Moli v. King County

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: April 29, 2024
• Docket: 2:23-cv-00823
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 7

8 FUAMATALA MOLI, CASE NO. 2:23-cv-00823-RSL 9 Plaintiff, v. 10

11 KING COUNTY, et al., ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO 12 Defendants. DISMISS

14 This matter comes before the Court on “Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Second 15 Amended Complaint.” Dkt. # 14. Plaintiff alleges that defendants failed to accommodate 16 her religious beliefs in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, and the Washington Law 17 18 Against Discrimination (“WLAD”), RCW 49.60.180, et seq. Defendants argue that the 19 claims, as alleged in the operative pleading,1 fail as a matter of law because plaintiff has 20 not adequately alleged a religious belief that conflicts with a job requirement or that she 21 informed her employer of the conflict. 22 23 24 25

26 1 Although the operative pleading, Dkt. # 13, is entitled “Amended Complaint for Damages,” it is actually plaintiff’s second amended complaint. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO 1 The question for the Court on a motion to dismiss is whether the facts alleged in the 2 complaint sufficiently state a “plausible” ground for relief. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 3 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). In the context of a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules 4 5 of Civil Procedure, the Court must “accept factual allegations in the complaint as true and 6 construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Manzarek v. St. 7 Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). The 8 Court’s review is generally limited to the contents of the complaint. Campanelli v. 9 10 Bockrath, 100 F.3d 1476, 1479 (9th Cir. 1996). “We are not, however, required to accept 11 as true allegations that contradict exhibits attached to the Complaint or matters properly 12 subject to judicial notice, or allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted 13 deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Daniels-Hall v. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, 629 14 15 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010). 16 To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 17 []Twombly, 550 U.S. [at 570]. A plausible claim includes “factual content 18 that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is 19 liable for the misconduct alleged.” U.S. v. Corinthian Colls., 655 F.3d 984, 991 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). 20 Under the pleading standards of Rule 8(a)(2), a party must make a “short and 21 plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). . . . A complaint “that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ 22 or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” 23 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Thus, 24 “conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.” Adams v. Johnson, 355 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th 25 Cir. 2004). 26 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO 1 Benavidez v. Cty. of San Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1144–45 (9th Cir. 2021). If the complaint 2 fails to state a cognizable legal theory or fails to provide sufficient facts to support a claim, 3 dismissal is appropriate. Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 622 F.3d 1035, 4 5 1041 (9th Cir. 2010). 6 Having reviewed the Amended Complaint for Damages (Dkt. # 13) and the 7 submissions of the parties,2 the Court finds as follows: 8 BACKGROUND 9 10 On August 10, 2021, the King County Executive issued an order requiring all 11 County executive branch employees to be fully vaccinated against COVID-19 by October 12 18, 2021, unless they were entitled under law to an accommodation on account of 13 disability or religious belief. Exec. Order No. ACO-8-27-EO (found at 14 15 https://kingcounty.gov/en/search).3 At the time, plaintiff was employed as the Chief of 16 Inventory Management with King County Metro Transit. On August 23, 2021, plaintiff 17 asserted that her “sincerely held religious beliefs conflict with King County’s vaccination 18 mandate” and requested an exemption. Dkt. # 13 at ¶ 18. She explained: 19 The Religious principles that guide my objection to the COVID vaccination 20 are as follows: God has given me a choice to live eternity in heaven or to live 21 eternity in hell after I die. (Deuteronomy 30:15-20) There is only one true God and I am to worship him only. (James 2:19 and Revelation 14-9-10) I 22 am a temple of God, he live in me and I can not [sic] desecrate/defile myself. 23 (1 Corinthians 3:16-19) The COVID vaccination is a desecration/defilement of my temple and it will condemn my spirit and soul to eternity in hell after I 24 2 This case can be decided on the papers submitted. Defendants’ request for oral argument is DENIED. 25 3 The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that the conduct of which plaintiff complains occurred during the 26 COVID-19 pandemic and of the cited Executive Order. Denis v. Ige, 538 F. Supp. 3d 1063, 1068-69 (D. Haw. 2021) (taking judicial notice of public health statements and emergency proclamations published on the internet). ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO 1 die. My sincerely held religious beliefs conflict with King County’s vaccination mandate because receiving the COVID vaccinations will 2 guarantee that my spirit and soul will NOT return to heaven but be sent to 3 hell for eternity. I am not opposed to all Immunizations, just the Immunizations that conflict with my sincerely held religious beliefs 4 described above concerning the COVID vaccination. I am seeking an 5 exemption from the mandatory COVID vaccination. I will adhere to all King County mandates that do not conflict with my sincerely held religious beliefs 6 such as social distancing, masking up, temperature checks, cleaning procedures, etc. 7

