MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any Apr 22 2020, 9:23 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK Indiana Supreme Court the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals and Tax Court estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE1 David B. Schilling William J. Beggs Lee F. Baker Ryan M. Heeb Monroe County Legal Department Bunger & Robertson Bloomington, Indiana Bloomington, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Monroe County, Indiana and April 22, 2020 Monroe County Plan Court of Appeals Case No. Commission, 20A-PL-177 Appellant-Plaintiffs, Appeal from the Monroe Circuit Court v. The Honorable Elizabeth A. Cure, Judge Boathouse Apartments, LLC, Trial Court Cause No. Appellee-Defendant. 53C01-1702-PL-257
Bradford, Chief Judge.
1 We note that while Appellee Boathouse Apartments, LLC, did not file an Appellee’s Brief in the instant appeal, the listed counsel filed a joint appearance on Boathouse’s behalf.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-PL-177 | April 22, 2020 Page 1 of 8 Case Summary [1] On February 3, 2017, Monroe County, Indiana, and the Monroe County Plan
Commission (collectively, “the County”) filed a complaint in the Monroe
Circuit Court, seeking a monetary penalty against Boathouse Apartments, LLC
(“Boathouse”), for alleged violations of certain Monroe County ordinances.
Boathouse subsequently filed a Trial Rule 12(B)(1) motion to dismiss, arguing
that the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the County’s
claims. The trial court granted Boathouse’s motion to dismiss. Because we
conclude that the trial court does have subject matter jurisdiction over the
County’s claims, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Facts and Procedural History [2] Boathouse owns three lots (the “Boathouse Property”) within the Lakes
Neighborhood Planned Unit Development in Bloomington. During 2016,
Boathouse began a project to construct six buildings of townhome apartments
on the Boathouse Property. In completing the project, Boathouse was required
to comply with the use and occupancy requirements of the Monroe County
Code of Ordinances (“Monroe County Code”).
[3] On February 3, 2017, the County filed a complaint seeking a monetary penalty
against Boathouse, alleging that Boathouse had violated the use and occupancy
requirements of the Monroe County Code. Specifically, the County alleged
that Boathouse had permitted tenants to occupy the apartment units before a
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-PL-177 | April 22, 2020 Page 2 of 8 land use certificate and certificate of occupancy were issued. Boathouse
answered and filed affirmative defenses to the complaint on April 4, 2017.
[4] On October 14, 2019, Boathouse filed a Trial Rule 12(B)(1) motion to dismiss,
claiming that the County had failed to comply with applicable ordinances in
bringing its claims against Boathouse and “[t]his failure deprives the Court of
subject matter jurisdiction over these claims.” Appellants’ App. Vol. II p. 76.
As such, Boathouse requested “that the Court grant its Motion to Dismiss
because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear [the County’s]
claims.” Appellants’ App. Vol. II p. 76. The County filed both a brief and a
supplemental brief in opposition to Boathouse’s motion to dismiss. On January
6, 2020, the trial court, ruling on a paper record, issued an order granting
Boathouse’s motion and dismissing the County’s lawsuit.
Discussion and Decision [5] Initially we note that where, as here, the appellee fails to submit an appellate
brief, we need not undertake the burden of developing an argument on the
appellee’s behalf. Trinity Homes, LLC v. Fang, 848 N.E.2d 1065, 1068 (Ind.
2006). “Rather, we will reverse the trial court’s judgment if the appellant’s brief
presents a case of prima facie error.” Id. “Prima facie error in this context is
defined as, ‘at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of it.’” Id. (quoting
Santana v. Santana, 708 N.E.2d 886, 887 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999)).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-PL-177 | April 22, 2020 Page 3 of 8 [6] In challenging the trial court’s dismissal of its action against Boathouse, the
County claims that the trial court erred in determining that it lacked subject
matter jurisdiction over the County’s claims. Where, as here, the facts before
the trial court are not in dispute, “the question of subject matter jurisdiction is
purely one of law.” GKN Co. v. Magness, 744 N.E.2d 397, 401 (Ind. 2001).
“Under those circumstances no deference is afforded the trial court’s conclusion
because “appellate courts independently, and without the slightest deference to
trial court determinations, evaluate those issues they deem to be questions of
law.” Id. “Thus, we review de novo a trial court’s ruling on a motion to
dismiss under Trial Rule 12(B)(1) where the facts before the trial court are
undisputed.” Id.
