Mondiv, Division of Lassonde Specialties Inc. v. United States

Court of International Trade

Mondiv, Division of Lassonde Specialties Inc. v. United States

219 F. Supp. 3d 1364, 2017 CIT 34, 39 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1137, 2017 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 34, 2017 WL 1201035

CourtUnited States Court of International Trade

DecidedMarch 30, 2017

DocketCourt 16-00038; Slip Op. 17-34

StatusPublished

This text of 219 F. Supp. 3d 1364 (Mondiv, Division of Lassonde Specialties Inc. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of International Trade primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Mondiv, Division of Lassonde Specialties Inc. v. United States, 219 F. Supp. 3d 1364, 2017 CIT 34, 39 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1137, 2017 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 34, 2017 WL 1201035 (cit 2017).

Pincite

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Choe-Groves, Judge:

Before the court is Plaintiff Mon-div, Division of Lassonde Specialties Ine.’s (“Plaintiff’) consent motion to amend the scheduling order. See Consent Mot. to Am. Scheduling Order, Mar. 13, 2017, EOF No. 25. Plaintiff seeks to amend the scheduling order by extending the deadline for discovery by sixty days and all subsequent deadlines by thirty days respectively. See id. Once a scheduling order is issued, “[a] schedule may be modified only for good cause and with the judge’s consent.” US-CIT R. 16(b)(4). Good cause requires the moving party to show that the deadline for which an extension is sought cannot reasonably be met despite the movant’s diligent efforts to comply with the schedule. See High Point Design LLC v. Buyers Direct, Inc., 730 F.3d 1301, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2013).

Plaintiff asserts that good cause exists because:

Plaintiff has been involved in a number of other litigation matters with deadlines that have coincided with the discovery deadlines, as well as maintained a busy travel schedule. The additional time would allow counsel the attention to respond to the interrogatory and production requests, and would allow government counsel the necessary time to review the responses and schedule depositions.

Consent Mot. to Am. Scheduling Order. Plaintiff has failed here to articulate sufficient detail to support a good cause modification of the scheduling order. An “overextended caseload is not ‘good cause shown,’ unless it is the result of events unforeseen and uncontrollable by both counsel and client.” Mississippi v. Turner, 498 U.S. 1306, 1306, 111 S.Ct. 1032, 112 L.Ed.2d 1172 (1991) (Scalia, Circuit Justice). Plaintiffs general assertion of a busy schedule does not satisfy the good cause standard. See Pfeiffer v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 230 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (affirming decision that a heavy attorney workload and busy travel schedule does not constitute good cause).

Therefore, upon consideration of Plaintiffs motion to amend the scheduling order and in accordance with the foregoing, it is hereby

ORDERED that Plaintiffs motion is denied without prejudice.

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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Choe-Groves, Judge:

Before the court is Plaintiff Mon-div, Division of Lassonde Specialties Ine.’s (“Plaintiff’) consent motion to amend the scheduling order. See Consent Mot. to Am. Scheduling Order, Mar. 13, 2017, EOF No. 25. Plaintiff seeks to amend the scheduling order by extending the deadline for discovery by sixty days and all subsequent deadlines by thirty days respectively. See id. Once a scheduling order is issued, “[a] schedule may be modified only for good cause and with the judge’s consent.” US-CIT R. 16(b)(4). Good cause requires the moving party to show that the deadline for which an extension is sought cannot reasonably be met despite the movant’s diligent efforts to comply with the schedule. See High Point Design LLC v. Buyers Direct, Inc., 730 F.3d 1301, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2013).

Plaintiff asserts that good cause exists because:

Plaintiff has been involved in a number of other litigation matters with deadlines that have coincided with the discovery deadlines, as well as maintained a busy travel schedule. The additional time would allow counsel the attention to respond to the interrogatory and production requests, and would allow government counsel the necessary time to review the responses and schedule depositions.

Consent Mot. to Am. Scheduling Order. Plaintiff has failed here to articulate sufficient detail to support a good cause modification of the scheduling order. An “overextended caseload is not ‘good cause shown,’ unless it is the result of events unforeseen and uncontrollable by both counsel and client.” Mississippi v. Turner, 498 U.S. 1306, 1306, 111 S.Ct. 1032, 112 L.Ed.2d 1172 (1991) (Scalia, Circuit Justice). Plaintiffs general assertion of a busy schedule does not satisfy the good cause standard. See Pfeiffer v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 230 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (affirming decision that a heavy attorney workload and busy travel schedule does not constitute good cause).

Therefore, upon consideration of Plaintiffs motion to amend the scheduling order and in accordance with the foregoing, it is hereby

ORDERED that Plaintiffs motion is denied without prejudice.

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219 F. Supp. 3d 1364, 2017 CIT 34, 39 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1137, 2017 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 34, 2017 WL 1201035, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mondiv-division-of-lassonde-specialties-inc-v-united-states-cit-2017.

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