8 Id. 9 Plaintiff alleges that she was granted an exemption from the vaccination mandate, 10 but that her request for an accommodation was denied on December 28, 2021. Dkt. # 13 at 11 ¶ 19. “Defendants failed to hold an interactive and engaging analysis of the job prior to 12 13 denying the Plaintiff’s requested accommodation.” Id. She was placed on administrative 14 leave on January 11, 2022, and her employment was terminated on March 18, 2022. Dkt. 15 # 13 at ¶ 21. 16 DISCUSSION 17 18 A. Failure to Accommodate 19 To allege a prima facie case of religious discrimination under Title VII, a plaintiff 20 must plead that “(1) a bona fide religious belief of the employee conflicted with an 21 employment policy; (2) the employee informed the employer of the conflict; and (3) the 22 23 employee was penalized in some way because of the conflict.” E.E.O.C. v. Townley Eng’g 24 & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 614 (9th Cir. 1988). Similarly, a prima facie claim of failure to 25 accommodate religious practices under the WLAD requires a showing that (1) he or she 26 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO 1 had a bona fide religious belief, the practice of which conflicted with employment duties; 2 (2) he or she informed the employer of the beliefs and the conflict; and (3) the employer 3 responded by subjecting the employee to threatened or actual discriminatory treatment. 4 5 Kumar v. Gate Gourmet Inc., 180 Wn.2d 481, 501-02 (2014). 4 Only after a plaintiff has 6 alleged a prima facie case of religious discrimination does the burden shifts to the 7 employer to show “that it initiated good faith efforts to accommodate the employee’s 8 religious practices or that it could not reasonably accommodate the employee without 9 10 undue hardship.” Lawson v. Washington, 296 F.3d 799, 804 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting 11 Heller v. EBB Auto Co., 8 F.3d 1433, 1438 (9th Cir. 1993)). The key element at issue here 12 – whether plaintiff has adequately alleged a religious belief that conflicts with the COVID- 13 19 vaccination requirement – is the same under both Title VII and the WLAD. 14 15 According to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), a bona 16 fide religious belief is one that is sincerely held. U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, 17 EEOC-CVG-2021-3, Section 12: Religious Discrimination, § 12-I(A)(2) (Jan. 15, 2021). A 18 plaintiff’s “religious belief need not be consistent or rational to be protected under Title 19 VII, and an assertion of a sincere religious belief is generally accepted.” Keene v. City and 20 21 Cnty. of San Francisco, No. 22-16567, 2023 WL 3451687, at * 2 (9th Cir. 2023) 22 23

