1 EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
Mar 26, 2026 2
SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK 3
5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 6
7 MONICA S.,1 No: 1:24-CV-03090-LRS 8 Plaintiff,
9 v. ORDER REVERSING AND REMANDING THE COMMISSIONER’S 10 FRANK BISIGNANO, DECISION FOR AWARD OF COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL BENEFITS 11 SECURITY,
12 Defendant.
13 BEFORE THE COURT are the parties’ briefs. ECF Nos. 10, 14. This matter 14 was submitted for consideration without oral argument. Plaintiff is represented by 15 attorney D. James Tree. Defendant is represented by Special Assistant United States 16 Attorney Erin F. Highland. The Court, having reviewed the administrative record 17 and the parties’ briefing, is fully informed. For the reasons discussed below, 18 19
20 1 The Court identifies a plaintiff in a Social Security case only by the first 21 name and last initial to protect privacy. See Local Civil Rule 5.2(c). 1 Plaintiff’s brief, ECF No. 10, is granted and Defendant’s brief, ECF No. 14, is 2 denied. 3 JURISDICTION 4 Plaintiff Monica S. (Plaintiff), filed for supplemental security income (SSI) on
5 June 12, 2015, and for child’s insurance benefits based on disability on June 16, 6 2015, alleging disability beginning June 26, 2012 in both applications. Tr. 247-59. 7 Benefits were denied initially, Tr. 126-35, and upon reconsideration, Tr. 137-48.
8 Plaintiff appeared at a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ) on February 9 23, 2018. Tr. 33-71. In April 2018, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision, Tr. 12- 10 32, and in February 2019, the Appeals Council denied review. Tr. 1-6. Plaintiff 11 appealed to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington
12 and in May 2020, the Honorable Stanley A. Bastian issued an order reversing and 13 remanding the case for further administrative proceedings. Tr. 548-72. 14 A second hearing was held on May 27, 2021. Tr. 478-507. In June 2021, the
15 ALJ issued a second unfavorable decision. Tr. 443-69. In March 2022, pursuant to 16 the stipulation of the parties, the undersigned issued an order reversing and 17 remanding the case for further proceedings. Tr. 955-60. A third hearing occurred on 18 September 20, 2023. Tr. 1209-41. In March 2024, the ALJ issued a third unfavorable
19 decision. Tr. 927-54. The matter is now before this Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 20 1383(c)(3). 21 1 BACKGROUND 2 The facts of the case are set forth in the administrative hearing and transcripts, 3 the ALJ’s decision, and the briefs of Plaintiff and the Commissioner, and are 4 therefore only summarized here.
5 Plaintiff was born in 1992 and was 19 years old on the alleged onset date. Tr. 6 944. She testified that she finished ninth grade. Tr. 49. She has tried to get a GED 7 but has not succeeded. Tr. 490, 1215. She has no work experience. Tr. 50. On the
8 alleged onset date, her father was fatally shot in her presence and she sustained a 9 gunshot wound to her face. Tr. 50-51. Since then, the main issue preventing her from 10 work is mental. Tr. 55. She has anxiety, PTSD, and depression. Tr. 51, 56, 1227. She 11 has frequent flashbacks. Tr. 1232. She testified she socially isolates. Tr. 488, 493.
12 When she is around people she gets frustrated and her anger builds up. Tr. 496. She 13 lashes out at people and has outbursts of anger. Tr. 1231. 14 STANDARD OF REVIEW
15 A district court’s review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social 16 Security is governed by 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The scope of review under § 405(g) is 17 limited; the Commissioner’s decision will be disturbed “only if it is not supported by 18 substantial evidence or is based on legal error.” Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 1158
19 (9th Cir. 2012). “Substantial evidence” means “relevant evidence that a reasonable 20 mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. at 1159 (quotation and 21 citation omitted). Stated differently, substantial evidence equates to “more than a 1 mere scintilla[,] but less than a preponderance.” Id. (quotation and citation omitted). 2 In determining whether the standard has been satisfied, a reviewing court must 3 consider the entire record as a whole rather than searching for supporting evidence in 4 isolation. Id.
