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STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT
Cumberland, ss. Civil Action
JEFFREY W . MONROE & LINDA S. MONROE,
Plaintiffs,
v. Docket No. PORSC-RE- 15-169
CARlvfEN CHATMAS & IMAD KHALIDI,
Defendants, STATE OF MAINE and Cumberland, ss, Clerk's Office
MARIA C. RINALDI MAR 23 2016 Party-In-Interest RECEIVED LARRY D . AMBERGER & JANET K. AMBERGER et al,
Plain tiffs,
v. Docket No. PORSC-RE- 15-204
IMAD KHALID I, CARMEN CHATMAS & MARIA C. RINALDI
Defendants
GEORGE W . FOLEY, III,
Plaintiff
v. Docket No . PORSC-RE-1 5-206
IMAD KHALID I, CARMEN CHATMAS & MARIA C. RINALDI ,
ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS' JOINT MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The Plaintiffs in these consolidated cases have moved for summary judgment against
the Defendants . In their joint motion, Plaintiffs assert that the notices that the Defend ants
1 recorded in Cumberland County Registry of Deeds and served on Plaintiffs pursuant to the
Maine Paper Streets Act, 23 M.R.S. § 3033, were premature and insufficient, and therefore
void, as a matter of law. Defendants oppose Plaintiffs' joint motion. Oral argument was held
on March 21, 2016.
Based on the entire record, Plaintiffs' joint motion for summary judgment is granted.
I. Background
In 1911, the Shore Acres Land Company recorded with the Cumberland County
Registry of Deeds, at Book 12, Page 45, a plan for the Shore Acres subdivision in the Town of
Cape Elizabeth (the "1911 Plan" ). (Pls . Supp. S.M .F . ~ l; Defs. Opp. S.M.F . ~ l; Neagle Aff.
Ex. 1. ) A second subdivision plan, which Plaintiffs aver was an "amendment" to the 1911 Plan,
was recorded in 1930 at Book 19, Page 45 (the "1930 Plan" ). (Pls. Supp. S.M.F. ~ 3; Neagle
Aff. Ex. 2.)
The 1911 Plan shows an unlabeled way, which connects two other ways, Surf Side
Avenue and Oak Grove Road . (Neagle Aff Ex . 1.) The unlabeled subdivision way depicted on
the 1911 Plan crosses over lots 10, 11, 12, and 13. (Id. ) Lots 10 through 13 are owned by
Defendants. (Defs. Opp. S.M .F . ~ ~ 60- 62; Stier Aff. Ex. A. ) Both the unlabeled subdivision
way and the way labeled as Surf Side Avenue are "paper streets," meaning dedicated but
unconstructed and unaccepted ways shown on a subdivision plan, but not existing as streets on
the face of the earth.
Plaintiffs assert that the unlabeled subdivision way depicted on the 1911 Plan is actually
a portion of Surf Side Avenue . (Pls. Sup. S.M .F. ~ 2. ) Plaintiffs also assert that, sometime
around 1999, this portion of Surf Side Avenue was renamed Atlantic Place in order to clarify
emergency response addresses . (Pls. Supp. S.M.F. ~ ~ 2, 11. ) Defendants deny that the
unlabeled portion was ever part of Surf Side A venue, and assert that part or all of Atlantic Place
2 consists of a private driveway that Defendants Imad Khalidi and Maria C. Rinaldi use to access
their respective homes . (Defs . Opp. S.M.F. ~ 2.)
In 2014, Defendants Carmen Chatmas and I mad Khalidi invoked the procedure
contained in the Maine Paper Streets Act ["the Act"], in order to extinguish any interests that
other owners of lots in their subdivision might have in the unlabeled way, pursuant to 23
M.R.S. § 3033.
Under the Act, to extinguish the interests of other lot owners in the subdivision, a
person claiming ownership of a paper street must record a notice at the registry of deeds. Id. §
3033(1). The notice mus t include the names of all current owners of lots in the subdivision
plan and their mortgagees. Id. The person claiming ownership of the paper street must also
mail a copy of the notice to all record owners and their mortgagees . Id. Any owners oflots in
the subdivision who claim an interes t in the paper street must record with the registry of deeds
a sworn statement asserting their interest within one year of receiving the notice and must
bring an action to quiet title within 180 days of recording their statement in order to protect
their interest. Id. § 3033(2). Otherwise, the owners of lots in the subdivision are forever
barred from asserting any interest in the paper street. Id.
