Monaco v. Guido

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Monaco v. Guido

142 A.D.2d 986, 530 N.Y.S.2d 408, 1988 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 15022

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJuly 7, 1988

StatusPublished

This text of 142 A.D.2d 986 (Monaco v. Guido) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Monaco v. Guido, 142 A.D.2d 986, 530 N.Y.S.2d 408, 1988 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 15022 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1988).

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Opinion

Order insofar as appealed from unanimously reversed on the law with costs and defendants’ motion granted, in accordance with the following memorandum: Plaintiff’s first cause of action for breach of contract of employment should have been dismissed for failure to state a cause of action. It is clear from defendant’s submissions in support of his motion to dismiss, primarily plaintiff’s letters to defendant seeking to be rehired, that plaintiff did not have a contractual relationship with defendant at the time she was allegedly discharged from employment. Second, assuming, arguendo, that plaintiff was employed by defendant, plaintiff fails to allege any express [987]*987limitation on defendant’s right to discharge (see, Sabetay v Sterling Drug, 69 NY2d 329, 336). In the circumstances of this case, plaintiff’s claim must be read as alleging a breach of promise to rehire her seasonally. However, plaintiff has failed to allege an express agreement by defendant to rehire her and an implied agreement may not be inferred on these facts. (Appeal from order of Supreme Court, Niagara County, Koshian, J.—dismiss cause of action.)

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Order insofar as appealed from unanimously reversed on the law with costs and defendants’ motion granted, in accordance with the following memorandum: Plaintiff’s first cause of action for breach of contract of employment should have been dismissed for failure to state a cause of action. It is clear from defendant’s submissions in support of his motion to dismiss, primarily plaintiff’s letters to defendant seeking to be rehired, that plaintiff did not have a contractual relationship with defendant at the time she was allegedly discharged from employment. Second, assuming, arguendo, that plaintiff was employed by defendant, plaintiff fails to allege any express [987]*987limitation on defendant’s right to discharge (see, Sabetay v Sterling Drug, 69 NY2d 329, 336). In the circumstances of this case, plaintiff’s claim must be read as alleging a breach of promise to rehire her seasonally. However, plaintiff has failed to allege an express agreement by defendant to rehire her and an implied agreement may not be inferred on these facts. (Appeal from order of Supreme Court, Niagara County, Koshian, J.—dismiss cause of action.)

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Bluebook (online)

142 A.D.2d 986, 530 N.Y.S.2d 408, 1988 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 15022, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/monaco-v-guido-nyappdiv-1988.

Opinion

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