Molina v. James

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
• Decided: March 10, 2025
• Docket: 23-6868(L)
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

23-6868(L) Molina v. James

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 10th day of March, two thousand twenty-five.

Present: DENNY CHIN, MICHAEL H. PARK, SARAH A. L. MERRIAM, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________

JUAN CARLOS MOLINA,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. 23-6868(L), 23-6931(CON)

LETITIA JAMES, MADELINE SINGAS, ESTATE OF ROSALIND & JOSEPH GURWIN, JOHN DOE, FEDERAL INSURANCE COMPANY/CHUBB GROUP,

Respondents-Appellees,

STATE OF NEW YORK, NASSAU COUNTY, ESTATE OF JOSEPH GURWIN, FEDERAL INSURANCE COMPANY,

Defendants-Appellees. *

* The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the caption accordingly. _____________________________________

FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Juan Carlos Molina, pro se, Wantagh, NY.

FOR FEDERAL INSURANCE COMPANY: Vincent Passarelli, Cozen O’Connor, New York, NY.

FOR NASSAU COUNTY: Ian Bergström, for Thomas A. Adams, Office of the Nassau County Attorney, Mineola, NY.

FOR STATE OF NEW YORK: Barbara D. Underwood, Ester Murdukhayeva, David Lawrence III, for Letitia James, Attorney General of the State of New York, NY.

Appeals from judgments of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New

York (Kovner, J.).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

DECREED that the judgments are AFFIRMED.

In his Second Amended Complaint, Appellant Juan Carlos Molina, proceeding pro se,

brought claims against the State of New York (“State”), Nassau County, Federal Insurance

Company/Chubb Group (“Federal”), and the Estate of Joseph Gurwin (“Gurwin Estate”), alleging

constitutional violations related to a state conviction in 1982 and his associated civil action. 1 The

district court granted Defendants’ motions to dismiss. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the

underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues on appeal.

1 In his original and first amended complaints, Molina brought claims against other defendants including Attorney General Letitia James; Madeline Singas, the Nassau County District Attorney; the Estate of Rosalind and Joseph Gurwin; and John Doe of Federal Insurance Company/Chubb Group. Molina does not challenge on appeal the district court’s dismissal of the claims against those defendants; we thus review the dismissal of only the claims in the Second Amended Complaint. 2 “Where a district court grants a defendant’s Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, an appellate

court will review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de

novo.” Aurecchione v. Schoolman Transp. Sys., Inc., 426 F.3d 635, 638 (2d Cir. 2005). “We

review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), construing the

complaint liberally, accepting all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and drawing all

reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.” Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152

(2d Cir. 2002).

I. Claims Seeking To Vacate Molina’s Conviction

Molina seeks to vacate his 1982 criminal conviction. But the Rooker-Feldman doctrine

bars federal courts from hearing suits “that are, in substance, appeals from state-court judgments.”

Sung Cho v. City of New York, 910 F.3d 639, 644 (2d Cir. 2018) (quotation marks omitted).

Because the relief that Molina seeks requires a federal court to review—and to vacate—the state

court’s conviction, the district court properly dismissed these claims.

On appeal, Molina now argues that the district court should have construed his claims to

vacate his conviction as a petition for habeas relief. We disagree. “In order for a federal court to

have jurisdiction over a [§ 2254] habeas petition, the petitioner must be ‘in custody pursuant to the

judgment of a State court’ at the time the petition is filed.” Nowakowski v. New York, 835 F.3d

210, 215 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)). But Molina left prison decades ago and

fails to allege any continuing restraint on his liberty. He is thus ineligible to seek § 2254 relief.

II. Claims Against the State and Nassau County

Molina’s claims against the State and Nassau County fare no better. According to Molina,

the State and Nassau County failed to provide him with a Spanish language interpreter during his

criminal and civil actions. But the Eleventh Amendment bars claims for damages against states.

3 See Mary Jo C. v. N.Y. State & Loc. Ret. Sys., 707 F.3d 144, 151 (2d Cir. 2013). See generally

U.S. Const. amend. XI. And the claims against Nassau County arose four decades ago and are

barred by the applicable statute of limitations. See Shomo v. City of New York, 579 F.3d 176, 181

(2d Cir. 2009).

III. Claims Against Federal Insurance Company and the Gurwin Estate

Molina also brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Federal and the Gurwin Estate.

He alleges that Federal and the Gurwin Estate “conspired together to wrongfully prosecute” him

by “shifting the blame for embezzlement by other parties” onto him because he “was the only party

with assets that Federal could collect against.” Joint App’x at 54. He offers no specific facts to

support the theory that Federal and the Gurwin Estate acted under color of state law, however, and

“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Still, Molina maintains

that he is entitled to default judgment against the Gurwin Estate for its failure to appear. But “a

default judgment that creates an incongruity with a judgment on the merits is unseemly and absurd,

as well as unauthorized by law.” Moore v. Booth, 122 F.4th 61, 63 (2d Cir. 2024) (cleaned up).

The district court thus properly dismissed Molina’s claims against both Federal and the Gurwin

Estate. 2

IV. Relief Under Rule 60(b)

Under Rule 60(b)(2), parties can seek relief from final judgment by identifying “newly

discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to

move for a new trial under Rule 59(b).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2). “[W]e generally review motions

2 To the extent that Molina raised state law claims against Federal, the district court properly

declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any such claims. 4 pursuant to the provisions of Rule 60(b) for abuse of discretion.” State St. Bank & Tr. Co. v.

Inversiones Errazuriz Limitada, 374 F.3d 158, 178 (2d Cir. 2004). Here, Molina sought to

introduce as newly discovered evidence records purportedly showing the dismissal of a 1981

indictment against him. But as the district court noted, such evidence has “presumably [] been

available since 1981.” Joint App’x at 8.

* * *

We have considered Molina’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. For

the foregoing reasons, the judgments of the district court are AFFIRMED.

FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court