COLE, Judge.
Once again Craig Wesley Moon has petitioned this Court for relief. Moon’s difficulties stem from his involvement in an automobile accident of February 18, 1979, on U.S. Route 140. Moon was travelling north when he collided with a vehicle in the southbound lane killing the driver and passenger of that vehicle. He was tried and convicted of two counts of automobile manslaughter, two counts of homicide by motor vehicle while intoxicated, reckless driving, driving while intoxicated, negligent driving and failing to drive on the right half of the road. The first time this matter came to our attention the State requested our review of a per curiam opinion of the Court of Special Appeals reversing Moon’s conviction because that Court determined that certain test results were received into evidence in violation of Md.Code (1974, 1980 Repl.Vol.) §§ 10-302 to 10-309, Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. Moon v. State, No. 154, September Term, 1980, filed October 30, 1980. This Court reversed the Court of Special Appeals because we held that the blood taken from Moon and the chemical test performed thereon were done to determine treatment required rather than as evidence for criminal prosecution. We remanded this case to the court to consider the issues raised but not decided. State v. Moon, 291 Md. 463, 436 A.2d 420 (1981). On remand the Court of Special Appeals affirmed Moon’s convictions. Moon v. State, No. 154, September Term, 1980, per curiam opinion filed February 10, 1982.
Thereafter this Court granted Moon’s petition for certiorari and issued its per curiam order
[357]*357without affirmance or reversal, with instructions to answer the question “Were the results of Petitioner’s blood alcohol and osmolality tests admitted into evidence in violation of his constitutional right of confrontation?” [Moon v. State, 293 Md. 593, 445 A.2d 703 (1982).]
On remand the Court of Special Appeals concluded that because of their objective nature, “the admission of Moon’s blood alcohol and osmolality tests was not in violation of his constitutional right of confrontation.” Moon v. State, No. 154, September Term, 1980, per curiam opinion filed June 23, 1982, at 1.
Moon filed a petition for writ of certiorari which we granted to consider the constitutional issue raised. Before us Moon contends that his right of confrontation and cross-examination was violated by admitting the hospital tests into evidence without presenting the testimony of the technician who performed the chemical tests. We shall recite such of the facts as are necessary to place the issue in proper focus.
The accident occurred on February 18, 1979, at approximately 12:30 a.m. Testimony at trial indicated that prior to the accident Moon’s car was seen proceeding erratically at a high rate of speed. Persons arriving at the scene noted an odor of alcohol in Moon’s car. The medical attendant accompanying Moon in a State Police helicopter to the University of Maryland Shock Trauma Unit detected an odor of alcohol on Moon’s breath. At the hospital the attending physician ordered x-ray examinations and drug screening tests to be performed. An osmolality test was performed in the clinical laboratory of the Shock Trauma Unit and a blood alcohol test was performed in the hospital laboratory. The osmolality reading was 347 and the blood alcohol concentration was determined to be 0.165%. These tests results were a part of and included in Moon’s hospital records. The parties stipulated that the hospital records were kept in the ordinary course of the hospital’s business and it was unnecessary to produce the custodian of the records to authenticate the file as pertaining to Moon. However, the [358]*358stipulation did not extend to the admissibility of the osmolality and blood alcohol test results. The defense maintained that before the question of admissibility could be resolved it had the right to confront and cross-examine the laboratory technician who conducted the tests and obtained the results. The State argued that these tests were routine procedures followed by the hospital and were, therefore, admissible under the statutory business records exception to the hearsay rule as provided in Maryland Code (1974, 1980 Repl.Vol.) § 10-101, Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. Thus, the State persisted that the defendant’s right to confront the witnesses against him was outweighed by the inherent trustworthiness of the records and the fact that the laboratory technician was present and available in the courtroom at the time of trial was of no significance. The State, therefore, declined to call the technician. Because the defense was unwilling to vouch for the technician’s credibility, it, too, refused to call him as a witness.
