Molinsky v. New York State Department of Motor Vehicles

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Molinsky v. New York State Department of Motor Vehicles

105 A.D.3d 960, 962 N.Y.S.2d 710

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedApril 17, 2013

StatusPublished

This text of 105 A.D.3d 960 (Molinsky v. New York State Department of Motor Vehicles) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Molinsky v. New York State Department of Motor Vehicles, 105 A.D.3d 960, 962 N.Y.S.2d 710 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2013).

Pincite

Opinion

Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles Appeals Board, dated December 27, 2010, confirming a determination of an Administrative Law Judge dated June 29, 2010, which, after a hearing, found that the petitioner had violated Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1180 (d) (2), and imposed a fine in the sum of $90, plus a surcharge.

Adjudged that the determination is confirmed, the petition is denied, and the proceeding is dismissed on the merits, with costs.

Contrary to the petitioner’s contention, the determination that he violated Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1180 (d) (2) by speeding is supported by substantial evidence (see Matter of Kobel v State of N.Y. Dept. of Motor Vehs. Appeals Bd., 85 AD3d 916 [2011]; Matter of Hall v Swartz, 61 AD3d 868 [2009]; Matter of Namer v Martinez, 26 AD3d 498 [2006]; Matter of Clarke v Martinez, 14 AD3d 612 [2005]; Matter of Koenigsberg v State of N.Y. Dept. of Motor Vehs. Appeals Bd., 8 AD3d 383 [2004]; Matter of Mataragas v New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs., 6 AD3d 537, 538 [2004]). The Administrative Law Judge properly relied on the police officer’s testimony concerning his visual estimate of the speed of the petitioner’s vehicle as well as the reading of the radar device in the officer’s vehicle. This testimony was sufficient to sustain the determination that the petitioner violated Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1180 (d) (2) (see Matter of Kobel v State of N.Y. Dept. of Motor Vehs. Appeals Bd., 85 AD3d at 916; Matter of Hall v Swartz, 61 AD3d at 868-869; Matter of Clarke v Martinez, 14 AD3d at 612-613).

The petitioner’s remaining contentions are without merit, or Eire not properly before this Court because they were not raised [961]*961at the administrative hearing (see Matter of Klapak v Blum, 65 NY2d 670, 672 [1985]; Matter of Kearney v Village of Cold Spring Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 83 AD3d 711, 714 [2011]).

Rivera, J.E, Dickerson, Leventhal and Hinds-Radix, JJ., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles Appeals Board, dated December 27, 2010, confirming a determination of an Administrative Law Judge dated June 29, 2010, which, after a hearing, found that the petitioner had violated Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1180 (d) (2), and imposed a fine in the sum of $90, plus a surcharge.

Adjudged that the determination is confirmed, the petition is denied, and the proceeding is dismissed on the merits, with costs.

Contrary to the petitioner’s contention, the determination that he violated Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1180 (d) (2) by speeding is supported by substantial evidence (see Matter of Kobel v State of N.Y. Dept. of Motor Vehs. Appeals Bd., 85 AD3d 916 [2011]; Matter of Hall v Swartz, 61 AD3d 868 [2009]; Matter of Namer v Martinez, 26 AD3d 498 [2006]; Matter of Clarke v Martinez, 14 AD3d 612 [2005]; Matter of Koenigsberg v State of N.Y. Dept. of Motor Vehs. Appeals Bd., 8 AD3d 383 [2004]; Matter of Mataragas v New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs., 6 AD3d 537, 538 [2004]). The Administrative Law Judge properly relied on the police officer’s testimony concerning his visual estimate of the speed of the petitioner’s vehicle as well as the reading of the radar device in the officer’s vehicle. This testimony was sufficient to sustain the determination that the petitioner violated Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1180 (d) (2) (see Matter of Kobel v State of N.Y. Dept. of Motor Vehs. Appeals Bd., 85 AD3d at 916; Matter of Hall v Swartz, 61 AD3d at 868-869; Matter of Clarke v Martinez, 14 AD3d at 612-613).

The petitioner’s remaining contentions are without merit, or Eire not properly before this Court because they were not raised [961]*961at the administrative hearing (see Matter of Klapak v Blum, 65 NY2d 670, 672 [1985]; Matter of Kearney v Village of Cold Spring Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 83 AD3d 711, 714 [2011]).

Rivera, J.E, Dickerson, Leventhal and Hinds-Radix, JJ., concur.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

105 A.D.3d 960, 962 N.Y.S.2d 710, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/molinsky-v-new-york-state-department-of-motor-vehicles-nyappdiv-2013.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack