Moonbug Entertainment Limited, et al. v. BabyBus (Fujian) Network Technology Co., Ltd, et al.

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: April 22, 2026
• Docket: 3:21-cv-06536
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 MOONBUG ENTERTAINMENT Case No. 21-cv-06536-EMC LIMITED, et al., 8 Plaintiffs, ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 9 DENYING IN PART MOTION FOR v. FEES 10 BABYBUS (FUJIAN) NETWORK 11 TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD, et al., Docket No. 798

12 Defendants.

13 14 Following years of hard-fought litigation, Plaintiff Moonbug prevailed in this copyright 15 action against Defendant BabyBus before a jury and on appeal. This Court entered judgment 16 based on the jury verdict and fees awarded. The Ninth Circuit affirmed on appeal. 17 Moonbug now seeks $933,148 in additional fees incurred in the appeal and in its effort to 18 collect on its $25.6 million dollar judgment. Moonbug seeks $535,155.25 in fees incurred on 19 appeal and $315,488 incurred through judgment enforcement. Dkt. Nos. 798, 807. The Ninth 20 Circuit granted Moonbug’s request to transfer its fees motion to this court. 21 Having reviewed the initial and supplemental briefing and heard oral argument, the Court 22 DENIES Moonbug’s motion for appellate fees but GRANTS in part Moonbug’s motion for 23 judgment enforcement fees. 24 25 I. FACTS & BACKGROUND 26 A. Jury Verdict and Fee Award 27 On July 27, 2023, a jury found Defendant BabyBus liable for willful copyright 1 579; Dkt. No. 711. This Court determined that Moonbug was the prevailing party under Section 2 505 of the Copyright Act. Dkt. No. 711. Applying the Fogerty factors, the Court found that (1) 3 “Moonbug achieved nearly complete success on the merits”; (2-3) “there [was] no evidence that 4 BabyBus acted frivolously or had a bad motivation in defending Moonbug’s claims of copyright 5 infringement; (4) “BabyBus’s overall defense to copyright infringement was not objectively 6 unreasonable,” and it was “entirely reasonable for BabyBus to challenge that their works were not 7 substantially similar to the CoComelon copyrighted works as a matter of law because of the 8 unprotectable element,” but “several more specific aspects of BabyBus’s defense were objectively 9 unreasonable” — including initially denying copying but conceding willful infringement a year 10 later and Babybus’ independent development defense, which was “baseless” and relied on 11 “fabricated evidence,” — resulting in this factor weighing in favor of fees; and (5) that the need to 12 deter Babybus from further infringement did not weigh in favor of fees because the Court had 13 already issued a permanent injunction. Dkt. No. 711 at 4-7. Overall, the factors weighed in favor 14 of fees. Id. at 7. The Court awarded a total of $6,147,482 in attorney fees. Id. at 20. 15 16 B. Ninth Circuit Appeal 17 BabyBus appealed the verdict, and challenged the Court’s jury instructions, verdict form, 18 and grant of partial summary judgment to Moonbug on the copyrightability of the JJ character. 19 Dkt. No. 796. The panel affirmed this Court’s decision on all issues. The panel held that (1) “The 20 district court properly instructed the jury on filtering,” noting that Appellants agreed with the 21 proposed instruction before trial; (2) “There was also no error in the district court’s guidance on 22 scenes a faire, merger, and thick/thin protection”; (3) “the district court did not abuse its discretion 23 when it forwent a merger instruction based on insufficient evidence”; (4) “The district court also 24 did not err by finding thick protection and applying the substantial similarity standard,” and that 25 any such error would have been harmless; (5) “There was no error in the district court’s selection 26 and arrangement instruction,” because the Court “provided adequate filtering guidance by 27 distinguishing between the kinds of elements that are typically protected versus those that are 1 the copyrightability of the JJ character,” because the JJ character had several unique characteristics 2 that rendered him “especially distinctive”; and (7) “The district court did not abuse its discretion in 3 formulating the verdict form.” Id. For the issues of providing a merger instruction and applying 4 the substantial similarity standard for thick protection, the panel affirmed on the additional ground 5 that any error was harmless. Id. at 3-4. Babybus’ petition for panel rehearing and en banc was 6 denied. Dkt. No. 799-6. 