On March 20, 2014, Defendant Carmen Chatmas recorded a notice pursuant to section
3033 ( 1) at the Cumberland County Registry of Deeds, at Book S 13 98, Page 109. D efendant
Chatmas recorded a second notice on May 12, 20 14, at Book 3 1496, Page 193 . On May 13,
2014, Defendant Khalidi also r ecorded a notice pursuant to section 3033 with the Cumberland
County Registry of Deeds, at Book 3 149 8, Page 199. (Chatmas's and Khalidi's notices are
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collectively referred to as "section 30.'.3.'.3(1) no tices" ). The notices were sent to all owners and
mortgagees oflots in the 1911 Plan. 1
The notices claim that the Defendants own portions of the unlabeled way shown on the
1911 Plan. Each notice defines the proposed unaccepted way in an attached and incorporated
Exhibit 1 to the notice, and defines the portion of the way that is the subject of the notice in an
attached and incorporated Exhibit 2 to the notice. (Neagle Aff. Exs 8,9.)
On April 23, 2015 , Plaintiff Jeffrey Monroe recorded two sworn affidavits pursuant to
2.'.3 M.R.S. § .'.30.'.3.'.3(2), asserting interests in the portions of the unlabeled way described in
Defendants' notices. Plaintiffs Jeffrey and Linda Monroe filed a complaint seeking a declaratory
judgment of adverse possession and to quiet title on September 9, 2015. The Monroes filed an
amended complaint on November 4, 2015.
Plaintiffs Larry and Janet Amberger and thirty-five other owners of lots in the
subdivision also recorded sworn affidavits pursuant to section 303.'.3(2). The Ambergers and
other lot owners filed their complaint to quiet title and for adverse possession on October 27,
2015.
On May 11, 2015, Plaintiff George Foley, III, as trustee and personal representative of
Margaret Foley, also recorded a sworn affidavit pursuant to section 3033(2), and he filed a
complaint seeking to quiet title and for declaratory judgment on October 29, 20 15.
On November 30, 2015, Mr. Foley filed a motion to consolidate the three separate cases
pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 42. Plaintiffs then filed their joint motion for
summary judgment on December 16, 2015. After an enlargement of time, Defendants filed
I At oral argument, the Plaintiffs indicated that they were not conceding that the Defendants had validly notified the owners of all lots shown in the 1911 Plan, but they have· not raised any genuine issue in that regard.
2 Defendants' motion for leave to file a surreply asserts that Plaintiffs' reply brief raises new issues of law for the first time. (Defs . Mot. for Surreply 2.) Contrary to Defendants' assertion, Plaintiffs' reply
4 their opposition the motion for summary on January 13, 2016. The court granted the motion
to consolidate on January 15, 2016. After additional time, Plaintiffs filed a reply on January 27,
2016. Defendants also sought leave to file a surreply, which Plaintiffs opposed. 2
II. Analysis
Plaintiffs assert that they are entitled to summary judgment because Defendants'
section 3033( 1) notices were void for two reasons: ( 1) the proposed, unaccepted way referred to
in Defendants' section 3033 has not "deemed vacated" pursuant to 23 M.R.S. § 3032; and (2)
Defendants failed to serve their notices on all of the owners oflots in the 1930 Plan. (Pls . Mot.
Summ. J. 6, 8.)
A. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate if, bas ed on the parties' statements of material fact
and the cited record, there is no genuine iss ue of material fact and the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter oflaw. M.R. Civ. P. 56(c); Dyer v. Dep't ofTransp., 2008 ME 106, ~ 14,
95 1 A.2d 821. "A material fact is one that can affect the outcome of the case. A genuine issue of
material fact exists when the [fact finder] must choose between competing versions of the
truth." Dyer, 2008 ME 106, ~ 14, 951 A.2d 821 (internal citation and quotation marks
omitted). When deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court reviews the evidence in
the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id.
