Monitzer v. Monitzer

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Monitzer v. Monitzer

600 So. 2d 575, 1992 Fla. App. LEXIS 7476, 1992 WL 157441

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedJuly 10, 1992

DocketNo. 91-02935

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 600 So. 2d 575 (Monitzer v. Monitzer) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Monitzer v. Monitzer, 600 So. 2d 575, 1992 Fla. App. LEXIS 7476, 1992 WL 157441 (Fla. Ct. App. 1992).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

The appellant, Frances K. Monitzer, challenges a trial court determination that her adult daughter is not a dependent person under the provisions of section 743.07(2), Florida Statutes (1989). The only competent substantial evidence in the appellate record presented to us establishes that the parties’ daughter, although she is over the age of eighteen, is dependent because of a mental or physical incapacity which began prior to her reaching majority. See Fagan v. Fagan, 381 So.2d 278 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). Although the expert testified that she may become independent in the future, she was dependent at the time of the hearing and had been for years prior to reaching her majority.

[576]*576Since the evidence establishes that the parties’ daughter meets the requirements for continued support pursuant to section 743.07(2), the court erred by not ordering the appellee to contribute to that support. We, accordingly, reverse and remand for proceedings consistent herewith.

Reversed and remanded.

CAMPBELL, A.C.J., and SCHOONOVER and THREADGILL, JJ., concur.

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PER CURIAM.

The appellant, Frances K. Monitzer, challenges a trial court determination that her adult daughter is not a dependent person under the provisions of section 743.07(2), Florida Statutes (1989). The only competent substantial evidence in the appellate record presented to us establishes that the parties’ daughter, although she is over the age of eighteen, is dependent because of a mental or physical incapacity which began prior to her reaching majority. See Fagan v. Fagan, 381 So.2d 278 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). Although the expert testified that she may become independent in the future, she was dependent at the time of the hearing and had been for years prior to reaching her majority.

[576]*576Since the evidence establishes that the parties’ daughter meets the requirements for continued support pursuant to section 743.07(2), the court erred by not ordering the appellee to contribute to that support. We, accordingly, reverse and remand for proceedings consistent herewith.

Reversed and remanded.

CAMPBELL, A.C.J., and SCHOONOVER and THREADGILL, JJ., concur.

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600 So. 2d 575, 1992 Fla. App. LEXIS 7476, 1992 WL 157441, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/monitzer-v-monitzer-fladistctapp-1992.

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