Rel: June 5, 2026
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.
ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OCTOBER TERM, 2025-2026 _________________________
CL-2025-0707 _________________________
Monroe County Board of Education
v.
Barbarietta Turner-Pugh
Appeal from the Decision of the Students First Act Hearing Officer (2025 100)
FRIDY, Judge.
The Monroe County Board of Education ("the Board") appeals from
the decision of a hearing officer appointed pursuant to the Students First
Act ("the SFA"), § 16-24C-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975, reversing the Board's
decision to terminate the employment of its tenured employee, Dr. CL-2025-0707
Barbarietta Turner-Pugh ("Pugh"). For the reasons set forth herein, we
reverse.
Background
On December 19, 2024, Monroe County school superintendent
Gregory L. Shehan ("the superintendent") issued a written notification to
Pugh that he was recommending the termination of her employment as
director of student services based on allegations of failure to perform her
duties in a satisfactory manner, incompetency, insubordination, and
other good and just cause. The notice advised Pugh that she had a right
to request a termination hearing and that, upon timely written notice
from her, the Board would provide her with written notice of the date of
the hearing.
On December 20, 2024, Pugh submitted a timely written request
for a termination hearing. On December 26, 2024, pursuant to the SFA,
she submitted a written notice of contest demanding all procedural
protections afforded by law, stating that her attorneys would be notifying
the superintendent of their appearances, and requesting that any further
correspondence be directed to her attorneys. Pugh did not identify any
attorneys by name in her written notice.
2 CL-2025-0707
When Pugh requested the hearing before the Board, she was
already involved in an employment-discrimination action ("the federal
case") in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Alabama against the Monroe County School System, the Board, and the
Board's members in their official capacities. Pugh was represented in the
federal case by Christine Hernandez and other attorneys in her law firm.
The attorneys who represented the superintendent in this case, Mark
Boardman and Katherine Watkins, also served as counsel for the Board
and its members in the federal case.
In a letter dated January 3, 2025, the superintendent notified Pugh
that the Board had set the termination hearing for February 6, 2025. The
letter advised Pugh of her rights under the SFA; established prehearing
procedural deadlines that required submission of witness lists, exhibits,
and subpoena requests by January 27, 2025; and provided that the
superintendent's anticipated witness list and exhibits would be produced
by the same deadline. The letter asked Pugh to provide an e-mail address
for her or her attorney for service of materials.
On January 6, 2025, attorney Leston C. Stallworth, Jr., sent
written correspondence to the superintendent, copying the
3 CL-2025-0707
superintendent's counsel, Boardman, advising that he represented Pugh
in connection with the proposed employment-termination matter. The
letter expressly instructed that "[a]ll correspondence regarding [that]
matter should be directed to [him]." On the same date, Hernandez
transmitted correspondence to the Board's counsel, Watkins, regarding
scheduling depositions in the federal case and identifying multiple
potential deposition dates, including February 7, 2025 ("the deposition-
scheduling letter").
Although Pugh did not file a written motion to continue the
termination hearing, Boardman, as attorney for the superintendent, and
Stallworth, as attorney for Pugh, engaged in telephone discussions
concerning the scheduling of the termination hearing and reached an
agreement to continue the hearing by one day, to February 7, 2025, and
the Board agreed to the change. On January 15, 2025, the superintendent
sent a letter and an e-mail to Stallworth confirming that Stallworth had
requested a change of the February 6, 2025, termination-hearing date,
"citing a potential conflict with [his] co-counsel." The superintendent
further stated that Stallworth's unnamed co-counsel (presumably
Hernandez) had sent correspondence to Boardman and Watkins stating
4 CL-2025-0707
that February 7, 2025, was available on her calendar and that, based on
those communications, Stallworth and Boardman had agreed to move the
termination hearing from February 6 to February 7, 2025. The
correspondence confirmed that the termination hearing would proceed on
February 7, 2025, and adjusted the prehearing disclosure deadline from
January 27 to January 28, 2025. The superintendent also noted that
Stallworth was the only attorney from whom he had received written
notice of representation and that, consistent with Stallworth's
instruction that all communications be directed to him, he had sent the
correspondence only to Stallworth.
It appears that sometime between January 20 and January 27,
2025, Stallworth sent an e-mail to the superintendent that is not
contained in the record; however, the record does include the
superintendent's January 27, 2025, response to that e-mail explaining
that a snow emergency and school closures since January 20, 2025, had
delayed the superintendent's reply. In the response, the superintendent
explained to Stallworth that the Board could not reschedule the
termination hearing to March 2025 and that Stallworth had indicated
that February 7, 2025, accommodated his calendar. The superintendent
5 CL-2025-0707
enclosed the deposition-scheduling letter from Hernandez to Board
attorney Watkins that proposed February 7, 2025, as a potential date for
depositions in the federal case, and the superintendent stated that the
Board had already moved the termination hearing from February 6 to
February 7, 2025, at both Stallworth's and Hernandez's request.
On January 30, 2025, Boardman e-mailed both Hernandez and
Stallworth stating that he had received Stallworth's January 6, 2025,
letter of representation and Hernandez's deposition-scheduling letter of
the same date referencing her availability on February 7, 2025, for
depositions in the federal case. Boardman stated that the termination
hearing had originally been set for February 6, 2025, and that, after
discussions with Stallworth, he had agreed to move it to February 7,
2025, because of a conflict Hernandez had with the February 6, 2025,
date. He further stated that the Board was required to hold the
termination hearing in February and that he and Stallworth had also
considered February 20, 2025, but that date had not been agreeable.
Boardman explained that, because Hernandez had indicated February 7
was available in her deposition-scheduling letter and because he and
6 CL-2025-0707
Stallworth had agreed to move the hearing to that date, the termination
hearing would remain scheduled for February 7, 2025.
On February 3, 2025, Boardman sent an e-mail to Hernandez
responding to an inquiry she had apparently made regarding the date of
the termination hearing.1 In the e-mail, Boardman wrote that he did not
set, and could not unilaterally set, the termination-hearing date under
the SFA and that the hearing date had been set by the Board itself. He
explained that the termination hearing had already been moved with the
agreement of Pugh's "sole attorney," Stallworth, who had notified him in
writing that he represented Pugh in the termination proceeding and that
he had sent Hernandez that letter of representation "earlier." Boardman
further stated that Stallworth had instructed that all correspondence be
directed to him and that he had complied with that instruction by sending
1The information about the communications between the parties is
derived from copies of the letters appearing in the record on appeal as attachments to briefs that they filed with the hearing officer who presided over Pugh's appeal from the decision of the Board to uphold the superintendent's recommendation to terminate her employment. Although the record on appeal does not contain a copy of the communication from Hernandez that Boardman referenced in his February 3, 2025, e-mail to Hernandez, an attorney of Pugh's in a different matter attempted to provide a copy of that letter to this court as an attachment to an amicus brief she sought to file with this court. This court denied that attorney's request to file her amicus brief. 7 CL-2025-0707
Stallworth a letter confirming that the termination-hearing date had
been moved to February 7, 2025. He further stated that Pugh could not
"create" a scheduling conflict by changing attorneys and that, because
the Board had originally reserved February 6 and 7, 2025, for the
termination hearing, the matter remained set for February 7, 2025.
On February 7, 2025, the Board convened the termination hearing
to consider Pugh's contest. The record reflects that Boardman prosecuted
the superintendent's recommendation for termination, while the Board
retained separate counsel to advise it on related legal issues and to
prepare any written order the Board issued after the hearing. According
to the record, one Board member, identified as Pugh's mother, recused
herself from the termination proceeding. Pugh did not appear at the
termination hearing, and no attorney appeared on her behalf.
At the outset of the termination hearing, Boardman advocated that
the hearing proceed without Pugh. He told the Board that Pugh had been
represented by at least four attorneys in connection with the termination
of her employment and that he had had contact with three of them. He
explained that Stallworth was the attorney who initially contacted him
in this matter and that the Alabama Education Association had retained
8 CL-2025-0707
Stallworth to represent Pugh. Boardman explained that, as far as he
knew, Stallworth was available for the February 7, 2025, termination
hearing. Boardman further explained that the Board had originally set
the termination hearing for February 6, 2025, had held February 7 in
reserve in the event an additional day was needed, and had moved the
hearing to February 7 after discussions with Stallworth and in light of
communications referencing the parties' availability on that date. He
said that, when Pugh's counsel had requested a change of the
termination-hearing date, he had consistently advised that he lacked the
authority to move the termination hearing because it was set by the
Board. Boardman argued that no formal request to continue the
termination hearing had been filed and requested that the hearing
proceed because proper notice had been provided.