If the moving party's motion for summary judgment is properly supported, the burden
shifts to the non-moving party to respond with specific facts indicating a genuine issue for trial
in order to avoid summary judgment. M .R. Civ. P. 56(e). If the non-moving party fails to
2 Defendants' motion for leave to file a surreply asserts that Plaintiffs' reply brief raises new iss ues of law for the first time . (Defs . Mot. for Surreply 2.) Contrary to Defendants' assertion, Plaintiffs' reply does not raise new issues, but merely responds to arguments raised by Defendants' opposition. Therefore, Defendants' motion for leave to file a surreply is denied .
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present sufficient evidence of a genuine issue for trial, then the moving party is entitled to a
summary judgment. Watt v. UnzFirst Corp., 2009 ME 47, ~ 21, 969 A.2d 897.
B. Whether the proposed, unaccepted way referred to in Defendants' section SOS S( l ) notices can be deemed vacated under the Paper Streets Act
This section addresses the Plaintiffs' contention that the Defendants cannot use the
section sass notice procedure that the Defendants have invoked because the Town of Cape
Elizabeth still has the right to accept the paper street referred to in Defendants' notices.
On its face, the section SOSS (1) notice procedure that Defendants have invoked applies
only to proposed, unaccepted ways that are "deemed vacated under section SOS2." Section SOS2
of the Paper Streets Act provides that any proposed, unaccepted way or portion thereoflaid out
in a subdivision plan recorded prior to September 29, 1987, is deemed vacated on the later of
September 29, 1997, or fifteen years after its recording if the following conditions are met: ( 1)
the way has not been constructed or used, and (2) the way has not been accepted by the town,
county, or st ate as a public way or as a public, utility, or recreational easement. Id.§ SOS2( 1-A).
However, section SOS2 permitted municipalities to extend the deadline by which they
could accept paper streets for a period of twenty years by filing a notice with the registry of
deeds before the expiration of the September 29, 1997 deadline. Id. § SOS2 (2) . Thus, any
proposed, unaccepted way that might still be accepted by the municipality within which it lies
cannot be 'deemed vacated" until the municipality's option to do so has expired.
Plaintiffs assert that Defendants cannot use the section S03S( l ) notice procedure under
the Paper Streets Act at this time because the Town of Cape Elizabeth has until September
201 7 to decide whether to accept the paper street at issue as a public way or as a public, utility
or recreational easement. (Pls . Mot. Summ J. 7; Pls. Supp. S.M.F. ~ ~ 4-5.) It is undisputed
that, on September 11, 1997, the Town of Cape Elizabeth recorded in the Cumberland County
Registry of Deeds , at Book 1SS17, Page 15 1, an order declaring that "the Town Council,
6 pursuant to 23 M .R.S. § 3032(2), hereby extends for a period of twenty (20) years all proposed,
unaccepted ways within the Town of Cape Elizabeth" except for paper streets shown on a few
town maps listed in the order. (Neagle Aff. Ex 4.) None of the parties contends that the paper
street at issue in these cases is among those shown on the listed maps.
By establishing the undisputed fact that the Town has extended its right to accept all
paper streets in the Town, except for the few that were expressly excluded, to a date in
September 2017, the Plaintiffs have made a przmafacie showing that the paper street at issue in
these cases will not be deemed vacated for purposes of section .30.32 until September 2017.
In their opposition, Defendants argue that the Town Council's recorded extension did
not include the paper street at issue here , or at least that there is a mixed question of fact and
law as to whether it did. (Defs. Opp . S.M.F. ~ ~ 4-5 .) Defendants base their objection on a
report entitled "Inventory and Evaluation of Paper Streets in Cape Elizabeth, Maine" dated
August 1, 1996. (Id. ~ 87; Stier Aff. Ex. J. ) According to the report, there were fifty-one paper
streets in the Town of Cape Elizabeth in 1996. ( Id. ) The report does not list Atlantic Place as
a paper street within the Town of Cape Elizabeth at that time. (Defs. Opp. S.M.F. ~ 88; Stier
Aff. Ex. J.) According to Defendants, because the Town of Cape Elizabeth did not recognize
Atlantic Place as a paper street in the 1996 inventory, the 1997 recorded extension cannot be
deemed to apply to Atlantic Place.
