Monterde v. Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: June 9, 2025
• Docket: 24-2450
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 9 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

EUGENE FRANCIS MENGUITO No. 24-2450 MONTERDE, Agency No. A087-171-123 Petitioner,

v. MEMORANDUM*

PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submission Deferred March 19, 2025** Submitted June 6, 2025

Before: BOGGS,*** FRIEDLAND, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.

Eugene Francis Menguito Monterde, a native and citizen of the Philippines,

petitions for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision dismissing

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Danny J. Boggs, United States Circuit Judge for the Court of Appeals, 6th Circuit, sitting by designation. his appeal from an Immigration Judge (IJ) order denying his application for

cancellation of removal. “Where, as here, the BIA cites Matter of Burbano, 20 I. &

N. Dec. 872, 874 (BIA 1994) and also provides its own review of the evidence and

law, we review both the IJ’s and the BIA’s decisions.” Cordoba v. Barr, 962 F.3d

479, 481 (9th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). We have

jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition.

1. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s conclusion that Monterde’s

qualifying relatives, his two United States citizen children, would not experience

“exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” upon Monterde’s removal from the

United States, and that Monterde is therefore ineligible for cancellation of removal.

8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D). Although we lack jurisdiction to review the agency’s

ultimate discretionary decision whether to grant cancellation of removal or any

underlying findings of fact, we have jurisdiction to review the agency’s hardship

determination as a mixed question of law and fact under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D).

See Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209, 212, 225 & n.4 (2024); Gonzalez-Juarez v.

Bondi, ---F.4th---, 2025 WL 1440220, at *3 & n.2 (9th Cir. May 20, 2025).

To demonstrate the required hardship, an alien must show hardship “that is

substantially different from, or beyond, that which would normally be expected from

the deportation of an alien with close family members [in the United States].”

Gonzalez-Juarez, ---F.4th---, 2025 WL 1440220, at *8 (quoting In re Monreal-

2 24-2450 Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56, 65 (B.I.A. 2001)). In making this determination, the

agency “evaluates ‘the ages, health, and circumstances’ of qualifying relatives.” Id.

(quoting Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 63). We review the agency’s

hardship determination for substantial evidence. See id. at *7. “Under this standard,

we must uphold the agency determination unless the evidence compels a contrary

conclusion.” Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 2019).

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Monterde did

not demonstrate the required hardship for purposes of cancellation of removal.

Monterde testified that his family would accompany him to the Philippines in the

event of his removal. The agency found that Monterde could find housing and work

in the Philippines, that his children could adapt, and that the evidence did not show

that his older child would face greater risk in the Philippines due to his peanut

allergy. The agency also found that Monterde did not show that any of his children’s

medical or schooling needs could not be met in the Philippines. Given these

findings, the record does not compel the conclusion that Monterde’s children would

experience exceptional and extremely unusual hardship in the event of his removal.

See Gonzalez-Juarez, ---F.4th---, 2025 WL 1440220, at *9 (“[T]he hardship

determination requires hardship that deviates, in the extreme, from the hardship that

ordinarily occurs in removal cases.”).

2. Monterde argues that the agency violated his due-process rights by not

3 24-2450 expressly discussing his fear of returning to the Philippines. But the agency is not

required to “discuss each piece of evidence submitted,” and when the record does

not reflect “a failure to consider all the evidence, a ‘general statement that [the

agency] considered all the evidence before [it]’ may be sufficient.” Cole v. Holder,

659 F.3d 762, 771 (9th Cir. 2011) (alteration in original) (quoting Almaghzar v.

Gonzales, 457 F.3d 915, 922 (9th Cir. 2006)); see also id. at 772 (“[W]here

potentially dispositive testimony and documentary evidence is submitted, the BIA

must give reasoned consideration to that evidence.”). There is no indication that the

IJ did not consider Monterde’s testimony on this point or that this testimony would

change the result in his case.

3. The BIA did not abuse its discretion in declining to remand for

consideration of Monterde’s additional country-conditions evidence. A motion to

remand, like a motion to reopen, is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Coria v.

Garland, 114 F.4th 994, 1001 (9th Cir. 2024); Aguilar Fermin v. Barr, 958 F.3d 887,

892 (9th Cir. 2020). To succeed, a petitioner must show a “reasonable likelihood”

that he “would prevail on the merits” if the motion were granted. Fonseca-Fonseca

v. Garland, 76 F.4th 1176, 1179 (9th Cir. 2023). Monterde’s additional evidence

did not show that his older child would be unable to obtain medical treatment or

schooling in the Philippines, and it thus did not materially affect Monterde’s

eligibility for cancellation of removal.

4 24-2450 4. The temporary stay of removal will remain in place until the issuance of the

mandate, and the motion to stay removal (Dkt. No. 3) is otherwise DENIED.

PETITION DENIED.

5 24-2450