The Board's advisory counsel advised that the SFA requires the
termination hearing to be set within thirty to sixty days of the employee's
request for a hearing and probably prohibited any continuance that
would extend the proceeding beyond that statutorily prescribed period. 2
2Actually, the SFA provides that "the hearing shall be set by the
employer not less than 30 and not more than 60 calendar days from the 9 CL-2025-0707
He further explained that the SFA required the Board to conduct a
termination hearing once requested, but did not require the employee to
be present, to be represented, or to present evidence in order for the
hearing to proceed. He advised that all the required participants were
present and that the absence of Pugh or her counsel did not relieve the
Board of its statutory obligation to proceed with the termination hearing
and to render a decision.
The Board proceeded with the termination hearing in Pugh's
absence and received testimony and documentary evidence. At the
conclusion of the termination hearing, the Board voted to adopt the
superintendent's recommendation to terminate Pugh's employment. On
February 7, 2025, the Board issued a written notice to Pugh of its decision
and informed her of her right to appeal within fifteen days, pursuant to
the SFA. Pugh timely appealed, asserting that her attorney had
contacted the Board in advance and had requested a new hearing date
because of a scheduling conflict, that she did not receive notice of the
rescheduled termination-hearing date, and that she appeared at the
date written notice of the time, date, and place of the hearing is issued to the employee ...." § 16-24C-6(b), Ala. Code 1975. 10 CL-2025-0707
Board office on February 6, 2025, in reliance on the original notice, only
to be told that no hearing would occur that day and that no new hearing
date had been provided. She further contended that she had been denied
the opportunity to present evidence, examine witnesses, or otherwise
defend against the allegations underlying her termination.
On August 13, 2025, the date set for the hearing on Pugh's appeal,
the Board filed two briefs with the hearing officer assigned to consider
Pugh's appeal. One addressed the issue of Pugh's alleged lack of notice of
the February 7, 2025, termination hearing. The Board asserted in that
brief that Pugh had received clear and repeated notice of the February 7
date and that communications had been properly directed to Stallworth,
consistent with his instruction that all correspondence be routed to him.
It further asserted that the hearing date had been rescheduled from
February 6 to February 7, 2025, at Stallworth's request, that the
superintendent had confirmed the rescheduled hearing date in writing
on January 15, 2025, and that the parties had consistently referenced
February 7 as the operative date in subsequent communications. The
Board contended that Pugh's failure to appear was voluntary and did not
constitute a due-process violation because she had notice and an
11 CL-2025-0707
opportunity to be heard and that the decision not to participate in the
hearing reflected a strategic choice that did not invalidate the outcome of
At the August 13, 2025, hearing on Pugh's appeal, Hernandez
appeared on behalf of Pugh and argued that her initial communication
regarding Pugh's representation was with Stallworth on January 6, 2025,
and that they intended to work together on the matter. She argued that
"no [hearing] date [was] set that was provided to [her]" and that,
although Boardman represented to the Board that she, Hernandez, was
representing Pugh and had agreed to the February 7, 2025, hearing date,
she had not in fact agreed to that date. Hernandez further argued that
the notice Pugh had received from the Board identified a February 6,
2025, hearing date and that Pugh had not received any subsequent
written notice of the rescheduled February 7 hearing date. She told the
hearing officer that Pugh had appeared at the Board's office on February
6, but no hearing had been held that day, and that Pugh had not been
aware of the February 7 hearing date. As a result, Hernandez concluded,
Pugh had been denied her right to due process, including the opportunity
to present documentation.
12 CL-2025-0707
Boardman acknowledged that the correspondence from the
superintendent on January 15 and 27, 2025, was directed to Stallworth
and stated that he had no notice that Hernandez was handling the SFA
matter. He pointed out to the hearing officer that the record reflected two
sets of instructions -- one from Pugh and one from Stallworth -- that he
was to direct all correspondence to Stallworth and that there was no
letter from Stallworth withdrawing from representation or otherwise
indicating he was no longer involved. Boardman noted that he had
received a letter from Stallworth expressly stating that he represented
Pugh but that he had not received any similar notice from Hernandez,
although he acknowledged that he had "informal notice" of her
involvement.
After addressing the notice issue, the parties proceeded to argue the
merits before the hearing officer, disputing whether the exhibits and
testimony presented to the Board rendered its decision arbitrary and
capricious.
After the review hearing, Pugh filed a response brief asserting that
the February 7, 2025, termination decision arbitrarily and capriciously
13 CL-2025-0707
denied her procedural-due-process rights and reiterated the arguments
she had made before the hearing officer.
On August 22, 2025, the hearing officer issued a decision reversing
the Board's decision to terminate Pugh's employment. In her decision,
the hearing officer found that Pugh had been denied her right to
procedural due process in connection with the scheduling and conduct of
the February 7, 2025, termination hearing. She credited the assertions
that neither Hernandez nor Pugh had been informed of the rescheduled
termination-hearing date, that Hernandez had advised the Board's
counsel of a scheduling conflict due to a criminal jury trial and had
requested that the hearing be rescheduled within the statutory
timeframe, and that she had received no response to that request. As a
result, the hearing officer concluded, the Board heard only from the
superintendent's witnesses, which in effect rendered the Board's decision
arbitrary and capricious.
In support of that conclusion, the hearing officer offered extensive
findings, including her belief that Boardman's contention that
Hernandez's correspondence regarding deposition dates in the federal
case showing her availability for depositions on February 7, 2025, proved
14 CL-2025-0707
that Hernandez had been available for the termination hearing on that
date was "totally disingenuous." She also found unpersuasive
Boardman's argument that Stallworth's prior notice of representation
and direction that future correspondence be sent to him justified not
communicating with Hernandez about rescheduling. She noted that
Boardman knew Hernandez had been retained by Pugh, had
communicated with her regarding the termination hearing and the
appeal on several occasions, and knew she had requested that the
hearing be rescheduled.
Although the hearing officer made "no comment or judgment
concerning the merits of the termination case brought against [Pugh],"
she found that Pugh had followed the "rules and procedures in requesting
a hearing before [the Board] to appeal [the superintendent's decision] to
terminate her employment." She also found that Pugh had been entitled
to a hearing and had demonstrated every intention of appearing by
reporting on the original hearing date, only to be told that no hearing
would occur that day and not told that the hearing had been reset for the
following day. She further found that Hernandez had remained in contact
with Boardman, had informed him that she was unavailable on February
15 CL-2025-0707
6 and 7, 2025, and had requested that the hearing be rescheduled within
the time permitted by the SFA. She found that Boardman never
responded to that request and proceeded with the hearing on February 7
in the absence of both Pugh and Hernandez.
The hearing officer concluded that those circumstances resulted in
a "blatant denial" of Pugh's due-process rights and led to a Board decision
that was "arbitrary and capricious." The hearing officer therefore
reversed the Board's decision to terminate Pugh's employment and
ordered that she be reinstated to her employment in accordance with the
SFA. The Board timely appealed the hearing officer's reversal of its
decision to terminate Pugh's employment to this court, pursuant to § 16-
24C-6(f), Ala. Code 1975, of the SFA.
Analysis
The Board argues that the hearing officer improperly reversed its
termination decision, not because the termination itself was unsupported
by the evidence or was arbitrary on the merits, but solely on the
conclusion that Pugh's procedural-due-process rights were violated. The
Board contends that it complied with all procedural requirements under
the SFA and provided Pugh with both notice and a meaningful
16 CL-2025-0707
opportunity to be heard. It maintains that Pugh and her attorneys made
the voluntary decision not to appear at the February 7, 2025, termination
hearing and that their failure to attend cannot later be used to invalidate
the proceedings.
The Board further argues that the hearing officer's factual findings
were incorrect, particularly the conclusion that Pugh lacked notice of the
February 7, 2025, termination hearing when the record reflects repeated
communications confirming that date to Stallworth, Pugh's designated
counsel. It also contends that disputes regarding which attorney was
actively handling the matter are immaterial because Stallworth was the
only attorney who formally appeared, expressly directed that all
correspondence be sent to him, and never withdrew as counsel. According
to the Board, notice to Stallworth was legally sufficient and any internal
confusion among counsel does not transform statutory compliance into a
due-process violation.
The hearing officer concluded that the Board's decision to proceed
with the February 7, 2025, termination hearing was arbitrary and
17 CL-2025-0707
capricious based on an alleged denial of procedural due process. 3 The
reversal rested solely on the conclusion that Pugh was denied adequate
notice of the February 7, 2025, termination hearing and, as a result, was
deprived of a meaningful opportunity to be heard.
