NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 15 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MONSTER ENERGY COMPANY, a No. 24-6521 Delaware Corporation, D.C. No. 3:22-cv-00590-LL-DDL Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. MEMORANDUM*
JIANGSU SITOUGUAI INDUSTRY CO., LTD., a Chinese Corporation; CHANGZHOU HAIGE MICROFIBER TEXTILE CO., LTD., a Chinese Corporation,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California Linda Lopez, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted October 6, 2025 Pasadena, California
Before: GILMAN, GOULD, and KOH, Circuit Judges.**
Plaintiff-Appellant Monster Energy Company (“Monster Energy”) is a
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The Honorable Ronald Lee Gilman, United States Circuit Judge for the Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation. leader in the energy drink market. Monster Energy also produces branded
merchandise (such as towels and backpacks) bearing Monster Energy’s logo and
signature green and black trade dress. Monster Energy has trademark registrations
for both its beverage products and its non-beverage products. Defendants-
Appellees Jiangsu Sitouguai Industry Co. (“4Monster”) and Changzhou Haige
Microfiber Textile Co. (“Haige”) (collectively, “Defendants”) produce camping
equipment (such as backpacks and towels) under the name “4Monster.”
Monster Energy sued Defendants for trademark infringement, trade dress
infringement, and unfair competition. Specifically, Monster Energy alleged that
Defendants’ use of the “4Monster” mark was likely to cause confusion among
consumers as to whether Monster Energy produces Defendants’ goods. The district
court granted summary judgment to Defendants. Monster Energy timely appealed,
and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the district
court’s order de novo, and we consider the record in the light most favorable to
Monster Energy. See Ironhawk Techs., Inc. v. Dropbox, Inc., 2 F.4th 1150, 1159
(9th Cir. 2021). We reverse and remand for further proceedings in accordance with
this disposition.
“The test for likelihood of confusion is whether a ‘reasonably prudent
consumer’ in the marketplace is likely to be confused as to the origin of the good
or service bearing one of the marks.” Dreamwerks Prod. Grp., Inc. v. SKG Studio,
2 24-6521 142 F.3d 1127, 1129 (9th Cir. 1998). The analysis is guided by eight factors:
(1) strength of the mark; (2) proximity of the goods; (3) similarity of the marks; (4) evidence of actual confusion; (5) marketing channels used; (6) type of goods and the degree of care likely to be exercised by the purchaser; (7) defendant’s intent in selecting the mark; and (8) likelihood of expansion of the product lines.
Lodestar Anstalt v. Bacardi & Co. Ltd., 31 F.4th 1228, 1252 (9th Cir. 2022)
(quoting Ironhawk Techs., 2 F.4th at 1160). “These factors are neither exhaustive
nor dispositive; it is the totality of facts in a given case that is dispositive.” Id. at
1252 (quoting Ironhawk Techs., 2 F.4th at 1160). “Due to the fact-intensive nature
of trademark infringement claims, we grant motions for summary judgment
infrequently.” Lerner & Rowe PC v. Brown Engstrand & Shely LLC, 119 F.4th
711, 718 (9th Cir. 2024). “Nevertheless, when no genuine issue of material fact
exists, we have not hesitated to affirm a grant of summary judgment.” Id.
Here, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to likelihood of confusion.1
As to the first factor, mark strength, Monster Energy’s marks are conceptually
distinctive and therefore “trigger the highest degree of trademark protection.” JL
Beverage Co., LLC v. Jim Beam Brands Co., 828 F.3d 1098, 1107 (9th Cir. 2016)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Monster Energy’s marks are also
commercially strong both as to beverage products and non-beverage products.
1 Each of Monster Energy’s claims rises or falls on whether a likelihood of confusion exists. See Dreamwerks, 142 F.3d at 1129 n.2 (treating common law and Lanham Act claims as coextensive).
3 24-6521 “Commercial strength is based on actual marketplace recognition.” Id. (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). Viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to Monster Energy, a jury could find that Monster Energy’s wide
distribution of non-beverage merchandise goods has created widespread
marketplace recognition for Monster Energy’s non-beverage marks.
For the second factor, the relatedness of goods, a jury could find that the
parties’ products are “similar in use and function,” “complementary,” or intended
for the “same class” of consumers. Ironhawk Techs., 2 F.4th at 1163. Monster
Energy’s non-beverage goods include towels and backpacks that are “similar in use
and function” to Defendants’ towel and backpack products. Id. Likewise, a
reasonable juror could conclude that the end consumers for both parties’ goods are
the general buying public because Monster Energy licenses its marks to retailers.