The trial court admitted the hospital records as business records under the statute, and the State called Dr. Yale H. Caplan, Chief Toxicologist of the State Medical Examiner’s Office, over objection, to interpret the results of the blood alcohol and osmolality tests. Dr. Caplan testified that he was generally familiar with the blood testing procedures used at University Hospital; that an osmolality test is an objective test conducted prior to treatment to indicate preliminary if alcohol was involved in the condition of the patient; that the osmolality test is not a definitive test of alcohol but only an indicator; that a 347 osmolality reading is consistent with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.15 or 0.16%; that the blood analysis is very definitive with a high degree of precision and accuracy; that a person with a blood alcohol level of 0.165% will experience heightened self-confidence, increased reaction time, decreased concentration and impaired vision.
In addition to objecting to Dr. Caplan’s testimony, Moon claims he was denied the right to question the authenticity of these tests because the State did not produce the labora[359]*359tory technician. Moon contends that the blood alcohol test report is saddled with several significant discrepancies. First, the report does not state his name but rather contains the description “Male Doe 8515” in the blank following the notation “patient.” He admits that other documents in the hospital report specify his name and also contain the same number 8515. Moon further notes that the toxicology report indicates the time of blood withdrawal as “2-18-79 2:49 a.m.”; however, the date of the report is indicated as “2-21-79.” Moon argues that without the testimony of the technician, the trial court cannot be certain that the report is about him or why the blood test and/or report was not made until three days after the test was allegedly conducted. He maintains that the timeliness of a report has direct bearing on its reliability. Thus, Moon squarely poses before us the question of whether admitting the hospital records into evidence without first producing the laboratory technician as a witness violated his constitutional right of confrontation.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires that: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witness against him____” Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights requires that “in all criminal prosecutions, every man hath a right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him____” We note, therefore, that these provisions secure “the same right.” Crawford v. State, 282 Md. 210, 211, 383 A.2d 1097 (1978) (citing State v. Collins, 265 Md. 70, 288 A.2d 163 (1972)). Furthermore, because the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause has been held applicable to the states, see Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965), the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the federal right to confrontation is binding upon this State. Nevertheless, because the Maryland right has been a part of our law since 1776, a brief review of both the major Maryland and Supreme Court cases interpreting the confrontation right where the hearsay rule has been involved is in order.
[360]*360The first Maryland case in this area is Johns v. State, 55 Md. 350 (1881), in which the defendant was indicted as a defaulter under the Act of 1872, ch. 329, providing that the Comptroller’s certificate showing the taxes due shall “be received as prima facie evidence of such defalcation.” Id. at 359. Johnson contended that admitting the certificate violated his right to be confronted by the witnesses against him. The Court, however, rejected this argument, noting that this “provision of the Declaration of Rights is not to be understood as excluding all other evidence except oral evidence of witnesses produced in court.” Id. at 360.
The Court of Appeals later discussed Johns in Jones v. State, 205 Md. 528, 109 A.2d 732 (1954). In that case, the defendant had been convicted of abortion. At trial, the prosecuting witness’ testimony as to her pregnancy was uncertain; therefore, the State sought to prove pregnancy through the testimony of the head of the department of obstetrics and gynecology at the hospital in which the victim had been treated after the “abortion.” The doctor had never seen the victim; however, he had examined her hospital records and brought them to court. The defense objected to admitting the hospital records without referring to the right of confrontation. Thereafter, the doctor testified about the substance of what was contained in the records without any reference to those records. The Court held that because the doctor gave the impression of testifying from personal knowledge as if he were her attending physician, permitting such testimony was erroneous.
Even though the hospital record was neither offered in evidence nor referred to in testimony and the defendant at trial had failed to raise any objection based on Article 21 of the Declaration of Rights, the Court indicated that the hospital record would have been admissible under the business records statute. The Court construed Johns as having “held that the right of confrontation does not apply to documentary evidence, and that the Legislature has the constitutional power to change the common law rules of evidence as to what documents are admissible and the [361]*361weight to be attributed to them, even in criminal cases.” Id. at 533. This sweeping conclusion extended well beyond the facts with which the Court was faced in Jones. Subsequent cases have indicated that a more thorough analysis is required in a confrontation case than the sweeping deference to legislative alteration of evidence law suggested in Jones.
In 1965, the Supreme Court in Pointer v. Texas, supra, held that the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation is a fundamental right made obligatory on the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. In that case, Pointer and a co-defendant were taken before a judge for a preliminary hearing on a charge of robbery. The victim testified at this hearing, identifying Pointer as the robber; however, neither of the defendants was represented by counsel. The victim moved to California and at trial the transcript of his preliminary hearing testimony was introduced as evidence. Pointer was convicted and the Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the testimony was taken at a time when Pointer was not afforded through counsel an adequate opportunity to cross-examine the witness, he was denied his privilege of confrontation.
The Court in Pointer cited earlier cases dealing with the Confrontation Clause to illustrate the Court’s understanding of this constitutional guarantee. For instance, in Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 15 S.Ct. 337, 39 L.Ed. 409 (1895), the Court offered one of its earliest interpretations of the Confrontation Clause:
The primary object of the constitutional provision in question was to prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits such as were sometimes admitted in civil cases, being used against the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination of the witness in which the accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he [362]*362gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief. There is doubtless reason for saying that the accused should never lose the benefit of any of these safeguards even by the death of the witness; and that, if notes of his testimony are permitted to be read, he is deprived of the advantage of that personal presence of the witness before the jury which the law has designed for his protection. But general rules of. law of this kind, however beneficent in their operation and valuable to the accused, must occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case. To say that a criminal, after having once been convicted by the testimony of a certain witness, should go scot free simply because death has closed the mouth of that witness, would be carrying his constitutional protection to an unwarrantable extent. The law in its wisdom declares that the rights of the public shall not be wholly sacrificed in order that an incidental benefit may be preserved to the accused. [Id. at 242-43, 15 S.Ct. at 339-40.]
Thus, in Mattox where the witness had already given testimony under oath and had been cross-examined, his prior recorded testimony was admissible when he was unavailable at a subsequent trial.
On several occasions following Pointer the Supreme Court has further defined the confrontation right. In Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 85 S.Ct. 1074, 13 L.Ed.2d 934 (1965), and Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968), the Court found violations of the defendant’s confrontation rights because of an inability to cross-examine an accomplice whose statement incriminating the defendant was presented to the jury. In Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 88 S.Ct. 1318, 20 L.Ed.2d 255 (1968), the Court recognized that the confrontation requirement is not violated when prior testimony that has been subject to cross-examination is utilized because the witness has become unavailable. However, in that case the Court noted that “a witness is not ‘unavailable’ for the purposes of the foregoing exception to the confrontation [363]*363requirement unless the prosecutorial authorities have made a good-faith effort to obtain his presence at trial.” Id. at 724-25, 88 S.Ct. at 1322. In Barber, the Court found that the witness was not “unavailable” because the State made no effort to procure the witness’ presence.
In California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970), the majority and a concurring opinion addressed the basic relationship between the hearsay rule and the right of confrontation. In that case the chief prosecution witness was present at trial yet became evasive; therefore, he was questioned regarding prior inconsistent statements that inculpated the defendant. California law allowed the substantive use of the statements to prove the truth of the matters asserted therein. The defendant was convicted and the California Supreme Court affirmed a lower court’s reversal, reasoning that substantive use of a prior inconsistent statement was precluded by the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. The Supreme Court vacated this judgment concluding that this alteration of California’s evidence law did not violate the defendant’s constitutional rights.
The Supreme Court began its analysis by reviewing the relationship between the Confrontation Clause and the hearsay rule. The Court noted:
While it may readily be conceded that hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause are generally designed to protect similar values, it is quite a different thing to suggest that the overlap is complete and that the Confrontation Clause is nothing more or less than a codification of the rules of hearsay and their exceptions as they existed historically at common law. Our decisions have never established such a congruence; indeed, we have more than once found a violation of confrontation values even though the statements in issue were admitted under an arguably recognized hearsay exception. See Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 [88 S.Ct. 1318, 20 L.Ed.2d 255] (1968); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 [85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923] (1965). The converse is equally true: merely be[364]*364cause evidence is admitted in violation of a long-established hearsay rule does not lead to the automatic conclusion that confrontation rights have been denied. [Id., 399 U.S. at 155-56, 90 S.Ct. at 1933-34 (footnote omitted).]1
The Court reasoned that because the literal right to “confront” witnesses formed “the core of the values furthered by the Confrontation Clause ... there is good reason to conclude that the Confrontation Clause is not violated by admitting a declarant’s out-of-court statements, as long as the declarant is testifying as a witness and subject to full and effective cross-examination.” Id. at 157-58, 90 S.Ct. at 1934-35. The Court then evaluated the purposes of confrontation: (1) to insure that statements are given under oath; (2) to force the witness to submit to cross-examination; and (3) to permit the jury to observe the witness’ demeanor. Id. at 158, 90 S.Ct. at 1935. Thus, the Court reasoned that even if an out-of-court statement is admitted, as a practical matter most of the benefits of these protections are regained when that declarant is present and testifying at trial. However, Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion argued that the Confrontation Clause simply requires the prosecution to “produce any available witness whose declarations it seeks to use in a criminal trial.” Id. at 174, 90 S.Ct. at 1943 (Harlan, J., concurring). See generally Note, Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule, 75 Yale L.J. 1434 (1966); Westen, The Future of Confrontation, 77 Mich.L.Rev. 1185 (1979).
In Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 91 S.Ct. 210, 27 L.Ed.2d 213 (1970), a plurality opinion, the defendant (Evans) was convicted of first-degree murder. At trial Shaw, an inmate of the same institution as Williams (an accomplice to the [365]*365murders), testified that when Williams returned from his arraignment he lamented that if it hadn’t been for Evans “we wouldn’t be in this now.” Shaw’s testimony was admitted under the Georgia co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the District Court’s denial of Evans’ petition for writ of habeas corpus, concluding that he had been denied his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. The Supreme Court reversed, but could not agree on the appropriate rationale.
The plurality opinion reaffirmed the Court’s refusal to equate the Confrontation Clause and the hearsay rule. In concluding that admitting the statements did not deprive the defendant of his constitutional right, the plurality focused on two factors. First, it noted that the case did not involve evidence that was “crucial” or “devastating,” because there were nineteen other prosecuting witnesses. Second, the plurality noted that the statement was offered to identify Evans and there were sufficient indicia of reliability in connection with the use of this statement in that it was spontaneous and against Williams’ penal interest.
Justice Harlan concurred in the result, concluding that due process of law really is the appropriate standard for reviewing state rules of evidence. Harlan explained his departure from the position he took in California v. Green, supra, stating that certain types of evidence, notably business records, were so intrinsically reliable that requiring production of the declarant may be difficult, if not pointless.
Two Maryland cases followed Green and Dutton. In State v. Collins, 265 Md. 70, 288 A.2d 163 (1972), this Court concluded that the defendant’s right to be confronted by his accusers was violated by admitting an unavailable witness’ deposition when the defendant received no notice of, and was not present at, the deposition. Judge Digges observed that traditionally there have been limited exceptions to the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses. “But these aberrations have only been permitted after close scrutiny [366]*366has disclosed that this type of evidence is both necessary and so intrinsically reliable that it need not be subjected to the rigors of cross-examination.” Id. at 78, 288 A.2d 163 (footnote omitted) (emphasis supplied).
In Crawford v. State, 282 Md. 210, 383 A.2d 1097 (1978), we concluded that the defendant’s confrontation right was not violated by using testimony elicited at a preliminary hearing when the witness was unavailable for trial. In that case, the witness’ demonstrated unavailability obviously made it necessary for the State to use her prior testimony. Thus, Chief Judge Murphy focused on whether the testimony at the prior judicial proceeding was sufficiently reliable. Citing the test elucidated by the Supreme Court in Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 92 S.Ct. 2308, 33 L.Ed.2d 293 (1972), that there must be sufficient “indicia of reliability” associated with the former testimony, the Court concluded that the testimony was basically reliable and thus admissible at trial.
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980), represents the most recent Supreme Court case in this area. Roberts had been arrested and charged with forgery and possession of stolen credit cards belonging to Bernard Isaacs and his wife. At a preliminary hearing, Roberts called the Isaacs’ daughter, Anita, and tried to elicit an admission that she, in fact, had given him the checks and credit cards; however, she denied this. At trial, Anita did not appear although the State had issued several subpoenas to her at her parents’ residence. Roberts testified that Anita had given him the cards and checks to use, and the State offered the transcript of Anita’s testimony on rebuttal. The trial court conducted a voir dire hearing after Roberts asserted that use of the transcript violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause. Mrs. Isaacs testified that Anita had left home for Tucson, Arizona, and later was in San Francisco. She had only talked with Anita twice and knew of no way to contact her. The trial court admitted the transcript and the Court of Appeals of Ohio reversed, concluding that the State failed to show that it made a “good-faith effort” to secure Anita’s presence. The [367]*367Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed on other grounds, nonetheless holding the transcript inadmissible.
The Supreme Court noted that it was “called upon to consider once again the relationship between the Confrontation Clause and the hearsay rule with its many exceptions.” Id. at 62, 100 S.Ct. at 2537. The Court acknowledged that it had proceeded gradually in this area, but suggested that “a general approach to the problem is discernible.” Id. at 65, 100 S.Ct. at 2538. The Court stated:
The Confrontation Clause operates in two separate ways to restrict the range of admissible hearsay. First, in conformance with the Framers’ preference for face-to-face accusation, the Sixth Amendment establishes a rule of necessity. In the usual case (including cases were prior cross-examination has occurred), the prosecution must either produce, or demonstrate the unavailability of, the declarant whose statement it wishes to use against the defendant. See Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 [92 S.Ct. 2308, 33 L.Ed.2d 293] (1972); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 [88 S.Ct. 1318, 20 L.Ed.2d 255] (1968). See also Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458 [20 S.Ct. 993, 44 L.Ed. 1150] (1900); California v. Green, 399 U.S., at 161-162, 165, 167, n. 16 [90 S.Ct., at 1936-1937, 1939 n. 16].7
The second aspect operates once a witness is shown to be unavailable. Reflecting its underlying purpose to augment accuracy in the factfinding process by ensuring the defendant an effective means to test adverse evidence, the Clause countenances only hearsay marked with such trustworthiness that “there is no material departure from the reason of the general rule.” Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. [97] at 107 [54 S.Ct. 330 at 333].
* s¡c * * * *
The Court has applied this “indicia of reliability” requirement principally by concluding that certain hearsay exceptions rest upon such solid foundations that admission of virtually any evidence within them comports with [368]*368the “substance of the constitutional protection.” Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S., at 244 [15 S.Ct., at 340].8 This reflects the truism that “hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause are generally designed to protect similar values,” California v. Green, 399 U.S., at 155 [90 S.Ct., at 1933], and “stem from the same roots,” Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86 [91 S.Ct. 210, 218, 27 L.Ed.2d 213] (1970). It also responds to the need for certainty in the workaday world of conducting criminal trials.
In sum, when a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause normally requires a showing that he is unavailable. Even then, his statement is admissible only if it bears adequate “indicia of reliability.” Reliability can be inferred without more in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. In other cases, the evidence must be excluded, at least absent a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.9 [Id. 448 U.S. at 65-66, 100 S.Ct. at 2538-2539.]
In footnote 7, the Court indicated when “unavailability” might not be required. Citing Dutton v. Evans, supra, the Court suggested that if the utility of trial confrontation is “so remote” the prosecution would not be required to produce a seemingly available witness.