The SFA was enacted to ensure "fundamental fairness and due
process" while also reducing unnecessary procedural obstacles and delay
in personnel adjudications. Ala. Code 1975, § 16-24C-2(1) and (5). Under
the SFA, an employee must receive written notice of his or her proposed
employment termination, including the reasons for the termination and
notice of the right to request a hearing; if a hearing is requested, the
employer must set the hearing no fewer than thirty and no more than
sixty calendar days after written notice of the hearing date is issued; and,
after the hearing, the employee must receive written notice of the final
decision and notice of the right to appeal. § 16-24C-6(b)-(d). The SFA also
provides that the employee may be represented by counsel and that "[t]he
3We note that the hearing officer applied the wrong standard in
determining that Pugh's due-process rights had been denied. The arbitrary-and-capricious standard under the SFA applies to the employer's ultimate personnel decision, not to procedural matters relating to the termination process. Calhoun Cmty. Coll. v. Hudson, 200 So. 3d 1175, 1178-79 (Ala. Civ. App. 2015). 18 CL-2025-0707
employee or his or her representative" shall be afforded the opportunity
to present testimony, evidence, argument, and cross-examination. § 16-
24C-6(c).
Pugh has not shown that the Board failed to comply with the
statutory requirements of the SFA. It is undisputed that the
superintendent issued written notice recommending termination of
Pugh's employment and advising her of her right to request a hearing. It
is further undisputed that Pugh timely requested a hearing and that the
Board issued written notice setting the hearing for February 6, 2025,
advising her of her procedural rights under the SFA, including the right
to counsel, and establishing prehearing deadlines. It is also undisputed
that Pugh later received written notice of the termination decision and
her right to appeal. The issue we must decide is whether notice of the
continued February 7, 2025, hearing date was constitutionally sufficient
given that notice was provided to Stallworth.
Pugh did not contend below, and does not contend here, that the
Board violated § 16-24C-6(k), which pertains to how notice is to be
provided under the SFA. Section 16-24C-6(k) provides that, "[u]nless
otherwise provided, notice for all purposes under [the SFA]" must be
19 CL-2025-0707
given by certified mail, private mail carrier, or physical delivery to the
employee or the employee's last known address. As previously noted,
when Pugh notified the Board that she was contesting her proposed
termination, she indicated that her attorneys would be noticing their
appearance and that all further correspondence should be directed to
them. By a letter dated January 3, 2025, and apparently sent by certified
mail, the Board provided notice to Pugh of the original hearing date of
February 6, 2025. Thereafter, Stallworth gave notice of his appearance
for Pugh and directed that all further communication regarding the
termination matter be directed to him. Thus, when the Board provided
correspondence on January 15, 2025, that the hearing had been
rescheduled from February 6 to February 7, 2025, at Stallworth's
request, it did so in the manner instructed by both Stallworth and Pugh
-- by sending notice to Stallworth. Pugh did not argue below, and does
not argue here, that the manner of providing that correspondence
violated § 16-24C-6(k), but, even if she had, and even if we were to
conclude that that subsection applied to that correspondence, by
directing that communications be directed to her counsel and thereafter
having Stallworth appear on her behalf and direct that all
20 CL-2025-0707
correspondence be directed to him, Pugh waived any claim that the Board
was obligated under § 16-24C-6(k) to direct that correspondence to her.
Cf. Alabama State Tenure Comm'n v. Goldsby, 627 So. 2d 434, 436 (Ala.
Civ. App. 1993) (under the former Alabama Teacher Tenure Act, § 16-24-
1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975, teacher waived any claim of defective notice).
Due process requires " 'notice reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action
and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.' " Taylor v.
Huntsville City Bd. of Educ., 143 So. 3d 219, 228 (Ala. Civ. App. 2013)
(quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314
(1950)). " 'The notice must be of such nature as reasonably to convey the
required information,' " id. (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314), and " '[t]he
means employed must be such as one desirous of actually informing the
absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it,' " id. (quoting Mullane,
339 U.S. at 315) (emphasis omitted). Due process does not require that a
party actually receive the notice but only that the method employed was
reasonably calculated to provide it. McDonald v. Keahey, 301 So. 3d 823,
838 n.18 (Ala. Civ. App. 2019). Accordingly, the question is whether the
Board's method of notice to Stallworth was reasonably calculated, under
21 CL-2025-0707
the circumstances, to apprise Pugh of the hearing and afford her an
opportunity to respond. We conclude that it was.
