Montlake Community v. Central Pugent Sound

43 P.3d 57
CourtCourt of Appeals of Washington
DecidedApril 1, 2002
Docket46708-5-I
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 43 P.3d 57 (Montlake Community v. Central Pugent Sound) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Montlake Community v. Central Pugent Sound, 43 P.3d 57 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002).

Opinion

43 P.3d 57 (2002)
110 Wash.App. 731

MONTLAKE COMMUNITY CLUB, a Washington nonprofit corporation, et. al., Appellant,
v.
CENTRAL PUGET SOUND GROWTH MANAGEMENT HEARINGS BOARD; and The City of Seattle, a Washington municipal corporation, Respondents.

No. 46708-5-I.

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 1.

April 1, 2002.

*58 Roger Melvin Leed, Seattle, for Appellant.

Sharon Sullivan Eckholm, Assistant Attorney General, Olympia, for Respondent Central Puget Sound Growth Management Hearings Board.

Robert David Tobin, Seattle City Attorney's Office, Seattle, for Respondent City of Seattle.

BECKER, A.C.J.

To satisfy the transportation and concurrency requirements of the Growth Management Act, Seattle employs a screenline methodology that was incorporated into the comprehensive plan the city adopted in 1994. A subarea plan adopted in 1998 for the University community incorporates the same methodology. Montlake Community Club's petition for review of the 1998 subarea ordinance seeks to have level of service standards established for individual arterial segments within the subarea, such as the Montlake Bridge. Because the subarea plan does not amend the screenline methodology or change the level of service standards set by the 1994 city wide plan, we conclude the Board properly rejected the Club's petition as untimely.

Montlake Community Club is a non-profit organization serving a residential neighborhood located directly south of the University of Washington, across Portage Bay and the Montlake Cut. The Club is concerned, among other things, about gridlock on and around the Montlake Bridge. The bridge is a state-owned facility that connects the Montlake community with the University District. Montlake Boulevard East, a congested corridor that crosses the bridge, is a state highway and a principal city arterial connecting to State Route 520, a major freeway.

The City of Seattle adopted a new, citywide comprehensive plan in 1994 that was designed to comply with the Growth Management Act. The plan designated the University Community Urban Center as one of five "urban village" areas planned for high density.

The City then initiated a subarea planning process for the University Community Urban Center. Although the Montlake neighborhood lies outside the boundary of the Urban Center, the Club participated in the process and asked the city to study traffic impacts on Montlake Boulevard and Pacific Avenue at eight specific intersections. The City adopted the subarea plan in 1998 as an amendment to the 1994 Seattle Comprehensive Plan through Ordinance 119230. Concerned that the City had inadequately studied the impact that growth planned for the subarea would have upon these street segments that are already congested, the Club appealed the ordinance to the Central Puget Sound Growth Management Hearings Board within 60 days of its adoption. The Club sought an order from the Board invalidating or remanding the ordinance. The Board dismissed *59 the Club's appeal as untimely, and did not address the merits of the appeal. The superior court affirmed. The Club now appeals to this court.

In reviewing an administrative action, the appellate court sits in the same position as the superior court, applying the standards found in the Administrative Procedures Act directly to the record before the agency. Northwest Steelhead and Salmon Council of Trout Unlimited v. Dept. of Fisheries, 78 Wash.App. 778, 785, 896 P.2d 1292 (1995). The appellate court reviews the record and decision of the administrative body, not that of the superior court. Bellevue Farm Owners Ass'n v. Shoreline Hearings Bd., 100 Wash.App. 341, 997 P.2d 380, rev. denied, 142 Wash.2d 1014, 16 P.3d 1265 (2000).

The standard of review for administrative orders is set forth in RCW 34.05.570(3). With respect to issues of law under RCW 34.05.570(3)(d), an appellate court applies a de novo standard, giving substantial weight to the Board's interpretation of the statute it administers. King County v. Central Puget Sound Growth Management Hearings Bd., 142 Wash.2d 543, 553, 14 P.3d 133 (2000). While a reviewing court may accord "deference to an agency interpretation of the law where the agency has specialized expertise in dealing with such issues," the court is not bound by the agency's conclusions of law. Redmond v. Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 136 Wash.2d 38, 46, 959 P.2d 1091 (1998). The party asserting the error bears the burden of demonstrating that the Board erroneously interpreted or applied the law, or that the Board's order is not supported by substantial evidence. RCW 34.05.570(1)(a); The Cooper Point Ass'n v. Thurston Cy., 108 Wash.App. 429, 31 P.3d 28 (2001).

To comply with the Growth Management Act, a comprehensive plan must include a transportation element that establishes a "level of service" standard for all arterial and transit routes.

Each comprehensive plan shall include a plan, scheme, or design for each of the following:

...

(6) A transportation element that implements, and is consistent with, the land use element.
(a) The transportation element shall include the following subelements:

(iii) Facilities and services needs, including:

(B) Level of service standards for all locally owned arterials and transit routes to serve as a gauge to judge performance of the system....
(C) For state-owned transportation facilities, level of service standards for highways, as prescribed in chapters 47.06 and 47.80 RCW, to gauge the performance of the system.

RCW 36.70A.070(6)(a)(iii)(B) and (C).

The Growth Management Act also requires that the City prohibit development that causes a decline in level of service standards. An action-forcing ordinance of this type is known as a concurrency ordinance because its purpose is to assure that development permits are denied unless there is concurrent provision for transportation impacts:

local jurisdictions must adopt and enforce ordinances which prohibit development approval if the development causes the level of service on a locally owned transportation facility to decline below the standards adopted in the transportation element of the comprehensive plan, unless transportation improvements or strategies to accommodate the impacts of development are made concurrent with the development.

RCW 36.70A.070(6)(b).

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