No. 96-407 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1997
MONTANANS FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS, INC., a non-profit corporation; HENRY BROERS; CHARLES TUSTIN; DARRELL OLSON; DAVID LIETZ; BARB LIETZ; JIM DOWLING; RAYMOND "RAY" SERRA, SR.; CAROL DUVAL; RUSS CROWDER; RON RABIDUE, Plaintiffs and Appellants, “. __
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF FLATHEAD COUNTY, MONTANA, Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District, In and for the County of Flathead, The Honorable Katherine R. Curtis, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD: For Appellants: Gerald J. Neeley, Attorney at Law, Billings, Montana For Respondent: Jonathan B. Smith and Dennis J. Hester, Deputy Flathead County Attorneys, Kalispell, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: October 31, 1996 Decided: January 28, 1997 Filed:
Clerk .j Justice Karla M. Gray delivered the Opinion of the Court.
Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3 cc), Montana Supreme Court
1995 Internal Operating Rules, the following decision shall not be
cited as precedent and shall be published by its filing as a public
document with the Clerk of the Supreme Court and by a report of its
result to State Reporter Publishing Company and West Publishing
Company.
Montanans For Property Rights, Inc., a nonprofit corporation,
Henry Broers, Charles Tustin, Darrell Olson, David Lietz, Barb
Lietz, Jim Dowling, Raymond "Ray" Serra, Sr., Carol Duval, Russ
Crowder, and Ron Rabidue (collectively, MPRI) appeal from the
judgment entered by the Eleventh Judicial District Court, Flathead
County, on its orders granting the motions for summary judgment
filed by the Board of County Commissioners of Flathead County,
Montana (Commissioners), and denying MPRI's cross-motion for
partial summary judgment. We affirm.
The issue on appeal is whether the District Court erred in
granting the Commissioners' motions for summary judgment. In order
to resolve that issue, we address the following subissues:
a. Did the District Court err in concluding that planning board documents which are readily available to the public need not be on file at the Flathead County Clerk and Recorder's office?
b. Did the District Court err in concluding that freeholder protests were properly counted pursuant to 5 76-2-205(6), MCA? C. Did the District Court err in concluding that 5 2-6- 109, MCA, prohibited the Flathead County Clerk and Recorder from providing MPRI with a list of freeholder names and addresses?
2 d. Did the District Court err in concluding that the Commissioners were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on MPRI's claim that the Hungry Horse News and the Bigfork Eagle are not newspapers of general circulation?
e. Did the District Court err in concluding that the zoning regulations were validly adopted under Title 76, Chapter 2, Part 2, MCA?
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 1973, the Commissioners established the Flathead County
Planning Board (Planning Board) to advise them regarding land use
issues in Flathead County. Five years later, the Planning Board
proposed the first Flathead County Comprehensive Plan, which
divided Flathead County into neighborhood planning units and
provided general guidance for resolving land use issues. In September of 1986, the Planning Board gave notice that it
would hold a hearing to receive public comments regarding a revised
comprehensive plan, the so-called Flathead County Comprehensive
Plan Update. The notice specified that copies of the revised
comprehensive plan were available for public review at the Flathead
Regional Development Office (FRDO) The Planning Board held the
public hearing and subsequently recommended that the Commissioners
adopt the revised comprehensive plan.
On February 5, 1987, the Commissioners passed a resolution of
intention to adopt the revised comprehensive plan; they caused
notice to be published that the resolution had been passed. The
Commissioners subsequently adopted the revised comprehensive plan
and, thereafter, referred to it as the Flathead County Master Plan
(FCMP).
3 The FCMP encourages communities in Flathead County to develop
"neighborhood" plans if they experience unique problems, face special issues, or desire to more adequately plan for growth in the
future. Based on that recommendation, some residents of Canyon
Area communities in Flathead County formed a committee, the Canyon
Citizen Initiated Zoning Group (CCIZG), to guide the planning
process for those communities. The Canyon Area is a long, narrow
band of land in Flathead County located generally west and south of
Glacier National Park.
CCIZG hired a consultant to assist in developing a neighborhood plan and land use regulations for their communities
and, together, they drafted proposed land use regulations and a
neighborhood plan (Canyon Plan) for the three land use regions in
the Canyon Area--the Lower Canyon Region (Lower District), the
Middle Canyon Region (Middle District), and the Upper Canyon Region
(Upper District). Thereafter, the consultant held fifteen public
meetings to receive comments on the Canyon Plan and land use
regulations. CCIZG then presented the Canyon Plan to the Planning
Board for review and the Commissioners subsequently passed a
resolution adding the Canyon Plan to the FCMP.