7 BabyBus did not challenge the Section 505 fee award, the Court’s findings supporting fees 8 under Rule 37(c)(2), fees under 17 U.S.C. § 512(f) for copyright misrepresentation, and sanctions 9 for its discovery misconduct. 10 11 C. Collection Issues 12 On October 30, 2023, the Court entered Judgment in this action. Dkt. No. 627. During a 13 January 11, 2024 hearing on BabyBus’ post-trial motions, BabyBus requested that the Court stay 14 execution of the judgment pending resolution of those motions, which the Court granted. Dkt. No. 15 679. On May 15, 2024, the Court denied BabyBus’s post-trial motions in their entirety, ending the 16 temporary stay. Dkt. No. 680. 17 In May 2024, Moonbug sent notices of levy and related documents to the U.S. Marshals’ 18 office for registration, and subsequently served those materials on various levied entities. Dkt. 19 No. 799 ¶ 25. Moonbug also filed a Motion for Order Assigning Rights to Payments from 20 Defendants to Plaintiffs and Restraining Defendants from Interfering with the Assignments. Dkt. 21 No. 683. Moonbug resumed pursuit of collection discovery originally served in September and 22 October 2024. Dkt. No. 799 ¶ 25. 23 On August 6, 2024, the Court issued its Fee Award Order. Dkt. No. 711. As to 24 enforcement of the judgment, the Court denied Moonbug’s request for assignment of BabyBus’ 25 third-party payments as “premature” in part based on BabyBus’ representation that it would post a 26 bond. Id. at 20. On August 22, the Court clarified in a minute order that the stay of Moonbug’s 27 writ of execution had expired on May 15, when the post-trials motions were resolved, and that 1 On August 14, Moonbug learned from Google that back in June, BabyBus’ counsel Quinn 2 Emanual had served on Google a Third Party Claim of Superior Interest by Japan BabyBus Co. 3 Ltd. Dkt. No. 799 ¶ 30. Japan BabyBus “purported to notify Google that it had a superior interest 4 in the funds held by YouTube/Google that Moonbug was seeking to levy.” Id. Two days later, 5 Moonbug filed an emergency motion for an order assigning rights to payments to Moonbug and 6 restraining defendants from interfering with the assigned funds. Dkt. No. 714. 7 On September 12, at oral argument over Moonbug’s motion for an assignment of rights to 8 payment, BabyBus represented that it was unable to put up a bond after all. Dkt. No. 732. The 9 Court reiterated that no stay of judgment was in place. Id. The Court also noted that it expected 10 the 30(b)(6) deposition on judgment enforcement to proceed. Id. 11 The Court granted Moonbug’s request to be assigned certain rights to payment from third 12 parties and to restrain BabyBus from any other assignment of any of those assets to any other 13 entity. Dkt. No. 733. These third parties included Japan Babybus Co., Ltd., YouTube, Apple, 14 Google, PayPal, Spotify, Amazon, Pandora, Baidu, The Roku Channel, Tencent, iQiyi, Toutiao 15 Pangolin, Youku, Himalaya, Sohu, MangoTV, Wasu TV, LeTV, PPTV, ironSource Ltd., and 16 Beijing Youletong Network Technology Co. Id. 17 On September 26, 2024, the 30(b)(6) deposition of BabyBus on judgment enforcement 18 went forward but the witness was not prepared to answer basic questions on the noticed topics. 19 See Dkt. No. 780 ¶ 8; Dkt. No. 777 (J. Westmoore noting that BabyBus does not “seriously 20 dispute” that their proffered witness was unprepared). 21 On November 4, 2024, Moonbug moved to add Japan BabyBus as a judgment debtor. Dkt. 22 No. 738. Moonbug contended that the BabyBus Defendants, rather than paying the judgment, 23 “have instead sought to thwart enforcement of levies on their U.S. revenues by using Japan 24 BabyBus as a shell to launder the [judgment] money.” Dkt. 738 at 21. BabyBus filed a one-page 25 opposition that argued only that BabyBus did not need to provide a substantive response because it 26 had not been properly served and that Japan BabyBus had not controlled the litigation. Dkt. No. 27 765 at 3-4 (citing Dkt. No. 745 at 2). At the January 9, 2025 motions hearing, the parties 1 subsequently notified the court that they were unable to reach agreement. Dkt. No. 761, Dkt. No. 2 763. Also in January, counsel for Moonbug learned that Amazon has released funds to Japan 3 BabyBus that were subject to the assignment order. Dkt. No. 799 ¶ 35 (citing Dkt. No. 780-5). 4 On February 10, the Court granted Moonbug’s motion to alter the judgment. Dkt. No. 765. 