Mood v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America

379 F. Supp. 2d 267, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10228, 2005 WL 1869728
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. New York
DecidedMay 31, 2005
Docket04-CV-1488
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 379 F. Supp. 2d 267 (Mood v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Mood v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 379 F. Supp. 2d 267, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10228, 2005 WL 1869728 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM, ORDER and JUDGMENT

WEINSTEIN, Senior District Judge.

Table of Contents

I. Introduction..269

II. The Problems Created by the Theory of Review...270

III. Facts...;.271

IV. Standard of Review .273

A. Law . 273 I

B. Analysis of Law . 03

Y. Merits of the Claim .. t — 1 OO 03
A. Issue of Reversal rH CO 03
B. Issue of Remand rH CO 03
VI. Conclusion. to 00 to
I. Introduction

Plaintiff Rita J. Mood sues defendants Yasuda Fire and Marine Insurance Company of America Long Term Disability Plan (the “Plan”) and Prudential Insurance Company of America (“Prudential”), the Plan administrator. She contends that she was improperly denied long-term disability benefits under the Plan, an employee welfare benefit arrangement governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 1001-1461. The district court reviews the denial to determine whether Prudential’s decision should be approved, or remanded for further proceedings, with *270 a direction to provide benefits, or for other action. The leading opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit leaves room for clarification. See Nichols v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 406 F.3d 98 (2d Cir.2005). For the reasons stated below, a remand is ordered.

II. The Problems Created by the Theory of Review

Among the questions now posed are the following: Did Prudential reasonably construe the medical and other evidence before it? Does the record cover medical determinations as to which reasonable doctors can differ, such as the claims of “multiple chemical sensitivity” and of carpal tunnel syndrome and the intensity of the claimed disabling symptoms? Even if there is a “multiple chemical sensitivity” defect causing some difficulty to claimant, is it reasonable for a person in her condition under current socioeconomic conditions not to seek employment? Would a reasonable potential employer hire this claimant even if she were eager to work, though she was perhaps somewhat disabled? Triers such as plan administrators and courts bring their own biases and life experiences into an assessment of what is reasonable in answering each of these questions.

The problem is quite different from that of determining whether a specific event took place in the real world — e.g., did defendant fire a gun into the deceased’s heart, or did an employee fall off a ladder while obtaining a box of Wheaties for a customer? The terms “disability,” “permanent disability,” “employability,” “nature and degree of disease,” and the like, all are somewhat subjective and somewhat vague, with varying factual and legal content. They are analogous to concepts such as “negligence” in tort actions, “disability” in social security actions, and “reasonableness” in applying Supreme Court rulings in habeas corpus proceedings.

Solution is further complicated because the federal courts (appellate as well as trial) are expected to decide not how they would have decided the issue were they the administrator, but whether the administrator’s decision should be validated by the courts. In this respect, the problem is somewhat similar to that described in United States v. Copeland, 369 F.Supp.2d 275, 276 (E.D.N.Y.2005), where the trial court was directed to decide how a hypothetical administrative immigration body would have decided a fact-law issue had it ruled on the issue a decade ago.

A judge may say, “I believe a mistake was made by the administrator,” but in the back of his or her mind will be the question, “What would other federal judges conclude?” Were there an attempt to think of the problem in quantitative terms it might proceed somewhat like this: How would a group of randomly chosen federal appellate judges (or trial judges) think a group of randomly chosen administrators would evaluate the diagnosis of claimant made by a group of randomly chosen specialist doctors (or general practitioners, as the case may be); how would a group of randomly selected employees with claimant’s alleged medical problems react to their difficulties in looking for a job; and how would a group of randomly selected potential employers react to a job-seeker such as the claimant with her alleged medical difficulties? And, in this chain of probabilities, what numbers should be required in each link?

As indicated below, infra Part IV, the courts in the Second Circuit, as elsewhere, approach the problem by first deciding whether federal trial and appellate courts should apply a “de novo ” or an “arbitrary and capricious” standard in reviewing the administrator’s decision. Conceptually, *271 the phrases “de novo ” and “abuse of discretion” are not well-defined cubbyholes, but areas on a spectrum of doubt about the reasonableness of the administrator’s decision. “Arbitrary and capricious” is not completely arbitrary and capricious, like tossing a coin might be, but unreasonably arbitrary and capricious under the circumstances. And “de novo,” while reflecting the usual Latin obscurantism of the law, does not really mean the judge will decide as on a clean slate without considering the decision of the administrator (or on appeal the decision also of the trial court). Even the most egocentric federal judge applying de novo revieiv will give some weight to what the presumably more expert or experienced plan administrator actually did, even if that weight is applied sub rosa or subconsciously. Both de novo and arbitrary and capricious standards pack a good deal of reviewer subjectivity.

Another way of describing the court’s review process is to paraphrase Holmes: It is a prediction of what a large group of randomly selected federal judges would by consensus conclude on the same record as the administrator had before it. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HaRV. L.Rev. 457 (1897). If most would disagree with the administrator, there was an abuse of discretion; if a considerable number would disagree, de novo review requires remand. Cf, e.g., Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 409, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000); Henry v. Poole, 409 F.3d 48, 68, 2005 WL 1220468, at *18 (2d Cir.2005) (“Williams

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Durham v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America
890 F. Supp. 2d 390 (S.D. New York, 2012)
Mood v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America
313 F. App'x 381 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Suarato v. Building Services 32BJ Pension Fund
554 F. Supp. 2d 399 (S.D. New York, 2008)
Tsagari v. Pitney Bowes, Inc. Long-Term Disability Plan
473 F. Supp. 2d 334 (D. Connecticut, 2007)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
379 F. Supp. 2d 267, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10228, 2005 WL 1869728, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mood-v-prudential-insurance-co-of-america-nyed-2005.