Finally, as to Monster Energy’s beverage goods, a reasonable juror could find that
energy drinks are complementary to 4Monster’s camping-related textile goods
because Monster Energy markets its beverage products as adjacent to extreme
sport and outdoor adventure activities. Thus, the relatedness of goods factor weighs
in Monster Energy’s favor.
A reasonable juror could also find that the third factor, the similarity of the
marks, favors Monster Energy. Both marks prominently feature the word
“Monster.” See Rearden LLC v. Rearden Com., Inc., 683 F.3d 1190, 1211-12 (9th
4 24-6521 Cir. 2012) (finding that common use of the name “Rearden” made two marks more
than “somewhat” similar). And 4Monster’s products commonly utilize the exact
same shade of green as Monster Energy’s signature trade dress. Thus, although the
parties’ marks differ in some respects, a reasonable juror could find that the marks
are confusingly similar. See Ironhawk Techs., 2 F.4th at 1164 (explaining that
“similarities are weighed more heavily than differences” (cleaned up)).
Likewise, as to the fourth factor—evidence of actual confusion—Monster
Energy’s survey evidence creates a genuine dispute of material fact when the
survey evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to Monster Energy. See
Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1026 n.28 (9th
Cir. 2004). “Defendants may have valid criticism of [an expert’s] methods and
conclusions, and their critique may justify reducing the weight eventually afforded
[the] expert report.” Id. at 1027. But a district court’s “weighing” of “admissible
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 15 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MONSTER ENERGY COMPANY, a No. 24-6521 Delaware Corporation, D.C. No. 3:22-cv-00590-LL-DDL Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. MEMORANDUM*
JIANGSU SITOUGUAI INDUSTRY CO., LTD., a Chinese Corporation; CHANGZHOU HAIGE MICROFIBER TEXTILE CO., LTD., a Chinese Corporation,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California Linda Lopez, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted October 6, 2025 Pasadena, California
Before: GILMAN, GOULD, and KOH, Circuit Judges.**
Plaintiff-Appellant Monster Energy Company (“Monster Energy”) is a
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The Honorable Ronald Lee Gilman, United States Circuit Judge for the Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation. leader in the energy drink market. Monster Energy also produces branded
merchandise (such as towels and backpacks) bearing Monster Energy’s logo and
signature green and black trade dress. Monster Energy has trademark registrations
for both its beverage products and its non-beverage products. Defendants-
Appellees Jiangsu Sitouguai Industry Co. (“4Monster”) and Changzhou Haige
Microfiber Textile Co. (“Haige”) (collectively, “Defendants”) produce camping
equipment (such as backpacks and towels) under the name “4Monster.”
Monster Energy sued Defendants for trademark infringement, trade dress
infringement, and unfair competition. Specifically, Monster Energy alleged that
Defendants’ use of the “4Monster” mark was likely to cause confusion among
consumers as to whether Monster Energy produces Defendants’ goods. The district
court granted summary judgment to Defendants. Monster Energy timely appealed,
and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the district
court’s order de novo, and we consider the record in the light most favorable to
Monster Energy. See Ironhawk Techs., Inc. v. Dropbox, Inc., 2 F.4th 1150, 1159
(9th Cir. 2021). We reverse and remand for further proceedings in accordance with
this disposition.
“The test for likelihood of confusion is whether a ‘reasonably prudent
consumer’ in the marketplace is likely to be confused as to the origin of the good
or service bearing one of the marks.” Dreamwerks Prod. Grp., Inc. v. SKG Studio,
2 24-6521 142 F.3d 1127, 1129 (9th Cir. 1998). The analysis is guided by eight factors:
(1) strength of the mark; (2) proximity of the goods; (3) similarity of the marks; (4) evidence of actual confusion; (5) marketing channels used; (6) type of goods and the degree of care likely to be exercised by the purchaser; (7) defendant’s intent in selecting the mark; and (8) likelihood of expansion of the product lines.
Lodestar Anstalt v. Bacardi & Co. Ltd., 31 F.4th 1228, 1252 (9th Cir. 2022)
(quoting Ironhawk Techs., 2 F.4th at 1160). “These factors are neither exhaustive
nor dispositive; it is the totality of facts in a given case that is dispositive.” Id. at
1252 (quoting Ironhawk Techs., 2 F.4th at 1160). “Due to the fact-intensive nature
of trademark infringement claims, we grant motions for summary judgment
infrequently.” Lerner & Rowe PC v. Brown Engstrand & Shely LLC, 119 F.4th
711, 718 (9th Cir. 2024). “Nevertheless, when no genuine issue of material fact
exists, we have not hesitated to affirm a grant of summary judgment.” Id.
