1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 11 12 MONICA SANCHEZ, Case No.: 25-cv-01963-AJB-AHG
13 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 14 v. DISMISS
15 DELTA GALIL USA, INC., (Doc. No. 9) 16 Defendant. 17 18 Before the Court is Defendant Delta Galil USA, Inc.’s (“Delta Galil”) motion to 19 dismiss. (Doc. No. 9.) Plaintiff Monica Sanchez (“Sanchez”) opposes the motion. (Doc. 20 No. 11.) Following the conclusion of the initial briefing, the Court sought supplemental 21 briefing regarding whether the Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 22 §§ 1332(a) and 1332(d). (Doc. No. 13.) On January 15, 2026, the Court heard oral argument 23 on the motion. (Doc. No. 18.) The Court authorized the parties to conduct limited discovery 24 and ordered a second round of supplemental briefing. (Doc. No. 20.) The motion is now 25 fully briefed. (Doc. Nos. 9; 11–12; 14–17; 22–24.) Pursuant to Local Rule 7.1.d.1, the 26 Court finds this matter suitable for disposition without further oral argument. 27 For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Delta Galil’s motion to dismiss. 28 (Doc. No. 9.) Sanchez may file a second amended complaint on or before May 21, 2026. 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 A. Factual Background 3 On June 25, 2025, Sanchez purchased a pair of pants from the website 4 https://www.7forallmankind.com for $186. (Doc. No. 7 ¶ 10.) According to Sanchez, Delta 5 Galil operates the website to sell clothing and accessories. (Id. ¶¶ 1, 3.) At the time of her 6 purchase, the website indicated that the pants had a “reference price” of $248 and a 7 discounted price of $186. (Id. ¶ 10.) Sanchez did not see any disclaimer or notice explaining 8 the reference price “was anything other than the former price or regular price at which 9 [Delta Galil] itself sold [the pants] to consumers.” (Id. ¶ 12.) Sanchez alleges this reference 10 pricing constitutes a “deceptive pricing scheme” that “induces customers to buy products 11 they never would have bought—or at the very least, to pay more for merchandise they 12 otherwise would have if Defendant was simply being truthful about its ‘sales.’” (Id. ¶ 28.) 13 An investigation by Sanchez’s counsel, Scott J. Ferrell, indicated that between 14 January 29, 2023, and June 24, 2025—i.e., before Sanchez purchased the pants—Delta 15 Galil regularly advertised the pants with a reference price of $248 and a discounted price 16 of $186. (Id. ¶ 14.) However, between June 5, 2022, and October 6, 2022, Delta Galil 17 advertised the pants with a price of $218. (Id. ¶ 16.) Additionally, on November 4, 2024, 18 Delta Galil advertised the pants with a reference price of $248 and a discounted price of 19 $136. (Id. ¶ 15.) 20 Mr. Ferrell’s investigation also showed that between July 8, 2025, and September 21 26, 2025—i.e., after Sanchez purchased the pants—Delta Galil continued to advertise the 22 pants with a reference price of $248 and a discounted price of $186. (Id. ¶ 17.) 23 B. Procedural Background 24 On July 31, 2025, Sanchez initiated this Action as a putative class action. (Doc. No. 25 1.) Sanchez served Delta Galil on August 20, 2025. (Doc. No. 4.) Delta Galil timely moved 26 to dismiss Sanchez’s initial complaint. (Doc. No. 5.) 27 On September 26, 2025, instead of responding to Delta Galil’s initial motion to 28 dismiss, Sanchez filed the operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). (Doc. No. 7.) The 1 FAC identifies two causes of action: (1) a “violation of California’s False Advertising 2 Law[,] Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500 et seq.”; and (2) a “violation of Consumers Legal 3 Remedies Act[,] Cal. Civil Code § 1750 et seq.” (Id. ¶¶ 52–73.) 4 On October 17, 2025, Delta Galil moved to dismiss the FAC. (Doc. No. 9.) Delta 5 Galil argues that (1) this Court does not possess jurisdiction over this action because 6 Sanchez’s status as a tester precluded her from suffering a cognizable Article III injury 7 (Doc. No. 9-1 at 9–10)1; (2) venue is not proper in the Southern District of California 8 because Sanchez does not reside in the District and none of the underlying events that gave 9 rise to this action occurred in the District (id. at 12–13); and (3) Sanchez fails to state a 10 claim on which relief may be granted (id. at 11). 11 On November 14, 2025, the Court requested that the parties provide supplemental 12 briefing on whether Sanchez has satisfied the amount in controversy requirements 13 established by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a) & (d)(2) in light of Rosenwald v. Kimberly-Clark 14 Corporation, 152 F.4th 1167 (9th Cir. 2025). (Doc. No. 13.) 15 On January 15, 2026, following supplemental briefing, the Court held a motion 16 hearing. (Doc. Nos. 14–18.) Because significant questions remained regarding whether the 17 Court has jurisdiction over this matter, the Court authorized limited discovery on Delta 18 Galil’s corporate structure and Sanchez’s residence between November 2024 and July 19 2025. (Doc. No. 20 at 1.) The Court also requested a second round of supplemental briefing. 20 (Id.) More supplemental briefs were timely filed. (Doc. Nos. 22–24.) 21 This Order follows. 22 II. LEGAL STANDARD 23 A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) 24 A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) tests whether 25 the court has subject matter jurisdiction. Lack of Article III standing requires dismissal for 26