The Plaintiffs respond that what the Defendants are calling Atlantic Place is identified
in the 1996 inventory as Surf Side Avenue. Defendants' rejoinder to that contention is that
there is no evidence that the areas that are defined in their notices have ever been considered a
part of Surf Side Avenue. (Defs. Opp. S.M.F. ~ 2.) Pursuant to Rule 56(f) of the civil rules,
they assert that, if the court deems Plaintiffs to have made a sufficient showing regarding
summary judgment, ruling on the motion should be deferred until the Defendants have an
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opportunity to take discovery regarding that issue as well as to the other issue Plaintiffs have
raised, regarding lots on the 1930 Plan.
Regardless of which side is correct on the narrow question of whether the unlabeled
proposed, unaccepted way defined in the Defendants' section SOSS( 1) notices is, or is not, listed
in the 1996 inventory, it is not the 1996 inventory that is at issue here. It is the plain language
of the Town's recorded extension that determines whether the Town extended into 2017 its
right to accept the paper street at issue in these cases . The 1997 recorded order is
unambiguous, and in fact could not be clearer, in stating the Town's intent to extend for 20
years its right to accept, with specified irrelevant exclusions, "all proposed, unaccepted ways
within the Town of Cape Elizabeth" (emphasis added). Thus, there is no genuine issue as to
whether any and all proposed, unaccepted ways laid out in a subdivision plan within Cape
Elizabeth prior to September 29, 1987, that were not specifically excluded by the recording,
were extended until September 20 17.
It fo llows that, regardless of whether the proposed, unaccepted way mentioned in
Defendants' section 3033( 1) notices is Atlantic Place, a portion of Surf Side Avenue, or has no
name at all, the deadline for the Town of Cape Elizabeth to accept the way was extended until
September 201 7 . Therefore, the proposed, unaccepted way defined in Defend an ts' section
3033( 1) notices has not been "deemed vacated" under section 3032.
Given that the recorded Town Council order plainly and unambiguously states the
intent to extend the Town's right regarding all proposed, unaccepted ways in the Town except
those specifically excluded, the Defendants' request to take discovery under Rule 56(f)
regarding whether the way at issue in these cases was within the scope of the extension seeks
to explore further a question that the 1997 extension itself clearly answers . Defendant's Rule
56(f) request is denied.
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Defendants make two additional arguments. First, Defendants argue that Town of
Cape Elizabeth's opportunity to accept the unlabeled way at issue may have already lapsed at
common law, and therefore, the September 1997 recording could not have extended the Town's
right. (Defs. Opp'n to Pls . Mot. Summ. J. 12); See Ocean Point Colony Tr., Inc. v. To wn of
Boothbay, 1999 ME 152, ~~ 7-10, 739 A.2d 382 . Defendants assert that they have not had an
opportunity to conduct meaningful discovery on this issue. (Defs . Opp'n to Pls . Mot. Summ. J.
12.) Defendants request the court deny summary j udgment under Rule 56(f) to allow further
discovery. ( Id. ) Second, Defendants also assert that some or all of Atlantic Place is nothing
more than the name of Defendants Khalidi's and Rinaldi's private driveway, and therefore, not a
paper street at all. (Defs. Opp. S.M.F. ~ 2.)
What both of these contentions suggest is that the Paper Streets Act may not apply at
all to the areas covered in the Defendants' section 3033( 1) notices, in which case the Defendants
cannot invoke the procedure contained in the Act for extinguishing Plaintiffs' interests, if any.
Section 3033 of the Paper Streets Act applies to "proposed, unaccepted way or portion of a
proposed, unaccepted way deemed vacated under section 3032." 23 M.R.S. § 3033( 1).
Therefore, if the Town of Cape Elizabeth's right to accept the unlabeled way as a public way or
easement had lapsed at common law, then the unlabeled way is outside the scope of the Act.
Likewis e, if the areas defined in Defendants' notices do not include any part of a paper street,
the Act does not apply. Thus, in either or both of these scenarios, Defendants' section 3033( 1)
notices would still be void.
For these reasons, the court concludes that the Plaintiffs are entitled to summary
judgment on the validity of the Defendants' section 3033(1) notices . That conclusion resolves
the counterclaim filed in Monro e v. Chatmas, Docket No . PORSC-RE-169, in which Defendants
seek a declaration that the Monroes' action was untimely commenced under the Act. Given
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that the Defendants' notices to the Monroes were not valid, they did not trigger any obligation
on the part of the Monroe Plaintiffs to file a section 3033(2) action within the statutory
deadline. The counterclaim seeking to enforce the statutory deadline is thus moot, and will be
dismissed.