5 In reviewing a denial of benefits, a district court may not substitute its 6 judgment for that of the Commissioner. Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 7 (9th Cir. 2001). If the evidence in the record “is susceptible to more than one
8 rational interpretation, [the court] must uphold the ALJ’s findings if they are 9 supported by inferences reasonably drawn from the record.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 10 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012). Further, a district court “may not reverse an ALJ’s 11 decision on account of an error that is harmless.” Id. An error is harmless “where it
12 is inconsequential to the [ALJ’s] ultimate nondisability determination.” Id. at 1115 13 (quotation and citation omitted). The party appealing the ALJ’s decision generally 14 bears the burden of establishing that it was harmed. Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S.
15 396, 409-10 (2009). 16 FIVE-STEP EVALUATION PROCESS 17 A claimant must satisfy two conditions to be considered “disabled” within the 18 meaning of the Social Security Act. First, the claimant must be “unable to engage in
19 any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or 20 mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or 21 can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.” 42 1 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). Second, the claimant’s impairment must 2 be “of such severity that he is not only unable to do [his or her] previous work[,] but 3 cannot, considering [his or her] age, education, and work experience, engage in any 4 other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.” 42
5 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(B). 6 The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential analysis to determine 7 whether a claimant satisfies the above criteria. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-
8 (v), 416.920(a)(4)(i)-(v). At step one, the Commissioner considers the claimant’s 9 work activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i). If the claimant is 10 engaged in “substantial gainful activity,” the Commissioner must find that the 11 claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b).
12 If the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, the analysis 13 proceeds to step two. At this step, the Commissioner considers the severity of the 14 claimant’s impairment. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). If the
15 claimant suffers from “any impairment or combination of impairments which 16 significantly limits [his or her] physical or mental ability to do basic work 17 activities,” the analysis proceeds to step three. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 18 416.920(c). If the claimant’s impairment does not satisfy this severity threshold,
19 however, the Commissioner must find that the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. 20 §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). 21 1 At step three, the Commissioner compares the claimant’s impairment to 2 severe impairments recognized by the Commissioner to be so severe as to preclude a 3 person from engaging in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 4 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If the impairment is as severe or more severe
5 than one of the enumerated impairments, the Commissioner must find the claimant 6 disabled and award benefits. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). 7 If the severity of the claimant’s impairment does not meet or exceed the
8 severity of the enumerated impairments, the Commissioner must pause to assess the 9 claimant’s “residual functional capacity.” Residual functional capacity (RFC), 10 defined generally as the claimant’s ability to perform physical and mental work 11 activities on a sustained basis despite his or her limitations, 20 C.F.R. §§
12 404.1545(a)(1), 416.945(a)(1), is relevant to both the fourth and fifth steps of the 13 analysis. 14 At step four, the Commissioner considers whether, in view of the claimant’s
15 RFC, the claimant is capable of performing work that he or she has performed in the 16 past (past relevant work). 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). If the 17 claimant is capable of performing past relevant work, the Commissioner must find 18 that the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f). If the
19 claimant is incapable of performing such work, the analysis proceeds to step five. 20 At step five, the Commissioner should conclude whether, in view of the 21 claimant’s RFC, the claimant is capable of performing other work in the national 1 economy. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v). In making this 2 determination, the Commissioner must also consider vocational factors such as the 3 claimant’s age, education, and past work experience. 20 C.F.R. §§ 4 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v). If the claimant is capable of adjusting to other
5 work, the Commissioner must find that the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 6 404.1520(g)(1), 416.920(g)(1). If the claimant is not capable of adjusting to other 7 work, analysis concludes with a finding that the claimant is disabled and is therefore
8 entitled to benefits. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g)(1), 416.920(g)(1). 9 The claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one through four above. 10 Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). If the analysis proceeds to 11 step five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to establish that (1) the claimant is
12 capable of performing other work; and (2) such work “exists in significant numbers 13 in the national economy.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1560(c)(2), 416.960(c)(2); Beltran v. 14 Astrue, 700 F.3d 386, 389 (9th Cir. 2012).
