Monica Hankins v. Embry Carter D/B/A WC Roofing

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: July 24, 2025
• Docket: 01-24-00159-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

Opinion issued July 24, 2025

In The

Court of Appeals For The

First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-24-00159-CV ——————————— MONICA HANKINS, Appellant V. EMBRY CARTER D/B/A WC ROOFING, Appellees

On Appeal from the 189th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 2011-49521

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Generally, appellate courts have jurisdiction only over appeals from final

judgments. See Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001); N.E.

Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Aldridge, 400 S.W.2d 893, 895 (Tex. 1966). To be final, a

judgment must dispose of all issues and parties in a case. Aldridge, 400 S.W.2d at 895. A judgment that does not dispose of all issues and parties may nonetheless be

final and appealable if the judgment contains language clearly and unequivocally

reflecting the trial court’s intention to render a final judgment. See Lehmann, 39

S.W.3d at 206. If the judgment contains a statement such as “‘This judgment

finally disposes of all parties and all claims and is appealable’, this would leave no

doubt about the court’s intention.” Id.

Appellant, Monica Hankins, is attempting to appeal an amended judgment

signed on January 30, 2024. This appeal arises from a lawsuit filed by Hankins

against Arnold Brown d/b/a Brown Construction Company and Embry Carter d/b/a

W C Roofing. On December 4, 2023, the trial court signed an order granting

appellee Arnold Brown’s motion for final judgment. This was not a final judgment

as it failed to dispose of all parties, and it lacked any indicia of finality. On January

30, 2024, the trial court signed an amended judgment, which included the

following finality language:

This judgment finally deposes [sic] of all claims and all parties, and is not appealable.

The Court ORDERD [sic] execution to issue for this judgment.

The “Amended Final Judgment” signed on January 30, 2024, which states

that neither Hankins nor her counsel appeared for trial, was a default judgment on

Brown’s affirmative defense of offset. There was no trial on the merits on

Hankins’s claims.

2 The “Amended Final Judgment” does not dispose of all parties because it

fails to rule on Hankins’s affirmative claims. It also does not clearly and

unequivocally express an intent to render a final judgment. See id. at 205–06.

Although the language of an order may make it final, see id., the language in the

amended final judgment states both that it disposes of all parties and claims and

that it is “not appealable.” The Texas Supreme Court has held that when a

purportedly final judgment states “not appealable,” this “contradictory” language

“cannot satisfy the ‘unmistakable clarity’ standard in Lehmann. More than that,

however, it expressly communicates a lack of finality on which parties should be

able to rely in light of the unique nature of default judgment . . . .” See In re

Lakeside Resort JV, LLC, 689 S.W.3d 916, 924 (Tex. 2024).

On November 5, 2024, this Court granted Hankins’s voluntary motion to

dismiss her appeal against Arnold Brown. Unlike Arnold Brown, Embry Carter did

not plead the affirmative defense of offset, and he was not awarded affirmative

relief. In the brief filed in this Court, Hankins seeks only to have the “Amended

Final Judgment” declared void as signed beyond the trial court’s plenary power.

The “Amended Final Judgment” is not final under Texas Supreme Court

precedent and, even if it were, there appears to be no remaining controversy

between Hankins and Embry Carter. See State ex rel. Best v. Harper, 562 S.W.3d

1, 6 (Tex. 2018), as corrected on denial of reh’g (Dec. 21, 2018) (stating that case

3 becomes moot when there ceases to be justiciable controversy between parties or

when parties cease to have legally cognizable interest in outcome).

On May 1, 2025, this Court informed Hankins of the jurisdictional defects

and that this appeal was subject to dismissal for want of jurisdiction. TEX. R. APP.

P. 42.3(a), (c). Hankins failed to timely respond.

Conclusion

Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction. See TEX. R.

APP. P. 42.3(a), 43.2(f). We dismiss any pending motions as moot.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Justices Guerra, Gunn, and Dokupil.