CCIZG and its consultant then drafted zoning regulations for
the Canyon Area communities based on the Canyon Plan. They held nine public meetings to discuss the proposed zoning regulations,
which were referred to as the Canyon Area Land Use Regulatory
System (CALURS) . Following the public meetings, CCIZG presented
4 the CALURS to the Planning Board for its review and recommendation
that the Commissioners adopt the CALURS.
The agenda for the Planning Board's September 14, 1994,
meeting included a discussion of the proposed CALURS and a notice
regarding this meeting was published on August 25, 1994. The
notice stated that copies of documents pertaining to agenda items,
such as the CALURS, were available for public inspection at the
FRDO. The Planning Board received public comments on the proposed
CALURS at its September meeting and passed a motion to discuss the
CALURS further at its next meeting, scheduled for October 12, 1994.
At the October meeting, the Planning Board passed a motion
recommending that the Commissioners adopt the CALURS.
The Commissioners caused two notices to be published that they
would hold a hearing on November 15, 1994, to receive public
comments regarding adoption of the CALURS. Following the hearing,
the Commissioners passed a resolution of intention to adopt the
CALURS and caused notice of passage of the resolution to be
published. The notice stated that copies of the proposed CALURS
were available for public inspection at the office of the Flathead County Clerk and Recorder (Clerk), the FRDO, and the Commissioners'
office. It also stated that persons owning real property
(freeholders) within the Upper, Middle and Lower Districts of the
Canyon Area could file written protests to the CALURS for a period
of thirty days beginning November 24, 1994 (the protest period).
Both proponents and opponents of the CALURS requested a list
of freeholders from the Clerk in order to contact them regarding
5 the CALURS. The Clerk refused to provide either group with a list of freeholders, but did allow review of the freeholder list at her
office. One of the opponents of the CALURS was Glacier Wilderness
Ranch (GWR), a time-share condominium association. The chairman of GWR's board of directors filed a timely protest, purportedly on
behalf of each of the approximately six hundred owners of GWR time-
share units. The Clerk informed him that each time-share owner was
a freeholder entitled to individually protest the CALURS and that
he could not protest on behalf of all GWR owners.
After the close of the protest period, the Clerk reported the
protest results to the Commissioners. Less than forty percent of
freeholders in the entire Canyon Area protested the adoption of the
CALURS. When the protests were counted by districts, less than
forty percent of freeholders in the Upper and Middle Districts,
but more than forty percent of freeholders in the Lower District,
of the Canyon Area protested the adoption of the CALURS. Based on those percentages, the Commissioners adopted the CALURS for the
Upper and Middle Districts of the Canyon Area.
MPRI filed a complaint for injunctive and declaratory relief
on September 30, 1994, seeking to invalidate the Commissioners'
adoption of, and amendments to, the FCMP and certain zoning
regulations adopted thereunder. In answering the complaint, the
Commissioners asserted that MPRI lacked standing to bring the
lawsuit and was not entitled to injunctive or declaratory relief;
they also pled the affirmative defenses of lathes and the statute
of limitations.
6 The Commissioners moved for summary judgment contending that lathes precluded MPRI from challenging certain of their actions, no
genuine issue of material fact existed and they were entitled to
judgment as a matter of law on the nine counts contained in MPRI's
complaint. MPRI opposed the Commissioners' summary judgment motion
and filed a cross-motion for partial summary judgment. Thereafter,
the District Court permitted MPRI to file an amended complaint and
the Commissioners filed their answer.
In March of 1995, the District Court heard oral argument on
the parties' summary judgment motions. On August 16, 1995, the
District Court granted the Commissioners' motion for summary
judgment on issues in the original complaint not amended by the
amended complaint and denied MPRI's cross-motion for partial
summary judgment. On August 30, 1995, the Commissioners moved for summary
judgment on the remaining issues in the amended complaint. MPRI
opposed the motion. After oral argument, a stipulation by the
parties that no issues of fact remained and supplementary
memoranda, the District Court granted the Commissioners' motion for
summary judgment and, thereafter, entered judgment in their favor.
MPRI appeals.
Additional facts are provided below as necessary for our
resolution of the issues before us.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is proper when no genuine issues of material
fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), M.R.Civ.P. We review a district court's grant
of summary judgment de nova, applying the same Rule 56(c),
M.R.Civ.P., criteria used by that court. Jarrett v. Valley Park,
Inc. (Mont. 1996), 922 P.2d 485, 487, 53 St.Rep. 671, 672 (citation
omitted). Ordinarily, such a review requires that we first determine whether the moving party met its burden of establishing
both the absence of genuine issues of material fact and entitlement
to judgment as a matter of law. Jarrett, 922 P.2d at 487.
In this case, MPRI does not contend that genuine issues of
material fact precluded summary judgment on the Commissioners'
first motion and the parties stipulated to the absence of genuine
issues of material fact regarding the Commissioners' second summary
judgment motion. We must determine, therefore, whether the
District Court erred in concluding that the Commissioners were
entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. We review a
district court's conclusions of law to determine whether they are
correct. & Estate of Brooks (Mont. 1996), 927 P.2d 1024, 1026,
53 St.Rep. 1263, 1264.
DISCUSSION
The overall issue on appeal is whether the District Court
erred in granting the Commissioners' motions for summary judgment.
In resolving that issue, we address each subissue raised by MPRI
separately below.
a. Did the District Court err in concluding that planning board documents which are readily available to the public need not be on file at the Clerk's office?
8 MPRI argues that, because the CALURS proposal and the
published notice of the September 14, 1994, public hearing regarding it were not on file at the Clerk's office before the
Commissioners took action on them, the zoning regulations adopted
thereunder are not valid. The Commissioners contend that 5 7-5
2131, MCA, does not require that the specified documents be kept at
the Clerk's office and, moreover, that they were readily available
to the public at the FRDO.
At the outset, we note MPRI's two-sentence "argument" on this
issue, each sentence merely quoting statutory language without
analysis or application to the facts of this case. We caution
counsel that while such a presentation may constitute minimal
compliance with the Rule 23(a) (4), M.R.App.P., requirement
regarding citation to authorities in support of a party's legal
contentions, it does not suffice to establish the correctness of
those contentions. The general operations and conduct of local governments are
governed by statute in Montana. Title 7, Chapter 5, Part 21, MCA,
sets out the requirements for conducting county government
business. Section 7-5-2129, MCA, requires that boards of county
commissioners maintain a minute book, a road book, a franchise book
and a warrant book. All records kept in these four county books
must be available for public inspection, free of charge, at the
Clerk's office. Section 7-5-2131, MCA. It is clear, under the
facts of this case, that of these four books, MPRI's argument could
relate only to the minute book, which is a record of all decisions
9 and orders made by the board of county commissioners at regular and special meetings. Section 7-5-2129(l), MCA. We must determine,
then, whether the CALURS or the related notice are "decisions and
orders" made by the Commissioners.
The CALURS was drafted by CCIZG and its consultant and
presented to the Planning Board, a board organized to advise the
Commissioners on zoning and other land use planning matters, for
review. CCIZG and the Planning Board work with the Commissioners
in an advisory capacity only. They are not part of the board of
county commissioners and their decisions are not "orders and decisions" made by the Commissioners as contemplated by § 7-5-
2129(l), MCA. As a result, we conclude that § 7-s-2131, MCA, does
not require that the CALURS proposal be kept at the Clerk's office
and open for public inspection there. Nor does § 7-5-2129, MCA, require that the Commissioners
maintain a copy of all published notices relating to their
decisions or prospective decisions in the minute book. Such
notices are not "orders and decisions" of the board of county
commissioners pursuant to § 7-5-2129(l), MCA; they are indications to the public of such decisions and prospective decisions which are
separately required by law. MPRI advances no argument that actual
decisions or orders of the Commissioners relating to the CALURS were not properly reflected in the minute book required by § 7-S-
2129 (1) , MCA, and maintained in the Clerk's office pursuant to 5 7-
5-2131, MCA. Thus, we conclude that MPRI has not established a
failure to comply with § 7-s-2131, MCA.
10 MPRI also contends that 55 76-2-205(l) (d) and (5) (c), MCA,
require that the CALURS proposal and the related notice be on file for public inspection at the Clerk's office. It did not raise this
theory in the District Court, however, and it is well-settled that
we will not address on appeal issues not presented to the trial
court. & Tisher v. Norwest Capital Mgt. & Trust (1993), 260
Mont. 143, 156, 859 P.2d 984, 992 (citing Duensing v. Travelers Co.
(1993) I 257 Mont. 376, 386, 849 P.2d 203, 209). Therefore, we
decline to address this contention.