The SFA expressly permits representation by counsel and
contemplates that an employee may proceed through a representative.
See § 16-24C-6(c). While the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure are not
binding in this context, see Rule 81(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.; Berryman v. Civil
Serv. Bd. of Muscle Shoals, 571 So. 2d 1122, 1124 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990),
they provide guidance reflecting the general framework Alabama courts
use in evaluating whether notice to counsel satisfies due-process
requirements for represented parties. Rule 5(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides
that "[w]henever … service is required or permitted to be made upon a
party represented by an attorney, the service shall be made upon the
attorney unless service upon the party is ordered by the court."
Consistent with that framework, the Alabama Supreme Court has
held that " '[k]nowledge of the attorney will be imputed to the client if the
knowledge comes to the attorney while engaged in a service for the client
after the attorney-client relationship has commenced.' " Ex parte Utilities
Bd. of Roanoke, 348 So. 3d 1098, 1103 (Ala. 2021) (quoting Sanders v.
Flournoy, 640 So. 2d 933, 939 (Ala. 1994)). Indeed, it has specifically held
22 CL-2025-0707
that "notice of a hearing that is provided to an attorney constitutes notice
to the attorney's client." Id. (citing Shirley v. McDonald, 220 Ala. 50, 53,
124 So. 104, 106 (1929) (holding that counsel's knowledge of a trial date
"must be imputed" to the client as a matter of law)). Likewise, our
appellate courts have recognized that service on a party's "attorney of
record,"4 rather than directly on the party, satisfies due-process
requirements absent an explicit order authorizing an alternate method.
Stribling Equip., Inc. v. Crager, 891 So. 2d 299, 304 (Ala. 2004) (finding
no due-process violation when notice was served on counsel rather than
directly on the party because service complied with the Alabama Rules of
Civil Procedure); see also Calhoun v. Calhoun, 46 Ala. App. 381, 386, 243
So. 2d 37, 42 (Civ. App. 1970). Furthermore, notice to one attorney is
sufficient to give notice to both attorneys when the record reflects their
"co-counsel" status. Thomas v. Kellett, 489 So. 2d 554, 555 (Ala. 1986).
Here, Pugh informed the Board that her attorneys would be
notifying it of their appearances and requested that future
4An "attorney of record" is an attorney who has filed an appearance
or pleading in the action and is therefore presumed to have authority to bind the client, including by accepting service on the client's behalf. Maner v. Maner, 279 Ala. 652, 658, 189 So. 2d 336, 342 (1966). 23 CL-2025-0707
correspondence be directed to her counsel. Thereafter, Stallworth sent
written correspondence advising that he represented Pugh in connection
with the proposed termination matter and expressly instructed that "[a]ll
correspondence regarding [that] matter should be directed to [him]." No
other attorney filed a formal notice of appearance or directed that
communications be handled differently, and Stallworth never filed a
notice of withdrawal. Therefore, the Board could have reasonably
believed that Stallworth was Pugh's attorney of record for purposes of the
termination matter and that notice provided to Stallworth of the hearing
was imputed to Pugh. See Ex parte Utilities Bd., 348 So. 3d at 1103;
Maner v. Maner, 279 Ala. 652, 658, 189 So. 2d 336, 342 (1966). Cf. Ex
parte Hill, 225 So. 3d 56, 65 (Ala. 2016) (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co. v. Humphres, 293 Ala. 413, 418, 304 So. 2d 573, 577 (1974)) (" '[A]
party may not avail himself of error, if any, into which he has led the
court.' "). Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the Board's notice to
Stallworth, as Pugh's attorney of record, was inconsistent with due
process or that it was not reasonably calculated to apprise Pugh of the
hearing and afford her an opportunity to respond.
24 CL-2025-0707
The record also does not support the conclusion that Pugh and her
attorneys were unaware that the hearing would proceed on February 7,
2025. The superintendent sent a letter on January 15, 2025, to Stallworth
indicating that the hearing before the Board would be held on February
7. Boardman sent his exhibit list, witness list, and subpoena information
to both Hernandez and Stallworth, and, on February 3, 2025, in response
to Hernandez, specifically confirmed that the termination hearing would
proceed on February 7. The record reflects that Pugh did not file a motion
to continue the hearing. When neither Pugh nor her attorneys appeared
at the termination hearing, the Board had no duty to continue the matter
or to separately contact them again. Cf. D. & J. Min. & Mining, Inc. v.
Wilson, 456 So. 2d 1099, 1100-01 (Ala. Civ. App. 1984) (noting that a
party, "usually through an attorney," is responsible for keeping track of
his or her case and that "the court owes no duty to notify a party of the
setting of a case or to continue a case because of the absence of a party or
other engagements of his attorney").
Likewise, Hernandez's assertion that she was unavailable on
February 6 and 7, 2025, does not establish a due-process violation. Under
§ 16-24C-6(b), the hearing is set "by the employer," i.e., the Board, and
25 CL-2025-0707
may be rescheduled only "by agreement or for good cause shown." The
Board originally set the hearing for February 6 and continued it to
February 7, a date already contemplated during scheduling, based on an
agreement with Stallworth. The statute did not require Hernandez's
consent to set the hearing date. It is clear that there was no agreement
to further modify the date, because Boardman advised Hernandez that
the hearing would remain scheduled for February 7 and that he could not
unilaterally change it. The record reflects no communications with
Hernandez after February 3. Further, nothing in the record establishes
that Stallworth -- the attorney the Board reasonably understood to be
representing Pugh -- was unavailable or that any of Pugh's attorneys
filed a motion with the Board seeking a continuance of the hearing for
good cause. Although there is some indication that Pugh terminated
Stallworth's services at some point during the termination proceedings,
the record does not indicate when that occurred, and nothing in the
record indicates that the Board was ever informed that Stallworth no
longer represented Pugh.
Due process requires notice and an opportunity to respond, not
guaranteed attendance or actual participation. " ' "[T]he essential
26 CL-2025-0707
requirements of due process … are notice and an opportunity to
respond." ' " Huntsville City Bd. of Educ. v. Jacobs, 194 So. 3d 929, 942
(Ala. Civ. App. 2014) (quoting Frizzell v. Autauga Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 972
F. Supp. 564, 565 (M.D. Ala. 1997), quoting in turn Cleveland Bd. of Educ.
v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985)). In the school-employment
context, "[t]he essential elements of due process are not that the teacher
must personally appear, nor that teacher's counsel must examine or
cross-examine witnesses, but that the teacher be afforded opportunity to
do these things." Alabama State Tenure Comm'n v. Board of Sch.
Comm'rs of Mobile Cnty., 332 So. 2d 724, 730 (Ala. Civ. App. 1976).
That is exactly what occurred here. As discussed above, Pugh had
notice of the hearing date through Stallworth, the sole attorney who
notified the Board of his appearance and who remained Pugh's counsel of
record. Pugh had the opportunity to appear, present evidence, cross-
examine witnesses, and contest the recommendation. The Board held the
hearing in compliance with the SFA, and, as the Board's advisory counsel
correctly noted, nothing in the SFA conditions the validity of that hearing
on the employee's attendance. Pugh's failure to appear -- and her
27 CL-2025-0707
attorneys' failure to appear -- does not transform adequate notice into a
Ultimately, the hearing officer's conclusion rested not on any failure
by the Board to provide notice, but on dissatisfaction with how Pugh's
attorneys managed the representation and communicated with each
other and with Pugh. Due process does not require the Board to resolve
internal communication failures among counsel or to investigate private
attorney-client disputes before proceeding with a statutorily required
hearing. The Board acted consistently with Pugh's own instructions, with
Stallworth's written directive, and with the procedural requirements of
the SFA. Because the Board provided Pugh with constitutionally
sufficient notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard, the hearing
officer erred in reversing the termination decision on procedural-due-
process grounds. The Board's decision is therefore due to be reinstated.
Conclusion
Having concluded that the hearing officer erred in reversing the
Board's decision to terminate Pugh's employment on the ground that the
Board violated Pugh's procedural-due-process rights, we reverse the
28 CL-2025-0707
hearing officer's order and remand the case to the hearing office to enter
an order affirming the Board's decision.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Moore, P.J., and Edwards, Hanson, and Bowden, JJ., concur.