Montano Rivas v. Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: June 4, 2025
• Docket: 23-3947
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 4 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

KATERIN MONTANO RIVAS; No. 23-3947 B. M. R. M., Agency Nos. A209-998-780 Petitioners, A209-998-781

v. MEMORANDUM* PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted June 2, 2025**

Before: SANCHEZ, H.A. THOMAS, and DESAI, Circuit Judges.

Katerin Montano Rivas and her minor daughter, B. M. R. M., are natives and

citizens of El Salvador.1 Montano Rivas seeks review of an order of the Board of

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 1 B. M. R. M. is a derivative beneficiary of Montano Rivas’ asylum application. B. M. R. M. did not file separate applications for withholding of removal and CAT Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”)

(collectively “the Agency”) denial of her request for asylum, withholding of

removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). “When

the BIA adopts an IJ’s decision, but also adds its own reasoning, as occurred here,

we review both decisions.” Kaur v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 734, 736 (9th Cir. 2004).

“We review purely legal questions de novo, and the [A]gency’s factual findings for

substantial evidence.” Perez-Portillo v. Garland, 56 F.4th 788, 792 (9th Cir. 2022).

Under this “highly deferential” standard, the Agency’s factual findings are

“conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to

the contrary.” Salguero Sosa v. Garland, 55 F.4th 1213, 1217–18 (9th Cir. 2022)

(quoting Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U.S. 573, 584 (2020)); see also 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(b)(4)(B). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We deny the

petition.

1. Substantial evidence supports the Agency’s denial of Petitioners’

application for asylum and Montano Rivas’s application for withholding of

removal. Montano Rivas argues that her experience of being extorted by MS-13

gang members bore a nexus to her membership in the particular social group

(“PSG”) of “Female Heads of Household.” But substantial evidence supports the

protection. See Ali v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 780, 782 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating that, unlike asylum, derivative relief is not available with respect to withholding of removal or CAT protection).

2 23-3947 Agency’s conclusion that this PSG is not cognizable because Montano Rivas has

not offered evidence that such a group is “composed of members who share a

common immutable characteristic,” “defined with particularity,” and “socially

distinct within” El Salvadoran society. Diaz-Reynoso v. Barr, 968 F.3d 1070, 1077

(9th Cir. 2020) (internal citations omitted). Substantial evidence also supports the

Agency’s conclusion that Montano Rivas was the target of general criminal

activity that did not bear a nexus to a protected ground. Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d

1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[A noncitizen’s] desire to be free from harassment by

criminals motivated by theft or random violence by gang members bears no nexus

to a protected ground.”).

2. Substantial evidence supports the Agency’s finding that Montano Rivas

has not demonstrated that she faced a “particularized threat of torture” that would

warrant relief under CAT. Lalayan v. Garland, 4 F.4th 822, 840 (9th Cir. 2021)

(citation and emphasis omitted). Montano Rivas testified that she never reported

the extortion she experienced to the El Salvadoran police. Nor has Montano Rivas

provided evidence of governmental acquiescence beyond the general claim that the

government of El Salvador “allow[s] criminals to behave with impunity.”

Substantial evidence also supports the Agency’s conclusion that Montano Rivas

did not establish a probability of future torture with the acquiescence of the El

Salvadoran government. See Garcia v. Wilkinson, 988 F.3d 1136, 1148 (9th Cir.

3 23-3947 2021) (“[A] speculative fear of torture is insufficient to satisfy the ‘more likely

than not’ standard.”).

PETITION DENIED.2

2 The temporary stay of removal remains in place until the mandate issues.

4 23-3947