Montana Lee Schneider v. the State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: December 17, 2025
• Docket: 06-25-00029-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

In the Court of Appeals Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06-25-00029-CR

MONTANA LEE SCHNEIDER, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 6th District Court Lamar County, Texas Trial Court No. 31156

Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice van Cleef MEMORANDUM OPINION

Montana Lee Schneider pled guilty to both counts in trial court cause number 31156:

possession of child pornography less than 100 depictions in count one and possession of child

pornography, namely, a video depicting sexual assault of a child younger than eighteen years of

age, in count two. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.26 (Supp). In Schneider’s companion trial

court cause number 30850 (our appellate cause number 06-25-0028-CR), he pled guilty to one

count of sexual assault of a child younger than seventeen years of age, thirteen counts of sexual

performance of a child younger than eighteen years of age, and sixty-six counts of possession of

child pornography. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 22.011, 43.25 (Supp.), § 43.26.

Schneider elected to have a jury assess his punishment. In trial court cause number

31156, the jury assessed his punishment for count two at life imprisonment and ten years’

confinement in prison for count one. The trial court ordered Schneider to pay a $10,000.00 fine

on each count. After considering the State’s motion to cumulate Schneider’s punishment, the

trial court ordered that the sentences on all counts in both cause numbers be served

consecutively.

Schneider’s trial counsel has filed a brief stating that he reviewed the record and found no

genuinely arguable issues that could be raised on appeal. The brief outlines the procedural

history of the case and summarizes the evidence presented during the trial court proceedings.

Since counsel has provided a professional evaluation of the record demonstrating why there are

no arguable grounds to be advanced, that evaluation meets the requirements of Anders v.

California. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 743–44 (1967); In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d

2 403, 406 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (orig. proceeding). Counsel also filed a motion with this Court

seeking to withdraw as counsel in this appeal.

On July 1, 2025, counsel mailed Schneider copies of the brief, the motion to withdraw,

and the appellate record. Schneider was informed of his right to review the record and to file a

pro se response.

Schneider chose to file a response but asked for additional time to do so. By order dated

September 16, 2025, this Court granted Schneider’s second motion for extension to file a pro se

response. In the same September 16 order, we further informed Schneider that the case would be

set for submission on October 7, 2025.

We received Schneider’s pro se response on September 16, 2025. In his response,

Schneider argues that (1) trial counsel was ineffective for not investigating his mental-health

history, seeking an expert under Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985), or challenging

competency; (2) appellate counsel was ineffective for not providing the full record and

abandoning him during the motion for new trial period; (3) he lacked counsel and advice about a

motion for new trial; (4) he was incompetent, so his plea is void; (5) the trial court abused its

discretion and the State committed Brady and discovery violations by not obtaining medical

records allegedly proving incompetence; (6) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct; and

(7) cumulative error warrants relief. See In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409 n.23.

We have reviewed the entire appellate record and Schneider’s pro se response and have

independently determined that no reversible error exists. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824,

826–27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409. However, non-reversible

3 error exists in the judgments because the judgments assess duplicative court costs. See TEX.

CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 102.073(a).

“In a single criminal action in which a defendant is convicted of two or more offenses or

of multiple counts of the same offense, the court may assess each court cost or fee only once

against the defendant.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 102.073(a). “For purposes of this

rule, a person convicted of two or more offenses in the same trial or plea proceeding is convicted

of those offenses in a ‘single criminal action.’” Shuler v. State, 650 S.W.3d 683, 690 (Tex.

App.—Dallas 2022), abrogated by Bradshaw v. State, 707 S.W.3d 412 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024)

(quoting Hurlburt v. State, 506 S.W.3d 199, 201–03 (Tex. App.—Waco 2016, no pet.)); see also

Clark v. State, 592 S.W.3d 919, 933 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2019, pet. ref’d) (striking multiple

costs assessed where the trial was consolidated). When this rule is applicable and the costs

should only be assessed once, the trial court should determine in which case the costs should be

assessed. In deciding where to assess the costs, generally the trial court assesses “using the

highest category of offense that is possible based on the defendant’s convictions.” TEX. CODE

CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 102.073(b).

Since the indictments in trial court cause number 31156 and trial court cause number

30850 were consolidated for trial, this was a “single criminal action.” See TEX. CODE CRIM.

PROC. ANN. art. 102.073(a); Shuler, 650 S.W.3d at 690. Schneider was convicted of eighty-two

counts in total. Schneider was assessed court costs of $330.00 in count three in companion trial

court cause number 30850 (our appellate cause number 06-25-00028-CR) and $290.00 in count

4 one here. This was improper, and the trial court should have only assessed costs in one of the

judgments. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 102.073(a).

Count three in companion trial court cause number 30850 (our appellate cause number

06-25-00028-CR) is a first-degree felony, and count one here is a third-degree felony. Count

three of companion trial court cause number 30850 is the highest category of offense.

Consequently, the trial court should have assessed costs in the judgment with the lowest cause

number. See Shuler, 650 S.W.3d at 690. We modify the trial court’s judgment in this cause

number to delete the assessment of court costs in count one.

Next, in count one in this cause number, the judgment incorrectly lists the statute for the

offense as “43.26(d)(2)(b) Penal Code.” We modify the trial court’s judgment to list the statute

for the offense as “43.26(d)(1) Penal Code.” See Act of May 22, 2023, 88th Leg., R.S., ch. 1041,

§ 2, 2023 Tex. Gen. Laws 3339, 3340 (repealed 2025); TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b); Bigley v. State,

865 S.W.2d 26, 27–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).

In the Anders context, once we determine that no reversible error exists, we must affirm

the trial court’s judgment. Bledsoe, 178 S.W.3d at 826–27.

5 As modified, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.1

Charles van Cleef Justice

Date Submitted: October 7, 2025 Date Decided: December 17, 2025

Do Not Publish

1 Since we agree that this case presents no reversible error, we also, in accordance with Anders, grant counsel’s request to withdraw from further representation of appellant in this case. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744. We will not appoint substitute counsel. Should appellant desire to seek further review of this case by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, appellant must either retain an attorney to file a petition for discretionary review or file a pro se petition for discretionary review. Any petition for discretionary review (1) must be filed within thirty days from either the date of this opinion or the date on which the last timely motion for rehearing was overruled by this Court, see TEX. R. APP. P. 68.2, (2) must be filed with the clerk of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, see TEX. R. APP. P. 68.3, and (3) should comply with the requirements of Rule 68.4 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, see TEX. R. APP. P. 68.4. 6