Molina-Cardoza v. Bondi
This text of Molina-Cardoza v. Bondi (Molina-Cardoza v. Bondi) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 28 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SANDRA MOLINA-CARDOZA; MATEO No. 24-2514 GARCIA-MOLINA, Agency Nos. A220-912-983 Petitioners, A208-561-635 v. MEMORANDUM* PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted October 24, 2025** San Francisco, California
Before: CLIFTON, OWENS, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges.
Petitioners, Sandra Molina Cardoza and her son Mateo, petition for review of
the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision affirming the immigration
judge’s (“IJ”) denial of their applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Since the BIA
“conduct[ed] an independent review of the IJ’s findings, we review the BIA’s
decision and not that of the IJ.” Hernandez-Mancilla v. Holder, 633 F.3d 1182, 1184
(9th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). We deny the petition.
1. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s denial of asylum and withholding
of removal. See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481–83 (1992). To establish
entitlement to asylum and withholding of removal, Petitioners must show a nexus
between feared persecution and a protected ground. Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846
F.3d 351, 360 (9th Cir. 2017).
The record does not compel the conclusion that the BIA erred in determining
that Petitioners failed to establish a nexus between their feared persecution and a
protected ground. Petitioners first challenge the BIA’s determination that they are
not members of the protected groups of (1) “witnesses of crimes who testify publicly
against the gangs,” and (2) “individuals who take concrete steps to oppose gang
activities and authority.” Regarding the first group, the BIA reasonably determined
that lead Petitioner was not a “witness.” After her car was stolen, she didn’t call the
police and instead only spoke to them after they approached her. Unlike the
petitioners in Henriquez-Rivas, 707 F.3d 1081, 1092 (9th Cir. 2013), she didn’t
testify in open court or otherwise publicly participate in the prosecution. Concerning
the second group, Petitioner did not take steps to oppose gang activities. For
2 24-2514 example, she paid the extortion money that the gangs demanded. Thus, the BIA
reasonably found she was not a member of the second proposed group.
Petitioners also challenge the BIA’s nexus finding. The BIA found that the
threats Petitioners received were only because of greed and personal animus. Lead
Petitioner expressly acknowledged that the main reason that gang members
threatened her was because they thought she had tried to send them to prison.
Retributory motives alone do not establish a nexus to a protected ground. Cf.
Rodriguez Tornes v. Garland, 993 F.3d 743, 751 (9th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted).
Further, although Petitioners assert membership in the proposed protected group
“members of the Molina family” they do not meaningfully challenge the BIA’s
conclusion that gang members did not have an interest in them because of their
family membership.
Because substantial evidence supports the lack of nexus to a protected ground,
the BIA reasonably denied her asylum and withholding of removal claims.
2. Substantial evidence also supports the denial of CAT protection. To
establish entitlement to CAT relief, Petitioners must show that any torture would be
“inflicted by, or at the instigation of, or with the consent or acquiescence of, a public
official acting in an official capacity or other person acting in an official capacity.”
Plancarte Sauceda v. Garland, 23 F.4th 824, 834 (9th Cir. 2022) (citing 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.18(a)(1)). The record doesn’t support the assertion that the government of
3 24-2514 El Salvador would turn a blind eye to potential harm against Petitioners. Lead
Petitioner’s subjective belief that police would acquiesce is undermined by the fact
that police showed up after her car was stolen and arrested the suspects—alleged
members of the 18th Street Gang.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
4 24-2514
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