27 1 Page citations refer to the pagination generated by the Case Management/Electronic Case Files 28 1 want of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1). See Nw. Requirements Utils. v. 2 FERC, 798 F.3d 796, 807 n.9 (9th Cir. 2015). 3 “A Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack may be facial or factual.” Safe Air for 4 Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). “In a facial attack, the challenger 5 asserts that the allegations contained in a complaint are insufficient on their face to invoke 6 federal jurisdiction.” Id. The court “resolves a facial attack as it would a motion to dismiss 7 under Rule 12(b)(6): Accepting the plaintiff’s allegations as true and drawing all 8 reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor, the court determines whether the allegations 9 are sufficient as a legal matter to invoke the court’s jurisdiction.” Leite v. Crane Co., 749 10 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 2014). 11 “[I]n a factual attack,” on the other hand, “the challenger disputes the truth of the 12 allegations that, by themselves, would otherwise invoke federal jurisdiction.” Safe Air, 373 13 F.3d at 1039. In resolving such an attack, unlike a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), 14 a court “may review evidence beyond the complaint without converting the motion to 15 dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.” Id. Moreover, the court “need not presume 16 the truthfulness of the plaintiff’s allegations.” Id. Once the defendant has moved to dismiss 17 for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff bears the burden of 18 establishing the court’s jurisdiction. See Chandler v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 598 19 F.3d 1115, 1122 (9th Cir. 2010). 20 B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3) 21 A party may file a motion to dismiss for improper venue. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3). 22 The plaintiff has the burden of showing that venue is proper. Piedmont Label Co. v. Sun 23 Garden Packing Co., 598 F.2d 491, 496 (9th Cir. 1979). “In a Rule 12(b)(3) motion, the 24 allegations in the complaint need not be accepted as true and the Court may consider 25 evidence outside the pleadings.” eBay Inc. v. Digital Point Sols., Inc., 608 F. Supp. 2d 26 1156, 1161 (N.D. Cal. 2009). “If the court finds that the case has been filed in the wrong 27 division or district, it must dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to 28 any district or division in which it could have been brought.” Allstar Mktg. Grp., LLC v. 1 Your Store Online, LLC, 666 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1126 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (internal citation 2 and quotation omitted). 3 C. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) 4 A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a plaintiff’s 5 complaint. See Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). “[A] court may dismiss 6 a complaint as a matter of law for (1) lack of cognizable legal theory or (2) insufficient 7 facts under a cognizable legal claim.” SmileCare Dental Grp. v. Delta Dental Plan of Cal., 8 Inc., 88 F.3d 780, 783 (9th Cir. 1996) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 9 However, a complaint will survive a motion to dismiss if it contains “enough facts to state 10 a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 11 (2007). In making this determination, a court reviews the contents of the complaint, 12 accepting all factual allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of 13 the nonmoving party. See Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Nat’l League of Postmasters of U.S., 14 497 F.3d 972, 975 (9th Cir. 2007). 15 Notwithstanding this deference, the reviewing court need not accept legal 16 conclusions as true. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). It is also improper for 17 a court to assume “the [plaintiff] can prove facts that [he or she] has not alleged.” Assoc. 18 Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 19 (1983). However, “[w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume 20 their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to 21 relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. 22 III. DISCUSSION 23 A. The Court grants Delta Galil’s request for judicial notice. 24 In conjunction with its motion to dismiss, Delta Galil asks the Court to take judicial 25 notice of nine complaints Sanchez filed in Los Angeles County Superior Court through Mr. 26 Ferrell, three complaints Sanchez filed in San Diego County Superior Court through Mr. 27 Ferrell, and two additional documents filed in one of Sanchez’s Los Angeles County 28 Superior Court cases. (Doc. No. 9-2; see also Doc. Nos. 9-3–9-16.) Delta Galil asserts the 1 Court may judicially notice these documents because “(1) they are offered as evidence of 2 their existence, rather than the truth of any statements contained therein; and (2) they can 3 be accurately verified through court filings and therefore are not subject to reasonable 4 dispute.” (Doc. No. 9-2 at 2.) Delta Galil adds that the documents are relevant “because 5 they elucidate [Sanchez’s] place of residence as well as her motives in filing false 6 advertising lawsuits.” (Id.) 7 Sanchez objects that the documents are not relevant. (Doc. No. 11-3.) 8 Delta Galil replies that the documents are relevant to two issues raised in its motion 9 to dismiss. “First, [Sanchez’s] perception of the accused advertisement, in light of her 10 experience litigating false advertising claims, is relevant to the merits of the claims. 11 Second, [Sanchez’s] place of residence at the time that she purchased Defendant’s product 12 is relevant to whether venue in this district is proper.” (Doc. No. 12-3 at 2.) 13 Delta Galil is correct. 14 Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b) authorizes district courts “to notice an adjudicative 15 fact if it is ‘not subject to reasonable dispute.’ A fact is ‘not subject to reasonable dispute’ 16 if it is ‘generally known,’ or can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose 17 accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.’” Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., 899 18 F.3d 988, 999 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(1)–(2)). 