Here, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to likelihood of confusion.1
As to the first factor, mark strength, Monster Energy’s marks are conceptually
distinctive and therefore “trigger the highest degree of trademark protection.” JL
Beverage Co., LLC v. Jim Beam Brands Co., 828 F.3d 1098, 1107 (9th Cir. 2016)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Monster Energy’s marks are also
commercially strong both as to beverage products and non-beverage products.
1 Each of Monster Energy’s claims rises or falls on whether a likelihood of confusion exists. See Dreamwerks, 142 F.3d at 1129 n.2 (treating common law and Lanham Act claims as coextensive).
3 24-6521 “Commercial strength is based on actual marketplace recognition.” Id. (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). Viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to Monster Energy, a jury could find that Monster Energy’s wide
distribution of non-beverage merchandise goods has created widespread
marketplace recognition for Monster Energy’s non-beverage marks.
For the second factor, the relatedness of goods, a jury could find that the
parties’ products are “similar in use and function,” “complementary,” or intended
for the “same class” of consumers. Ironhawk Techs., 2 F.4th at 1163. Monster
Energy’s non-beverage goods include towels and backpacks that are “similar in use
and function” to Defendants’ towel and backpack products. Id. Likewise, a
reasonable juror could conclude that the end consumers for both parties’ goods are
the general buying public because Monster Energy licenses its marks to retailers.
Finally, as to Monster Energy’s beverage goods, a reasonable juror could find that
energy drinks are complementary to 4Monster’s camping-related textile goods
because Monster Energy markets its beverage products as adjacent to extreme
sport and outdoor adventure activities. Thus, the relatedness of goods factor weighs
in Monster Energy’s favor.
A reasonable juror could also find that the third factor, the similarity of the
marks, favors Monster Energy. Both marks prominently feature the word
“Monster.” See Rearden LLC v. Rearden Com., Inc., 683 F.3d 1190, 1211-12 (9th
4 24-6521 Cir. 2012) (finding that common use of the name “Rearden” made two marks more
than “somewhat” similar). And 4Monster’s products commonly utilize the exact
same shade of green as Monster Energy’s signature trade dress. Thus, although the
parties’ marks differ in some respects, a reasonable juror could find that the marks
are confusingly similar. See Ironhawk Techs., 2 F.4th at 1164 (explaining that
“similarities are weighed more heavily than differences” (cleaned up)).
Likewise, as to the fourth factor—evidence of actual confusion—Monster
Energy’s survey evidence creates a genuine dispute of material fact when the
survey evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to Monster Energy. See
Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1026 n.28 (9th
Cir. 2004). “Defendants may have valid criticism of [an expert’s] methods and
conclusions, and their critique may justify reducing the weight eventually afforded
[the] expert report.” Id. at 1027. But a district court’s “weighing” of “admissible
evidence at [summary judgment] is improper.” Id. Defendants’ arguments are best
directed to a jury. See id.
The sixth factor, the type of goods and the degree of care likely to be
exercised by the purchaser, also weighs in Monster Energy’s favor. The low-cost
goods at issue make confusion more likely because customers are unlikely to
exercise a high degree of care. See Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Ent.
Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1060 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that purchasers of
5 24-6521 inexpensive goods “are likely to exercise less care, thus making confusion more
likely”).
As to the fifth factor, the marketing channels used by the parties somewhat
overlap, but not in a significant manner. See Pom Wonderful LLC v. Hubbard, 775
F.3d 1118, 1130 (9th Cir. 2014) (explaining that “a channel of trade is not limited
to identical stores or agents”). For the seventh factor, Monster Energy has not
presented evidence of 4Monster’s intent in selecting the 4Monster mark. See
GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 202 F.3d 1199, 1208 (9th Cir. 2000)
(explaining that this factor is of “minimal importance”). And for the eighth factor,
although there is no evidence of 4Monster’s expansion into Monster Energy’s core
energy drink business, the parties offer similar towel and backpack products, and
the extent of the parties’ competition in such goods is unclear. See Brookfield, 174
F.3d at 1060 (explaining that this factor carries less weight when parties offer
competing goods).
Considering the above factors collectively, a genuine dispute exists as to
“whether the consuming public is likely somehow to associate [4Monster’s]
products with [Monster Energy].” Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1056. Because a
reasonable juror could find a likelihood of confusion, summary judgment in favor
of 4Monster was inappropriate.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
6 24-6521