[7] Subject-matter jurisdiction is the constitutional or statutory power of a court to hear and determine cases of the general class to which any particular proceeding belongs. So, in determining whether a court has subject-matter jurisdiction, the only relevant inquiry is whether the petitioner’s claim falls within the general scope of the authority conferred upon such court by the constitution or by statute.
State v. Reinhart, 112 N.E.3d 705, 711–12 (Ind. 2018) (internal quotations
omitted). “Courts of general jurisdiction are presumed to have subject matter
jurisdiction.” Lakes & Rivers Transfer, a Div. of Jack Gray v. Rudolph Robinson Steel
Co., 736 N.E.2d 285, 290 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). “All circuit courts have: (1)
original and concurrent jurisdiction in all civil cases and in all criminal cases.”
Ind. Code § 33-28-1-2 (a). “The Monroe circuit court is a court of general
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-PL-177 | April 22, 2020 Page 4 of 8 jurisdiction” and, as such, has the authority to maintain a civil docket. Ind.
Code § 33-33-53-2(a).
[8] The County claims that statutory authority expressly confers subject matter
jurisdiction over the County’s case against Boathouse to the trial court. We
agree. “The Indiana General Assembly, through statutes, has both authorized
local units of government to create ordinances and established the manner in
which those ordinances are to be enforced.” Boss v. State, 944 N.E.2d 16, 22
(Ind. Ct. App. 2011). In doing so, the General Assembly “specifically withheld
from [local] units, however, the power to prescribe a penalty for conduct
constituting” a violation of a local ordinance. Id. (internal quotation omitted).
The General Assembly instead gave this power to the courts.
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MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any Apr 22 2020, 9:23 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK Indiana Supreme Court the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals and Tax Court estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE1 David B. Schilling William J. Beggs Lee F. Baker Ryan M. Heeb Monroe County Legal Department Bunger & Robertson Bloomington, Indiana Bloomington, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Monroe County, Indiana and April 22, 2020 Monroe County Plan Court of Appeals Case No. Commission, 20A-PL-177 Appellant-Plaintiffs, Appeal from the Monroe Circuit Court v. The Honorable Elizabeth A. Cure, Judge Boathouse Apartments, LLC, Trial Court Cause No. Appellee-Defendant. 53C01-1702-PL-257
Bradford, Chief Judge.
1 We note that while Appellee Boathouse Apartments, LLC, did not file an Appellee’s Brief in the instant appeal, the listed counsel filed a joint appearance on Boathouse’s behalf.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-PL-177 | April 22, 2020 Page 1 of 8 Case Summary [1] On February 3, 2017, Monroe County, Indiana, and the Monroe County Plan
Commission (collectively, “the County”) filed a complaint in the Monroe
Circuit Court, seeking a monetary penalty against Boathouse Apartments, LLC
(“Boathouse”), for alleged violations of certain Monroe County ordinances.
Boathouse subsequently filed a Trial Rule 12(B)(1) motion to dismiss, arguing
that the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the County’s
claims. The trial court granted Boathouse’s motion to dismiss. Because we
conclude that the trial court does have subject matter jurisdiction over the
County’s claims, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Facts and Procedural History [2] Boathouse owns three lots (the “Boathouse Property”) within the Lakes
Neighborhood Planned Unit Development in Bloomington. During 2016,
Boathouse began a project to construct six buildings of townhome apartments
on the Boathouse Property. In completing the project, Boathouse was required
to comply with the use and occupancy requirements of the Monroe County
Code of Ordinances (“Monroe County Code”).
[3] On February 3, 2017, the County filed a complaint seeking a monetary penalty
against Boathouse, alleging that Boathouse had violated the use and occupancy
requirements of the Monroe County Code. Specifically, the County alleged
that Boathouse had permitted tenants to occupy the apartment units before a
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-PL-177 | April 22, 2020 Page 2 of 8 land use certificate and certificate of occupancy were issued. Boathouse
answered and filed affirmative defenses to the complaint on April 4, 2017.
[4] On October 14, 2019, Boathouse filed a Trial Rule 12(B)(1) motion to dismiss,
claiming that the County had failed to comply with applicable ordinances in
bringing its claims against Boathouse and “[t]his failure deprives the Court of
subject matter jurisdiction over these claims.” Appellants’ App. Vol. II p. 76.