5 The Court found that “the evidence provided a firm basis to find that Japan Babybus is a mere 6 shell for Babybus” and that “[w]ere Japan BabyBus not considered the alter ego of BabyBus an 7 inequitable result would occur as BabyBus would be allowed to continue delaying satisfaction of 8 the judgment” since “Japan Babybus is holding the money.” Id. at 7-8. The Court found that 9 BabyBus had offered no evidence to dispute Moonbug’s contention that BabyBus has “sought to 10 thwart enforcement of levies on their U.S. revenues by using Japan BabyBus as a shell to launder 11 the money.” Id. at 8 (citing Dkt. 738 at 21). 12 On February 18, the parties entered a stipulation providing that BabyBus would fully 13 satisfy the judgment by early March, which tolled pending discovery disputes. Dkt. No. 767. On 14 February 27, Moonbug learned that BabyBus had communicated to Google/YouTube that it would 15 satisfy the judgment by March 10 and that based on BabyBus’ representation, Google/YouTube 16 intended to temporarily pause disbursements from the levied BabyBus accounts to avoid 17 overpayment. Dkt. No. 799 ¶ 40-41 (citing Dkt. No. 780-8, 780-9). 18 BabyBus did not satisfy the judgment by March 10 and did not provide any explanation to 19 Moonbug for its failure to do so. Dkt. No. 799 ¶ 42. Instead, on April 10, BabyBus moved for a 20 stay of enforcement of judgment, which Moonbug opposed. Dkt. No. 775, 779. At this time, 21 $12.2 million of the judgment, plus interest, remained due to Moonbug. Dkt. No. 777. 22 Meanwhile, Judge Westmoore provided guidance to the parties on their judgment collection 23 discovery disputes, noting that further depositions of high BabyBus executives were warranted. 24 Dkt. No. 777. On June 9, BabyBus withdrew its motion to stay the judgment and on June 20, 25 Moonbug filed a notice of satisfaction of judgment. Dkt. No. 783, 785. 26

27 Procedural History 1 Moonbug filed the instant motion in this Court on January 14, 2026. Dkt. No. 798. The 2 Court heard oral argument on March 5, 2026. Dkt. No. 805. At the hearing, the Court ordered 3 the parties to file a supplemental joint chart with the collection fees that Moonbug contends reflect 4 extraordinary collection efforts and BabyBus’ disputes as to such efforts. Id. The supplemental 5 chart of annotated time entries and associated briefing was submitted on March 19. Dkt. No. 807. 6

7 II. DISCUSSION 8

9 A. Is Moonbug Entitled to Fees Incurred on Appeal? 10 Under the Copyright Act, a court may not “award[] attorney’s fees as a matter of course.” 11 Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 579 U.S. 197, 202 (2016) (quoting Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 12 510 U. S. 517, 533 (1994)). To determine whether fees should be awarded, courts assess the 13 nonexclusive Fogerty factors: “the degree of success obtained on the claim; frivolousness; 14 motivation; objective reasonableness of factual and legal arguments; and need for compensation 15 and deterrence.” VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 887 (9th Cir. 2016). Courts are to 16 give “substantial weight to the objective (un)reasonableness of a losing party’s litigating position.” 17 Kirtsaeng, 579 U.S. at 205. Losing alone does not establish objective unreasonableness. Seltzer v. 18 Green Day, Inc., 725 F.3d 1170, 1181 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he mere fact that [a party] lost cannot 19 establish his objective unreasonability.”). “Although objective reasonableness carries significant 20 weight, courts must view all the circumstances of a case on their own terms, in light of the 21 Copyright Act’s essential goals.” Kirtsaeng, 579 U.S. at 209. 22 As a threshold matter, Moonbug argues that the Court does not need to independently 23 assess the Fogerty factors to determine whether appellate fees should be awarded but can simply 24 rely on its prior assessment and award of fees. This position is not supported. The Supreme Court 25 has made clear that assessing copyright fees requires “particularized” inquiry and “case-by-case 26 assessment.” Kirtsaeng, 579 U.S. at 202. And Ninth Circuit authority reflects that an assessment 27 1 (9th Cir. 1979) (affirming trial-level fee award but denying appellate fees where the appeal was 2 “not frivolous” and “[e]quity considerations” favored each side bearing appellate fees). Even 3 where the Ninth Circuit had awarded appellate fees on top of a trial-level fee award, it has done so 4 only after an independent evaluation of the Fogerty factors. See Maljack Productions, Inc. v. 5 GoodTimes Home Video Corp, 81 F.3d 881, 890-91 (9th Cir. 1996) (applying Fogerty factors 6 before awarding appellate fees based on “factually unreasonable” arguments made). 7 The Court’s prior finding that the Fogerty factors were satisfied relied on certain 8 unreasonable legal and factual positions taken and sanctionable conduct not necessarily at issue on 9 the appellate record. The Court therefore makes a new, independent assessment of whether the 10 Fogerty factors support fees. 11 The first factor, success obtained, clearly supports Moonbug – the panel rejected each of 12 BabyBus’ seven grounds of appeal. However, the other factors, including the factor of objective 13 reasonableness, do not support a fee award. BabyBus’ appeal isolated a limited set of issues for 14 appeal that related to questions of copyrightability and protectability: BabyBus appealed the 15 partial summary judgment order of copyrightability, and various jury instructions and verdict form 16 formulations relating to protectable and unprotectable elements. These were reasonable bases for 17 appeal. The Court previously observed in its summary judgment ruling on copyrightability that 18 “reasonable minds can differ as to whether the traits shared between the CoComelon and Super 19 JoJo characters, even when combined, are protectible” under the extrinsic test. Dkt. No. 242 at 20. 20 For the jury instructions, the Court made several modifications from the model instructions based 21 on caselaw. While the Court believes these modifications provided greater clarity, and the Ninth 22 Circuit affirmed them on appeal, the instructions and verdict form were not unreasonable to 23 challenge. Finally, nothing about the panel’s decision indicates that the panel found the appeal 24 objectively unreasonable – the panel engaged on the merits of each question. 25 Notably, BabyBus did not appeal rulings on legal positions that the Court previously found 26 unreasonable, including its independent development defense, willfulness, copyright 27 misrepresentation, and the sanctions arising from its fabrication of evidence. See No. 24-3748, 1 all the DouDou issue… [M]y client was sanctioned below and … Judge Chen handled that…. I’m 2 not here to defend it.”). Nor does Moonbug provide any basis from which to impute an improper 3 motive to BabyBus’ appeal. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148, 4 1156 (9th Cir. 1986) (rejecting “contention that [party] brought the appeal merely as a means of 5 further harassment” when that contention was unsupported by evidence); Dkt. No. 711 at 4 6 (finding “no evidence that BabyBus acted frivolously or had a bad motivation in defending 7 Moonbug’s claims of copyright infringement”). Where counsel reasonably believes appealable 8 issues exist, there is nothing improper about pursuing an appeal on those issues to set aside a 9 multimillion-dollar judgment. While Moonbug attempts to characterize the panel’s occasional 10 finding of harmless error as an indication that the appeal was frivolous, the panel only found 11 harmless error in the alternative on two discrete issues; the panel did not dispose of the appeal as a 12 whole on harmless error. Had the panel agreed with BabyBus, its client could have been relieved 13 from paying millions. Thus, BabyBus’ appeal was not objectively unreasonable, frivolous, or 14 improperly motivated. 15 Finally, as the Court previously found, the deterrence factor is not implicated because the 16 Court’s permanent injunction prevents BabyBus from infringing Moonbug’s works going forward. 17 Dkt. No. 711 at 7. 18 Given that BabyBus limited its appeal to issues where appeal was objectively reasonable 19 and the only factor supporting fees for Moonbug is success on appeal, the Court finds that the 20 Fogerty factors do not support an award of appellate fees. See Seltzer, 725 F.3d at 1181. Such an 21 outcome furthers the goal of the fees statute to “encourage [] useful copyright litigation.” 22 Kirtsaeng, 579 U.S. at 205. Parties that lose at trial and are assessed with fees should not be 23 chilled by the potential imposition of further appellate fees from appealing a limited subset of 24 discrete issues on which reasonable minds may differ. 25 Moonbug’s motion for appellate fees is DENIED.

