Monroy Monroy, Y. v. Lopez Chavez, M.

Opinion

J-S27030-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

YURI MONROY MONROY : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : : v. : : : MIGUEL LOPEZ CHAVEZ : No. 1033 EDA 2025

Appeal from the Order Entered March 18, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County Civil Division at No(s): 2024-FC-1096

BEFORE: STABILE, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED OCTOBER 8, 2025

Yuri Monroy Monroy (Mother) appeals from the order entered by the

Lehigh County Court of Common Pleas which granted her sole legal and

physical custody of her now 18-year-old son, B.L.M. (the Child),1 whose father

is Miguel Lopez Chavez (Father). The order also denied Mother’s petition for

special relief, in which she requested that the trial court make predicate factual

findings that would enable the Child to petition the United States Citizenship

and Immigration Services (USCIS) for Special Immigrant Juvenile Status

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 Although the Child turned 18 years of age in May 2025, this appeal is not

moot. The federal Special Immigrant Juvenile Status statute affords relief in a proper case until a child reaches the age of 21. Accordingly, we conclude that the issue is not moot, and the Lehigh County Court of Common Pleas has jurisdiction to make the requested findings. See Orozco v. Tecu, 284 A.3d 474, 479 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2022). J-S27030-25

(SIJS). After careful review, we reverse and remand for entry of an order

containing predicate SIJS determinations for the Child.

We discern the following factual and procedural history from the certified

record. The Child was born in May 2007 in Guatemala. Who he lived with in

his early life is unclear from the record. However, according to Mother’s

custody complaint, the Child began living with his Paternal Grandparents in

Guatemala in 2013.2 At some point, Mother came to live in the United States.

On September 3, 2023, the Child entered the United States at the United

States/Mexico border near Rio Grande City, Texas. From September 3 to

September 21, 2023, the Child was held by the United States Department of

Health and Human Services’ Office of Refugee Resettlement. Thereafter, the

Office released the Child into Mother’s custody. The Child then resided in

Lehigh County, Pennsylvania with Mother, Mother’s long-term boyfriend,

Mother’s brother, and Mother’s other two minor children (the Child’s half-

siblings).

2 The record contains conflicting information regarding whether the Child was

living with his Paternal or Maternal Grandparents in Guatemala. Mother’s custody petition stated that the Child had been living with his Paternal Grandparents. Mother also testified at the custody hearing that the Child was previously living with his Paternal Grandparents. However, the trial court referred to these individuals as the Child’s Maternal Grandparents in its custody opinion and Appellate Rule 1925(a) opinion. Likewise, Mother’s appellate brief uses the term “Maternal Grandparents.” Nevertheless, based on Mother’s custody petition and her uncontradicted testimony, we refer to these individuals as the Child’s Paternal Grandparents. We also note that whether the Child was living with his Paternal or Maternal Grandparents in Guatemala has no bearing on our disposition.

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On October 23, 2024, Mother filed a custody complaint requesting sole

legal and physical custody of the Child. Mother also filed a petition for special

relief requesting that the trial court make specific factual findings relevant for

SIJS. The court held a custody hearing on March 14, 2025. Mother was

present and represented by counsel. Mother, Mother’s boyfriend, and the

Child testified; an interpreter facilitated their testimony. Father was not

present at the hearing. Mother’s custody complaint stated that Father’s last

known residence was in Guatemala. However, it was revealed through service

of process and testimony at the hearing that Father was in New York when

the custody petition was served.3 After the hearing, the court issued a custody

3 We note that “a parent outside the Commonwealth is entitled to notice and

an opportunity to be heard in accordance with our law or the foreign state’s law, but Pennsylvania does not require the absent parent to participate in the proceedings in order for our courts to have jurisdiction over the custody action.” Velasquez v. Miranda, 321 A.3d 876, 884 n.2 (Pa. 2024) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). During the hearing, the trial court called to see if Father was present in the courtroom and asked Mother’s attorney if he had service on Father. See N.T., 3/14/25, at 5. Mother’s attorney stated that Father “was previously served and accepted service on the 20th of November [2024].” Id. at 5-6. The certified record contains an acceptance of service signed by Father on November 20, 2024, stating that he was accepting service of the custody complaint, petition for special relief, and a November 11, 2024, court order. See Acceptance of Service, 12/10/24. The acceptance document notes that there was a custody conference scheduled in December 2024 and states that Father received the notice on November 20 in the state of New York. See id. Within that document, Father also waived all rights to participate in the custody matter and stated that he did not wish to participate in any further proceedings related to the custody matter. See id.; see also N.T. at 6 (Mother’s counsel stating, “on that service, [Father] had indicated that he wished to waive all rights to participate in the matter.”).

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order granting Mother sole legal and physical custody of the Child but denying

her petition for SIJS findings.

Mother timely filed this appeal. She presents the following question for

our review:

1. Is [Mother] entitled to a Special Immigrant Juvenile Status (“SIJS”) predicate order containing the language required for her Child B.L.M. to receive Special Immigrant Juvenile Status?

Mother’s Brief at 5.

We first clarify that Mother’s issue implicates only the part of the trial

court’s order denying her request for predicate judicial findings to support

SIJS, not the court’s decision to grant her sole legal and physical custody of

the Child.

Last year, our Supreme Court discussed the applicable standard and

scope of review for SIJS issues that arise in the context of custody

proceedings. See Velasquez v. Miranda, 321 A.3d 876, 891 (Pa. 2024).

The High Court provided the following guidance:

When considering pure questions of law, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. We generally do not “interfere with the trial court’s factual conclusions unless they are unreasonable in view of the trial court’s factual findings and thus represent an abuse of discretion.” Likewise, while we have a broad scope of review, we cannot nullify the fact-finding function of the judge presiding over the custody hearing or their ability to make credibility determinations.

Id. (internal citations omitted). “Thus, we must conduct a plenary review of

the instant certified record to ascertain whether the trial court’s conclusions

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are reasonably supported by its factual findings.” Zayas v. Brizuela, 334

A.3d 363, *2 (Pa. Super. 2025) (unpublished memorandum). Additionally,

we must determine, as a matter of law, whether Mother has established

sufficient evidence to support the predicate SIJS findings.

SIJS “is an immigration classification that provides humanitarian

protection for certain minors located in the United States.” Velasquez, 321

A.3d at 882 (citations omitted). Pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality

Act, SIJS means, in relevant part, a child immigrant who is present in the

United States, and:

(i) who has been declared dependent on a juvenile court located in the United States or whom such a court has legally committed to, or placed under the custody of, an agency or department of a State, or an individual or entity appointed by a State or juvenile court located in the United States, and whose reunification with 1 or both of the immigrant’s parents is not viable due to abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis found under State law;

(ii) for whom it has been determined in administrative or judicial proceedings that it would not be in the alien’s best interest to be returned to the alien’s or parent’s previous country of nationality or country of last habitual residence; and

(iii) in whose case the Secretary of Homeland Security consents to the grant of [SIJS] [. . .]

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(i-iii).

Thus, SIJS allows immigrant children to seek lawful residency in the

United States in order to remain where their needs are best met and avoid

deportation to their country of nationality or last habitual residence. Id. SIJS

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requires decisions at both the state and federal levels. Ultimately, the USCIS,

a federal agency of the United States Department of Homeland Security,

determines whether to grant SIJS to a child. See Velasquez, 321 A.3d at

883 (citation omitted). However, the USCIS application process requires, inter

alia, a state court order that includes predicate judicial determinations. See

id. (citation omitted).

The state court must be one that has “jurisdiction under State law to

make judicial determinations about the dependency and/or custody and care

of juveniles.” Id. (citation omitted). The state court’s order must include

dependency or custody, parental reunification, and best interest

determinations. See id. (citation omitted).

