Monroe v. Bailey

141 S.W. 412, 145 Ky. 794, 1911 Ky. LEXIS 955
CourtCourt of Appeals of Kentucky
DecidedDecember 13, 1911
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 141 S.W. 412 (Monroe v. Bailey) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Kentucky primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Monroe v. Bailey, 141 S.W. 412, 145 Ky. 794, 1911 Ky. LEXIS 955 (Ky. Ct. App. 1911).

Opinion

Opinion op the Court by

William Rogers Clay, Commissioner

Affirming.

Appellee, J. R. Bailey, and Mildred E. Bailey, Ms1 wife, brought this action against appellant, T. J. Monroe, for specific performance of a written contract for the sale of a tract of land containing about two hundred and eighty-three acres. Upon the admission of the case, the chancellor awarded appellees the relief prayed for, and Monroe appeals. The contract was dated May 7, 1910. The contracting parties were John R. Bailey and appellant, T. J. Monroe, and the contract was signed by each of them. The consideration to be páid was'$35,000, of which $7,000 was to be paid on the delivery of the deed, and $500 of the $7,000 was paid by a check as earnest money but was to be credited upon the payment to be made when the deed was delivered; and $14,000 was to be paid by assuming a mortgage on the land held by an insurance company. The remainder was to be paid in 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 years from the date of the deed, for which five notes were to be executed. The contract also contained certain stipulations in regard to wheat and some other things on the farm. The deed was to be made to Monroe not later than june 20,1910. The petition, after setting forth the execution and terms of the contract, alleged that appellees duly signed, acknowledged and tendered to appellant a deed to the land on-June 21, 1910, and that appellant refused to accept it. The petition also charged that on J une 20, 1910, appellees ’ agent, between the hours of twelve and eight o’clock p. m., visited, appellant’s home and made a diligent effort to. find him, but was unable to do so because he wus either absent from home or concealed himself so that the agent 'could not find him to make a tender of the deed. .It. was also charged in the petition that appellee, J. R. Baiiey, .was fully authorized by his wife, Mildred Bailey; to "make the contract on her behalf. Appellant’s ; demurrer to the petition was overruled. He then answered denying [796]*796the allegations of the petition and pleaded that the contract was never mutually agreed upon by appellant and appellees; that it was signed by them with the agreement that neither of them was to be bound by it, and that it was never delivered by either of them to the other. He also pleaded that after the contract was signed it was held by a real estate agent who knew it was signed at his request and that it was agreed that it should not be binding on either of the parties thereto. Appellant also defended upon the ground that Mildred Bailey, the wife of J. R. Bailey had not signed the contract and that no deed was ever tendered to him, until after June 20, 1910. The answer also contained the additional defense that the contract was abandoned by the parties.

The evidence for appellees is to the effect that they are the joint owners of the land in controversy; that on the day the contract was entered into, the terms of it were discussed and all embraced in the written contract sued upon; that J. R. Bailey had authority from his wife to make the contract; that at the time it was signed appellant executed to appellees a check for $500 as earnest money. This check, though executed on the 7th, was dated May 10th. After the check and contract were signed they were delivered to Mr. Poteet, who was acting as appellees’ agent in making the sale. After the contract was signed, appellant wanted to know if appellee would give him the option for January 1st instead of June. J. R. Bailey replied that he would see Col. Gaither and ascertain if it was legal. The parties were engaged in making the trade from about noon until sundown. On Tuesday morning the parties met at Col. Gaither’s and he had the contract drawn with the change desired by appellant, but appellant declined to execute it; and suit was, therefore, brought upon the contract in question. On June 20th, W. J. Poteet, appellees’ agent, went to the residence of appellant in Mercer county with a deed drawn in accordance with the contract, which was signed and acknowledged by J. R. Bailey and Mildred Bailey, for the purpose of tendering it to appellant. The agent was informed that appellant was not at his residence but was on some part of his farm.. The agent sought appellant at that point and found his horse and buggy hitched there but was unable to find appellant. He returned to appellant’s house and spent the entire after[797]*797noon searching for him but could not find him, and about dark returned to his home.

The evidence of appellant and his nephew, Corn, is to the effect that during the time that Poteet was preparing the contract and before it was signed, Bailey told appellant he would not be bound by any contract unless his attorney prepared or approved it; that some one then went to the telephone and called Mr. Gaither, but was unable to get him.

Appellant and Bailey then signed the contract with the understanding and agreement that it was not binding or complete, but that-they were to return the following Tuesday when a proper contract would be prepared under the directions of Bailey’s attorney. On cross-examination, appellant admitted that he agreed to the provisions in the contract which he signed, but stated that he wanted the privilege of taking possession either in June or January, and that to this extent the parties did not agree upon the contract. Appellant also stated that he was at his home and out in his tobacco patch on the afternoon of June 20th, when Mr. Poteet claims to have called there, and that he never hid himself nor sought in any way to avoid the tender of the deed. Appellant also testified that the reason he did not sign the contract prepared by Col. Gaither on Tuesday was that J. R, Bailey’s wife’s name was not signed to the contract and he did not consider it binding. He also testified that on that occasion Mr. Poteet told him that if he did not sign the new contract he would not get the land. Mr. Demaree testified that Mr. Poteet told him Mr. Bailey would not accept the contract until his lawyer looked over it. Mr. Bailey admitted that after the execution of the contract, he attempted to sell the land to others, but said that he did this' on the advice of his áttorney who told him that as appellant had refused to take the land he could sell it to some one else. Our attention is also called to certain statements made by Bailey and Poteet in their testimony to the effect that Mr. Bailey said he did not want a binding contract unless his lawyer did the writing. A careful reading of their testimony, however, convinces us that these statements were not made with reference to any alteration of the contract. In other words, if the contract was to be altered, Bailey wanted his attorney to make the alteration or apprové it.

In a ease of this kind where a party seeks to avoid [798]*798liability on a written contract on the ground that when he and the other parties thereto signed it, they agreed that neither was to be bound but that they were to meet on a subsequent day and draw up another contract, the evidence in support of such a plea must be clear and convincing. Appellant’s evidence does not come up to this requirement.. It is not probable that two men would sign a written contract involving a sale of a farm for the large sum of $35,000 merely for the convenience of a real estate agent and without any intention of being bound thereby. Considered in the light of all the facts and circumstances, it is much more reasonable to suppose that the contract was actually consummated, but that it was suggested that a .

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Parke v. Spurlin
268 S.W.2d 33 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky, 1954)
Hon v. Richerson
193 S.W.2d 441 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976), 1946)
Thompson v. Fairleigh
187 S.W.2d 812 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976), 1945)
Dean v. Sargent
12 N.W.2d 249 (Supreme Court of Iowa, 1943)
Stuart-Mcknight Company v. Monroe
1 S.W.2d 1054 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976), 1928)
Oliver v. Morgan
248 S.W. 1020 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky, 1923)
Huff v. Fuller
246 S.W. 149 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky, 1922)
Purtell v. Bell
200 S.W. 644 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky, 1918)
Womack v. Douglas
163 S.W. 1130 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky, 1914)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
141 S.W. 412, 145 Ky. 794, 1911 Ky. LEXIS 955, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/monroe-v-bailey-kyctapp-1911.