Montgomery v. Cairns

CourtSuperior Court of Maine
DecidedJune 20, 2006
DocketCUMcv-04-342
StatusUnpublished

This text of Montgomery v. Cairns (Montgomery v. Cairns) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Montgomery v. Cairns, (Me. Super. Ct. 2006).

Opinion

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT CUMBERLAND, ss. CIVIL ACTION DOCKET NO. CV-04-342 /

ROBERT MONTGOMERY

Plaintiff

v. REFEREE'S

KIMBERLY CAIRNS

Defendant

Before the court is Plaintiff's motion to reject or modify a referee's report,

entered by Clarke C. Hambley on September 20, 2005 ("Report"), and

Defendant's objections to the Report. The Report provides a background for the

parties' dispute, makes factual findings, and provides for relief by distributing

the parties' assets, and structuring the sale of Plaintiff's interest in a jointly

owned daycare business to Defendant'. It includes an appendix in which the

referee has responded to the parties' objections to the draft report. Pursuant to

M.R.Civ.P. 53(e)(2), the Report's factual findings are reviewed for clear error.

However, the application of the law to the facts is reviewed de novo. Warren v.

Warren, 2005 ME 9, q[ 20,866 A.2d 97,101.

I. Plaintiff's Objections

Plaintiff first objects to the calculation of distributions from a partnership

called R.K. Investment Partners. This partnership was established to receive

$2,132,119, the net winnings from a lottery ticket purchased by Plaintiff. The

partnership provided that Plaintiff was a 51% owner of the capital contributed to

' It also provides options for sale of Defendant's interest to Plaintiff, and for sale of the whole business to a third party, but both Plaintiff and Defendant acknowledge that, objections aside, Defendant will be the one to purchase the daycare business. the account, and Defendant was a 49% owner of the capital contributed to the

account. The Referee found that the funds in t h s account, all of which have been

disbursed, were almost exclusively distributed personally to the partners. After

distribution to the partners, the funds were used for a variety of personal

expenses, gifts, and as capital contributions or loans to two businesses owned

jointly by the parties, INMIRAGE Holdings, Inc. ("INMIRAGE"), and N. Oasis,

LLC ("N. Oasis").

The Referee calculated, based on the distributions to the partners, that

Defendant is entitled to a $447,724 credit. This figure is based on the Referee's

factual finding that $1,841,916 was distributed to the partners, $1,387,101 of

which was distributed to Plaintiff and $454,815 of which was distributed to

Defendant, and his legal conclusion that "under the partnership agreement,

distributions to the partners, as opposed to business expenses of the partnership,

were to be distributed [51% Plaintiff 149% Defendant]." Plaintiff attacks the

Referee's factual finding by asserting that over $500,000 of the amount

distributed to him were gifts, and that these gifts must be taken out of the

calculation of amounts distributed to him. According to the Report, however,

these gifts are unproven, and so not exempted from the calculation of

distributions to partners. This factual conclusion is not clearly erroneous.

Plaintiff then claims that the Referee's interpretation of the R.K.

partnership agreement ("Agreement") is legally incorrect. The Agreement

provides for adjustments to the capital accounts of the partners where the

partners make transfers to one another by gift, sale, or otherwise. However,

Plaintiff failed to prove, factually, any adjustment to the capital accounts of the

partners by gift, sale or otherwise. The Agreement requires Plaintiff, as the managing partner, to maintain in the records of the partnership a written list

providing, inter alia, the percentage of capital of the partners. Apparently, no

such list was maintained, as none appears in the record-and certainly there is

no list reflecting any upward adjustment, by gift, sale or otherwise, in Plaintiff's

capital account. Accordingly, the Referee concluded that the capital contributed

by each partner upon commencement of the partnership, minus any losses

sustained by the partnership, was the capital to w h c h each partner was entitled

upon dissolution of the partnership. This capital was described in the

Agreement, not in dollar amounts2, but rather in percentages. The Referee

solved for the amounts contributed by each partner by combining the business

expenses of the partnership with the distributions to each partner. Under the

Agreement, the partners shared net losses in accordance with their respective

percentages of capital. This preserved the 51%149% proportion, and resulted in

the conclusion that, based on the distributions, Defendant was entitled to a

$447,724 credit. The referee's interpretation of the Agreement and his

application of its terms to the facts were correct as a matter of law.

Plaintiff also objects to the finding that he is not entitled to reimbursement

for certain loans he claims he made to INMIRAGE. The Report found, in Section

VI, that Plaintiff's claims for reimbursement of approximately $46,533 in "off the

books" loans to INMIRAGE are unproven, because while "there may be some

items [on Plaintiff's credit card statements] ... that represent genuine business

expenses that were not reimbursed, there was inadequate proof by [Plaintiff]to

identify these particular items." The exhibits and testimony upon which this

2 Neither party was able to account fully for the net proceeds of the lottery ticket, so this figure was not used by the Referee in calculating the partners' respective capital contributions.

3 finding is based do not clearly link any of the charges to INMIRAGE. As the

findings on this issue were not clearly erroneous, they will be accepted.

Next, Plaintiff argues that Defendant has been unjustly enriched by the

assignment to Defendant of a 50% interest in the net equity of N. Oasis and

INMIRAGE, as she paid nothing in to these companies. This argument seems to

assume that these businesses cannot be worth more than the amounts that were

loaned or paid into them, and ignores the fact that all monies that Plaintiff paid

into the businesses, including paid-in capital to INMIRAGE and loans to both

business, were subtracted from their "equity" prior to assigning Defendant's 50%

interest. See Summary of Accounting Items, attached to the Report (reflecting

$1,066,390 in equity in the two businesses, and $807,206 in loans and paid-in

capital due Plaintiff, resulting in $129,592 in equity/profits belonging to

Defendant .)

Plaintiff also asserts that the "equity" in INMIRAGE and N. Oasis should

be divided prior to repayment of the loan amounts due him. This, however,

attempts to disguise as equity that whch is a loan, and is contrary to the priority

of distribution directed by the Uniform Partnership Act. See 31 M.R.S.A. § 320(2)

(requiring that debts owing to partners be repaid before profits are distributed.)

Plaintiff also objects to the requirement, under Part XVI of the Report, that

he provide financing to Defendant if she is unable to obtain third-party financing

adequate to cover the full amount of the purchase price for the daycare business.

The Court agrees that Plaintiff is entitled to a risk-free return of capital, and that

he should not be required to extend financing to Defendant if she is unable to

obtain it elsewhere. Of course, if neither party is willing or able to purchase the

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Related

Warren v. Warren
2005 ME 9 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2005)

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