24 4 Plaintiff correctly points out that a complaint in an employment discrimination lawsuit need not contain factual allegations aimed at each and every element of the prima facie case. Dkt. # 16 at 5 (quoting Swierkiewicz v. Sorema 25 N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 (2002). But the allegations must give rise to a plausible inference that plaintiff is entitled to relief, i.e., that the adverse employment action was motivated by and/or based on plaintiff’s religion. Plaintiff could 26 satisfy that burden by alleging direct evidence of discriminatory animus. She has not done so, however, and the question before the Court is whether the circumstances alleged give rise to the required inference. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO 1 (unpublished) (citations omitted). Nevertheless, courts need not accept conclusory 2 assertions that a particular belief is “religious,” Bolden-Hardge v. Off. of the Cal. State 3 Controller, 63 F.4th 1215, 1223 (9th Cir. 2023), and “a ‘threadbare reference’ to a 4 5 plaintiff’s religious beliefs is insufficient to satisfy the first element of her prima facie case 6 for Title VII discrimination, Bird v. Randol, No. 6:23-CV-1678-MC, 2024 WL 964244, at 7 *3 (D. Or. Mar. 6, 2024). 8 In October 2021, the EEOC published guidance regarding a wide range of COVID- 9 10 19 issues in the workplace, including how employers should respond to reasonable 11 accommodation claims based on religious objections to vaccinations. The publication was 12 most recently updated on May 15, 2023. The EEOC made clear that: 13 Title VII does not protect social, political, or economic views or personal 14 preferences. Thus, objections to a COVID-19 vaccination requirement that 15 are purely based on social, political, or economic views or personal preferences, or any other nonreligious concerns (including about the possible 16 effects of the vaccine), do not qualify as religious beliefs, practices, or observances under Title VII. However, overlap between a religious and 17 political view does not place it outside the scope of Title VII’s religious 18 protections, as long as the view is part of a comprehensive religious belief system and is not simply an isolated teaching. 19 What You Should Know About COVID-19 and the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and 20 21 Other EEO Laws at L.2 to L.3, U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n (Oct. 25, 2021), 22 https://www.eeoc.gov/wysk/what-youshould-know-about-covid-19-and-adarehabilitation- 23 act-and-other-eeo-laws#L. Thus, the question before the Court on this motion to dismiss is 24 whether plaintiff has plausibly alleged that her objections to her employer’s COVID-19 25 26 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO 1 vaccination mandate arose from her religious beliefs as opposed to her social/ 2 philosophical/medical views and/or personal preferences. 3 Plaintiff informed her employer, and alleges in her complaint, that she has a 4 5 sincerely held religious belief that receiving the COVID-19 vaccination will defile her 6 body, a temple of God, thereby condemning her to eternity in hell. Dkt. # 13 at ¶ 18. She 7 makes clear, however, that she does not object to all vaccines or immunizations. Plaintiff 8 makes no attempt to explain how the injection of the COVID-19 vaccine constitutes a 9 10 defilement or desecration of God’s temple while the injection of a similar substance aimed 11 at another illness does not. As the Ninth Circuit noted in Keene, religious beliefs do not 12 have to be logical or consistent, but simply designating a belief, preference, or viewpoint 13 as religious is insufficient under Rule 12(b)(6). Plaintiff must do more than present labels, 14 15 conclusions, and/or a formulaic recitation of a cause of action’s elements to give rise to a 16 plausible inference that plaintiff’s sincerely held objections to obtaining a COVID-19 17 vaccine were religious in nature. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545. See Bartholomew v. Wash., __ 18 F. Supp. 3d __, 2024 WL 1426308, at *4 (2024) (“[A]n employee’s complaint must 19 provide sufficient information about the nature of the employee’s beliefs in order to state a 20 21 claim for Title VII religious discrimination.” Blackwell v. Lehigh Valley Health Network, 22 No. 5:22-CV-03360-JMG, 2023 WL 362392, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 23, 2023)). 23 In this case, plaintiff alleges a one-off objection to a particular employer-mandated 24 vaccine and simply labels that objection as religious in nature. While the Court fully 25 26 credits her belief that her body is to be cherished and protected as a reflection of and ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO 1 temple to her deity, there is no indication that this belief compels her to reject any 2 particular medical intervention, injection, or foreign substance. Especially where plaintiff 3 acknowledges that neither injections nor vaccines are, as a general matter, forbidden in her 4 5 belief system, the complaint does not give rise to an inference that plaintiff’s religion 6 forbids receiving the COVID-19 vaccine. “[V]ague expressions of sincerely held Christian 7 beliefs alone cannot serve as a blanket excuse for avoiding all unwanted employment 8 obligations.” Kather v. Asante Health Sys., No. 1:22-cv-01842-MC, 2023 WL 4865533, at 9 10 *5 (D. Or. July 28, 2023) (citing Finkbeiner v. Geisinger Clinic, 623 F. Supp. 3d 461, 465– 11 66 (M.D. Pa. 2022)). 12 Having failed to identify any element of her religious belief system that conflicted 13 with her employer’s COVID-19 vaccination requirement, plaintiff failed to give her 14 15 employer timely notice of a religious conflict. Because an employer has no duty to 16 accommodate non-religious objections to workplace policies, the alleged failure to engage 17 in an interactive discussion regarding potential accommodations cannot establish liability 18 in this case. 19 B. Doe Defendants 20 21 Plaintiff sued a number of Doe defendants but has not identified any acts or 22 omissions attributed to them or any legal theory under which individuals or entities other 23 than her employer could be liable for a failure to accommodate. A bare allegation that an 24 unidentified person is in some way involved in and legally responsible for wrongdoing 25 26 does not raise a plausible inference of liability. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO 1 C. Leave to Amend 2 Plaintiff seeks leave to amend her complaint “if the Court finds that more facts are 3 needed to support” her claim.” Dkt. # 16 a 13. Courts “should freely give leave [to amend] 4 5 when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). There is a “strong policy in favor of 6 allowing amendment” (Kaplan v. Rose, 49 F.3d 1363, 1370 (9th Cir. 1994)), and “[c]ourts 7 may decline to grant leave to amend only if there is strong evidence of undue delay, bad 8 faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by 9 10 amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of 11 allowance of the amendment, or futility of amendment, etc.” (Sonoma County Ass’n of 12 Retired Employees v. Sonoma County, 708 F.3d 1109, 1117 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal 13 quotation marks and alterations omitted)). The underlying purpose of Rule 15 is “to 14 15 facilitate decision on the merits, rather than on the pleadings or technicalities.” Lopez v. 16 Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) 17 Although leave to amend is the norm in this situation, plaintiff has already amended 18 her complaint on two occasions, and the Court finds that further amendment would be 19 futile. Plaintiff has not identified any religious belief other than that her body is a temple of 20 21 God to justify her objection to the COVID-19 vaccine, and that broad and general belief 22 does not conflict with the employer’s policy as discussed above. Even if plaintiff could 23 now identify a sincerely held religious belief that actually precludes receiving the COVID- 24 19 vaccine, she failed to give the employer timely notice of any such belief and will 25 26 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO 1 therefore be unable to raise an inference of unlawful employment discrimination. Leave to 2 amend is therefore denied. 3

4 5 For all of the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED. The 6 Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of defendants and against plaintiff. 7

8 Dated this 29th day of April, 2024. 9 10

11 Robert S. Lasnik United States District Judge 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO