Molloy v. D'Angelillo

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Molloy v. D'Angelillo

267 A.D.2d 65, 699 N.Y.S.2d 676, 1999 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 12645

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedDecember 9, 1999

StatusPublished

This text of 267 A.D.2d 65 (Molloy v. D'Angelillo) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Molloy v. D'Angelillo, 267 A.D.2d 65, 699 N.Y.S.2d 676, 1999 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 12645 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1999).

Pincite

Opinion

—Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Alan Saks, J.), entered September 2, 1998, which, in a personal injury action arising from an automobile accident, denied the motion of Action No. 1 defendant Stella I. D’Angelillo for summary judgment dismissing the complaint upon the ground that plaintiff had not sustained “serious injury” within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d), unanimously affirmed, with costs.

The medical report detailing plaintiff’s “serious injuries” (see, Insurance Law § 5102 [d]), along with plaintiff’s affidavit as to the extent of her disabling symptoms, sufficed to raise a factual issue as to whether plaintiff had sustained “serious injury’ as defined in Insurance Law § 5102 (d) and thus to defeat defendant’s motion for summary judgment (see, Greco v Five Five Garage Corp., 123 AD2d 422). Concur — Ellerin, P. J., Nardelli, Williams, Rubin and Andrias, JJ.

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—Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Alan Saks, J.), entered September 2, 1998, which, in a personal injury action arising from an automobile accident, denied the motion of Action No. 1 defendant Stella I. D’Angelillo for summary judgment dismissing the complaint upon the ground that plaintiff had not sustained “serious injury” within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d), unanimously affirmed, with costs.

The medical report detailing plaintiff’s “serious injuries” (see, Insurance Law § 5102 [d]), along with plaintiff’s affidavit as to the extent of her disabling symptoms, sufficed to raise a factual issue as to whether plaintiff had sustained “serious injury’ as defined in Insurance Law § 5102 (d) and thus to defeat defendant’s motion for summary judgment (see, Greco v Five Five Garage Corp., 123 AD2d 422). Concur — Ellerin, P. J., Nardelli, Williams, Rubin and Andrias, JJ.

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Bluebook (online)

267 A.D.2d 65, 699 N.Y.S.2d 676, 1999 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 12645, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/molloy-v-dangelillo-nyappdiv-1999.

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