NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 13 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SAM MONET, No. 24-253 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 1:21-cv-00368-LEK-KJM v. MEMORANDUM* EDWARD UNDERWOOD, DLNR Administrator in his individual capacity; GORDON WOOD, Working Group Chairman in his individual capacity; SHARON MORIWAKI, Hawaii State Senator in her individual capacity; ATTORNEY GENERAL STATE OF HAWAII, in her official capacity,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii Leslie E. Kobayashi, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted January 30, 2026**
Before: SCHROEDER, FRIEDLAND, and COLLINS, Circuit Judges.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Appellant Sam Monet appeals pro se from the district court’s entry of
judgment in favor of Defendants-Appellees: Edward Underwood, the administrator
of a division within Hawaii’s Department of Land and Natural Resources, in his
personal capacity; the Attorney General of the State of Hawaii in her official
capacity (“AG”); Hawaii State Senator Sharon Moriwaki in her personal capacity;
and Gordon Wood, a member of a legislative working group established by
Senator Moriwaki, in his personal capacity. In his operative second amended
complaint, Monet alleged that he experienced violations of his constitutional rights
at the hands of Hawaii state officials, all of which related to his residency at the
Ala Wai Small Boat Harbor. On appeal, Monet challenges the district court’s
substantive rulings as well as many of the court’s procedural decisions made
throughout the litigation. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
1. We review de novo the district court’s dismissal under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) of Monet’s claims against the AG. See Jones v.
Allison, 9 F.4th 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2021).
The district court properly held that the AG, when sued in her official
capacity as she was here, is immune from claims for damages. Aholelei v. Dep’t of
Pub. Safety, 488 F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2007).
The district court also did not err in denying leave to amend and dismissing
2 24-253 with prejudice the claims against the AG for prospective injunctive relief. A state
official may not be sued in her official capacity for injunctive relief unless she has
a “fairly direct” connection to the challenged action—“a generalized duty to
enforce state law or general supervisory power over the persons responsible for
enforcing the challenged provision will not subject an official to suit.” L.A. Cnty.
Bar Ass’n v. Eu, 979 F.2d 697, 704 (9th Cir. 1992). Because Hawaii regulations
establish that other officials are responsible for enforcing the challenged provisions
of law, Monet did not and could not demonstrate that the AG had anything more
than a “general supervisory power.” Id.; Haw. Admin. R. §§ 13-232-40(b)-41; Id.
§ 13-230-4(b). Accordingly, any amendment to his complaint would have been
futile, and the dismissal with prejudice was proper. Reddy v. Litton Indus., Inc.,
912 F.2d 291, 296 (9th Cir. 1990).
2. We review de novo the district court’s determination that Senator
Moriwaki and Wood were entitled to absolute legislative immunity. Jones, 9 F.4th
at 1139.
Senator Moriwaki’s involvement in the contested conduct at the Harbor
stems solely from her efforts to develop a working group to propose legislation
related to the Harbor. Because that was a traditional legislative activity, Senator
Moriwaki was entitled to legislative immunity against claims for damages and for
3 24-253 injunctive relief. Schmidt v. Contra Costa Cnty., 693 F.3d 1122, 1132 (9th Cir.
2012).
Although Wood is not an elected official, the district court properly granted
him legislative immunity as well. Jones, 9 F.4th at 1140 (“Legislative
immunity . . . is not limited to officials who are members of legislative bodies.”).
Wood’s actions were functionally legislative, because they all related to Senator
Moriwaki’s working group and its efforts to develop legislation. Monet failed to
produce sufficient evidence to raise a triable issue that Wood enforced Harbor
policies or engaged in any conduct unrelated to the working group’s aims of
recommending legislation. Monet’s only evidence on this score consisted of his
own declaration, in which the relevant assertions were conclusory, not based on
personal knowledge, or wholly lacking in foundation. That is not enough to create
a genuine dispute about whether Wood’s activities were all functionally legislative.
Nigro v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 784 F.3d 495, 497 (9th Cir. 2015) (“The district
court can disregard a self-serving declaration that states only conclusions and not
facts that would be admissible evidence.”).
3. We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment on
the claims against Underwood. Cates v. Stroud, 976 F.3d 972, 978 (9th Cir. 2020).
Monet introduced no evidence that Underwood knowingly violated the law or
4 24-253 personally took any actions that a reasonable official would have known violated
the law, so the district court correctly held that Underwood was entitled to
qualified immunity. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986) (holding that
qualified immunity “provides ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or
those who knowingly violate the law”); see also Hyde v. City of Wilcox, 23 F.4th
863, 874 (9th Cir. 2022) (“Under Section 1983, supervisors cannot be held liable
for the acts of their reports under a respondeat superior theory.”).