15 With regard to child’s insurance benefits based on disability, Title II of the 16 Social Security Act provides disabled child’s insurance benefits based on the 17 earnings record of an insured person who is entitled to old-age or disability benefits 18 or has died. 42 U.S.C. § 402(d); 20 C.F.R. § 404.350(a). The same definition of
19 “disability” and five-step sequential evaluation outlined above governs eligibility for 20 disabled child’s insurance benefits. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d); 20 C.F.R. § 21 404.1520(a)(1)-(2). In addition, in order to qualify for disabled child’s insurance 1 benefits several criteria must be met. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.350(a)(1)-(5). In this case, 2 the relevant subsection provides that if the claimant is over age 18, the claimant 3 must “have a disability that began before [she] became 22 years old.” 20 C.F.R. § 4 404.350(a)(5).
5 ALJ’S FINDINGS 6 At step one, the ALJ found Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful 7 activity since June 26, 2012, the alleged onset date. Tr. 933. At step two, the ALJ
8 found that Plaintiff has the following severe impairments: borderline personality 9 disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, major depressive disorder, posttraumatic 10 stress disorder, and cannabis use disorder. Tr. 933. At step three, the ALJ found 11 that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets
12 or medically equals the severity of a listed impairment. Tr. 933. 13 The ALJ then found that Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity to 14 perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with the following additional
15 limitations: 16 The claimant can understand, remember, and carry out simple instructions and tasks. The claimant can use judgment to make 17 simple work-related decision. The claimant cannot perform work requiring a specific production rate (such as assembly line work) or 18 work that requires hourly quotas. The claimant can deal with only rare changes in the work setting. The claimant should have no 19 contact with the public. The claimant can work in proximity to but not in coordination with co-workers. The claimant can tolerate 20 occasional contact with supervisors. The claimant cannot work at heights or in proximity to hazardous conditions. 21 1 Tr. 936. 2 At step four, the ALJ found Plaintiff has no past relevant work. Tr. 944. At 3 step five, after considering the testimony of a vocational expert and Plaintiff’s age, 4 education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, the ALJ found that
5 there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff 6 can perform. Tr. 944. Thus, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has not been under a 7 disability as defined in the Social Security Act from June 26, 2012, through the date
8 of this decision. Tr. 9. 9 ISSUES 10 Plaintiff seeks judicial review of the Commissioner’s final decision denying 11 supplemental security income and child’s insurance benefits under Title II and XVI
12 of the Social Security Act. ECF No. 10. Plaintiff raises the following issues for 13 review: 14 1. Whether the ALJ properly evaluated Plaintiff’s symptom testimony;
15 2. Whether the ALJ properly considered the medical opinion evidence; 16 3. Whether the ALJ properly evaluated the lay witness statements; and 17 4. Whether the matter should be remanded for an award of benefits. 18 ECF No. 9 at 2.
21 1 DISCUSSION 2 As noted above, Plaintiff alleges the ALJ made several errors in evaluating the 3 evidence of record. ECF No. 10. Defendant concedes the ALJ made reversible errors 4 in evaluating the medical opinion evidence by failing to consider the opinions of
5 David Morgan, Ph.D., and by failing to offer legally sufficient reasons for giving 6 little weight to the opinions from N.K. Marks, Ph.D., Phyllis Sanchez, Ph.D., and 7 Melanie Edwards Mitchell, Psy.D. Each of these opinions found that Plaintiff had
8 marked or severe limitations in numerous areas of functioning. Tr. 338, 372, 378, 9 381, 773, 779. The only outstanding issue is the proper remedy. Plaintiff contends 10 she should be determined disabled and receive an immediate award of benefits. 11 Defendant contends there are outstanding issues which require reconsideration of the
12 medical opinion evidence and that there are serious doubts about Plaintiff’s claim of 13 disability. 14 The Social Security Act permits the district court to affirm, modify, or reverse
15 the Commissioner’s decision “with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.” 16 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see also Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1019. When a district court 17 reverses the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, “the proper course, 18 except in rare circumstances, is to remand to the agency for additional investigation