Specifically, the state court must decide whether: 1) “reunification with

1 or both of the [child’s] parents is not viable due to abuse, neglect,

abandonment, or a similar basis found under State law” and 2) “it would not

be in the [child’s] best interest to be returned to the [child’s] or parent’s

previous country of nationality or country of last habitual residence.” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1101(a)(27)(J)(i)-(ii); see Velasquez, 321 A.3d at 883. Once a state court

issues an order with those requisite findings, the child presents that order to

the USCIS to seek SIJS. Thus, the USCIS ultimately decides whether to grant

a child SIJS; the state court does not make an immigration decision, and its

determinations do not grant or guarantee SIJS to the child. See Velasquez,

321 A.3d at 895 (citing Orozco v. Tecu, 284 A.3d 474, 476-77 (Pa. Super.

2022) (further citation omitted)).

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Our Supreme Court has provided guidance on the appropriate burden of

proof in this context. Petitioners must prove their entitlement to predicate

SIJS findings by a preponderance of the evidence. See id. at 906 (collecting

cases). Further, a state court is expressly authorized by federal law to issue

an SIJS order when:

(1) The court has exercised its jurisdiction as authorized by Pennsylvania law to determine the dependency and/or custody and care of a child;

(2) Reunification with one or both of the child’s parents is not viable due to abuse, abandonment, neglect, or a similar basis under Pennsylvania law; and

(3) It is not in the child’s best interest to be returned to the child’s or their parent’s country of nationality or last habitual residence.

Id. at 895 (citations omitted).

Applying our Supreme Court’s guidance in Velasquez to this case, and,

thus, conducting our own “comprehensive review of the record,” reveals that

the Child is entitled to predicate SIJS determinations. See id. at 906 (citation

omitted). We will address each statutory element of the SIJS analysis in turn.

Here, there is no question that the first element was met because the

trial court properly exercised jurisdiction over this custody case and awarded

Mother sole custody of the Child. Our Supreme Court confirmed that a court

exercising custody jurisdiction is appropriate to issue predicate SIJS findings.

See id. at 903 (citing 8 C.F.R. §§ 204.11(a), (c) (“a juvenile court” is a court

with “jurisdiction under State law to make judicial determinations about the

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dependency and/or custody and care of juveniles,” and must make SIJ[S]

determinations “under” or “in accordance with State law”)). Thus, Mother

could appropriately seek SIJS determinations from the trial court on the Child’s

behalf, and the court was empowered to adjudicate Mother’s SIJS petition.

See id. at 882 (“[P]ursuant to federal SIJ[S] law, a child who is the subject

of custody proceedings that result in sole custody being awarded to the parent

presently in the United States may seek SIJ[S] determinations in that custody

proceeding.”). Our Supreme Court determined that one avenue to SIJS relief

is a court-ordered, one-parent custodial arrangement. See id. at 899-900

(collecting cases from numerous jurisdictions).

Further, Mother’s petition for special relief put a request for SIJS findings

directly before the trial court. At the end of the hearing, Mother’s counsel

reiterated that “as per the Petition for Special Relief, there is some additional

language that we would like included in the order, basically related to the

[F]ather’s abandonment of [C]hild, in addition to the findings of best

interests.” N.T., 3/14/25, at 32. The court responded “Okay.” Id. Mother’s

counsel then stated, “And if Your Honor would need any additional testimony,

I can certainly call any witnesses if you had --” and the court interjected by

saying, “Yeah, no.” Id. Thus, the first element of the SIJS analysis was met

in this case.

On the second element, Mother argues that the Child’s reunification with

Father is not viable due to abandonment. She presented uncontested and

credible testimony that the Child has never resided with Father, and Father

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has never contacted or provided support for the Child. See Mother’s Brief at

10. Mother asserts that the trial court found Mother’s, the Child’s, and

Mother’s boyfriend’s testimony to be credible, and made no adverse credibility

findings. Id. at 11.

Our review of the record confirms this. The court explicitly found that

Father abandoned the Child and awarded sole custody to Mother. The court

specifically stated, “It appears that Father has never cared for the Child and,

thus, has abandoned the Child.” Trial Court Opinion (T.C.O.), 3/18/25, at 4.

Separately, the court stated, “there is no evidence that Father ever cared for

the Child.” Id. at 3. The court also acknowledged, “[d]ue to the fact that

Mother has been caring for the Child and Father has not.” Id. at 5.

Additionally, as noted, the court awarded sole legal and physical custody of

the Child to Mother. See Final Custody Order, 3/18/25, at 1-2.

Further, the trial court specifically found “the following witnesses

credible: Mother, Child, [and Mother’s boyfriend].” T.C.O. at 2. “[T]here is

no reason to disrupt [the trial court’s] credibility determination[s] and factual

findings that led to its custody award as they are amply supported by the

record.” Velasquez, 321 A.3d at 906. Mother testified that the Child has

never resided with Father, and Father has never provided any money or

support for the Child. See N.T. at 11-12, 17. Mother also testified that

although she, the Child, and their family go on vacation, to church, and to the

park, the Child has never done any of those things with Father. See id. at

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13. Father did not make Mother or the Child aware of where he was living,

nor did he reach out to talk to the Child. See id. at 16.

Mother’s boyfriend corroborated her testimony and stated that they

provide everything for the Child. See id. at 24. Conversely, Father never

tries to call the Child or communicate with him. See id. Lastly, the Child

confirmed that he does not remember the last time he saw Father or had a

conversation with him. Id. at 29-30. The Child also testified that Father has

never given him any money or support. Id. at 29. Additionally, we note that

when served with the custody complaint, Father indicated that he did not wish

to participate in any further proceedings related to the custody matter. See

id. at 6.

Thus, the court’s own findings, along with the uncontradicted testimony

from the witnesses that the court deemed credible, showed that Father had

abandoned the Child. Therefore, the second element of the SIJS analysis was

met in this case because reunification with one of the Child’s parents is not

viable due to abandonment.

Next, we turn to the third element, whether it was in the Child’s best

interest to be returned to Guatemala, the Child’s country of nationality and

last habitual residence. Mother argues that while the Child lived in Guatemala

with Paternal Grandparents, conditions were dangerous, with assaults,

murders, and poor access to education. See Mother’s Brief at 11. Conversely,

the Child now thrives in Pennsylvania and wishes to remain in Mother’s care.

Id.

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Here, as in Velasquez, “the custody court’s best interest analysis and

award of sole custody to Mother establish it is in [the Child’s] best interest not

to be returned to Guatemala.” Velasquez, 321 A.3d at 908. Again, the trial

court found Mother, Mother’s boyfriend, and the Child to be credible witnesses.

Mother’s uncontradicted testimony was that there were dangerous situations

in Guatemala when the Child lived there, including murders, robberies, and

assaults. N.T. at 17.

Mother’s boyfriend testified that it was very difficult for the Child to be

so far away, and Guatemala is not a safe environment. See id. at 25.

Mother’s boyfriend stated that sometimes the children go to school in

Guatemala, but sometimes they do not. Id.

The Child testified that his life in Guatemala was very difficult, and it

was very difficult for him to go to school. Id. at 28. He also stated that there

were dangerous situations in Guatemala including assaults and homicides, but

he felt safe where he was living now. See id. at 29.

Mother testified that the United States was better than Guatemala for

education. See id. at 17. She also stated that she thought the Child was

really enjoying his time with her. See id. at 18. Mother’s boyfriend testified

that the Child is adjusting to life in the United States well and really likes it.

See id. at 22. The Child testified that he preferred living in the United States

with Mother. Id. at 29. Additionally, Mother’s brother lived in the family’s

house, along with Mother’s other two children. See T.C.O. at 4-5. The Child

testified that he gets along well with Mother, Mother’s boyfriend, and his two

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half-siblings. See N.T. at 29-30. He also testified that if Mother is ever out

of the house, Mother’s brother and her boyfriend help take care of him. See

id. at 30-31.

Based upon the trial court’s credibility determinations and the witnesses’

uncontradicted testimony, the third statutory element was met in this case.

It is undisputed that it is not in the Child’s best interest to be returned to

Guatemala.

However, as noted, the trial court denied Mother’s petition. Its rationale

for doing so was that “findings relative to the Child residing in Guatemala with

his [Paternal] [G]randparents are irrelevant to this case because they are not

parties to this case. This is the reason that the [c]ourt denied [Mother’s]

Petition For Special Relief.” Trial Court Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Statement, 4/24/25,

at 2 (unnumbered). In its opinion, the court stated:

Mother presented additional evidence relating to the Child’s life residing in Guatemala with his [Paternal] [G]randparents. It would be improper for the [c]ourt to make the findings requested by [Mother] in this regard because the [Paternal] [G]randparents are not parties to this case. Therefore, findings related to them are irrelevant to deciding custody between Mother and Father.

T.C.O. at 6.

We agree that evidence related to the Child’s life in Guatemala did not

affect the custody decision between Mother and Father. However, we disagree

that such evidence was not relevant to these proceedings. This evidence was

relevant to determine Mother’s petition for special relief. Most importantly, it

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was relevant for the third element under Velasquez, i.e., whether it was in

the Child’s best interest to be returned to the Child’s country of nationality or

last habitual residence. Thus, because Mother met all three elements under

Velasquez, the court should have granted her petition for special relief.

We recognize that the facts of this case are slightly different than

Velasquez. Here, Mother and Father were both located in the United States

at the time of the custody proceedings. In Velasquez, Father was in

Guatemala. See Velasquez, 321 A.3d at 883. However, this does not change

our analysis because the trial court could still determine whether reunification

between the Child and Father was viable and whether returning to Guatemala

was in the Child’s best interest, regardless of where Father lived at the time

of the custody proceeding. See id. at 905 (“If analysis of the child’s best

interest results in a determination that sole legal and physical custody should

be with the child’s parent or other individual who resides in the United States,

then the court can also make the predicate SIJ[S] judicial determination

related to the child’s best interest – that it is in [his] best interest not to be

returned to [his] country of nationality or habitual residency.”). Our reading

of the three factors in Velasquez is that each of these elements is

independent. The fact that the Child would not be returned to Guatemala

even if custody was awarded to Father does not negate the trial court’s

authority to make the SIJS findings. Ultimately, the federal government will

have to decide if the Child meets the criteria for SIJS, but Mother has met all

the requirements for the predicate findings at the state court level.

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In sum, we conclude that the trial court erred by denying Mother’s

petition for an order containing predicate SIJS determinations. See Orozco,

284 A.3d at 479 (“We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion.

Mother specifically requested SIJ[S] findings both orally during the March

2019 hearing and in her October 2019 petition. The federal statutory scheme

puts the factual determinations necessary for SIJ[S] [] solely within the

purview of state courts. Yet the court flatly refused to issue the SIJ[S] order.

In this posture, the refusal was an abuse of discretion.”). The court’s

credibility determinations and factual findings, along with the uncontradicted

evidence of record, show that there was sufficient support for the SIJS

findings. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court, and remand for entry of an

order granting Mother’s petition for special relief and containing predicate SIJS

determinations consistent with this memorandum. See Velasquez, 321 A.3d

at 908-09. The court’s order awarding sole legal and physical custody of the

Child to Mother remains intact. See id. at 909.

Order denying special relief reversed. Custody order affirmed. Case

remanded with instructions. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judge Stabile joins. PJE Stevens concurs in result.

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Date: 10/08/2025

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