19 “Judicial notice of court records is routinely accepted.” Mendez v. Optio Sols., LLC, 20 219 F. Supp. 3d 1012, 1014 (S.D. Cal. 2016). However, courts “may not take judicial notice 21 of such documents for the truth of the matter therein.” In re Bare Escentuals, Inc. Secs. 22 Litig., 745 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1067 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 23 Here, Sanchez alleges that she is “a resident of the County of San Diego who 24 purchased a product . . . from [Delta Galil’s] Website while located in the County of San 25 Diego.” (Doc. No. 7 ¶ 2.) Sanchez further alleges that she “purchased a Product that [she] 26 would not otherwise have purchased, but for Defendant’s representations.” (Id. ¶ 42.) 27 On the issue of Sanchez’s residence, the federal venue statute does not turn on the 28 place of a plaintiff’s residency. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). Nevertheless, in an action such as 1 this, a plaintiff’s place of residence may reveal from where she accessed a defendant’s 2 website, and in turn reveal where the acts or events that provide the underlying basis of an 3 action occurred. See id. § 1391(b)(2). With regard to Sanchez’s state court suits, under 4 California law, a plaintiff’s venue choice is not limited to any specific state court when the 5 defendant does not reside within California. See Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 395(a). It is 6 therefore reasonable to think that a plaintiff, like Sanchez, would initiate state court actions 7 in the venue in which she resides as a matter of convenience. Thus, where Sanchez initiated 8 other legal actions in state court may be indicative of her county of residence. In turn, the 9 documents are relevant to Delta Galil’s venue defense because they may controvert 10 Sanchez’s allegation that she resided in San Diego County at the time of her purchase. 11 As for Sanchez’s motivations, given that Sanchez alleges that she was deceived by 12 Delta Galil’s reference-pricing practice, the fact that Sanchez has filed similar actions 13 against other defendants may indicate that Sanchez is familiar with such price practices 14 and could not have been deceived. See, e.g., Cattie v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 504 F. Supp. 15 2d 939, 946–47 (S.D. Cal. 2007) (explaining that a plaintiff, “represented by four different 16 law firms, fil[ing] a nationwide lawsuit in four different states a mere eleven days after 17 making her purchase” indicates a “more than purely theoretical” possibility that the 18 plaintiff “did not rely on the allegedly false advertising.”). The documents are therefore 19 relevant to Delta Galil’s standing defense because they may controvert Sanchez’s 20 allegation that she relied on any allegedly deceptive representations. See id. 21 Under these circumstances, the Court takes judicial notice of Sanchez’s other court 22 filings. Mendez, 219 F. Supp. 3d at 1014. However, the Court does not accept the truth of 23 any facts alleged therein. In re Bare Escentuals, 745 F. Supp. 2d at 1067. 24 Additionally, the Court sua sponte takes judicial notice of the civil cover sheet filed 25 by Sanchez through Mr. Ferrell in Sanchez v. Organifi, LLC, No. 2:25-cv-04912-SB-MAR 26 (C.D. Cal. May 30, 2025). (See Doc. No. 19-1.) During the hearing, Sanchez’s counsel 27 confirmed that Sanchez was also the plaintiff in the Organifi matter. (Doc. No. 23-2 at 12.) 28 The civil cover sheet indicates that Sanchez resided in San Bernardino County on May 30, 1 2025. (Doc. No. 19-1.) This contradicts Sanchez’s declaration that she resided in Carlsbad 2 between November 2024 and July 2025. (Compare id., with Doc. No. 11-2 ¶ 3.) 3 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Delta Galil’s request for judicial notice. The 4 Court also takes judicial notice of the civil cover sheet filed in Sanchez v. Organifi, LLC, 5 No. 2:25-cv-04912-SB-MAR (C.D. Cal. May 30, 2025). 6 B. Sanchez possesses standing. 7 Turning to the substance of Delta Galil’s motion, Delta Galil contends that Sanchez 8 lacks standing to litigate this action. Specifically, Delta Galil asserts that Sanchez has not 9 suffered an injury-in-fact because she “is a tester plaintiff whose purchase . . . was designed 10 solely for litigation purposes.” (Doc. No. 9-1 at 9.) Delta Galil points to Sanchez’s other 11 lawsuits in which she self-identifies as a tester to support this contention. (Id. (citing Doc. 12 No. 9-14 ¶ 4).) Delta Galil additionally relies on Cattie, 504 F. Supp. 2d at 948, to imply 13 that Sanchez “strategically fil[ing] a series of similar false advertising suits across multiple 14 venues” shows that her purchase here “was a ‘token purchase’ designed to ‘deliberately 15 seek out statutory violations.’” (Doc. No. 9-1 at 10.) Delta Galil also points to this Court’s 16 prior dismissal of an action where the plaintiff “recently filed [22 other lawsuits] against 17 similar establishments.” (Id. (citing Strojnik v. Vill. 1017 Coronado, Inc., No. 3:19-cv- 18 02210-BAS-MSB, 2020 WL 3250608 (S.D. Cal. June 16, 2020) (Bashant, J.).) 19 Delta Galil’s standing arguments are unavailing. 20 “To establish standing, a ‘[p]laintiff must have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that 21 is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be 22 redressed by a favorable judicial decision.’” In re Facebook, Inc. Internet Tracking Litig., 23 956 F.3d 589, 597 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Spokeo Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 24 (2016)). 25 Here, Delta Galil provides no evidence to establish that Sanchez’s purchase “was 26 designed solely for litigation purposes.” (Doc. No. 9-1 at 9; see generally Doc. No. 9-1.) 27 Delta Galil’s reliance on Cattie and Strojnik is also unpersuasive. Turning first to 28 Cattie, the court there did not rely on the fact that the plaintiff filed multiple suits in other 1 venues to conclude that the plaintiff’s purchase was a token purchase for seeking out 2 statutory violations. Rather, the court dismissed the complaint there because the plaintiff 3 did “not allege that false statements or claims had anything to do with her decision to 4 purchase [a product].” Cattie, 504 F. Supp. 2d at 947. Thus, the court’s statement that the 5 plaintiff, “represented by four different law firms, filed a nationwide lawsuit in four 6 different states a mere eleven days after making her purchase,” id. at 946–47, was dicta. 7 The court’s subsequent discussion of a “token purchase” made “at the direction of attorneys 8 deliberately seek[ing] out statutory violations” addressed the broader issue of whether a 9 plaintiff needed to allege reliance. Id. at 948. Under these circumstances, Cattie does not 10 support Delta Galil’s implication that a tester plaintiff, even a prodigious one, makes 11 purchases solely for litigation purposes. 12 As for Strojnik, the Court took judicial notice of the plaintiff’s slew of lawsuits to 13 test the credibility of whether a plaintiff who lives in Phoenix, AZ, would actually “visit 14 over twenty different [lodging] establishments” in San Diego. 2020 WL 3250608, at *3. 15 The Court emphasized that “a complaint must plead enough facts to state a claim to relief 16 that is plausible on its face.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Applying 17 this framework, the Court rejected the plaintiff’s allegation that he “plans to return to 18 [Village 1017 Coronado, Inc.’s] lodging establishment” in the future because “[i]t defies 19 credulity that [the] [p]laintiff intends to visit over twenty different [lodging] establishments 20 in San Diego when he lives in Phoenix.” Id. Here, the mere fact that Sanchez has filed 21 multiple, similar suits does not mean that Sanchez could not have relied on Delta Galil’s 22 allegedly deceptive representations regarding its product’s price. Nor is it facially 23 implausible that Sanchez would have relied on similar representations from multiple 24 retailers or that Sanchez later learned she might have been deceived by all of those 25 representations. 26 Furthermore, Sanchez has plausibly alleged that she relied on Delta Galil’s allegedly 27 deceptive pricing practice. Again, Sanchez alleged that she “purchased a Product that [she] 28 would not otherwise have purchased, but for Defendant’s representations.” (Doc. No. 7 1 ¶ 42.) The fact that Sanchez is familiar with deceptive reference pricing schemes, as 2 evidenced by her past litigation, does not necessarily preclude Sanchez from relying on 3 Delta Galil’s representations here. See, e.g., Cordes v. Boulder Brands USA, Inc., No. CV 4 18-6534 PSG-JCx, 2018 WL 6714323, at * 2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2018). Such familiarity 5 simply means that Sanchez “may have suspected” that Delta Galil was engaged in such 6 practices before buying the pants. Id. It does not mean that Sanchez “knew for certain” that 7 Delta Galil was engaged in a deceptive pricing scheme before she purchased the pants. Id. 8 Thus, Sanchez has plausibly alleged that she suffered an injury-in-fact that is 9 traceable to Delta Galil’s allegedly unlawful conduct. In turn, the Court finds that Sanchez 10 has Article III standing to pursue her claims.2 11 C. Venue is proper in this Court. 12 Delta Galil also asserts that the Southern District of California is not a proper venue 13 for this action, arguing primarily that Sanchez does not reside within this District. (Doc. 14 Nos. 9-1 at 12–13; 12 at 8–10.) 15 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), venue is proper in: 16 (1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located; 17 (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions 18 giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that the subject of the action is situated; or 19 (3) if there is no district in which any action may otherwise be brought as 20 provided in this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to such action. 21
22 The Court is persuaded that venue is proper in this District. 23 Again, a plaintiff’s residence is not determinative of the proper federal venue. See 24 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). Although Delta Galil devotes many pixels to arguing that Sanchez 25 does not reside within the Southern District of California, it limits its argument that the 26
27 2 Delta Galil does not argue that Sanchez’s alleged injury is not redressable by a favorable court 28 1 underlying events did not occur here to half of a heading. (Compare Doc. Nos. 9-1 at 12– 2 13; 12 at 8–10; 23 at 7–9 (addressing residence), with Doc. No. 9-1 at 12 (“Venue is 3 improper because . . . no events occurred in this [D]istrict.”).) 4 However, the allegations and evidence indicate all relevant underlying events 5 occurred in this district. The FAC alleges that Sanchez made her purchase “while located 6 in the County of San Diego,” and so “venue is proper because a substantial part of the acts 7 and events giving rise to the claims occurred in this District.” (Doc. No. 7 ¶¶ 2, 7.) 8 Additionally, Sanchez offers a declaration signed under penalty of perjury to declare that 9 “At all times that I used and navigated the [https://www.7forallmankind.com] Website, I 10 was located in the County of San Diego.” (Doc. No. 11-2 ¶ 3.) Sanchez adds that she used 11 a San Marcos, CA billing address and a Carlsbad, CA shipping address. (Id. ¶¶ 4–5.) Delta 12 Galil has also provided Sanchez’s order confirmation email, which corroborates Sanchez’s 13 declaration that she used a San Marcos billing address and a Carlsbad shipping address. 14 (Doc. No. 12-2.) Both San Marcos and Carlsbad are located in San Diego County, which 15 is located within the Southern District of California.3 16 Under these circumstances, the evidence before the Court indicates that all 17 underlying activities occurred within the Southern District of California. The Court 18 consequently finds that venue is proper in this District.4 19 20 21 3 The locations of San Marcos, CA; Carlsbad, CA; and San Diego County are facts that “can be 22 accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2); see also Jurisdiction Map of the United States District Court Southern District of 23 California, U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California, https://www.casd.uscourts.gov/_images/jurisdiction-map.png; City Web Sites in San Diego County, San 24 Diego County Department of Public Works, https://www.sandiegocounty.gov/content/sdc/dpw/citylinks.html. The Court judicially notices these facts 25 sua sponte. Fed. R. Evid. 201(c)(1). 26 4 Although the Court finds that venue is proper in this District, Delta Galil’s concerns regarding Sanchez’s pleading practices warrant pause. 27 As noted above, Sanchez and her counsel have made contradictory statements regarding Sanchez’s county of residence. (Compare Doc. No. 11-2 ¶ 3, with Doc. No. 19-1.) At the hearing, Sanchez’s counsel 28 1 D. Sanchez has stated claims on which relief can be granted. 2 Delta Galil next claims that Sanchez has failed to state a claim on which relief can 3 be granted because (1) her “claims are based on a token purchase made solely for purposes 4 of filing suit” and (2) Sanchez’s “allegations are implausible and inconsistent with the prior 5 pleading.” (Doc. No. 9-1 at 9–11.) 6 These objections are meritless. 7 First, as previously noted, Delta Galil does not offer any evidence to show that 8 Sanchez purchased the pants solely for litigation purposes. Instead, Sanchez has plausibly 9 alleged that she relied on Delta Galil’s purportedly deceptive pricing practice. (Supra at 10 8–10.) 11 Second, Sanchez’s allegations in the FAC are plausible and sufficient. 12 Focusing on the allegations contained in the FAC, Delta Galil asserts the Court 13 should reject the allegations therein because, “[i]n light of attorney Ferrell’s known practice 14 of filing ‘cookie cutter’ complaints, the new allegations are suspect and implausible on 15 their face and should be disregarded.” (Doc. No. 9-1 at 11 (citing Byars v. Hot Topic, Inc., 16 656 F. Supp. 3d 1051, 1060 (C.D. Cal. 2023)).) 17 18 19 20 This is not the first time that this Court has discovered inconsistencies in filings signed by 21 Sanchez’s counsel in this District and the Central District of California. See, e.g., Order to Show Cause, Esparza v. Express Scripts Pharm., Inc., No. 3:25-cv-01988-AJB-DDL (S.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2025), Doc. 22 No. 3; Order to Show Cause, Rodriguez v. Blaze Pizza, LLC, No. 3:25-cv-01850-AJB-DEB (S.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2025), Doc. No. 8. Mr. Ferrell previously explained that these inconsistencies occurred because 23 his office “inadvertently indicated [an incorrect] county of residence.” Plaintiff’s Suppl. Br. in Response to Order to Show Cause at 2, Rodriguez v. Blaze Pizza, LLC, No. 3:25-cv-01850-AJB-DEB (S.D. Cal. 24 Oct. 7, 2025), Doc. No. 11; see also Plaintiff’s Supp. Br. in Response to Order to Show Cause at 2, Esparza 25 v. Express Scripts Pharm., Inc., No. 3:25-cv-01988-AJB-DDL (S.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2025), Doc. No. 11 (similar). 26 The Court reminds counsel that they are responsible for the contents of the documents that they file. By signing and filing such documents, counsel “certify[y] that to the best of [his or her] knowledge, 27 information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances, . . . the factual contentions have evidentiary support.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(3). The Court stresses that violations of Rule 28 1 However, Delta Galil’s reliance on Byars is misplaced. Rather than addressing the 2 credibility or plausibility of the allegations in a complaint, the cited portion of Byars was 3 critical of whether a complaint’s allegations are sufficiently specific: 4 if a litigant pleads at such a high level of generality that it is possible to copy and paste a complaint word-for-word against a new defendant (at least after 5 the unnumbered ‘introduction’ section . . . ), then almost by definition the 6 pleading is without the factual specificity necessary to state a claim for relief.
7 8 656 F. Supp. 3d at 1059–61. Under these circumstances, the fact that Sanchez and her 9 counsel may rely on cookie cutter complaints does not necessarily undermine the 10 plausibility of the allegations contained in the FAC. Id. 11 In any event, the allegations in the FAC are sufficiently tailored to state a claim on 12 which relief can be granted. Preliminarily, the Court notes that it is indisputable that the 13 bulk of the FAC can be “cop[ied] and paste[d] . . . word-for-word against a new defendant.” 14 Id. For instance, the FAC’s use of defined terms like “Product” and “Website” allows 15 Sanchez and her counsel to use much of the same language as a template across multiple 16 actions. (See, e.g., Doc. No. 7 ¶ 14 (“In particular, Defendant was offering the exact same 17 Product on the Website for an allegedly discounted price of [$] with the same phantom 18 discount from a strike-through reference price of [$].”).) Additionally, the FAC references 19 screen captures that are archived on the Wayback Machine, as well as price histories 20 tracked by Klarna.com. (See id. ¶¶ 14–16, 19, 21–22.) Yet the FAC does not include any 21 hyperlinks to specific screen captures or Klarna.com tracking. (See id.) 22 Nevertheless, the FAC’s inclusion of 30 specific dates and identification of the 23 prices Delta Galil allegedly charged for the pants Sanchez purchased on those dates is 24 sufficient to prevent copying and pasting the complaint in its entirety. (See, e.g., id. 25 ¶¶ 14–22.) It also provides sufficient specificity to state a claim for relief. See Byars, 656 26 F. Supp. 3d at 1059–61. 27 28 1 E. The Court lacks jurisdiction over Sanchez’s claims. 2 Lastly, Delta Galil argues that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over 3 Sanchez’s claims because Sanchez has failed to plausibly plead an amount in controversy 4 that meets either 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)’s $75,000 threshold or the Class Action Fairness 5 Act’s $5 million threshold. (Doc. Nos. 16 at 2–6; 23 at 2–7.) 6 Delta Galil is correct. 7 1. The Court lacks diversity jurisdiction. 8 “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the 9 matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, 10 and is between citizens of different States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). To exercise diversity 11 jurisdiction, there must be “complete diversity—no plaintiff may be from the same state as 12 any defendant.” Rosenwald, 152 F.4th at 1174. 13 a. Amount in Controversy 14 Beginning with the amount in controversy requirement, the amount in controversy 15 “claimed by the plaintiff controls . . . [unless] [i]t . . . appear[s] to a legal certainty that the 16 claim is really for less than the jurisdictional amount.” St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red 17 Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288–89 (1938). A court is “obliged to inquire sua sponte whenever 18 a doubt arises as to the existence of federal jurisdiction.” Hansen v. LMB Mortg. Servs., 19 Inc., 1 F.4th 667, 671 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. 20 Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 278 (1977)). 21 In her supplemental brief, Sanchez offers two bases by which to satisfy the amount 22 in controversy requirement for her individual claim: (1) “the Court should not calculate 23 attorneys’ fees on a pro rata basis for purposes of diversity jurisdiction if a putative class 24 action is no longer at issue” and (2) “Plaintiff anticipates . . . that the cost of modifying 25 [the] Website to remove its extensive use of strike-through reference pricing and/or 26 implement a new policy and/or procedure to comply with applicable law would, combined 27 together with Plaintiff’s future attorneys’ fees, exceed $75,000.” (Doc. No. 14 at 8.) 28 1 Neither of these bases is persuasive. Sanchez’s first assertion that “the Court should 2 not calculate attorneys’ fees on a pro rata basis for purposes of diversity jurisdiction” tacitly 3 concedes that Sanchez’s present individual claim cannot reach the $75,000 threshold. (Doc. 4 No. 14 at 8.) Moreover, Rosenwald makes clear that the Court is prohibited from taking 5 Sanchez’s requested aggregation approach. 152 F.4th at 1180. Accordingly, Sanchez must 6 plausibly allege that she could individually recover more than $75,000. Id. at 1178. 7 She does not. Sanchez’s supplemental briefing makes no effort to provide a 8 breakdown of her anticipated individual actual damages, punitive damages, or attorney 9 fees. (See generally Doc. Nos. 14; 17; 22; 24.) 10 Setting aside this shortcoming, Rosenwald and additional evidence confirm that 11 Sanchez cannot meet the $75,000 threshold. 12 First, Rosenwald stated that a plaintiff’s actual damages will likely be less than the 13 price she paid for a particular product because “no plaintiff can recover ‘[a] full refund’ 14 unless they ‘prove the product had no value to them.’” 152 F.4th at 1178 (quoting In re 15 Tobacco Cases II, 240 Cal. App. 4th 779, 795 (2015)). Despite this burden, Sanchez does 16 not demonstrate that the pants she purchased had no value to her. (See generally Doc. Nos. 17 7; 11; 14; 17; 24.) To the contrary, Sanchez’s arguments illustrate that she received some 18 benefit from the pants because she “successfully accomplished” her goal of “look[ing] for 19 women’s pants to purchase for [her] to personally wear as [Sanchez is] a woman.” (Doc. 20 No. 11-2 ¶ 7.) Instead, Sanchez offers that she and the other class members would be 21 entitled to a full refund under a “complete restitution” model. (Doc. No. 17 at 2–3; see also 22 Doc. No. 24 at 6–11.) 23 This is incorrect. 24 In light of Sanchez’s acknowledgment that she received some benefit from her 25 purchase, she has already received some unquantified value from her purchase. If Sanchez 26 has worn or used the pants in any way, that unquantified value would increase. Authorizing 27 a full refund after the purchase has been used or enjoyed would allow Sanchez (and the 28 putative class members) “to retain some . . . boon [and] obtain the windfall of a full refund 1 and profit from a restitutionary award.” In re POM Wonderful LLC, No. ML 10-02199- 2 DDP-RZx, 2014 WL 1225184 at *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2014).5 In such a case, allowing a 3 full refund as restitution would go beyond restitution’s purpose of “restor[ing] the 4 defrauded party to the position [s]he would have had absent the fraud.” Nelson v. Serwold, 5 687 F.2d 278, 281 (9th Cir. 1982) (citation omitted). Sanchez fails to grapple with this 6 purpose and its attendant limitations on any potential remedy. (See Doc. Nos. 14 at 6–7; 7 17 at 2–3; 24 at 6–11.) 8 Thus, Sanchez is not entitled to a full refund, even in the form of restitution, and her 9 actual or compensatory damages would likely be less than the $186 she paid for the pants. 10 (See Doc. No. 7 ¶ 10.) 11 Additionally, Sanchez’s punitive damages would likely be capped below $744. This 12 is because “an award of more than four times the amount of compensatory damages [will] 13 be close to the line of constitutional impropriety.” Rosenwald, 152 F.4th at 1179 (quoting 14 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003)). 15 Against this backdrop, Sanchez has to show that she would be entitled to more than 16 $74,070 in attorney fees to satisfy 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1)’s threshold. Sanchez makes no 17 effort to do so. (See generally Doc. Nos. 14; 17; 22; 24.) 