As such, Boathouse requested “that the Court grant its Motion to Dismiss
because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear [the County’s]
claims.” Appellants’ App. Vol. II p. 76. The County filed both a brief and a
supplemental brief in opposition to Boathouse’s motion to dismiss. On January
6, 2020, the trial court, ruling on a paper record, issued an order granting
Boathouse’s motion and dismissing the County’s lawsuit.
Discussion and Decision [5] Initially we note that where, as here, the appellee fails to submit an appellate
brief, we need not undertake the burden of developing an argument on the
appellee’s behalf. Trinity Homes, LLC v. Fang, 848 N.E.2d 1065, 1068 (Ind.
2006). “Rather, we will reverse the trial court’s judgment if the appellant’s brief
presents a case of prima facie error.” Id. “Prima facie error in this context is
defined as, ‘at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of it.’” Id. (quoting
Santana v. Santana, 708 N.E.2d 886, 887 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999)).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-PL-177 | April 22, 2020 Page 3 of 8 [6] In challenging the trial court’s dismissal of its action against Boathouse, the
County claims that the trial court erred in determining that it lacked subject
matter jurisdiction over the County’s claims. Where, as here, the facts before
the trial court are not in dispute, “the question of subject matter jurisdiction is
purely one of law.” GKN Co. v. Magness, 744 N.E.2d 397, 401 (Ind. 2001).
“Under those circumstances no deference is afforded the trial court’s conclusion
because “appellate courts independently, and without the slightest deference to
trial court determinations, evaluate those issues they deem to be questions of
law.” Id. “Thus, we review de novo a trial court’s ruling on a motion to
dismiss under Trial Rule 12(B)(1) where the facts before the trial court are
undisputed.” Id.
[7] Subject-matter jurisdiction is the constitutional or statutory power of a court to hear and determine cases of the general class to which any particular proceeding belongs. So, in determining whether a court has subject-matter jurisdiction, the only relevant inquiry is whether the petitioner’s claim falls within the general scope of the authority conferred upon such court by the constitution or by statute.
State v. Reinhart, 112 N.E.3d 705, 711–12 (Ind. 2018) (internal quotations
omitted). “Courts of general jurisdiction are presumed to have subject matter
jurisdiction.” Lakes & Rivers Transfer, a Div. of Jack Gray v. Rudolph Robinson Steel
Co., 736 N.E.2d 285, 290 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). “All circuit courts have: (1)
original and concurrent jurisdiction in all civil cases and in all criminal cases.”
Ind. Code § 33-28-1-2 (a). “The Monroe circuit court is a court of general
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-PL-177 | April 22, 2020 Page 4 of 8 jurisdiction” and, as such, has the authority to maintain a civil docket. Ind.
Code § 33-33-53-2(a).
[8] The County claims that statutory authority expressly confers subject matter
jurisdiction over the County’s case against Boathouse to the trial court. We
agree. “The Indiana General Assembly, through statutes, has both authorized
local units of government to create ordinances and established the manner in
which those ordinances are to be enforced.” Boss v. State, 944 N.E.2d 16, 22
(Ind. Ct. App. 2011). In doing so, the General Assembly “specifically withheld
from [local] units, however, the power to prescribe a penalty for conduct
constituting” a violation of a local ordinance. Id. (internal quotation omitted).
The General Assembly instead gave this power to the courts.
[9] Indiana Code sections 36-7-4-1013 and 36-7-4-1014 detail remedies for
enforcement and allowable actions for violations of ordinances. Specifically,
Indiana Code section 36-7-4-1013(a) provides that if, after conducting an
investigation into an alleged violation of an ordinance, a municipal attorney or
an attorney representing the county comes to the reasonable belief that an entity
has violated an ordinance, “the municipal attorney or an attorney representing
the county may file a complaint against the person and prosecute the alleged
violation under IC 36-1-6.”2 Ind. Code section 36-7-4-1014 provides as follows:
2 Indiana Code section 36-1-6-4(a) provides that “A municipal corporation may bring a civil action … if a person: (1) violates an ordinance regulating or prohibiting a condition or use of property[.]”
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-PL-177 | April 22, 2020 Page 5 of 8 (a) The plan commission, board of zoning appeals, or any enforcement official designated in the zoning ordinance may bring an action under IC 36-1-6 to enforce any ordinance adopted or action taken under this chapter.
