-related Properties as fuel for the sugar-making operation;

3 the sawdust and shavings is used on the Farm-related Properties as livestock

bedding.

Lumber Processing and Byproduct Use on Farms

It is customary and, indeed, economically necessary, for farmers in Vermont

to use trees grown on their own farms not only for firewood, but also to saw or to

have those trees sawn into lumber on the farm, as well as to process the lumber by

planing and sanding, and to dry the lumber to use in constructing and maintaining

farm buildings and structures. Vermont farmers also customarily use the

byproducts of such lumber processing on the farm. Slab wood is used in sugar-

making and to fuel wood-fired furnaces and wood stoves. Shavings and sawdust

are used as animal bedding.

Farming Practices and Practices Associated with Farming Practices

Under 24 V.S.A. § 4413(d)(2), municipalities are prohibited from requiring a

municipal permit for a farm structure. The phrase “farm structure” is defined in 24

V.S.A. § 4413(d)(1) as “a building for . . . carrying out other practices associated with

agricultural or farming practices, . . . as ’farming’ is defined in 10 V.S.A. § 6001(22).”

The definition of farming in 10 V.S.A. § 6001(22) includes seven subcategories, two

of which are applicable to the present case.

Growing trees as a “fiber” crop as “farming” - 10 V.S.A. § 6001(22)(A)

The definition of farming in 10 V.S.A. § 6001(22)(A) covers the “cultivation or

other use of land” for “growing food, fiber, Christmas trees, maple sap, or

horticultural or orchard crops.” 10 V.S.A. § 6001(22)(A). Because the growing of

trees for lumber is not separately listed in this definition, it was necessary to take

4 evidence at trial from experts in the fields of silviculture and agriculture as to

whether the growing of trees for lumber is considered to be growing “fiber.”

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