4. We reject Monet’s challenges to the district court’s procedural orders
throughout the litigation.
Monet has not demonstrated that the court exceeded its authority to issue
rulings without an in-person hearing or shown prejudice stemming from the lack of
opportunity for oral argument. See, e.g., D. Haw. Local R. 7.1(c) (“Unless
specifically required, the court may decide all matters, including motions,
petitions, and appeals, without a hearing.”); Smith v. Ret. Fund Tr. of Plumbing,
Heating & Piping Indus. of S. Cal., 857 F.2d 587, 592 (9th Cir. 1988) (“[F]ailure
to grant oral argument is not reversible error in the absence of prejudice.”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Monet’s motion for
reconsideration. See Palm v. L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power,
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 13 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SAM MONET, No. 24-253 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 1:21-cv-00368-LEK-KJM v. MEMORANDUM* EDWARD UNDERWOOD, DLNR Administrator in his individual capacity; GORDON WOOD, Working Group Chairman in his individual capacity; SHARON MORIWAKI, Hawaii State Senator in her individual capacity; ATTORNEY GENERAL STATE OF HAWAII, in her official capacity,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii Leslie E. Kobayashi, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted January 30, 2026**
Before: SCHROEDER, FRIEDLAND, and COLLINS, Circuit Judges.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Appellant Sam Monet appeals pro se from the district court’s entry of
judgment in favor of Defendants-Appellees: Edward Underwood, the administrator
of a division within Hawaii’s Department of Land and Natural Resources, in his
personal capacity; the Attorney General of the State of Hawaii in her official
capacity (“AG”); Hawaii State Senator Sharon Moriwaki in her personal capacity;
and Gordon Wood, a member of a legislative working group established by
Senator Moriwaki, in his personal capacity. In his operative second amended
complaint, Monet alleged that he experienced violations of his constitutional rights
at the hands of Hawaii state officials, all of which related to his residency at the
Ala Wai Small Boat Harbor. On appeal, Monet challenges the district court’s
substantive rulings as well as many of the court’s procedural decisions made
throughout the litigation. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
1. We review de novo the district court’s dismissal under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) of Monet’s claims against the AG. See Jones v.
Allison, 9 F.4th 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2021).
The district court properly held that the AG, when sued in her official
capacity as she was here, is immune from claims for damages. Aholelei v. Dep’t of
Pub. Safety, 488 F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2007).
The district court also did not err in denying leave to amend and dismissing
2 24-253 with prejudice the claims against the AG for prospective injunctive relief. A state
official may not be sued in her official capacity for injunctive relief unless she has
a “fairly direct” connection to the challenged action—“a generalized duty to
enforce state law or general supervisory power over the persons responsible for
enforcing the challenged provision will not subject an official to suit.” L.A. Cnty.
Bar Ass’n v. Eu, 979 F.2d 697, 704 (9th Cir. 1992). Because Hawaii regulations
establish that other officials are responsible for enforcing the challenged provisions
of law, Monet did not and could not demonstrate that the AG had anything more
than a “general supervisory power.” Id.; Haw. Admin. R. §§ 13-232-40(b)-41; Id.
§ 13-230-4(b). Accordingly, any amendment to his complaint would have been
futile, and the dismissal with prejudice was proper. Reddy v. Litton Indus., Inc.,
912 F.2d 291, 296 (9th Cir. 1990).
2. We review de novo the district court’s determination that Senator
Moriwaki and Wood were entitled to absolute legislative immunity. Jones, 9 F.4th
at 1139.
Senator Moriwaki’s involvement in the contested conduct at the Harbor
stems solely from her efforts to develop a working group to propose legislation
related to the Harbor. Because that was a traditional legislative activity, Senator
Moriwaki was entitled to legislative immunity against claims for damages and for
3 24-253 injunctive relief. Schmidt v. Contra Costa Cnty., 693 F.3d 1122, 1132 (9th Cir.
2012).
Although Wood is not an elected official, the district court properly granted
him legislative immunity as well. Jones, 9 F.4th at 1140 (“Legislative
immunity . . . is not limited to officials who are members of legislative bodies.”).
Wood’s actions were functionally legislative, because they all related to Senator
Moriwaki’s working group and its efforts to develop legislation. Monet failed to
produce sufficient evidence to raise a triable issue that Wood enforced Harbor
policies or engaged in any conduct unrelated to the working group’s aims of
recommending legislation. Monet’s only evidence on this score consisted of his
own declaration, in which the relevant assertions were conclusory, not based on
personal knowledge, or wholly lacking in foundation. That is not enough to create
a genuine dispute about whether Wood’s activities were all functionally legislative.
Nigro v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 784 F.3d 495, 497 (9th Cir. 2015) (“The district
court can disregard a self-serving declaration that states only conclusions and not
facts that would be admissible evidence.”).
3. We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment on
the claims against Underwood. Cates v. Stroud, 976 F.3d 972, 978 (9th Cir. 2020).
Monet introduced no evidence that Underwood knowingly violated the law or
4 24-253 personally took any actions that a reasonable official would have known violated
the law, so the district court correctly held that Underwood was entitled to
qualified immunity. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986) (holding that
qualified immunity “provides ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or
those who knowingly violate the law”); see also Hyde v. City of Wilcox, 23 F.4th
863, 874 (9th Cir. 2022) (“Under Section 1983, supervisors cannot be held liable
for the acts of their reports under a respondeat superior theory.”).
4. We reject Monet’s challenges to the district court’s procedural orders
throughout the litigation.
Monet has not demonstrated that the court exceeded its authority to issue
rulings without an in-person hearing or shown prejudice stemming from the lack of
opportunity for oral argument. See, e.g., D. Haw. Local R. 7.1(c) (“Unless
specifically required, the court may decide all matters, including motions,
petitions, and appeals, without a hearing.”); Smith v. Ret. Fund Tr. of Plumbing,
Heating & Piping Indus. of S. Cal., 857 F.2d 587, 592 (9th Cir. 1988) (“[F]ailure
to grant oral argument is not reversible error in the absence of prejudice.”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Monet’s motion for
reconsideration. See Palm v. L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power, 889 F.3d 1081, 1085
(9th Cir. 2018) (“We review a denial of a motion for reconsideration . . . for abuse
5 24-253 of discretion.”). A motion for reconsideration “should not be granted, absent
highly unusual circumstances, unless the district court is presented with newly
discovered evidence, committed clear error, or if there is an intervening change in
the controlling law.” 389 Orange St. Partners v. Arnold, 179 F.3d 656, 665 (9th
Cir. 1999). No such circumstance was present here.
Monet’s arguments about the district court’s General Order (“G.O.”) 23-1,
which requires parties to disclose if their briefs or memoranda were generated
using artificial intelligence (AI), are unavailing. The general order does not
prohibit the use of AI tools, and Monet himself chose, in response to its disclosure
requirement, not to make use of AI in preparing the motion for reconsideration he
filed after the general order took effect. Monet has made no showing that the
choice not to use AI in his preparation of his reconsideration motion prejudiced
him in any respect. Indeed, it is implausible that the use of AI would somehow
have permitted Monet to satisfy the demanding standard for reconsiderations
motions, which he plainly did not meet. Because the order had no effect on him,
we decline to address further his challenges to it.
Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Monet leave
to late-file a third amended complaint. See Great Minds v. Office Depot, Inc., 945
F.3d 1106, 1112 (9th Cir. 2019) (“We review a district court’s denial of leave to
6 24-253 amend for abuse of discretion.”). Monet missed the deadline for amendment set by
the court, and the court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Monet had
not been diligent and had failed to demonstrate good cause to amend the
scheduling order. Johnson v. Mammoth Recreation, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th
Cir. 1992) (“If [the moving] party was not diligent, the [good cause] inquiry should
end.”); Carter v. C.I.R., 784 F.2d 1006, 1008 (9th Cir. 1986) (explaining that a pro
se litigant is “expected to abide by the rules of the court in which he litigates”).
5. We reject Monet’s unsupported allegation of judicial bias. See Larson
v. Palmateer, 515 F.3d 1057, 1067 (9th Cir. 2008) (“To succeed on a judicial bias
claim . . . the petitioners must overcome a presumption of honesty and integrity in
those serving as adjudicators.”). We decline to reach Monet’s additional
arguments. See Smith v. Marsh, 194 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[W]e will
not consider arguments that are raised for the first time on appeal.”); United States
v. Alonso, 48 F.3d 1536, 1545 (9th Cir. 1995) (declining to reach an issue about
which the appellant did not cite any authority or “articulate[] any theory as to how
the district court erred”).
AFFIRMED.
7 24-253