We hold that the District Court did not err in concluding that planning board documents which are readily available to the public
need not be on file at the Clerk's office.
b. Did the District Court err in concluding that freeholder protests were properly counted pursuant to 5 76-2-205(6), MCA?
MPRI contends that the District Court erred in upholding the
Clerk's method of counting the GWR condominium owners as six
hundred freeholders entitled to protest, but counting the GWR
protest as only one protest. MPRI maintains that this procedure
skewed the results so that less than the statutorily-mandated
percentage of freeholders protested, resulting in the adoption of
the CALURS for the Upper and Middle Districts of the Canyon Area.
Rule 23(a) (41, M.R.App.P., requires that an appellate argument
contain "the contentions of the appellant with respect to the
issues presented, and the reasons therefor, with citations to the
authorities, statutes and pages of the record relied on." MPRI
cites to no statute, case, treatise, or other legal authority
11 whatsoever in support of its contentions on this issue. Therefore, we decline to address it.
c. Did the District Court err in concluding that 5 2-6- 109, MCA, prohibited the Clerk from providing MPRI with a list of freeholder names and addresses?
MPRI contends that the Commissioners and their agent, the
Clerk, arbitrarily refused to provide it with a list of freeholder
names and addresses. The Commissioners maintain that 5 2-6-109,
MCA, expressly prohibits the Clerk from providing a mailing list to anyone during the 5 76-2-205(5), MCA, protest period.
Section 2-6-109(l), MCA, generally provides that:
(a) an agency may not distribute or sell for use as a mailing list any list of persons without first securing the permission of those on the list; and (b) a list of persons prepared by the agency may not be used as a mailing list except by the agency or another agency without first securing the permission of those on the list.
Section Z-6-109(2), MCA, defines "agency" and it is undisputed in
this case that the provisions of § 2-6-109(l), MCA, apply to the
Clerk as an officer of Flathead County.
It also is undisputed that the list of freeholder names and
addresses maintained by the Clerk is a "list" which, pursuant to
§ 2-6-109 (11, MCA, cannot be distributed, sold or used as a mailing
list without the permission of all freeholders on the list. MPRI
contends, however, that the nature of its intended use of the list
was not discussed when the list was requested.
The record, however, reflects the following testimony by the
GWR manager during the summary judgment proceedings:
12 Q: Had YOU earlier asked her on the telephone conversation whether or not you could have a list of landowners for purposes of any protest?
A: Yes, I did. I asked her specifically, I says, 1'11 trade you. If you want my list, I'll trade you for the list that you have of the upper canyon. It interests me to notify these people that they can protest.
Tl ais testimony indicates that MPRI discussed its intended use of
the list to "notify" freeholders regarding their protest rights at
the time the list was requested. The GWR manager also testified
that he requested the freeholder list so that he could send a "protest form out to every landowner, every freeholder on the list
in the upper canyon area and [he] would not have used it for any
other purpose but to notify them of County action against their
property." This testimony establishes that the clear intent was to
use the list as a mailing list to send out forms protesting
adoption of the CALURS. On the basis of this record, we conclude
that § Z-6-109(1) (a), MCA, prohibited the Clerk from providing the
list of freeholders to MPRI without securing the statutorily-
required permission and that MPRI intended to use the list as a
mailing list in violation of § 2-6-109(l) (b), MCA. MPRI also contends that the Clerk's refusal to provide it with
a list of freeholder names and addresses violated the protest
provisions contained in 5 76-2-205(6), MCA. Section 76-2-205(6),
MCA, provides that "if 40% of the freeholders within the district
whose names appear on the last-completed assessment roll .
have protested the establishment of the district or adoption of the
regulations, the board of county commissioners may not adopt the
resolution . .'I The statute merely sets out the percentage of
13 protests required to prevent the Commissioners from adopting a resolution establishing a district or zoning regulations. It does
not relate in any way to a proponent or opponent's ability or
inability to obtain a list of freeholders on the most recent
assessment roll; nor does the Clerk's refusal to provide the list
prevent or impair freeholders from filing written protests under
§ 76-Z-205(5) (d), MCA. We conclude that the Clerk's refusal to provide MPRI with a list of freeholder names and addresses did not
violate the protest provisions contained in § 76-2-205, MCA
Finally, MPRI contends that, to the extent 5 2-6-109, MCA,
prohibited the Clerk from providing the list of Canyon Area
freeholders, the statute violated its constitutional rights. In
particular, MPRI cites to the following sections of Article II of
the Montana Constitution:
§ 4, which provides that "[nlo person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws"; § 6, granting Montana citizens the right to petition for redress or to peaceably protest governmental action; s 8, granting the public the right to expect governmental agencies to afford a reasonable opportunity for citizen participation in the operation of such agencies; and 5 9, providing the public with the right to examine documents.
MPRI presents no analysis of its contentions in this regard
within the customary constitutional framework. It merely cites to
the sections of the Montana Constitution without providing any
rationale or authority under which the statute--or the Clerk's
reliance on the statute--violated the referenced constitutional
provisions. I' [Wlhen considering the constitutionality of a
statute, the constitutionality is presumed and anyone attacking the
14 validity of a statute has a heavy burden of proving the invalidity." Associated Students v. City of Missoula (1993), 261
Mont. 231, 235, 862 P.2.d 380, 382 (citations omitted). MPRI's
bare citations to the Montana Constitution do not meet the heavy
burden required to prove that § 2-6-109, MCA, is constitutionally
infirm.
We hold that the District Court did not err in concluding that
5 2-6-109, MCA, prohibited the Clerk from providing MPRI with a
list of freeholder names and addresses.
d. Did the District Court err in concluding that the Commissioners were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on MPRI's claim that the Hungry Horse News and the Bigfork Eagle are not newspapers of general circulation?
MPRI argues that certain notices regarding proposed amendments
to Flathead County zoning regulations are invalid because they were
published in the Bigfork Eagle and the Hungry Horse News, and that
those newspapers are not "newspapers of general circulation" as a
matter of law. The Commissioners contend to the contrary. There
is no factual dispute regarding the business operations of these
two newspapers.
Section 76-2-205, MCA, requires that notices regarding public
hearings on proposed zoning regulations and passage of resolutions
of intention to adopt such zoning regulations must be published
once a week for two weeks in a newspaper of general circulation
within the county. While the legislature did not define the term
"newspaper of general circulation," this Court has addressed the
statutory term on several occasions.
15 In state v. Board of County Com'rs (1938), 106 Mont. 251, 76
P.2d 648, we set out the criteria for determining whether a
newspaper is one of general circulation.
"First, that a newspaper of general circulation is not determined by the number of its subscribers, but by the diversity of its subscribers. Second, that, even though a newspaper is of particular interest to a particular class of persons, yet, if it contains news of a general character and interest to the community, although the news may be limited in amount, it qualifies as a newspaper of 'general circulation.'" [Citations omitted.1
Board of Countv Com'rs, 76 P.2d at 652 (quoting Burak v. Ditson
(Iowa 1930), 229 N.W. 227, 228). The following year, we held that
the Bridger Times qualified as a newspaper of general circulation
under the Board of County Com'rs criteria because it had been in
existence and published for twenty-five years; it had four pages of
general news and advertising printed in its own plant; and it was
distributed throughout the county. Shelley v. Normile (1939), 109
Mont. 117, 124, 94 P.2d 206, 210.
It is undisputed in this case that the Bigfork Eagle is
published once each week at its plant in Bigfork and has been
published since 1976. It contains news and advertising of a
general character and interest to the communities in the area.
Copies of the Bigfork Eagle are delivered to subscribers in
Kalispell, Whitefish, Somers, Lakeside, Kila, Hungry Horse,
Columbia Falls and Bigfork. Copies are also available at retail
outlets in Kalispell, Whitefish, Columbia Falls and Bigfork.
It also is undisputed that the Hungry Horse News is published
once each week at its plant in Columbia Falls and has been
16 published in Flathead County since 1946. It contains news and advertising of a general character and interest to the communities
in the area. Copies of the Hungry Horse News are delivered to
subscribers in Kalispell, Bigfork, Columbia Falls, Coram, Essex,
Hungry Horse, Kila, Lake McDonald, Lakeside, Marion, Martin City,
Olney, Polebridge, Somers, West Glacier and Whitefish. Copies are
also available at retail outlets in Kalispell, Bigfork, Columbia
Falls, Coram, Hungry Horse, Lake McDonald, Polebridge, West Glacier
and Whitefish.
The Bigfork Eagle and the Hungry Horse News have subscribers
in numerous communities throughout Flathead County and are
available at many Flathead County retail outlets. They carry news
of general character and interest to the communities in Flathead
County. Thus, they meet the "diversity of subscribers" and
"general interest news" criteria set forth In Board of Countv
Com'rs, 76 P.2d at 652. Moreover, like the Bridger Times in
Shellev, both the Bigfork Eagle and the Hungry Horse News are
printed in their own plants, have been published in--and
distributed throughout--the county for twenty years or more, and
contain general news and advertising. See Shellev, 94 P.2d at 210.
In support of its contention that the Bigfork Eagle and the
Hungry Horse News are not newspapers of general circulation, MPRI
advances definitions of "newspapers of general circulation" and
principles relating thereto from other jurisdictions. It does not
establish that the underlying statutes in those jurisdictions are
17 identical, or even similar, to § 76-2-205, MCA. Nor does it offer any explanation or rationale regarding how or why the holdings in
those cases are more appropriate or correct conclusions pursuant to
§ 76-Z-205, MCA, than our holdings in Board of County Com'rs and
Shelley. Indeed, MPRI does not address this Court's cases on the
issue, except to assert that they are "woefully out of date." We
hold that the District Court did not err in concluding that the
Commissioners were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on
MPRI's claim that the Hungry Horse News and the Bigfork Eagle are
not newspapers of general circulation.
e. Did the District Court err in concluding that the zoning regulations were validly adopted under Title 76, Chapter 2, Part 2, MCA? MPRI and the Commissioners agree that zoning properly can be
accomplished under either Part 1 or Part 2 of Title 76, Chapter 2,
MCA. MPRI contends that Flathead County zoning regulations enacted
after 1987 are invalid under either approach. According to MPRI,
post-1987 zoning regulations are invalid under Part 1 because sixty
percent of the freeholders affected did not consent to the prerequisite creation of a planning and zoning district or the
appointment of a five-member zoning commission pursuant to § 76-Z-
101, MCA. Alternatively, MPRI contends that the FCMP is not a
comprehensive plan as defined in Part 2 and, therefore, zoning
regulations could not have been properly adopted thereunder. The
Commissioners maintain that all zoning regulations adopted by
Flathead County since 1987 have been validly enacted under Part 2,
and that the FCMP is "comprehensive" as defined in § 76-l-601, MCA.
18 We address first whether the post-1987 zoning regulations were validly adopted under Title 76, Chapter 2, Part 2, MCA.
A board of county commissioners may adopt zoning regulations
for all or parts of its jurisdictional area in accordance with
Title 76, Chapter 2, Part 2, MCA, "[flor the purpose of promoting
the health, safety, morals, and general welfare of the people in
cities and towns and counties whose governing bodies have adopted
a comprehensive development plan for jurisdictional areas pursuant
to chapter 1 . . .'I Section 76-2-201, MCA. Part 6 of Chapter 1
discusses master plans and § 76-l-601, MCA, specifically sets out five categories of information that may be included in a master
plan: (1) surveys and studies of the area; (2) maps, plats,
charts, and descriptive material about the area; (3) reports and
recommendations regarding plans for development of the area;
(4) long-range development programs for public works projects in
the area; and (5) recommendations for the development of trailer
courts and mobile home sites. Category 2--maps, plats, charts, and
descriptive material--is then broken down into seventeen
subcategories that may be addressed in a master plan, including
land use, streets and highways, public and private utilities,
transportation, parks and recreation, education, and conservation.
The FCMP is a lengthy document addressing the people, economy,
agriculture, land use, transportation, public facilities and
services, parks, recreation and open space, unit community plans,
and implementation of the FCMP for the affected areas of Flathead
County. It includes and discusses most of the subjects which,
19 under § 76-l-601, MCA, may be included in a comprehensive development plan. We conclude that the FCMP is a comprehensive development plan, as defined in § 76-l-601, MCA, and that zoning regulations may be validly adopted thereunder pursuant to Part 2. The Commissioners presented evidence that all of its own and the Planning Board's post-1987 zoning actions have been initiated under Part 2. Seven zoning petitions were entered into evidence at the first summary judgment oral argument, all of which specifically requested zoning under Part 2. Resolutions entered into evidence by the Commissioners specifically state that they were adopted pursuant to § 76-Z-205, MCA; Part 2. We conclude, therefore, that the Commissioners' post-1987 zoning regulations were validly enacted under Part 2. As a result, we need not address MPRI's alternative contention that the zoning regulations were not properly adopted under Title 76, Chapter 2, Part 1, MCA. We have concluded that MPRI has established no error in the District Court's conclusions of law. Therefore, we hold that the District Court did not err in granting the Commissioners' motions for summary judgment. Affirmed.
20 We Concur: