Mongell, F. v. Martell, P.
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Opinion
J-S14003-23
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
FRANCIS MONGELL AND BARBARA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MONGELL, HIS WIFE : PENNSYLVANIA : Appellants : : : v. : : : No. 964 WDA 2022 PHILIP MARTELL AND TRISHA : MARTELL, HIS WIFE :
Appeal from the Order Dated July 25, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County Civil Division at No(s): 1409 Of 2017, G.D.
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and PELLEGRINI, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.: FILED: June 15, 2023
Francis and Barbara Mongell appeal from the order granting summary
judgment to Philip and Trisha Martell on the Mongells’ second amended
complaint alleging the Martells had defamed the Mongells through social
media posts. The Mongells argue that the trial court erred in concluding they
had not presented any evidence that the Martells had authored the posts in
issue. However, because the Martells also presented a counterclaim which was
not disposed of by the trial court, we conclude the trial court’s order was not
final and appealable. We quash.
____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. J-S14003-23
For purposes of this appeal, much of the factual background is
undisputed. Francis served as the president of the Connellsville Area School
Board from 2005 to 2009. His wife, Barbara, is a retired teacher from the
Connellsville Area School District (“the District”). Philip was the District’s
business manager from May 2015 to November 2016, and had been the
District’s superintendent since November 2016 until at least November 2017.
Philip’s wife, Trisha, did not have any known political involvement.
Starting in early 2017, a series of social media posts were placed on
Facebook and other social media sites such as Faywest.com. The Mongells
describe Faywest.com as “a web-based social media service, which allows
visitors to access message boards, organized by community, in Fayette,
Westmoreland, and Somerset Counties.” Complaint, 11/17/17, ¶ 7. These
posts alleged that the Mongells engaged in various unsavory activities,
including infidelity, corruption, and theft. The Faywest.com postings were
submitted under various—and presumably fictitious—usernames including
“Virgin Barb,” “Barb the Whore,” and “Cosmetic Block the Cock.”
In their second amended complaint, the Mongells asserted that these
various screen names were pseudonyms for either or both of the Martells and
that these posts constituted defamation. Philip and Trisha responded
separately. In her answer and new matter, Trisha denied posting defamatory
messages to any website, among other defenses. In his answer, new matter,
and counterclaim, Philip acknowledged that he had posted some messages to
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social media sites that could be construed as asserting the Mongells had
participated in infidelity, corruption, and theft. However, he denied that he
had authored the posts identified by the Mongells. He also raised other
defenses, and importantly, a counterclaim against the Mongells for
defamation.
The parties engaged in discovery, and the Martells filed a motion for
summary judgment arguing, among other theories, that the Mongells had
failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that the Martells had authored
the disputed posts. The Martells argued that the admissions contained in
Philip’s answer were sufficient to present a triable issue of fact to a jury. The
trial court disagreed, and granted the Martells’ motion for summary judgment,
opining that there was no evidence of record to support an inference that the
Martells had authored the disputed posts. Importantly, the trial court did not
reference Philip’s counterclaim, and the record does not contain any indication
that Philip discontinued his counterclaim. After the trial court denied their
motion for reconsideration, the Mongells filed this appeal.
Before we can address any of the issues raised on appeal by the
Mongells, we must determine whether order granting the Martells’ motion for
summary judgment was an appealable order. The appealability of the order
affects whether we have jurisdiction to hear this appeal. See Schmitt v.
State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 245 A.3d 678, 681 (Pa. Super. 2021).
“As a general rule, appellate courts have jurisdiction only over appeals taken
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from a final order. A final order is one that disposes of all the parties and all
the claims ….” Id.
Here, the record on appeal contains no indication that the trial court has
disposed of Philip’s counterclaim for defamation. As such, the order granting
only the Martells’ motion for summary judgment on the second amended
complaint is not a final, appealable order.
Under certain circumstances, non-final orders can be appealed. See id.
However, none of those circumstances apply here. As such, we have no
jurisdiction to entertain this appeal and are constrained to quash the appeal.
Appeal quashed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 6/15/2023
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