Court of Appeals Tenth Appellate District of Texas
10-25-00177-CV
Moir Watershed Services, LLC, Appellant
v.
Law Office of Heath Gurinsky, PLLC and Spencer Hofmann, Appellees
On appeal from the 40th District Court of Ellis County, Texas Judge Bob Carroll, presiding Trial Court Cause No. 115615
JUSTICE SMITH delivered the opinion of the Court.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Moir Watershed Services, LLC appeals from the trial court’s order
dismissing its legal malpractice suit against the Law Office of Heath Gurinsky,
PLLC and Spencer Hofmann. In its sole issue, Moir contends the trial court
erred in granting Appellees’ special appearance. We affirm. BACKGROUND
Moir retained the Law Office of Heath Gurinsky, a New York firm, to
represent it regarding Moir’s indebtedness on three loans. In its petition
against Appellees, Moir identified Hofmann as an attorney at the firm,
although the record shows he is a paralegal employed by the Law Office of
Heath Gurinsky. Moir alleged causes of action for negligence, breach of
contract, and violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, asserting
that “venue is proper as the cause of action arose in Ellis County, Texas.”
Appellees filed a special appearance alleging that the trial court did not
have jurisdiction over them. They asserted that they are residents of the State
of New York, do not have minimum contacts with Texas, lack continuous and
systematic contacts with the State of Texas, and have not personally availed
themselves of the privilege of conducting activities within the State of Texas.
Finally, they asserted that the exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court over
them would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice,
depriving them of due process. They filed a brief in support of the special
appearance and included affidavits of Gurinsky and Hofmann.
Moir filed a response and attached the retainer agreement and Moir’s
consent for the Law Office of Heath Gurinsky to work on his behalf with his
Moir Watershed Servs., LLC v. Law Office of Heath Gurinsky, PLLC Page 2 lenders. After a hearing, the trial court sustained Appellees’ special
appearance.
SPECIAL APPEARANCE
In its sole issue, Moir asserts the trial court erred in granting Appellees’
special appearance and dismissing Moir’s lawsuit.1 Moir contends that it
contracted with Appellees for legal work, the contract was to be partly
performed in Texas, and Appellees purposefully availed themselves of Texas
jurisdiction. Further, it argues, because the claims made arose out of or are
related to the contacts, that is the contract, the special appearance should have
been denied.
Standard of Review
To render a binding judgment, a court must have both subject matter
jurisdiction over the controversy and personal jurisdiction over the parties.
Spir Star AG v. Kimich, 310 S.W.3d 868, 871 (Tex. 2010). Whether a court has
personal jurisdiction over a defendant is determined as a matter of law, which
appellate courts review de novo. Id. When, as here, the trial court does not
issue findings of fact and conclusions of law to support its special appearance
1 Moir does not specify whether it is attacking the legal or factual sufficiency of the evidence. Based on its argument and a complete lack of authorities referencing sufficiency standards of review, we construe the challenge to be only a legal sufficiency challenge. See Rischer v. State, 85 S.W.3d 839, 842-43 (Tex. App.—Waco 2002, no pet.) (reviewing courts look to argument and authorities presented in party’s brief to determine whether an issue challenges legal or factual sufficiency of the evidence or both).
Moir Watershed Servs., LLC v. Law Office of Heath Gurinsky, PLLC Page 3 determination, we presume that all factual disputes were resolved in favor of
the trial court’s ruling unless they are challenged on appeal. Luciano v.
SprayFoamPolymers.com, LLC, 625 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex. 2021). These implied
findings are tested by evidentiary sufficiency standards. See BMC Software
Belg., N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 795 (Tex. 2002). For legal sufficiency
points, if there is more than a scintilla of evidence to support the finding, the
no evidence challenge fails. Id.
Applicable Law
Texas courts have personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant
when the Texas long-arm statute authorizes such jurisdiction, and its exercise
comports with federal due process guarantees. Luciano, 625 S.W.3d at 8.
Consistent with federal due process protections, personal jurisdiction over
nonresident defendants is constitutional only when 1) the defendant has
established minimum contacts with the forum state, and 2) the exercise of
jurisdiction does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice. Spir Star, 310 S.W.3d at 872.
A defendant’s contacts with a forum can give rise to either general or
specific jurisdiction. Id. General jurisdiction exists when a defendant’s
contacts are continuous and systematic, even if the cause of action did not arise
from activities performed in the forum state. Id.
Moir Watershed Servs., LLC v. Law Office of Heath Gurinsky, PLLC Page 4 A court has specific jurisdiction over a defendant if its contacts within
the state are purposeful, meaning the defendant has sought some benefit,
advantage, or profit by availing itself of the jurisdiction, and its alleged liability
arises from or is related to an activity conducted within the forum, even if those
contacts are isolated or sporadic. Id. at 873. Thus, where the defendant has
deliberately engaged in significant activities within a state, he manifestly has
availed himself of the privilege of conducting business in that state, invoking
the benefits and protections of its laws. Luciano, 625 S.W.3d at 9. Further,
purposeful availment and relatedness are two co-equal components. Moki Mac
River Expeditions v. Drugg, 221 S.W.3d 569, 579 (Tex. 2007). Accordingly,
there must be a “substantial connection” between the defendant’s conduct and
the operative facts of the litigation. Spir Star, 310 S.W.3d at 874. The
purposeful availment analysis seeks to determine whether a nonresident’s
conduct and connection to a forum are such that it could reasonably anticipate
being haled into court there. Moncrief Oil Int’l, Inc. v. OAO Gazprom, 414
S.W.3d 142, 152 (Tex. 2013).
In order for a Texas court to obtain jurisdiction over a non-resident
defendant, a plaintiff must first plead allegations sufficient to confer
jurisdiction under the Texas long-arm statute. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. §§ 17.041-.045; Moncrief Oil Int’l, Inc., 414 S.W.3d at 149. The
Moir Watershed Servs., LLC v. Law Office of Heath Gurinsky, PLLC Page 5 pleading requirement is satisfied by an allegation that the nonresident
defendant is doing business in Texas, contracted with a Texas resident and
either party is to perform the contract in whole or in part in Texas, or
committed tortious acts in Texas. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 17.042; Steward Health Care Sys. LLC v.
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Court of Appeals Tenth Appellate District of Texas
10-25-00177-CV
Moir Watershed Services, LLC, Appellant
v.
Law Office of Heath Gurinsky, PLLC and Spencer Hofmann, Appellees
On appeal from the 40th District Court of Ellis County, Texas Judge Bob Carroll, presiding Trial Court Cause No. 115615
JUSTICE SMITH delivered the opinion of the Court.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Moir Watershed Services, LLC appeals from the trial court’s order
dismissing its legal malpractice suit against the Law Office of Heath Gurinsky,
PLLC and Spencer Hofmann. In its sole issue, Moir contends the trial court
erred in granting Appellees’ special appearance. We affirm. BACKGROUND
Moir retained the Law Office of Heath Gurinsky, a New York firm, to
represent it regarding Moir’s indebtedness on three loans. In its petition
against Appellees, Moir identified Hofmann as an attorney at the firm,
although the record shows he is a paralegal employed by the Law Office of
Heath Gurinsky. Moir alleged causes of action for negligence, breach of
contract, and violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, asserting
that “venue is proper as the cause of action arose in Ellis County, Texas.”
Appellees filed a special appearance alleging that the trial court did not
have jurisdiction over them. They asserted that they are residents of the State
of New York, do not have minimum contacts with Texas, lack continuous and
systematic contacts with the State of Texas, and have not personally availed
themselves of the privilege of conducting activities within the State of Texas.
Finally, they asserted that the exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court over
them would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice,
depriving them of due process. They filed a brief in support of the special
appearance and included affidavits of Gurinsky and Hofmann.
Moir filed a response and attached the retainer agreement and Moir’s
consent for the Law Office of Heath Gurinsky to work on his behalf with his
Moir Watershed Servs., LLC v. Law Office of Heath Gurinsky, PLLC Page 2 lenders. After a hearing, the trial court sustained Appellees’ special
appearance.
SPECIAL APPEARANCE
In its sole issue, Moir asserts the trial court erred in granting Appellees’
special appearance and dismissing Moir’s lawsuit.1 Moir contends that it
contracted with Appellees for legal work, the contract was to be partly
performed in Texas, and Appellees purposefully availed themselves of Texas
jurisdiction. Further, it argues, because the claims made arose out of or are
related to the contacts, that is the contract, the special appearance should have
been denied.
Standard of Review
To render a binding judgment, a court must have both subject matter
jurisdiction over the controversy and personal jurisdiction over the parties.
Spir Star AG v. Kimich, 310 S.W.3d 868, 871 (Tex. 2010). Whether a court has
personal jurisdiction over a defendant is determined as a matter of law, which
appellate courts review de novo. Id. When, as here, the trial court does not
issue findings of fact and conclusions of law to support its special appearance
1 Moir does not specify whether it is attacking the legal or factual sufficiency of the evidence. Based on its argument and a complete lack of authorities referencing sufficiency standards of review, we construe the challenge to be only a legal sufficiency challenge. See Rischer v. State, 85 S.W.3d 839, 842-43 (Tex. App.—Waco 2002, no pet.) (reviewing courts look to argument and authorities presented in party’s brief to determine whether an issue challenges legal or factual sufficiency of the evidence or both).
Moir Watershed Servs., LLC v. Law Office of Heath Gurinsky, PLLC Page 3 determination, we presume that all factual disputes were resolved in favor of
the trial court’s ruling unless they are challenged on appeal. Luciano v.
SprayFoamPolymers.com, LLC, 625 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex. 2021). These implied
findings are tested by evidentiary sufficiency standards. See BMC Software
Belg., N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 795 (Tex. 2002). For legal sufficiency
points, if there is more than a scintilla of evidence to support the finding, the
no evidence challenge fails. Id.
Applicable Law
Texas courts have personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant
when the Texas long-arm statute authorizes such jurisdiction, and its exercise
comports with federal due process guarantees. Luciano, 625 S.W.3d at 8.
Consistent with federal due process protections, personal jurisdiction over
nonresident defendants is constitutional only when 1) the defendant has
established minimum contacts with the forum state, and 2) the exercise of
jurisdiction does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice. Spir Star, 310 S.W.3d at 872.
A defendant’s contacts with a forum can give rise to either general or
specific jurisdiction. Id. General jurisdiction exists when a defendant’s
contacts are continuous and systematic, even if the cause of action did not arise
from activities performed in the forum state. Id.
Moir Watershed Servs., LLC v. Law Office of Heath Gurinsky, PLLC Page 4 A court has specific jurisdiction over a defendant if its contacts within
the state are purposeful, meaning the defendant has sought some benefit,
advantage, or profit by availing itself of the jurisdiction, and its alleged liability
arises from or is related to an activity conducted within the forum, even if those
contacts are isolated or sporadic. Id. at 873. Thus, where the defendant has
deliberately engaged in significant activities within a state, he manifestly has
availed himself of the privilege of conducting business in that state, invoking
the benefits and protections of its laws. Luciano, 625 S.W.3d at 9. Further,
purposeful availment and relatedness are two co-equal components. Moki Mac
River Expeditions v. Drugg, 221 S.W.3d 569, 579 (Tex. 2007). Accordingly,
there must be a “substantial connection” between the defendant’s conduct and
the operative facts of the litigation. Spir Star, 310 S.W.3d at 874. The
purposeful availment analysis seeks to determine whether a nonresident’s
conduct and connection to a forum are such that it could reasonably anticipate
being haled into court there. Moncrief Oil Int’l, Inc. v. OAO Gazprom, 414
S.W.3d 142, 152 (Tex. 2013).
In order for a Texas court to obtain jurisdiction over a non-resident
defendant, a plaintiff must first plead allegations sufficient to confer
jurisdiction under the Texas long-arm statute. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. §§ 17.041-.045; Moncrief Oil Int’l, Inc., 414 S.W.3d at 149. The
Moir Watershed Servs., LLC v. Law Office of Heath Gurinsky, PLLC Page 5 pleading requirement is satisfied by an allegation that the nonresident
defendant is doing business in Texas, contracted with a Texas resident and
either party is to perform the contract in whole or in part in Texas, or
committed tortious acts in Texas. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 17.042; Steward Health Care Sys. LLC v. Saidara, 633 S.W.3d 120, 126 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2021, no pet.).
Once the plaintiff meets this initial burden, the burden shifts to the
nonresident defendant to negate all potential bases for personal jurisdiction
the plaintiff has alleged. See Moncrief Oil Int’l, Inc., 414 S.W.3d at 149; Kelly
v. Gen. Interior Constr., Inc., 301 S.W.3d 653, 658 (Tex. 2010). In ruling on a
special appearance, the court may consider the pleadings, stipulations made
by the parties, affidavits and attachments filed by the parties, the results of
discovery processes, and any oral testimony. TEX. R. CIV. P. 120a(3).
Discussion
In its petition, Moir alleged that Appellees committed negligence, breach
of contract, and violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and that
those causes of action arose in Ellis County, Texas. In its brief, Moir does not
assert that the trial court had general jurisdiction over Appellees. Moir
contends only that the special appearance should have been overruled because
the requirements for specific jurisdiction were met.
Moir Watershed Servs., LLC v. Law Office of Heath Gurinsky, PLLC Page 6 Moir was referred to the Law Office of Heath Gurinsky by a third-party
service located in Florida. Appellees, residents of New York, do not maintain
a place of business or a registered agent for service of process in Texas. They
do not advertise their services in Texas or engage in business in Texas.
Appellees have no employees or agents in Texas and have not recruited Texas
residents as potential employees. Moreover, where the underlying case
involves a legal malpractice action, the focus for personal jurisdiction purposes
is on where the attorneys performed the legal work at issue. See Abilene
Diagnostic Clinic, PLLC v. Paley, Rothman, Goldstein, Rosenberg, Eig &
Cooper, Chartered, 364 S.W.3d 359, 365-66 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2012, no
pet.). Moir hired Appellees to assist with lawsuits in New York, Arizona, and
Florida, not in Texas. All work Appellees did for Moir was done in New York.
Merely contracting with a Texas resident does not satisfy the minimum
contacts requirement. Internet Advert. Grp., Inc. v. Accudata, Inc., 301 S.W.3d
383, 389 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.). Moir focuses on the fact that its
part in the negotiations and decisions was performed in Texas and advice
rendered by Appellees was received by Moir in Texas, asserting this provides
ample contacts for Texas courts to obtain jurisdiction. However, these acts
occurred in Texas because that is where Moir is located, which is merely
fortuitous and does not establish any purposeful availment of Texas by
Moir Watershed Servs., LLC v. Law Office of Heath Gurinsky, PLLC Page 7 Appellees. See Buffet Partners, L.P. v. Sheffield Square, L.L.C., 256 S.W.3d
920, 924 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.) (rejecting contention that agreement
to refund security deposit at plaintiff’s offices in Texas established specific
jurisdiction over defendant as it was not conduct directed at the State).
Further, jurisdictionally relevant activities must be the defendant’s own
choice and must justify a conclusion that the non-resident defendant could
reasonably anticipate being called into a Texas court with respect to a
particular claim. See BRP-Rotax GmbH & Co. KG v. Shaik, 716 S.W.3d 98,
104 (Tex. 2025). Here, Appellees have not deliberately engaged in significant
activities within Texas. There is no indication that Appellees sought some
benefit, advantage, or profit by availing themselves of the privilege of
conducting business in Texas. See Spir Star, 310 S.W.3d at 873; Michiana
Easy Livin’ Country, Inc. v. Holten, 168 S.W.3d 777, 785 (Tex. 2005). We
conclude that the evidence negates Moir’s allegation that the district court had
specific jurisdiction over Appellees in this case. We overrule Moir’s sole issue.
CONCLUSION
Having overruled Moir’s sole issue, we affirm the trial court’s order
sustaining Appellees’ special appearance.
Moir Watershed Servs., LLC v. Law Office of Heath Gurinsky, PLLC Page 8 STEVE SMITH Justice
OPINION DELIVERED and FILED: January 29, 2026 Before Chief Justice Johnson, Justice Smith, and Justice Harris Affirmed CV06
Moir Watershed Servs., LLC v. Law Office of Heath Gurinsky, PLLC Page 9