1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MONIQUE SANCHEZ, Case No.: 25-cv-2736-RSH-SBC
12 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 13 v. MOTION TO PROCEED IFP AND DISMISSING COMPLAINT 14 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
15 Defendant. [ECF No. 2]
16 17 18 On October 14, 2025, plaintiff Monique Sanchez, proceeding pro se, initiated this 19 action and filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). ECF Nos. 1 (“Compl.”); 20 2. 21 I. MOTION TO PROCEED IFP 22 All parties instituting a civil action, suit, or proceeding in a district court of the 23 United States, other than a petition for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee. 28 24 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a party’s failure to pay the filing fee only 25 if the party is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). See Moore 26 v. Maricopa Cnty. Sheriff’s Office, 657 F.3d 890, 892 (9th Cir. 2011) (“All persons, not 27 just prisoners, may seek IFP status.”); Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 28 1999). A federal court may authorize the commencement of an action without the 1 prepayment of fees if the party submits an affidavit, including a statement of assets, 2 showing an inability to pay the required filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). “An affidavit in 3 support of an IFP application is sufficient where it alleges that the affiant cannot pay the 4 court costs and still afford the necessities of life[.]” Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 5 1234 (9th Cir. 2015). 6 Here, Plaintiff’s affidavit in support of her IFP motion is incomplete. The majority 7 of the boxes are blank. In leaving these boxes blank, it may have been Plaintiff’s intent to 8 communicate that the value of the income, assets, or liabilities at issue are zero; or that she 9 has no employment history, for example. The Court will provide Plaintiff an opportunity 10 to file an amended affidavit to make this intent clear. Accordingly, her IFP motion is denied 11 without prejudice to refiling. 12 II. SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) 13 A complaint filed by any person seeking to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 14 1915(a) is subject to sua sponte review and dismissal should the Court determine, inter alia, 15 that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 16 See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000) 17 (“[S]ection 1915(e) applies to all in forma pauperis complaints, not just those filed by 18 prisoners.”). 19 “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 20 which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 21 Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 22 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 23 2012) (noting that § 1915A screening “incorporates the familiar standard applied in the 24 context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). Rule 25 12(b)(6) requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state 26 a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 27 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 28 // 1 Here, upon review, the Complaint is inadequate. First, Plaintiff’s sole claim, under 2 the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), appears to be time-barred. The Complaint alleges 3 psychological and emotional injury to Plaintiff arising from an incident on November 13, 4 2013, in which an off-duty Border Patrol agent fired shots at a moving vehicle, inside of 5 which were a woman and child. Compl. ¶¶ 5–7. Plaintiff was a minor at the time. Id. ¶ 6. 6 Plaintiff alleges that she recently reached the age of majority and filed an administrative 7 claim with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security in 2025, over eleven years after the 8 incident. 9 To sue under the FTCA, a plaintiff must first file a claim with the responsible 10 government agency within two years of the accrual of the claim. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b); 11 Booth v. United States, 914 F.3d 1199, 1202 (9th Cir. 2019). A claim accrues “when a 12 plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of [the] action.” 13 Hensley v. United States, 531 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2008). The two-year limitation is 14 not tolled by virtue of the fact that the plaintiff is a minor. Booth, 914 F.3d at 1205 (“[W]e 15 have never recognized minority tolling for the FTCA’s statute of limitations.”) (collecting 16 cases). To invoke the separate doctrine of equitable tolling, “a litigant must establish (1) 17 that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary 18 circumstances stood in his way.” Id. at 1207. 19 In Booth, the Ninth Circuit explained: 20 Particular circumstances connected to one’s age could support 21 equitable tolling. For example, there may be cause for equitable tolling if a minor is abandoned by his parents and/or guardians and so left 22 unprotected. Likewise, some states have recognized that equitable 23 tolling may be appropriate where a minor is “a ward of the state without a next friend or guardian of his estate” or “has a guardian of his person 24 with interests possibly adverse to his own,” or where the cause of action 25 is not reasonably knowable by the plaintiff or her parents because of her minority. 26 27 Still, minority alone is not the type of exceptional circumstance described above. In multiple cases involving minors with FTCA claims, 28 1 this Court has considered whether minority tolling applies (and held that it does not), and then separately considered whether equitable 2 tolling applies and concluded that there was not a sufficient basis for 3 equitable tolling. 4 Id. (citations omitted). Plaintiff’s FTCA claim is thus time-barred under 28 U.S.C. § 5 2401(b) absent any factual basis for equitable tolling. 6 Second, the Complaint fails to adequately plead non-conclusory facts plausibly 7 establishing her entitlement to relief under the FTCA.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MONIQUE SANCHEZ, Case No.: 25-cv-2736-RSH-SBC
12 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 13 v. MOTION TO PROCEED IFP AND DISMISSING COMPLAINT 14 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
15 Defendant. [ECF No. 2]
16 17 18 On October 14, 2025, plaintiff Monique Sanchez, proceeding pro se, initiated this 19 action and filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). ECF Nos. 1 (“Compl.”); 20 2. 21 I. MOTION TO PROCEED IFP 22 All parties instituting a civil action, suit, or proceeding in a district court of the 23 United States, other than a petition for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee. 28 24 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a party’s failure to pay the filing fee only 25 if the party is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). See Moore 26 v. Maricopa Cnty. Sheriff’s Office, 657 F.3d 890, 892 (9th Cir. 2011) (“All persons, not 27 just prisoners, may seek IFP status.”); Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 28 1999). A federal court may authorize the commencement of an action without the 1 prepayment of fees if the party submits an affidavit, including a statement of assets, 2 showing an inability to pay the required filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). “An affidavit in 3 support of an IFP application is sufficient where it alleges that the affiant cannot pay the 4 court costs and still afford the necessities of life[.]” Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 5 1234 (9th Cir. 2015). 6 Here, Plaintiff’s affidavit in support of her IFP motion is incomplete. The majority 7 of the boxes are blank. In leaving these boxes blank, it may have been Plaintiff’s intent to 8 communicate that the value of the income, assets, or liabilities at issue are zero; or that she 9 has no employment history, for example. The Court will provide Plaintiff an opportunity 10 to file an amended affidavit to make this intent clear. Accordingly, her IFP motion is denied 11 without prejudice to refiling. 12 II. SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) 13 A complaint filed by any person seeking to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 14 1915(a) is subject to sua sponte review and dismissal should the Court determine, inter alia, 15 that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 16 See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000) 17 (“[S]ection 1915(e) applies to all in forma pauperis complaints, not just those filed by 18 prisoners.”). 19 “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 20 which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 21 Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 22 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 23 2012) (noting that § 1915A screening “incorporates the familiar standard applied in the 24 context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). Rule 25 12(b)(6) requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state 26 a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 27 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 28 // 1 Here, upon review, the Complaint is inadequate. First, Plaintiff’s sole claim, under 2 the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), appears to be time-barred. The Complaint alleges 3 psychological and emotional injury to Plaintiff arising from an incident on November 13, 4 2013, in which an off-duty Border Patrol agent fired shots at a moving vehicle, inside of 5 which were a woman and child. Compl. ¶¶ 5–7. Plaintiff was a minor at the time. Id. ¶ 6. 6 Plaintiff alleges that she recently reached the age of majority and filed an administrative 7 claim with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security in 2025, over eleven years after the 8 incident. 9 To sue under the FTCA, a plaintiff must first file a claim with the responsible 10 government agency within two years of the accrual of the claim. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b); 11 Booth v. United States, 914 F.3d 1199, 1202 (9th Cir. 2019). A claim accrues “when a 12 plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of [the] action.” 13 Hensley v. United States, 531 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2008). The two-year limitation is 14 not tolled by virtue of the fact that the plaintiff is a minor. Booth, 914 F.3d at 1205 (“[W]e 15 have never recognized minority tolling for the FTCA’s statute of limitations.”) (collecting 16 cases). To invoke the separate doctrine of equitable tolling, “a litigant must establish (1) 17 that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary 18 circumstances stood in his way.” Id. at 1207. 19 In Booth, the Ninth Circuit explained: 20 Particular circumstances connected to one’s age could support 21 equitable tolling. For example, there may be cause for equitable tolling if a minor is abandoned by his parents and/or guardians and so left 22 unprotected. Likewise, some states have recognized that equitable 23 tolling may be appropriate where a minor is “a ward of the state without a next friend or guardian of his estate” or “has a guardian of his person 24 with interests possibly adverse to his own,” or where the cause of action 25 is not reasonably knowable by the plaintiff or her parents because of her minority. 26 27 Still, minority alone is not the type of exceptional circumstance described above. In multiple cases involving minors with FTCA claims, 28 1 this Court has considered whether minority tolling applies (and held that it does not), and then separately considered whether equitable 2 tolling applies and concluded that there was not a sufficient basis for 3 equitable tolling. 4 Id. (citations omitted). Plaintiff’s FTCA claim is thus time-barred under 28 U.S.C. § 5 2401(b) absent any factual basis for equitable tolling. 6 Second, the Complaint fails to adequately plead non-conclusory facts plausibly 7 establishing her entitlement to relief under the FTCA. An FTCA claim must allege the 8 following six elements: (1) it is against the United States; (2) for money damages; (3) for 9 injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death; (4) caused by the negligent or 10 wrongful act or omission of any federal government employee; (5) while the employee was 11 acting within the scope of their office or employment; (6) under circumstances where the 12 United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the 13 law of the place where the act or omission occurred. Brownback v. King, 592 U.S. 209, 212 14 (2021); see also Nally v. Grace Cmty. Church, 47 Cal. 3d 278, 292 (1988) (to prove a claim 15 for negligence, a plaintiff must show “defendant had a duty to use due care, that he 16 breached that duty, and that the breach was the proximate or legal cause of the resulting 17 injury”). Here, the Complaint does not adequately allege facts establishing negligence on 18 the part of the off-duty agent, or that such individual was acting within the scope of his 19 employment. 20 // 21 // 22 // 23 // 24 // 25 // 26 // 27 // 28 // 1 CONCLUSION 2 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's IFP application [ECF No. 2] is DENIED. The 3 || Complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to prepay the filing fee 4 for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff is GRANTED forty-five (45) days from the date 5 |}on which this Order is electronically docketed to: (1) either file a new IFP motion or pay 6 entire $405 statutory and administrative filing fee; and (2) file an Amended Complaint 7 corrects the deficiencies identified herein. If Plaintiff fails to comply with either of the 8 || foregoing requirements, the Court will dismiss the action without prejudice. 9 IT IS SO ORDERED. 10 || Dated: October 30, 2025 C ‘ 1 Jerk 7 re Hon. Robert S. Huie United States District Judge 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28