Mohsen Ahmed v. County of San Diego, et al.

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 7 8 MOHSEN AHMED, Case No.: 25cv1920-LL-MMP

9 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 10 vs. MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 11 COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, et al.,

12 Defendants. [ECF No. 15] 13 14 15 16 Before the Court is Defendants’1 Motion to Dismiss pro se Plaintiff Mohsen 17 Ahmed’s (“Plaintiff”) First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). ECF No. 15. This matter is fully 18 briefed, and the Court deems it suitable for determination on the papers and without oral 19 argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ 20 Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED and the FAC is DISMISSED with leave to amend. 21 I. BACKGROUND 22 On July 28, 2025, Plaintiff Mohsen Ahmed, proceeding pro se, sued Defendant 23 County of San Diego and six County of San Diego officials and employees in their official 24

25 26 1 Defendants include: (1) County of San Diego, a public entity; (2) Ebony Shelton, in her official capacity as Chief Administrative Officer; (3) Claudia Silva, in her official capacity as County Counsel; (4) Cynthia 27 Lerma, in her official and individual capacities; (5) Richard McCarvell, in his official and individual capacities; (6) Ziad Aswad, in his official capacity as Contracting Officer Representative; (7) Terra 28 1 (and some in their individual) capacities. ECF No. 1. On August 14, 2025, Plaintiff filed 2 the operative FAC with a demand for a jury trial, against the same seven Defendants. ECF 3 No. 10. On August 27, 2025, Defendants moved to dismiss the FAC pursuant to Federal 4 Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5) and 12(b)(6). ECF No. 15. Plaintiffs filed an Opposition 5 to the Motion [ECF No. 16] and Defendants filed a Reply [ECF No. 18]. The following 6 allegations are from Plaintiff’s FAC. 7 Plaintiff owns a general construction contracting company called Tiger 8 Construction, LLC (“Tiger Construction”). FAC ¶ 21. Since 2020, Tiger Construction has 9 participated in multiple public solicitations administered by Defendant County of San 10 Diego, and alleges that “each time [he] faced disparate treatment not afforded to similarly 11 situated non-minority contractors.” Id. ¶ 21. Defendant County of San Diego nullified 12 several of these public solicitations, or “bids,” when Tiger Construction was identified as 13 the “apparent low bidder.” See id. ¶¶ 36–37, 44–45, 53–56, 72. Defendants stated Tiger 14 Construction’s bids were “non-responsive” and therefore rendered it ineligible for bidding. 15 See id. ¶¶ 37–38, 45, 56, 72. Plaintiff regularly contacted Defendants to express concerns 16 about their decision-making process. Id. ¶¶ 27, 31, 33, 61. Defendants’ communications to 17 Plaintiff about their actions were either vague and unsupported or went unexplained. Id. ¶¶ 18 25, 52, 65. At the same time, Plaintiff was performing other contracts with the Defendants. 19 Id. ¶¶ 35, 78. Following a change of staff with the Defendant County of San Diego, 20 Contracting Office Representative (“COR”), Plaintiff alleges that he was met with 21 inconsistent contract interpretation and administration that was not applied to other 22 contractors. Id. ¶¶ 82–85, 90,122. 23 These alleged events form the basis for Plaintiff’s claims for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for 24 equal protection violations based on Plaintiff’s “race, ethnicity, and status as the owner of 25 a certified minority-owned business.” Id. ¶ 121. Plaintiff also purports to bring a claim 26 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for procedural due process violations based on his “constitutionally 27 protected property interests in contract awards, performance opportunities, and 28 participation in public procurements.” Id. ¶ 127. Next, Plaintiff alleges a claim under 42 1 U.S.C. § 1983 for First Amendment violations based on his “engaging in protected 2 activity” by “reporting suspected discrimination to County officials, contacting elected 3 members of the Board of Supervisors, filing administrative bid protests, and seeking 4 redress through available internal and external channels.” Id. ¶ 133. Finally, Plaintiff brings 5 a Monell claim against the County, alleging his constitutional rights were violated based 6 on the County’s policies, practices, and customs. Id. ¶ 140. 7 II. LEGAL STANDARD 8 Parties may move to dismiss a claim for “failure to state a claim upon which relief 9 may be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); see also Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 10 1199-1200 (9th Cir. 2003) (requiring Rule 12(b)(6) to “be read in conjunction with Rule 11 8,” which requires a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief). 