26 27 1 B. Is Moonbug Entitled to Judgment Enforcement Fees? 2 Moonbug also seeks to recover fees for its post-judgment enforcement and collection 3 work. Dkt. No. 798 at 4. Moonbug originally sought $407,550.75 in fees for 532.5 hours of 4 work, but in supplemental briefing revised its request to $315,488.00 in fees for 416.6 hours of 5 work. Dkt. No. 807. 6 Motions for fees incurred in obtaining judgments are “supplemental proceedings” such that 7 Federal Rule 69(a)(1) applies. Carnes v. Zamani, 488 F.3d 1057, 1060 (9th Cir. 2007). Under 8 Rule 69(a)(1), such proceedings “must accord with the procedure of the state where the court is 9 located, but a federal statute governs to the extent it applies.” Proceedings here took place in 10 California; Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 685.040 provides that “Attorney's fees incurred in enforcing a 11 judgment are not included in costs collectible under this title unless otherwise provided by law.” 12 California procedure thus brings the inquiry back to Section 505 of the Copyright Act, which 13 “neither expressly allows nor expressly bars recovery of post-judgment costs and fees.” WB 14 Music Corp. et al. v. Royce Int’l Broad. Corp. et al., No. DCV16600JGBSPX, 2021 WL 4330876, 15 at *2 (C.D. Cal. May 7, 2021). 16 Courts in this circuit have granted collection fees under the Copyright Act where unusual 17 or extraordinary collection efforts were required. See Odnil Music Ltd. v. Katharsis LLC, No. CIV 18 S-05-0545WBSEFBP, 2008 WL 958109, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2008), report and 19 recommendation adopted, No. S-05-0545 WBS EFB, 2008 WL 1930301 (E.D. Cal. May 1, 2008). 20 (granting fees for post-judgment collection efforts to amend a judgment to reflect the true 21 infringer, where the party seeking fees had disclaimed “traditional[]” collection costs); Erickson 22 Prods. Inc. v. Kast, No. 13-CV-05472-DMR, 2021 WL 3887797, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2021) 23 (awarding post judgment collection fees based on an “unrebutted” record that the party had taken 24 “unreasonable, uncooperative positions on the issue of collection”); WB Music Corp., 2021 WL 25 4330876, at *3 (awarding post-judgment collection fees). 26 The parties dispute whether BabyBus’ post-judgment conduct was “routine” or objectively 27 unreasonable. BabyBus argues that there was “no manufactured receivership, no serial motions to 1 opposing counsel” and that Moonbug’s costs were incurred by its “own aggressive litigation 2 choices, not from any misconduct by BabyBus.” Dkt. No. 800 at 11, 12. While BabyBus’ 3 conduct may not rise to the level of evasion that occurred in some other cases, multiple instances 4 of its conduct were unreasonable or evasive, including (1) BabyBus’ service of a Third Party 5 Claim of Superior Interest by Japan BabyBus Co. Ltd. on assets Moonbug sought to levy without 6 informing Moonbug; (2) BabyBus’ proffer of an unprepared 30(b)(6) witness on collection topics 7 and subsequent opposition to Moonbug’s attempt to hold a further 30(b)(6), despite not “seriously 8 disputing” that the prior 30(b)(6) witness was inadequate; (3) the Court’s finding that BabyBus 9 has “sought to thwart enforcement of levies on their U.S. revenues by using Japan BabyBus as a 10 shell to launder the money”; (4) BabyBus’s repeated representations to the Court, to Moonbug, 11 and to levied third-parties (without Moonbug’s knowledge) that BabyBus was on the verge of 12 satisfying the judgment, rendering further levied payments or court actions unnecessary, only to 13 leave those representations unfulfilled; and (5) BabyBus’ eleventh-hour move for a stay of 14 judgment after failing to meet its own proposed deadline for satisfying the judgment. While 15 BabyBus attempts to characterize its post-judgment conduct as overall reasonable because it paid 16 the judgment in full in less than a year, the record reflects that this payment came almost 17 exclusively from levied third-parties due to Moonbug’s “aggressive” collection efforts, not any 18 compliance by BabyBus. Indeed, the vast majority of BabyBus’ affirmative conduct during the 19 collection process only served to delay and proliferate litigation costs and collection proceedings. 20 As for the other Fogerty factors, looking only to issues litigated in the judgment 21 enforcement process, Moonbug had a high degree of success, winning a motion to assign assets, a 22 motion to amend the judgment, and obtaining practical success on its post-collection discovery 23 disputes. Further, in the BabyBus Japan assignment motion, the Court accepted Moonbug’s 24 contention that BabyBus’s actions were motivated by an intent to “thwart enforcement” of the 25 judgment, indicating improper motive. BabyBus’ conduct in opposing a further 30(b)(6) when it 26 did not deny that its prior offeree was inadequate was also frivolous. Only the final factor of 27 deterrence slightly favors BabyBus. As noted above, Moonbug has obtained a permanent 1 fees is warranted, but only for conduct that the Court determines to be objectively unreasonable; 2 Moonbug cannot claim its routine collection costs. 3 Following the Court’s order at oral argument, the parties submitted a chart detailing the 4 collection costs that Moonbug contends reflect extraordinary efforts. In the supplemental brief, 5 Moonbug reduces its collection fee demand to $315,488 for 416.6 hours. This reflects a reduction 6 of 23% for hours that Moonbug concedes to reflect routine collection work that is not 7 compensable. Dkt. No. 807. BabyBus does not dispute that 158.3 of Moonbug’s collection hours, 8 totaling $115,906.75 in fees, represent extraordinary efforts, but contend that the remaining hours 9 involved only routine collection work. 10 The parties categorize their disputes into four categories. According to Moonbug, these 11 categories encompass: (1) BabyBus Japan’s role, including “BabyBus Japan’s assertion that it held 12 a superior interest in funds subject to Moonbug’s levies (including the notice served on Google), 13 evaluating BabyBus Japan’s purported ownership and entitlement theories, pursuing discovery 14 into BabyBus Japan’s assets and relationship with BabyBus Co., and litigating related issues in 15 connection with Moonbug’s levies, the motion to assign assets, and the motion to add BabyBus 16 Japan as a judgment debtor”; (2) Babybus “unreasonable discovery conduct”, including “work 17 necessitated by BabyBus’ efforts to stonewall post-judgment discovery into its assets, including 18 drafting and serving targeted document requests and interrogatories, preparing for and taking post- 19 judgment depositions, conferring with BabyBus over its deficient responses and unprepared Rule 20 30(b)(6) witness, and preparing submissions regarding BabyBus’ discovery misconduct”; (3) 21 BabyBus’ reliance on a nonexistent stay and its last-minute stay motion, including “time spent 22 addressing BabyBus’ insistence that a stay existed when no stay was in place (because BabyBus 23 never posted a sufficient security), responding to BabyBus’ changing stay-related positions or lack 24 thereof during meet-and-confer and in court, and opposing BabyBus’ belated motion to stay 25 enforcement based on purported difficulties in securing a bond and an inadequate proposal to 26 substitute an attorney-controlled U.S. bank account as security”; (4) fees incurred preparing 27 Moonbug’s fees motion. Dkt. No. 807 at 1-2. 1 enforcement—levy follow-ups, demand letters, payment tracking, and generic strategy 2 conferences with no link to the Japan BabyBus motions”; (2) fee entries for “drafting 3 interrogatories and document requests, scheduling depositions, corresponding with opposing 4 counsel about objections, preparing joint discovery letters for Magistrate Judge Westmore, and 5 conferring about the scope of asset discovery,” including discovery “aimed at identifying assets, 6 accounts, and debts,” which BabyBus contends is routine collection work, and billing entries for 7 unfiled or improperly filed motions; (3) research on motions to stay in the Ninth Circuit, which 8 BabyBus contends relates to an appellate stay, rather than district court stay, and Moonbug’s work 9 opposing BabyBus’ request for a stay in April 2025; (4) Moonbug’s fees on fees request, which 10 BabyBus contends was overbroad in requesting appellate fees and routine collection fees that the 11 Court has declined to grant. Dkt. No. 807 at 6-10. 12 As a general matter, as to category one, the Court agrees with BabyBus that fee entries that 13 reflect initial levy demands are routine collection work for which fees are not appropriate. But the 14 additional follow-on collection work caused by Japan BabyBus’ assertion of superior interest is 15 not routine work. Regardless of whether the time entries referred to Japan BabyBus by name, the 16 delay in third-party collection and the additional work required was due to the complications 17 caused by BabyBus Japan’s notice of superior interest and BabyBus’ ex parte representations to 18 third parties about the status of collection. Moonbug became aware of BabyBus Japan’s 19 interference on August 14, 2024; the Court finds that Moonbug’s levying and collection work after 20 this date is tainted by the Japan BabyBus issue and compensable. 21 As to category two, it is true that in some cases, discovery aimed at identifying assets may 22 be reasonable, routine discovery work, particularly where the defendant’s ability to pay is unclear. 23 In this case, however, BabyBus is a large, well-resourced company with sophisticated counsel. 24 Asset discovery should not have been required for BabyBus to make timely payment of its 25 judgment; the Court therefore finds that in this case, Moonbug’s discovery work into assets 26 reflected efforts above and beyond the typical case, which was necessitated by BabyBus’ pattern 27 of stonewalling. BabyBus’ behind-the-scenes maneuvering with Japan BabyBus and shifting 1 judgment enforcement discovery does not reflect overzealousness on the part of counsel but rather 2 a prudent assessment of BabyBus’ ongoing efforts to delay or avoid payment. 3 In this category, BabyBus also disputes work on two motions it labels as 4 “Improper/Abandoned” motions. The first concerns a motion to compel that Moonbug improperly 5 filed before the Court, rather than the magistrate judge. The second concerns a motion for 6 sanctions that was never filed. The Court credits BabyBus’ argument as to the first motion, which 7 Magistrate Judge Westmore terminated as improperly filed as a motion, rather than a joint 8 discovery letter. Dkt. No. 756. BabyBus is not responsible for fees for Moonbug’s error. As to 9 the second motion, Moonbug represents that the work originally intended as a sanctions motion 10 was ultimately repurposed for its successful motion to add BabyBus Japan to the judgment. Hrg. 11 Tr. 16:2-5. The timing and progression of the billing entries in October, leading up to the 12 November 4 filing of the BabyBus Japan motion, support this representation. Dkt. No. 807-1 at 13 13-16; Dkt. No. 738. However, several of the billing entries regarding this motion refer to 14 drafting a portion of the motion “related to depositions,” presumably, the 30(b)(6) deposition that 15 occurred in late September, at which BabyBus presented an unprepared witness. Given that 16 Moonbug chose not to file this motion but instead to seek relief for the unprepared deposition 17 witness in other ways (for which it will recover its costs), the Court will not hold BabyBus 18 compensable for work on the unfiled motion that related to depositions. Accordingly, the Court 19 excludes most but not all of the time entries labeled by BabyBus as “Disputed - Improper 20 /Abandoned Motions.” 21 Regarding the stay category, the Court agrees with BabyBus that work relating to a stay 22 imposed by the Ninth Circuit is out-of-scope.1 However, the Court agrees with Moonbug that its 23 work opposing BabyBus’ stay in April, 2025 is compensable. The stay motion was filed at the 24 eleventh hour, after BabyBus had missed its own deadline – agreed to in a filed stipulation – for 25 satisfying the judgment, and BabyBus withdrew the motion after Moonbug filed its opposition. 26

27 1 Other than the three billing entries called out by BabyBus, the Court finds no other references to ] The motion was unreasonable and time-wasting, and BabyBus should bear its expense. Finally, 2 || as to fees on fees, the Court applies a fifty percent discount to the fee work to reflect that 3 Moonbug was unsuccessful as to the appellate fees sought. 4 Having reviewed the joint time entry chart in light of the above, the Court finds that 5 || Moonbug incurred $279,962.75 in compensable fees for extraordinary collection work. 6 7 I. CONCLUSION 8 Moonbug’s motion for appellate fees is DENIED. Moonbug’s motion for judgment 9 || enforcement fees is GRANTED in part; Moonbug is awarded $279,962.75 in fees. 10 1] IT IS SO ORDERED. a 12

|| Dated: 4/22/2026

EDWARD M. CHEN = 16 United States District Judge

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