Monarch Condominium v. Raskin

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Monarch Condominium v. Raskin

37 A.D.3d 288, 831 N.Y.S.2d 369

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedFebruary 15, 2007

StatusPublished

This text of 37 A.D.3d 288 (Monarch Condominium v. Raskin) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Monarch Condominium v. Raskin, 37 A.D.3d 288, 831 N.Y.S.2d 369 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2007).

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Opinion

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Walter B. Tolub, J.), entered August 3, 2006, which denied plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction, unanimously affirmed, with costs.

Plaintiff condominium’s motion for a preliminary injunction compelling defendants to cease the use of their apartment as a psychiatry office and requiring the unit’s restoration to residential purposes was properly denied since plaintiff failed to demonstrate that it will suffer irreparable harm if the sought relief [289]*289is denied (see Doe v Axelrod, 73 NY2d 748, 750 [1988]). Contrary to plaintiffs contention, it is required to demonstrate irreparable harm. This is not a situation where a preliminary injunction may, by reason of specific statutory dispensation, be obtained without such a showing (cf. Village of Chestnut Ridge v Roffino, 306 AD2d 522, 524 [2003]). Plaintiff’s request for relief was also properly denied because it “clearly did not seek to maintain the status quo, but rather sought the ultimate relief in [the] action” (Putter v City of New York, 27 AD3d 250, 253 [2006]). Concur—Nardelli, J.P., Williams, Buckley, Catterson and McGuire, JJ.

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Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Walter B. Tolub, J.), entered August 3, 2006, which denied plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction, unanimously affirmed, with costs.

Plaintiff condominium’s motion for a preliminary injunction compelling defendants to cease the use of their apartment as a psychiatry office and requiring the unit’s restoration to residential purposes was properly denied since plaintiff failed to demonstrate that it will suffer irreparable harm if the sought relief [289]*289is denied (see Doe v Axelrod, 73 NY2d 748, 750 [1988]). Contrary to plaintiffs contention, it is required to demonstrate irreparable harm. This is not a situation where a preliminary injunction may, by reason of specific statutory dispensation, be obtained without such a showing (cf. Village of Chestnut Ridge v Roffino, 306 AD2d 522, 524 [2003]). Plaintiff’s request for relief was also properly denied because it “clearly did not seek to maintain the status quo, but rather sought the ultimate relief in [the] action” (Putter v City of New York, 27 AD3d 250, 253 [2006]). Concur—Nardelli, J.P., Williams, Buckley, Catterson and McGuire, JJ.

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Bluebook (online)

37 A.D.3d 288, 831 N.Y.S.2d 369, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/monarch-condominium-v-raskin-nyappdiv-2007.

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