Moments v. Adams

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided July 18, 2025·No. 1:24-cv-05973·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ---------------------------------------------------------------------- X : BETTA MOMENTS, : : Plaintiff, : 24-CV-5973 (JMF) : -v- : : MEMORANDUM OPINION MAYOR ERIC ADAMS et al., : AND ORDER : Defendants. : : ---------------------------------------------------------------------- X JESSE M. FURMAN, United States District Judge: Betta Moments, a state prisoner proceeding here without counsel, identifies herself as a “black Transwoman Female.” ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”), at 4. She brings this action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against Mayor Eric Adams and others alleging that, when she was detained on Rikers Island, her constitutional rights were violated because the jail’s commissary did not include cosmetic products “suitable for black people.” Id. She asserts that this is “pure bias and racist” that it has caused her “mental depression” and humiliation; she seeks $1.4 million in damages. Id. at 4-5. Defendants now move, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to dismiss. See ECF No. 17; see also ECF No. 18 (“Defs.’ Mem.”). Defendants’ motion must be and is granted because Moments’s Complaint fails to plausibly allege a constitutional violation. Liberally construed, the Complaint plainly alleges a claim of discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. To state a claim under the Equal Protection Clause, however, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that the defendants acted with “discriminatory intent or purpose.” Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977). That is, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that the defendants “selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.” Hayden v. Paterson, 594 F.3d 150, 163 (2d Cir. 2010). Moments fails to do so. Instead, her claim rests entirely on conclusory assertions. See Compl. 4 (alleging that the commissary contract “has proven to be bias [sic] towards the ethnicity of Black people”); id. (“This is pure bias and racist by all means.”). Such assertions

“are not entitled to the assumption of truth” and, thus, are insufficient to state a plausible equal protection claim. Hayden, 594 F.3d at 161-62; cf. Betts v. McCaughtry, 827 F. Supp. 1400, 1404-05 (W.D. Wis. 1993) (holding that prison restrictions on music and grooming implements did not constitute purposeful racial discrimination where, as here, the plaintiffs alleged only discriminatory impact and not discriminatory intent). Moments’s Complaint could also be construed to allege a conditions-of-confinement claim in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.1 To state such a claim, however, a plaintiff “must plausibly allege an objective component — that the deprivation of rights was objectively serious — and a subjective component — that the prison official acted with requisite mens rea.” Louime v. Lamanna, No. 21-CV-9594 (VB), 2023 WL 1385180, at *5

(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2023). Moments does neither. Objectively speaking, constitutional violations occur when “prison officials . . . deprive an inmate of [her] basic human needs such as food, clothing, medical care, and safe and sanitary living conditions.” Id. at *6. The failure to stock cosmetics matching Moments’s complexion does not rise to that level and qualify as “objectively serious.” See, e.g., Murray v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, No. 95-5204, 1997 WL 34677, at *2 (6th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (unpublished) (holding that the denial of makeup to an inmate did not violate the Eighth Amendment because “[c]osmetic products are not among the minimal

1 Such a claim would arise under the Due Process Clause rather than the Eighth Amendment because Moments was a pretrial detainee during the events at issue, although the relevant standards are the same. See, e.g., Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 856 (2d Cir. 1996). civilized measure of life’s necessities”). Subjectively speaking, to state a conditions-of- confinement claim, a plaintiff “must allege a defendant acted with more than mere negligence”; instead, she must allege that the defendant “kn[e]w of, and disregard[ed], an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Louime, 2023 WL 1385180, at *6 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Moments fails to plead that any Defendant acted with that mental state. See Compl. 4-5. For these reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion and DISMISSES Moments’s Complaint.2 That said, mindful of Moments’s pro se status, the Court grants her leave to amend the Complaint to state a claim of race discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The Court does so despite the fact that Moments had an opportunity to amend the Complaint in response to Defendants’ motion and was even warned that she would “not be given any further opportunity to amend the complaint to address issues raised by the motion to dismiss.” ECF No. 20, at 1. That is because Moments could conceivably cure the defects in her equal protection claim by alleging additional facts about Defendants’ intent.3 And while Defendants mentioned the words “equal protection” in a subject header in their memorandum of law, their substantive

argument was limited to the conditions of confinement. See Defs.’ Mem. 6-8. Moments shall file any amended complaint within thirty days of the date of this Memorandum Opinion and

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Moments v. Adams, (S.D.N.Y. 2025).

Moments v. Adams (Moments v. Adams) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Weyant v. Okst
101 F.3d 845 (Second Circuit, 1996)
Murray v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons
106 F.3d 401 (Sixth Circuit, 1997)
Hayden v. Paterson
594 F.3d 150 (Second Circuit, 2010)
Betts v. McCaughtry
827 F. Supp. 1400 (W.D. Wisconsin, 1993)