18 In contrast, Delta Galil offers that the highest pro rata share of attorney fees any 19 individual plaintiff can claim is $4,950. (Doc. No. 16 at 5.) To reach this number, Delta 20 Galil explains that “between August 1, 2022 and July 31, 2025 (the three years prior to this 21 suit),” the website sold $5.95 million-worth of strikethrough-discounted products to 22 23 24 25 5 Sanchez’s suggestion that this principle should be limited to cases involving food products is 26 illogical. (See Doc. No. 24 at 7n.1, 9–10.) The use of a physical product converts it from a “new” to a “used” condition. Moreover, when the product at issue is an article of clothing, as is the case here, such 27 use can cause wear and tear that further affects the product’s condition. This is compounded by the possibility that some of the clothing items may have been purchased—and used for—up to four years 28 before this Action was filed. 1 California consumers. (Id. at 2–3 (citing Doc. No. 16-1 ¶¶ 2–3).) Because Sanchez has not 2 shown that products purchased had no value to the buyers, Delta Galil posits that the 3 putative class members are only entitled to a 33.33% refund because that is the average 4 strikethrough discount. (Doc. No. 16 at 4.) Thus, Delta Galil calculates the total refundable 5 amount to be $1.98 million. (Id.) Applying Sanchez’s proposed 25% benchmark for 6 attorney fees (Doc. No. 14 at 3–5), Delta Galil concludes that the class would be entitled 7 to $495,000 in fees. (Doc. No. 16 at 2–5.) Assuming a class of exactly 100 members, this 8 would mean that each member is entitled to a maximum of $4,950 in fees. (Id.) This award 9 would, of course, be reduced by each additional putative class member. 10 Sanchez’s attempts to increase the total refundable amount does not move the needle 11 by any meaningful degree. Sanchez argues that the relevant time frame that should be 12 captured is four years prior to the initiation of this action because California’s Unfair 13 Competition Law provides for a four-year statute of limitations. (Doc. No. 17 at 2 n.1.) 14 Sanchez thus contends the amount in controversy should be based on an extrapolated total 15 of $7.9 million worth of strikethrough-discounted products sold to California consumers. 16 (Id. at 2.) Applying the 33.33% refund rate7 to the $7.9 million figure, the total refundable 17 amount would increase to $2,633,333.33. Using the 25% benchmark for attorney fees 18 produces a total of $658,333.33 in attorney fees for the class, or $6,583.33 per individual. 19 Using these figures, Sanchez is entitled to a maximum of $7,513.33 in damages and 20 fees. This falls far short of the $75,000 threshold. 21 Second, considering Delta Galil’s costs to revise the website does not help Sanchez 22 across the threshold. Sanchez cites a single case to support the idea that the Court should 23
24 25 6 Sanchez proposes that the putative class consist of “All persons who purchased one or more of Defendant’s products from Defendant’s Website while in California within the statute of limitations period 26 at a purported discount from a higher reference price.” (Doc. No. 7 ¶ 44.) 7 Sanchez’s sole argument for a higher refund rate is that the class members are entitled to a full 27 refund. (See Doc. Nos. 17 at 2–3; 24 at 6–11.) This argument is unavailing. Rosenwald, 152 F.4th 1178–79; In re POM Wonderful, 2014 WL 1225184 at *3. Accordingly, the Court applies Delta Galil’s 28 1 consider such costs in calculating the amount in controversy: Garcia v. TH Foods, Inc., 2 2:24-cv-08558-SVW-JPR, 2025 WL 395456 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2025). (Doc. No. 14 at 7–8.) 3 But Garcia indicates that any revision costs here would not bring the amount in controversy 4 across the $75,000 threshold. In Garcia, the plaintiff sued a cracker manufacturer for 5 allegedly unlawful “slack fill.” 2025 WL 395456, at *1. The manufacturer offered evidence 6 that designing and using new product packaging would cost over $200,000. Id. at *2. The 7 Garcia court discounted the costs of the manufacturer designing new packaging because 8 the manufacturer “would bear [such] costs whether or not it made new packaging,” but 9 agreed that the cost of using new packaging would exceed $75,000. Id. 10 Here, any costs for revising the website would likely be negligible and a non-factor. 11 Although Sanchez does not offer any evidence on this point, Delta Galil provides a 12 declaration that modifying the website would cost “a minimal amount of time and money.” 13 (Doc. No. 16-1 ¶ 6.) Delta Galil asserts that changing the website’s prices “would take a 14 few clicks of a button and would entail only minimal personnel cost.” (Doc. No. 16 at 5.) 15 Notably, these costs would be based on directing “[a]lready-salaried personnel . . . to click 16 a few buttons and remove the incompliant strikethrough discounts from the website.” (Id. 17 at 6 (citing Doc. No. 16-1 ¶ 6).) Because Delta Galil “would bear [these salary] costs 18 whether or not it [modifies the website],” the Court declines to consider such compliance 19 costs as part of calculating the amount in controversy. Garcia, 2025 WL 395456, at *2. 20 In turn, these negligible compliance costs do not bring Sanchez’s individual claim 21 of up to $7,513.33 in damages and fees past the $75,000 threshold. 22 b. Complete diversity 23 Although Sanchez has failed to establish that she can satisfy the amount in 24 controversy requirement, it appears that the complete diversity requirement is met. In the 25 FAC, Sanchez alleges that she is a citizen of California and that Delta Galil is a Delaware 26 corporation with a principal place of business in New Jersey. (Doc. No. 7 ¶¶ 2–3.) Delta 27 28 1 Galil does not dispute these allegations. (See generally Doc. No. 9-1.) Thus, the Court finds 2 that the complete diversity requirement is met at this time.8 3 2. The Court lacks Class Action Fairness Act jurisdiction. 4 “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action in which the 5 matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000, exclusive of interest and 6 costs, and is a class action in which any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a 7 State different from any defendant.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A). To determine the amount 8 in controversy for such a claim, “the claims of the individual class members shall be 9 aggregated.” Id. § 1332(d)(6). 10 a. Amount in Controversy 11 Sanchez fails to demonstrate that the putative class can satisfy the Class Action 12 Fairness Act’s $5 million amount in controversy. 13 In her supplemental briefing, Sanchez contends that the total amount in controversy 14 for the putative class’s claims exceeds $5 million. (Doc. No. 14 at 6.) To reach this 15 conclusion, Sanchez assumes that the putative class members would be entitled to complete 16 17
18 19 8 Although the Court finds that the complete diversity requirement is met, the evidence before the Court raises significant concerns regarding whether all necessary parties have been joined to this litigation. 20 The Court previously discovered that a company named “Seven For All Mankind, LLC” is affiliated with Delta Galil and may have a role in controlling the website at issue. (See Doc. No. 20 at 2– 21 3.) The Court accordingly authorized discovery on, among other things, the relationship between Delta 22 Galil and Seven For All Mankind, LLC. (Id.) The parties apparently agree that Seven For All Mankind, LLC is not a necessary party. (See Doc. No. 22 at 3; see also Doc. No. 23.) 23 Nevertheless, the parties’ discovery efforts have revealed that another entity named “DG Premium Brands LLC” may be a necessary party. DG Premium Brands LLC “is a wholly-owned subsidiary” of 24 Delta Galil. (Doc. No. 22-2 at 41–42.) It “administrates” the website at issue and has at least some “control over the pricing listed on the website.” (Id. at 42.) It also employs Bill Elliott, who provided the declaration 25 for Delta Galil that identifies the total value of the website’s California transactions and how much it 26 would cost to remove strikethrough pricing from the website. (Id. at 43–44; see also Doc. No. 16-1.) Sanchez contends that DG Premium Brands LLC is not a necessary party to this action. (Doc. No. 27 22 at 3–4). Delta Galil does not respond to or dispute this contention. (See generally Doc. No. 23.) Since the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this matter for other reasons, the Court will 28 not endeavor to resolve whether DG Premium Brands LLC is a necessary party at this time. 1 refunds (or restitution) and could seek attorney fees in addition. (See Doc. Nos. 14 at 6–7; 2 17 at 2–3; 24 at 6–11.) 3 This is incorrect. 4 As with her individual claims, Sanchez offers no proof that the products purchased 5 by the other putative class members had no value to them. (See generally Doc. Nos. 14 at 6 6–7; 17 at 2–3; 24 at 6–11.) Instead, Sanchez focuses on whether the class members could 7 seek “complete restitution.” (Doc. Nos. 14 at 6–7; 17 at 2–3; 24 at 6–11.) As previously 8 discussed, however, the putative class members are not entitled to complete refunds, even 9 in the form of restitution. (Supra at 14–18.) 10 Assuming that Sanchez and the putative class members may be entitled to some 11 remedy, the question of how to calculate or quantify that remedy remains. Taking Delta 12 Galil’s concession that the putative class members could be entitled to a 33.33% refund 13 rate (Doc. No. 16 at 4) and Sanchez’s calculation that Delta Galil has sold $7.9 million in 14 goods to California consumers in a four-year period (Doc. No 17 at 2), the maximum total 15 refundable amount appears to be $2,633,333.33. A 25% benchmark attorney fee (see Doc. 16 No. 14 at 3–5) would accordingly be $658,333.33. Adding these two numbers produces a 17 total amount in controversy of $3,291,666.66. 18 This falls short of the Class Action Fairness Act’s $5 million threshold. See 28 19 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2). 20 b. Minimum diversity 21 “Unlike the complete diversity of citizenship generally required by [28 U.S.C.] 22 § 1332(a) . . . , [the Class Action Fairness Act] requires only ‘minimal diversity.’” Ehrman 23 v. Cox Comms., Inc., 932 F.3d 1223, 1226 (9th Cir. 2019) (citing Bush v. Cheaptickets, 24 Inc., 425 F.3d 683, 684 (9th Cir. 2005)). Minimal diversity is present when any plaintiff is 25 a citizen of a state different from any defendant. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A)). 26 Here, because there appears to be complete diversity between Sanchez and Delta 27 Galil, there also appears to be minimal diversity. See Rosenwald, 152 F.4th at 1177. 28 * * * 1 In sum, the evidence before the Court shows that complete and minimal diversity is 2 || present for Sanchez’s claims. However, the maximum amount in controversy for Sanchez’s 3 personal claim appears to be $7,513.33, which falls well below 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)’s 4 $75,000 threshold. Similarly, the maximum amount in controversy for the putative class’s 5 ||claims appears to be $3,291,666.66, which does not meet 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)’s $5 6 || million threshold. The Court accordingly lacks subject matter jurisdiction of these claims. 7 F. The Court grants Sanchez leave to amend. 8 Sanchez seeks leave to amend her FAC if the Court grants Delta Galil’s motion to 9 dismiss. (Doc. No. 11 at 27.) Generally speaking, courts “freely give leave [to amend] 10 || when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2); see also Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 11 (1962). 12 The Court finds that granting Sanchez leave to amend her FAC 1s appropriate. 13 Sanchez may file a second amended complaint on or before May 21, 2026. 14 CONCLUSION 15 For the foregoing reasons, Delta Galil’s request for judicial notice and motion to 16 dismiss are GRANTED. (Doc. No. 9.) The hearing set for May 28, 2026, at 2:00 p.m. is 17 || VACATED. 18 Sanchez may file a second amended complaint on or before May 21, 2026. Pursuant 19 Local Civil Rule 15.1.c, any amendment “must be accompanied by a version of [the 20 || FAC] that shows — through redlining, underlining, strikeouts, or other similarly effective 21 || typographic methods — how that pleading differs from the [FAC].” 22 IT IS SO ORDERED. 23 Dated: May 7, 2026
25 United States District Judge 26 27 28