19 or explanation.” Dominguez v. Colvin, 808 F.3d 403, 407 (9th Cir.2015) (quoting 20 Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744 (1985)). Although a court 21 should generally remand to the agency for additional investigation or explanation, 1 the court also has discretion to remand for immediate payment of benefits. Treichler 2 v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1099-1100 (9th Cir. 2014). 3 Under the credit-as-true rule, the Court may order an immediate award of 4 benefits only if three conditions are met: (1) the ALJ failed to provide legally
5 sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence, whether claimant testimony or medical 6 opinion, (2) there are no outstanding issues that must be resolved before a disability 7 determination can be made and further administrative proceedings would serve no
8 useful purpose, and (3) when considering the record as a whole and crediting the 9 improperly discounted testimony as true, there is no doubt as to disability. See Leon 10 v. Berryhill, 880 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2017). However, even if all three criteria 11 are met, the decision to remand for an award of benefits or remand for further
12 proceedings is within the district court’s discretion. Id. 13 The first step of the credit-as-true rule is met, as the parties agree the ALJ 14 failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting multiple medical opinions
15 which include disabling limitations if credited. 16 The next question is whether the record is fully developed and whether further 17 administrative proceedings would be useful. Administrative proceedings are 18 generally useful where the record “has [not] been fully developed,” Garrison, 759
19 F.3d at 1020, there is a need to resolve conflicts and ambiguities, Andrews v. 20 Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995), or if the additional evidence “may well 21 prove enlightening” because of the passage of time. I.N.S. v Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 1 18 (2002); cf. Nguyen v. Chater, 100 F.3d at 1466-67 (remanding for ALJ to apply 2 correct legal standard, to hear any additional evidence, and resolve any remaining 3 conflicts); Byrnes v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 1995) (same); Dodrill v. 4 Shalala, 12 F.3d at 918, 919 (9th Cir. 1993) (same); Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d
5 341, 348 (9th Cir. 1991) (same). 6 The Court notes this matter has been pending for nine years. There have been 7 three hearings, two ALJ decisions, and two U.S. District Court remands. All but one
8 of the medical opinions in this case have been before the ALJ at least twice. There is 9 no indication that further development of the record is necessary. The question is 10 whether there are conflicts or ambiguities which must be resolved with further 11 administrative proceedings.
12 The Court finds the opinion evidence supports disability. In May 2015, Dr. 13 Marks opined that Plaintiff has severe limitations in six functional areas with an 14 overall severity rating of severe. Tr. 338. That same month, Dr. Sanchez reviewed
15 Dr. Marks’ opinion and found the severity and functional limitations are supported 16 by medical evidence. Tr. 372. In May 2017, Dr. Marks again evaluated Plaintiff and 17 assessed marked limitations in seven functional areas and severe limitations in four 18 functional areas with an overall severity rating of marked. Tr. 377-78. Later that
19 month, Dr. Edwards Mitchell reviewed Dr. Marks’ opinion and found the narrative 20 supports the functional limitations, noting “very poor prognosis for gainful 21 employment.” Tr. 381. In July 2019, Dr. Morgan opined Plaintiff has marked 1 limitations in five basic functional areas, including that ability to perform activities 2 within a schedule and maintain regular attendance; adapt to changes in a routine 3 work setting, communicate and perform effectively in a work setting; and complete 4 a normal workday and workweek without interruptions from psychologically based
5 symptoms. Tr. 779. In June 2020, Dr. Morgan opined that Plaintiff has marked 6 limitations in the same basic functional areas, plus a marked limitation in the ability 7 to perform routine tasks without special supervision and an overall severity rating of
8 marked. Tr. 773. Defendant concedes the ALJ erred by either overlooking or failing 9 to sufficiently address each of the foregoing six opinions. 10 In addition, the record contains the November 2015 opinion of CeCilia R. 11 Cooper, Ph.D., who opined that Plaintiff’s ability to understand is sufficient to
12 remember and complete two- to three-step tasks; she can reason; she is able to 13 remember written material; when she is required to interact frequently with others 14 her ability to maintain concentration is apt to be poor because of anxiety; if she has a
15 comfortable routine to follow by herself, her ability to concentrate would be 16 adequate; her response to normal hazards would be appropriate; she would require 17 moderately close supervision to ensure she completes tasks as instructed throughout 18 a normal shift; her ability to maintain appropriate social interactions with authority
19 figures is moderately to markedly impaired depending upon the circumstances; she 20 would have problems with peers; she is apt to have moderate to marked difficulty 21 adapting to changes depending upon perceived benefit. Tr. 348. 1 This Court previously found that the first ALJ, who gave “significant weight” 2 to Dr. Cooper’s opinion, Tr. 25, “failed to resolve the internal discrepancy in Dr. 3 Cooper’s opinion” that Plaintiff ‘required moderately close supervision’ and her 4 assessment that Plaintiff was moderately to markedly able to maintain appropriate
5 social interactions with people in authority.” Tr. 562-63. The matter was remanded; 6 on remand, the second ALJ decision also gave “significant weight” to Dr. Cooper’s 7 opinion, but it also appears to have failed to address the discrepancy within the
8 opinion. Tr. 459. That decision was remanded pursuant to the stipulation of the 9 parties, so no substantive finding was made by the Court. Despite twice before 10 finding that Dr. Cooper’s opinion was entitled to “significant weight,” in the current 11 decision, the ALJ accorded “little weight” to the opinion for several reasons, none of
12 which addresses the issue upon which this matter was originally remanded. Tr. 941. 13 Furthermore, the three reasons given by the ALJ for giving little weight to Dr. 14 Cooper’s opinion are insufficient. First, the ALJ found that Dr. Cooper’s assessment
15 is “somewhat vague and not otherwise defined, described in detail, explained and/or 16 quantified,” and “fail[s] to set forth the claimant’s maximum capabilities.” Tr. 941. 17 While an ALJ may may reject an opinion that does “not show how [the claimant’s] 18 symptoms translate into specific functional deficits which preclude work activity,”
19 Morgan v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 601 (9th Cir. 1999), the 20 claimant’s “maximum capabilities” are an RFC assessment, 20 C.F.R. §§ 21 404.1545(a)(1), 416.945(a)(1), and “[i]t is clear that it is the responsibility of the 1 ALJ, not the claimant’s physician, to determine [RFC].” Vertigan v. Halter, 260 2 F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 2001). 3 Second, the ALJ found Ms. Cooper’s opinion inconsistent with mental status 4 exams “during this period.” Tr. 941 (citing Tr. 1173, 1177-78, 1181, 1189-90, 1208).
5 The five records cited by the ALJ are counseling records from November and 6 December 2021, April 2022, and September 2023, six to eight years after Ms. 7 Cooper’s opinion. Furthermore, the reliance on these five counseling records ignores
8 that these and other records include findings such as presenting anxious, agitated, 9 irritable, with flat affect, pressured speech, angry, sad, tearful, and depressed. E.g., 10 Tr. 847, 853, 866, 1173, 1177, 1205, 1208. Third, the ALJ rejected Ms. Cooper’s 11 opinion because it was based on a single exam and not a review of the record. Tr.
12 943. This is inconsistent with the regulations indicating that more weight should 13 generally be assigned to an examining physician than a reviewing physician. 20 14 C.F.R. 404.1527(c). None of these reasons are legally sufficient.
15 After the last remand, an additional mental health opinion was added to the 16 record from psychiatric mental health nurse practitioner Joyce Austin, PMHNP-BC, 17 who examined Plaintiff in April 2022. Tr. 1185-1193. Ms. Austin diagnosed 18 generalized anxiety disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder, and major depressive
19 disorder and opined that while Plaintiff is able to understand, remember, and carry 20 out simple and complex instructions, she is not able to sustain concentration and 21 persist in work-related activity at a reasonable pace, including regular attendance at 1 work and completing work without interruption; and she is not able to interact with 2 coworkers and superiors and the public and adapt to the usual stresses encountered 3 in the workplace. Tr. 1191. The ALJ also gave “little weight” to Ms. Austin’s 4 opinion.
5 The ALJ gave four reasons for assigning little weight to the opinion, none of 6 which are sustainable. Tr. 943. First, the ALJ found that Ms. Austin’s ratings “are 7 not otherwise described, in detail, explained, and/or quantified (i.e., never,
8 occasionally, or frequently).” Tr. 943. The words “not able to” means that Ms. 9 Austin found Plaintiff unable to perform those functional activities which the Court 10 concludes is an adequate quantification. Second, the ALJ found Ms. Austin’s 11 opinion inconsistent with her observations and mental status exam, particularly that
12 Plaintiff “did not appear to be responding to internal stimuli, under the influence of 13 alcohol, cannabis, or other psychoactive substances, display signs of loosening of 14 associations, paranoia and/or paranoid delusional thinking, or other indicators of
15 psychotic process.” Tr. 943. There is no evidence in the record tying Plaintiff’s 16 impairments to these types of symptoms and the absence of such symptoms says 17 nothing about the support for Ms. Austin’s report. 18 Third, the ALJ found that Ms. Austin’s ratings are inconsistent with the record
19 because the record indicates: 20 the claimant has not experienced episodes of deterioration that would have required the claimant to be hospitalized or absent from work, as 21 it does not appear that the claimant required any crisis intervention, 1 emergency room evaluation, involuntary psychiatric admission, and/or inpatient psychiatric hospitalization for any self-inflicted injuries, 2 erratic, or violent behaviors, altered mental status, suicidal thoughts, symptoms of psychosis, alcohol intoxication, nausea, vomiting, 3 cannabis withdrawal symptoms, or other physiological illnesses during this period. 4 Tr. 943. Again, the absence of extreme symptoms has little to do with the weight to 5 be assigned to Ms. Austin’s limitations. There is no showing by the ALJ that any of 6 these absent symptoms would or should be expected in this case or that such 7 findings are required as the basis for assessing disabling limitations. Lastly, the ALJ 8 rejected Ms. Austin’s opinion because it was based on a single exam and not a 9 review of the record. Tr. 943. As above, this is counter to the regulations indicating 10 that more weight should generally be assigned to an examining physician than a 11 reviewing physician. 20 C.F.R. 404.1527(c). 12 The only opinions in the record given weight by the ALJ are the opinions of 13 the state agency reviewing psychologists, Patricia Kraft, Ph.D., and Carla Van Dam, 14 Ph.D. who reviewed the record in August 2015 and November 2015, respectively. 15 Tr. 74-90, 93-118. Dr. Kraft opined Plaintiff is able to understand and recall simple 16 one- to three-step tasks; would have difficulty maintaining adequate attention and 17 concentration with subjects involving complex tasks or multitasking; is able to 18 sustain adequate concentration, persistence, and pace with simple tasks that are 19 routine over a two-hour period with customary breaks in an eight-hour day; would 20 require work where interaction with the public was superficial and no more than 21 1 occasional; she is able to accept normal supervision but would require clear 2 boundaries with supervisors; is able to work in proximity to, but not in close 3 coordination with coworkers; and would be able to sustain productive activity in a 4 work environment with only occasional change that is otherwise routine; she would
5 do best with production goals as opposed to quotas. Tr. 80-81. Dr. Van Dam made 6 the same findings. Tr. 101-02. However, the vast majority of the record developed 7 after Dr. Kraft and Dr. Van Dam opined in 2015; they were unable to consider the
8 later opinions of Dr. Marks (2017), Dr. Edwards Mitchell, Dr. Morgan, Dr. Cooper, 9 or Ms. Austin, which are all essentially consistent in the ultimate conclusion. 10 In summary, Defendant concedes six opinions were not properly considered 11 by the ALJ. Plaintiff challenges the weight the ALJ assigned to the remaining
12 opinions, and Defendant does not specifically address those assignments of error. 13 The Court concludes two additional opinions were not properly considered by the 14 ALJ. Defendant argues that conflicts in the evidence remain because the ALJ should
15 reassess the improperly rejected medical opinions and decide which limitations 16 should be included in the RFC. However, as the Ninth Circuit observed in Garrison, 17 “our precedent and the objectives of the credit-as-true rule foreclose the argument 18 that a remand for the purpose of allowing the ALJ to have a mulligan qualifies as a
19 remand for a ‘useful purpose’ under the [] credit-as-true analysis.” Garrison v. 20 Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1021-1022 (9th Cir. 2014). Accordingly, after crediting the 21 improperly rejected opinions, the Court concludes remand for an award of benefits is 1 || the appropriate remedy as there is no “serious doubt” as to whether Plaintiff is in 2 || fact disabled. 3 Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED: 4 1. Plaintiffs Brief, ECF No. 10, is GRANTED. 5 2. Defendant’s Brief, ECF No. 14, is DENIED. 6 3. This case is REVERSED and REMANDED for immediate calculation 7|| and award of benefits consistent with the findings of this Court. 8 IT IS SO ORDERED. The District Court Executive is directed to enter this Order and provide copies to counsel. Judgment shall be entered for Plaintiff and the file shall be CLOSED. 11 DATED March 26, 2026. Vy oy _ LONNY R. SUKO 13 Senior United States District Judge 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
ORDER PEVERGING ANT RPENANDING TUE CONMNTCOTIONER °C