(b) The plan commission, board of zoning appeals, or any enforcement official designated in the zoning ordinance may also bring an action to enforce:
(1) conditions imposed by the commission or board of zoning appeals under this chapter; or
(2) covenants made in connection with a subdivision plat, a development plan, or a PUD district ordinance (as defined in section 1503 of this chapter).
****
(d) The plan commission, board of zoning appeals, or designated enforcement official may invoke any legal, equitable, or special remedy in an action described in subsection (a) or (b).
(e) An action for the levy of a fine or penalty for enforcement of a zoning ordinance may be brought in any court located within the jurisdiction of the plan commission or board of zoning appeals.
The above-quoted statutory sections clearly indicate that actions such as that
brought in this case by the County, which seeks penalties for alleged violations
of the certain County ordinances, may be brought in court, with Indiana Code
section 36-7-4-1014 allowing for the action to be brought in “any court located
within the jurisdiction.”
[10] Furthermore, we agree with the County that the arguments set forth in
Boathouse’s motion to dismiss allege procedural, i.e., legal, error. “Subject
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-PL-177 | April 22, 2020 Page 6 of 8 matter jurisdiction and legal error are distinct concepts.” Clark Cty. Bd. of
Aviation Comm’rs v. Dreyer, 986 N.E.2d 286, 287 (Ind. Ct. App. 3013), trans.
granted, opinion vacated, 992 N.E.2d 207 (Ind. 2013), and aff’d, 993 N.E.2d 624
(Ind. 2013). “Procedural error doesn’t rob the court of jurisdiction.” Reinhart,
112 N.E.3d at 712. Stated differently, “[i]t goes without saying that a court’s
power to award relief and a claimant’s entitlement to relief on the merits are
very different things.” Price v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 80 N.E.3d 170, 174 (Ind.
2017). “Real jurisdictional problems would be, say, a juvenile delinquency
adjudication entered in a small claims court, or a judgment rendered without
any service of process.” K.S. v. State, 849 N.E.2d 538, 542 (Ind. 2006) (emphasis
in original). “Thus, characterizing other sorts of procedural defects as
‘jurisdictional’ misapprehends the concepts.” Id. “Indeed, as strongly
suggested by the K.S. Court, practitioners and the judiciary, including
ourselves, should stop using the phrase ‘jurisdiction over a particular case,’
rather than ‘legal error.’” Dreyer, 986 N.E.2d at 291.
[11] Again, in its motion to dismiss, Boathouse alleged that the County failed to
comply with applicable ordinances in bringing claims against Boathouse and
“[t]his failure deprives the Court of subject matter jurisdiction over these
claims.” Appellants’ App. Vol. II p. 76. However, contrary to Boathouse’s
claim, we have previously concluded that procedural error or the failure to
follow statutory guidelines for initiating a particular action does not affect
subject matter jurisdiction, so long as the action was filed in the proper court for
such an action. Blackman v. Gholson, 46 N.E.3d 975, 979 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015)
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-PL-177 | April 22, 2020 Page 7 of 8 (citing K.S., 849 N.E.2d 542 (providing a juvenile court’s failure to follow all of
the statutory procedures for initiating a delinquency petition did not affect
either subject matter or personal jurisdiction, but was mere procedural error);
Fight Against Brownsburg Annexation v. Town of Brownsburg, 32 N.E.3d 798, 805
(Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (holding alleged defect in annexation remonstrance
signatures did not affect subject matter jurisdiction of trial court to consider
remonstrance petition)); see also Prosecuting Attorney of Hendricks Cty. v. Hammer,
92 N.E.3d 649, 652 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (providing that the question of
whether a suspended driver petitions the proper court under the SDP statute is a
“question of legal error, not jurisdictional error”). Thus, any procedural or
legal error that may have been committed by the County would not deprive the
trial court of subject matter jurisdiction.
[12] In sum, given that the relevant authority clearly demonstrates that the trial
court has subject matter jurisdiction over the County’s claims against
Boathouse, we conclude that the trial court erred by granting Boathouse’s Trial
Rule 12(B)(1) motion to dismiss. We therefore remand the matter back to the
trial court for further proceedings consistent with this decision.
[13] The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the matter remanded for further
proceedings.
Baker, J., and Pyle, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-PL-177 | April 22, 2020 Page 8 of 8