Monk-Sloan Supply Co. v. Quitman Oil Co.

Court of Appeals of Georgia

Monk-Sloan Supply Co. v. Quitman Oil Co.

73 S.E. 522, 10 Ga. App. 390, 1912 Ga. App. LEXIS 530

CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia

DecidedJanuary 15, 1912

Docket3630

StatusPublished

Cited by13 cases

This text of 73 S.E. 522 (Monk-Sloan Supply Co. v. Quitman Oil Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Monk-Sloan Supply Co. v. Quitman Oil Co., 73 S.E. 522, 10 Ga. App. 390, 1912 Ga. App. LEXIS 530 (Ga. Ct. App. 1912).

Pincite

Opinion

Powell, J.

The Quitman Oil Company brought suit against the Monk-Sloan Supply Company (a corporation, of which Sloan was president) and C. E. Whitfield. The jury rendered the following verdict: “We, the jury, find for the defendant our verdict for Sloan and Whitfield,” signed by the foreman. During the same term, the plaintiffs moved to set the verdict aside, onThe grounds, ’ (1) that it is ambiguous and uncertain; (2) that it is in favor of only one defendant, when there are two defendants in the case. The court granted the motion and the defendants excepted.

1. A verdict so uncertain as to be void may be set aside on motion. But “verdicts are to have a reasonable intendment, and are to receive a reasonable construction, and are not to be avoided unless from necessity.” Civil Code (1910), § 5927.

2. A canon of construction, often applied to verdicts, is that all surplusage may be disregarded. The maxim, “utile per inutile non vitiatur,” saves a verdict from the taint of any ambiguity or uncertainty brought about by rejectable surplusage. See, for example, the ease of Southern Ry. Co. v. Oliver, 1 Ga. App. 734 (58 S. E. 244), and the instances there cited of the perfecting of verdicts by the rejection of surplusage or the application of other cognate canons of construction. The words, “We, the jury, find for the defendant,” are a full, definite, and complete verdict. If the added, words, “our verdict for Sloan and Whitfield,” relate tp the defendants named in the pleadings, as they probably do, no harm is done by rejecting them, as they add nothing to the legal effect of the verdict. If the jury, in using these words, were referring to persons outside of the record, their reference to the outsiders is rankest surplusage, and of course it is to be rejected; for the only meaning which could then be given to the added words would be that the jury intended their finding in favor of the defendants to oper[392]*392ate also in favor of certain outsiders — a matter as to which they had no concern. So, by construing the added words as referring to the defendants, or as not referring to them, the legal effect is the same — the added reference is mere surplusage.

3. The point that the verdict is bad because the jury used the word “ defendant,” when there were two defendants, is not well taken. It is a common canon of legal construction that “the singular or plural number shall each include the other, unless expressly excluded.” Civil Code (1910), § 4, par. 4.

Judgment reversed.

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Powell, J.

The Quitman Oil Company brought suit against the Monk-Sloan Supply Company (a corporation, of which Sloan was president) and C. E. Whitfield. The jury rendered the following verdict: “We, the jury, find for the defendant our verdict for Sloan and Whitfield,” signed by the foreman. During the same term, the plaintiffs moved to set the verdict aside, onThe grounds, ’ (1) that it is ambiguous and uncertain; (2) that it is in favor of only one defendant, when there are two defendants in the case. The court granted the motion and the defendants excepted.

1. A verdict so uncertain as to be void may be set aside on motion. But “verdicts are to have a reasonable intendment, and are to receive a reasonable construction, and are not to be avoided unless from necessity.” Civil Code (1910), § 5927.

2. A canon of construction, often applied to verdicts, is that all surplusage may be disregarded. The maxim, “utile per inutile non vitiatur,” saves a verdict from the taint of any ambiguity or uncertainty brought about by rejectable surplusage. See, for example, the ease of Southern Ry. Co. v. Oliver, 1 Ga. App. 734 (58 S. E. 244), and the instances there cited of the perfecting of verdicts by the rejection of surplusage or the application of other cognate canons of construction. The words, “We, the jury, find for the defendant,” are a full, definite, and complete verdict. If the added, words, “our verdict for Sloan and Whitfield,” relate tp the defendants named in the pleadings, as they probably do, no harm is done by rejecting them, as they add nothing to the legal effect of the verdict. If the jury, in using these words, were referring to persons outside of the record, their reference to the outsiders is rankest surplusage, and of course it is to be rejected; for the only meaning which could then be given to the added words would be that the jury intended their finding in favor of the defendants to oper[392]*392ate also in favor of certain outsiders — a matter as to which they had no concern. So, by construing the added words as referring to the defendants, or as not referring to them, the legal effect is the same — the added reference is mere surplusage.

3. The point that the verdict is bad because the jury used the word “ defendant,” when there were two defendants, is not well taken. It is a common canon of legal construction that “the singular or plural number shall each include the other, unless expressly excluded.” Civil Code (1910), § 4, par. 4.

Judgment reversed.

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Bluebook (online)

73 S.E. 522, 10 Ga. App. 390, 1912 Ga. App. LEXIS 530, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/monk-sloan-supply-co-v-quitman-oil-co-gactapp-1912.

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