Monal Patel v. Department of Defense

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedJuly 24, 2024
DocketDC-3443-23-0304-I-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Monal Patel v. Department of Defense (Monal Patel v. Department of Defense) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Monal Patel v. Department of Defense, (Miss. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

MONAL PATEL, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, DC-3443-23-0304-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DATE: July 24, 2024 Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Monal Patel , Washington, D.C, pro se.

Allen Brooks , Esquire, Quantico, Virginia, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman Henry J. Kerner, Member*

*Member Kerner did not participate in the adjudication of this appeal.

FINAL ORDER

The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which dismissed for lack of jurisdiction his appeal of the agency’s decision to rescind its offer of employment as a negative suitability determination. On petition for review, the appellant argues that the administrative judge’s finding that he was not subjected to a negative suitability determination was based on erroneous 1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

facts, namely, that he was employed by a Government contractor. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b). We agree with the administrative judge that the appellant did not make a nonfrivolous allegation of Board jurisdiction because there is no indication that the agency subjected him to anything other than a nonselection for a specific position. The Board’s jurisdiction is not plenary; it is limited to those matters over which it has been given jurisdiction by law, rule, or regulation . Maddox v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 759 F.2d 9, 10 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Generally, an unsuccessful candidate for a Federal civil service position has no right to appeal his nonselection. Kazan v. Department of Justice, 112 M.S.P.R. 390, ¶ 6 (2009); see Ricci v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 953 F.3d 753, 757 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (finding that the agency’s decision to rescind its offer of employment for a specific position was not a suitability action that could be appealed to the Board) . Although the Board has jurisdiction over certain matters involving suitability for Federal employment pursuant to the Office of Personnel Management regulations, as explained in the initial decision, only “suitability actions”—cancellations of 3

eligibility, removals, cancellations of reinstatement eligibility, and debarment— may be appealed to the Board. Initial Appeal File, Tab 10, Initial Decision (ID) at 3 (citing Upshaw v. Consumer Product Safety Commission, 111 M.S.P.R. 236, ¶ 8 (2009); 5 C.F.R. § 731.203(a); 5 C.F.R. § 731.501(a)). Cancellation of eligibility or a nonselection for a specific position is not a suitability action even if it is based on the criteria for making a suitability determination under 5 C.F.R. § 731.202. ID at 3 (citing Upshaw, 111 M.S.P.R. 236, ¶ 8; 5 C.F.R. § 731.203(b)). Furthermore, while the Board has limited jurisdiction over an adverse action taken by an agency based on a security clearance determination, the denial of a security clearance is not itself an appealable adverse action. Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 529-32 (1988). We recognize that the administrative judge did not explicitly notify the appellant below of what he must do to establish an appealable issue in a suitability appeal; however, we find that the initial decision, combined with the agency’s pleadings, provided sufficient notice to cure the deficiency. See Burgess v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 758 F.2d 641, 643-44 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (finding that an appellant must receive explicit information on what is required to establish an appealable jurisdictional issue); Scott v. Department of Justice, 105 M.S.P.R. 482, ¶ 6 (2007) (finding that an administrative judge’s failure to provide an appellant with proper Burgess notice can be cured if the agency’s pleadings contain the notice that was lacking in the acknowledgment order, or if the initial decision puts the appellant on notice of what he must do to establish jurisdiction, thus affording him the opportunity to meet his jurisdictional burden in the petition for review). Because the appellant nevertheless did not nonfrivolously allege that the agency subjected him to a suitability action, we also find that the alleged factual error regarding his employment with a Government contractor does not warrant a different outcome in this matter. Panter v. Department of the Air Force, 22 M.S.P.R. 281, 282 (1984) (stating that an adjudicatory error that is not prejudicial to a party’s 4

substantive rights provides no basis for reversal of an initial decision). Accordingly, we affirm the administrative judge’s finding that the Board lacks jurisdiction over this appeal.

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 2 You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).

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Related

Department of the Navy v. Egan
484 U.S. 518 (Supreme Court, 1988)
Bridgett L. Burgess v. Merit Systems Protection Board
758 F.2d 641 (Federal Circuit, 1985)
Perry v. Merit Systems Protection Bd.
582 U.S. 420 (Supreme Court, 2017)
Ricci v. MSPB
953 F.3d 753 (Federal Circuit, 2020)

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Monal Patel v. Department of Defense, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/monal-patel-v-department-of-defense-mspb-2024.