Moon v. Ryan

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: May 8, 2026
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2026-0673
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

ADRIAN DAMICO MOON, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 1:26-cv-00673 (UNA) ) JOSEPH MICHAEL ) FRANCIS RYAN, III, ) ) Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is before the court on its initial review of Plaintiff’s pro se Complaint, ECF

No. 1, and Application for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis, ECF No. 2. The court grants the

in forma pauperis Application, and for the reasons discussed below, dismisses this matter as

frivolous.

Plaintiff’s Complaint is rambling and largely incomprehensible. He sues a single

Defendant, a D.C. Superior Court judge, alleging that he, and many others, including several other

judges and “Satan,” have engaged in an “evil, vicious, heinous” criminal conspiracy to ignore or

deny his motions, rule unfavorably, and enter a pre-filing injunction, and have also allegedly

committed myriad other crimes and wrongdoing, including, but not limited to, stalking, murder,

theft, destruction, false arrest, abduction, kidnapping, and domestic terrorism. The remainder of

the pleading consists of sweeping religious proclamations.

“A complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A complaint that lacks “an arguable basis either in

law or in fact” is frivolous, Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989), and a “complaint plainly abusive of the judicial process is properly typed malicious,” Crisafi v. Holland, 655 F.2d 1305,

1309 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The instant Complaint falls into both categories; accordingly, the court

cannot exercise subject matter jurisdiction over it. See Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-37

(1974) (“Over the years, this Court has repeatedly held that the federal courts are without power

to entertain claims otherwise within their jurisdiction if they are ‘so attenuated and unsubstantial

as to be absolutely devoid of merit.’”) (quoting Newburyport Water Co. v. Newburyport, 193 U.S.

561, 579 (1904)); Tooley v. Napolitano, 586 F.3d 1006, 1010 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (examining cases

dismissed “for patent insubstantiality,” including where the plaintiff allegedly “was subjected to a

campaign of surveillance and harassment.”).

As here, a court shall dismiss a complaint as frivolous “when the facts alleged rise to the

level of the irrational or the wholly incredible,” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992), or

“postulat[e] events and circumstances of a wholly fanciful kind,” Crisafi, 655 F.2d at 1307–08

(D.C. Cir. 1981); see also Ibrahim v. Dist. of Columbia, Nos. 93–0002, Civ. A. 93–0060, 1993

WL 30814, at *1 (D.D.C. Jan. 29, 1993) (finding the plaintiff’s “assertion that . . . matters were

decided against him because the Courts conspired” against him was frivolous where the “facts

only support the notion that the Judges in . . . those cases diligently worked on his complaints [but]

decided them against him”), appeal dismissed sub nom. Ibrahim v. D.C. Dep’t of Corrections, No.

93-7029, 1993 WL 328110 (D.C. Cir. July 7, 1993) (per curiam) (finding no basis for appeal).

For all of the foregoing reasons, the Complaint, ECF No. 1, and this case, are dismissed

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). A separate Order accompanies this Memorandum

Opinion.

DATE: May 8, 2026 /s/ CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER United States District Judge