Monroe v. Jones
This text of 8 R.I. 526 (Monroe v. Jones) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Rhode Island primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
The opinion of the court was read by
This is a bill in the. nature of a bill of interpleader, brought for the purpose of having the court construe the will of Sarah J. Monroe, late of East Providence, deceased. Sarah J. Monroe died, leaving real estate in East Providence, estimated to be worth $2,000, and which sold at auction for but little over $1,800, and ■personal property worth about $2,000. She left few or no debts except those incurred in her last sickness and for her funeral expenses. The first clause of her will is as follows :• — •
“ I give, devise and bequeath to my Executor all my real estate, situated in the town of East Providence, in the county of Providence, in the State of Rhode Island, in trust, to be sold by him, as soon as may be after my decease, at public auction, and the proceeds of such sale, to be used by him in the payment of the debts and charges hereinafter named, and the legacies bequeathed.”
Then follow various clauses making bequests of money, and of the annual interest of certain sums of money to be paid to legatees during life, the principal after their death to others, *535 amounting in all to $3,200, also a bequest of a note, payable to tbe testatrix, for $200, to tbe maker, and bequests of some specific articles, mainly of wearing apparel and bousebold furniture, of comparatively small value. Tbe testatrix appoints William S. Monroe ber executor, and gives bim certain directions. Tbe will concludes as follows :—
“ I also give and bequeath to tbe said Charles W. Lawton, John S. Douglass, Jr, and Oscar Douglass, all the residue and remainder of my personal estate to be equally shared by and between them. I direct my executor, in case my property should not be sufficient for tbe payment of tbe debts, charges and legacies herein mentioned, that, after the payment of my just debts and tbe charges above mentioned, tbe balance shall be placed at interest by bim until tbe amount shall be sufficient to pay said legacies.”
Tbe residuary legatees claim under tbe bequest ofall tbe residue and remainder of my personal estate,” (to use tbe words of tbe will) all tbe personal estate left by tbe testatrix, except what is given by way of specific legacies, and contend that tbe other legacies, and tbe debts, are to be paid out of tbe proceeds of tbe real estate. We do not deem this a reasonable construction of tbe will. Tbe pecuniary legacies alone, exclusive of debts, amount to $1,200 more than tbe estimated value of tbe real estate, and to nearly $1,400 more than tbe real estate actually sold for. Some of these legacies, are legacies of tbe interest of specified sums, to be paid annually to persons of advanced age. Another legacy, is a legacy of $300 to tbe First Baptist church in East Providence, to be used towards tbe purchase of an organ for tbe use of said church, whenever such purchase shall he made. Tbe inference from these legacies is that tbe testatrix contemplated an early payment, or at least an early readiness to pay ; and that she could not have looked to such delay as would result in carrying out the last clause of her will, if tbe fund for tbe payment of ber debts and pecuniary legacies is to be derived solely from ber real estate. Tbe counsel for tbe residuary legatees, in order to reconcile tbe last clause with bis construction, has to suppose that tbe word “ property ” in tbe *536 clause means “ real ” property simply, — au arbitrary restriction of tbe natural meaning of tbe word, for which, we see no sufficient warrant. We think that when the testatrix says, “in case my property should not be sufficient,” it is most natural to suppose she meant all her property, real and personal, and that if she had meant to confine the meaning of the word to real property, she would have said “real property.” It is true that under the construction which we adopt, we give to the words, “ all the residue and remainder of my personal estate,” the same meaning as if she had said “ all the residue and remainder of my estate,” without reference to whether such remainder was real or personal; but it is to be remembered that she had already in the first clause ordered her real estate to be converted into money, and nothing would be more natural than that, in making this residuary bequest, her mind should go forward to the period when the residue, if any, should be ascertained, — a period when all her property would be personal property.
We think that under this will the residuary legatees are entitled only to what remains after the payment of the debts and of the legacies given in the will, and that the decree should be drawn accordingly.
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8 R.I. 526, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/monroe-v-jones-ri-1867.