Likewi.se, the claims of quiet title asserted by the Monroes and by Mr. Foley in Foley v.
Khalidz; Docket No. PORSC-RE-15-206, and the claim of adverse possession asserted by the
Plaintiffs in Amberger v. Khalidz; Docket No. PORSC-RE-15-204, are probably not ripe, and also
the Town would likely have to be joined as a party in all three cases. However, whether the
Plaintiffs intend to pursue these claims despite the court's ruling in their favor on the invalidity
of the Defendants' notices is not entirely clear.
III. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the court concludes that the Defendants are not entitled to
proceed under the Paper Streets Act, either because there are no paper streets at issue; or
because the Town's right to accept the paper street at issue lapsed at common law and the
paper street is not subject to the Paper Streets Act, or, as seems most likely, because the paper
street at issue cannot be "deemed vacated," at least for the time being, as a result of the Town's
extension of its right to accept it and other paper streets" in the Town.
Thus, Plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment on that ground. It is unnecessary to
address Plaintiffs' alternate argument that the Defendants were required to send their section
3033(1) notices to all owners of lots shown on the 1930 Plan. Also, Plaintiffs indicated at oral
argument that their other motions could be denied if their joint motion for summary judgment
were granted- that invitation is accepted.
Three final points are in order.
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First, all that the court has decided is that none of the claims ofright asserted in the
Defendants' section SOSS ( 1) notices and none of the claims ofright asserted under section
SOSS (2 ) in the Plaintiffs' pleadings in these cases is ripe for adjudication under the Maine Paper
Streets Act. Therefore, the result of the grant of Plaintiffs' motion must be a dismissal of all
Maine Paper Street Act claims, rather than an entry ofjudgment in favor of any party on those
claims.
Second, it may be of benefit to all parties for t he registry record to be clear on what has
ensued regarding the various recorded instruments the parties have placed in the registry.
Also, some or all parties may prefer that any recordation be of an abstract rather than a full
order or judgment. The court encourages counsel for the parties to confer on this issue.
Third, this Order does not constitute an appealable final judgment because the
Plaintiffs' common law claims ar e outstanding.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS:
(1) Plaintiffs' joint motion for summary judgment is granted, to the extent that the
Plaintiffs have established that the paper street at issue cannot be deemed vacated for purposes
of section 3032 of the Maine Paper Streets Act, 23 M .R.S . § 3032, and therefore that
Defendants are not entitled to issue and record notices under section 3033 ( 1) of the Maine
Paper Streets Act, id. § 3033( 1). For the same reason, none of the Plaintiffs is entitled to record
a notice of claimed rights or to bring an action under section 30SS (2 ) of the Act, id. § 3033(2 ).
(2) Defendants' Rule 56(£) motion and Defendants' Motion for Leave to File Surreply
are hereby denied. All other pending motions are dismissed.
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(3)Counsel for all Plaintiffs shall advise the court within 14 days whether they intend to
pursue their common law claims at this time. If they do intend to pursue those claims, the
Clerk will schedule a conference of counsel to discuss a schedule for these cases.
(4) If the Plaintiffs elect not to pursue their common law claims at this time, counsel for
all parties shall confer and attempt to agree, without waiving any objection to this Order or any
right of appeal therefrom, on a proposed form of final judgment that provides as follows:
• for the complaints in Amberger v. Khalidi, Docket No. PORSC-RE-15-204, and Foley
v. Khalidi, Docket No. PORSC-RE-15-206, and the amended complaint and
counterclaim in in Monroe v. Chatmas, Docket No. PORSC-RE- 169, all to be
• for any and all filings in the registry of deeds made by any party regarding the
proposed, unaccepted way referred to in Defendants' section 3033( 1) notices to be
declared void and of no effect
• for Plaintiffs in each case to be awarded their costs as prevailing parties .
• for either the final judgment or an abstract thereof to be recorded .
(3 ) Any joint or separate proposed form ofjudgment shall be filed with the court within
30 days, and shall also be e-mailed to the clerk in Word format.
Pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 79(a), the Clerk is hereby directed to incorporate this Order by
reference in the docket.
Dated March 23, 2016 A.M. Horton Justice, Superior Court