The Court then applied this analysis to the facts in Roberts. The reliability aspect of the test was satisfied because Roberts’ attorney effectively cross-examined the witness at the preliminary hearing. Although she was called by the defense, the form of her examination was “replete with leading questions” and was the equivalent of significant cross-examination. Thus, the defense was able to test the reliability of the testimony. Regarding availability, the Court held that the trial court of Ohio correctly concluded that the witness’ unavailability had been established.
These cases make indelibly clear that the essence of the Confrontation Clause is to secure the right of the [369]*369defendant to have the witness against him produced in court. An exception is noted when the witness is unavailable and has made an otherwise trustworthy out-of-court statement. In such circumstances, unavailability may be established when the State demonstrates a good-faith effort to produce the witness but to no avail.
The cases also suggest circumstances where the courts have found no confrontation violation because the evidence to be offered is clothed with substantial indicia of reliability. Such evidence is admitted without the declarant’s testimony when producing the witness would likely prove unavailing or pointless. Business and hospital records fall within this category and generally the hearsay exception which allows their admission is expressed by statutory enactment.
The Maryland legislature has evidenced its approval of a business records exception to the hearsay rule in Md.Code (1974, 1984 Repl.Yol.) § 10-101, Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. However, as to the admissibility of records of alcohol test results in prosecutions for crimes growing out of drunk driving, Maryland seems to have made a policy statement and expressed its deep concern with the preservation of a defendant’s right of confrontation in prosecutions under the statute. The legislature made clear that alcohol test results are ordinarily reliable and generally admissible as business records. See Md.Code (1974, 1984 Repl.Vol.) §§ 10-302 to 10-309, Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (generally dealing with procuring and using alcohol test results). Section 10-306 governs the admissibility of the test results and provides:
(a) Subject to the provisions of subsection (b), in any criminal trial in which intoxication due to the consumption of alcohol, or being under the influence of alcohol, is an issue, an official copy of the results of a chemical test of breath or blood administered by a person authorized to administer the test, is admissible as substantive evidence without the presence or testimony of the technician who administered the test.
[370]*370(b) If the State decides to offer the test results without the testimony of the technician, it shall, at least 15 days before trial, notify the defendant or his attorney in writing of its intention and deliver to the defendant or his attorney a copy of the test results to be offered. If the defendant desires the technician to be present and testify at trial, he shall notify the court and the State in writing no later than 5 business days before trial; and if such timely and proper notice is given, the test results are inadmissible without the testimony of the technician. ■Failure to give timely and proper notice constitutes a waiver of the defendant’s right to the presence and testimony of the technician.
It seems to us that § 10-306(b) was designed to subordinate the admissibility of alcohol test results to the timely assertion of the defendant’s right of confrontation. The statute requires the tester to be produced, upon the defendant’s request, before the evidence may be admitted despite its reliability, and the defendant does not have to proffer what he intends to prove from this witness. In these circumstances, the legislature has safeguarded the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right and elevated it over what the statute has declared to be reliable evidence. Moon, of course, contends that the stricture of 10-306(b) pertains to these proceedings since the charges he must answer emanate from drunk driving. However, we held in State v. Moon, 291 Md. 463, 436 A.2d 420 (1981), that §§ 10-302 to 10-309 did not specifically apply to these proceedings where blood was taken from Moon as part of his treatment rather than for prosecution under the statute. We do not retreat from that position; nor is it necessary for us to go so far. Suffice it to say that we believe that where the record of alcohol test results, on its face, gives rise to a question as to the reliability of the record and the tester is available and the defendant interposes a seasonable objection, testimony of the declarant is neither frivolous nor pointless. Rather, it is error not to require the declarant to testify before the record is admitted. We believe that this [371]*371holding secures to the defendant his right of confrontation and is consistent with the legislative policy which accords alcohol test results less deference than other business records.
Here, the witness was present in the courtroom when Moon objected, pointing to a number of discrepancies on the face of the report which raised a doubt as to its reliability. Moon claimed that the hospital records were silent as to the kind of blood alcohol test performed. Dr. Caplan had indicated that while he was generally familiar with the tests employed at University Hospital, he did not know which specific procedure of the many tests used in the hospital was followed. As a matter of fact, when defense counsel sought to have the Doctor explain how a blood test was performed, the trial court cut off the cross-examination in response to the State’s objection. It is obvious to us that, under these circumstances, defense counsel had a sound basis for inquiring what test was used and if the technician was qualified to conduct the test.
Furthermore, the report indicated that it was completed on February 21, and the blood was drawn from the patient on February 18. These facts raise several potentially serious questions counsel may have addressed on cross-examination. Defense counsel in argument had told the trial court that the test was performed on the 21st and the blood drawn on the 18th. He did not know what happened to the blood sample in the interim, that is, how or if it was properly preserved. Cross-examination on whether chemical agents were added to the blood to maintain its stability, if the blood was deposited in a container to avoid evaporation, and if the blood was properly refrigerated to prevent putrefaction was germane to a determination of reliability. See generally American Medical Association, Committee on Medicolegal Problems, Alcohol and the Impaired Driver, A Manual on the Medicolegal Aspects of Chemical Tests for Intoxication (1968). A most important question was whether the blood test was performed on the 21st as part of Moon’s treatment. Moon had been in the hospital three [372]*372days, been operated on and placed in casts for his injuries prior to February 21st.’ It would be logical for counsel to inquire how blood drawn on the 18th and tested on the 21st had any diagnostic value' for treatment already received. If counsel elicited from the technician that the test was conducted on the 21st in response to a police request, the trial judge may have concluded that the test was not performed in connection with Moon’s treatment and, therefore, was not pathologically germane to the reason Moon was in the hospital. See Yellow Cab Co. v. Hicks, 224 Md. 563, 168 A.2d 501 (1961); Shirks Motor Express v. Oxenham, 204 Md. 626, 106 A.2d 46 (1954); Lee v. Housing Authority of Baltimore, 203 Md. 453, 101 A.2d 832 (1954); Globe Indemnity Co. v. Reinhart, 152 Md. 439, 137 A. 43 (1927). Counsel may even have inquired as to how the test, even if performed on the 18th, was pathologically germane to Moon’s treatment if it were not transmitted to the doctors until the 21st. Under these circumstances, the trial court may have been persuaded that the test was inadmissible.
Moon also complained that the report did not bear his name but rather a number. We do not speculate as to what Moon’s counsel would seek to prove by cross-examining the witness on this point. We do take note that trial counsel is often resourceful and ingenious in making use of the right of cross-examination. Suffice it to say here that the areas we single out are important enough to indicate that cross-examination would not have been frivolous or pointless.
While we recognize that ordinarily hospital (business) records are regarded as reliable, here, because Moon was denied the right to be confronted with the technician, it is questionable whether the report was properly admitted under the business records statute. Section 10-101(c) of the Courts Article requires that business records be made “at the time they are done or within a reasonable time afterwards.” [Emphasis supplied.] No testimony was presented at trial regarding standard hospital procedure and there was no explanation for the three-day delay if it is assumed the test was made on the 18th. Timeliness in [373]*373preparing a business record is logically related to the reliability of the record itself. Here, we can make no accurate assessment of the document’s reliability because the means of testing its trustworthiness were withheld from, the defendant.
In short, we conclude that although § 10-306 of the Courts Article has no application to the facts in this case, the policy set forth therein buttresses the conclusion we have reached through constitutional analysis—that Moon’s right of confrontation guaranteed by Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights and the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution was denied when the trial court did not require the testimony of the technician before admitting the alcohol test results.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT TO REVERSE THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR CARROLL COUNTY AND REMAND TO THAT COURT FOR A NEW TRIAL. CARROLL COUNTY TO PAY THE COSTS.