12 To survive this motion, a complaint must have “enough facts to state a claim to relief that 13 is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Although 14 “allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to 15 the nonmoving party,” courts are not required to accept as true “allegations that contradict 16 matters properly subject to judicial notice” or “allegations that are merely conclusory, 17 unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Sprewell v. Golden State 18 Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). 19 This standard is ultimately a “liberal” one, especially when the action has been filed 20 “pro se.” See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1976). Still, even under a “liberal 21 interpretation,” courts “may not supply elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” 22 See Ivey v. Bd. Of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 23 III. DISCUSSION 24 a. Standing 25 The Court will first address standing as it is a threshold matter in this case. 26 Defendants argue that “Plaintiff lacks standing under the doctrine of prudential standing to 27 assert the FAC’s claims because they are based on events that implicate only the legal 28 rights and interests of his company, Tiger, rather than his own personal legal rights and 1 interests.” Motion at 15. 2 The doctrine of prudential standing requires that a plaintiff “generally must assert 3 his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or 4 interests of third parties.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975); see also Ray Charles 5 Found v. Robinson, 795 F.3d 1109, 1120 (9th Cir. 2015). Prudential standing requires 6 courts to consider “whether the alleged injury is more than a ‘mere generalized grievance,’ 7 whether the plaintiff is asserting her own rights or the rights of third parties, and whether 8 the claim ‘falls within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the constitutional 9 guarantee in question.’” Alaska Right to Life Pol. Action Comm. v. Feldman, 504 F.3d 840, 10 840-49 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Johnson v. Stewart, 702 F.2d 193, 196 (9th Cir. 1983)). 11 Plaintiff argues that he “asserts his own constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 12 not derivative corporate claims.” Oppo. at 5. Specifically, Plaintiff argues: 13 The FAC alleges that Defendants excluded Plaintiff from equal participation in County contracting, retaliated against him personally for protected speech, 14 and deprived him of fair notice and due process. These are individual 15 constitutional harms, including reputational injury, loss of equal opportunity to compete, and chilling of protected petitioning activity, all of which are 16 redressable under § 1983. 17 18 Compl. ¶ 17. Plaintiff also argues that the “Tiger LA” case is inapposite. Id. ¶ 18 (citing 19 Tiger Construction LLC v. Housing Authority of Los Angeles, 2023 WL 12007340 (C.D. 20 Cal. Aug. 8, 2023) (hereinafter “Tiger LA”)). In support thereof, Plaintiff argues: 21 That case involved a single lost bid and alleged harms belonging solely to an LLC. Here, Plaintiff alleges a five-year pattern of systemic discrimination and 22 retaliation directed specifically at him as the owner and representative of a 23 certified minority-owned contractor. (internal citations omitted). Plaintiff further alleges exclusion even where other contractors, such as C&C Glass 24 and F&L Gates, were allowed to proceed under more favorable treatment 25 (internal citation omitted). 26 Compl. ¶ 18. 27 Plaintiff’s arguments are unfounded. Although Plaintiff attempts to argue in a 28 conclusory manner that he asserts his claims “in an individual capacity for violations of his 1 personal constitutional rights, the damages [sic] which are distinct from and in addition to 2 any injury to Tiger Construction, LLC,” it is evident from the allegations in the FAC that 3 the harm is to Plaintiff’s business. Compl. ¶ 4. For example, Plaintiff states that “Tiger 4 Construction, LLC” was “the contracting entity in several of the described transactions” 5 and describes Defendants’ contract-related behavior as causing Plaintiff “significant 6 economic harm,” disruption to his “business operations,” and irreparable damage to his 7 “professional reputation.” Id. ¶¶ 2, 4. Plaintiff also asserts that “the County’s actions have 8 deprived Plaintiff of property interests in the awarded contracts and bidding opportunities 9 [and] disrupted his business operations.” Id. ¶ 17. On their face, the allegations that form 10 the basis of Plaintiff’s causes of action concern his business. Plaintiff’s Opposition also 11 fails to explain why the harm is personal to him. Like his FAC, Plaintiff’s Opposition 12 asserts bare, conclusive statements that he suffered “reputational injury, loss of equal 13 opportunity to compete, and chilling of protected petitioning activity.” Oppo at 5. 14 Further, Plaintiff attempts to distinguish the LA Tiger case and argues that case 15 concerns only one bid while the facts here allege a five-year pattern of discrimination. 16 Compl. ¶ 18. However, the allegations that form the basis for the alleged injury here are 17 still allegations about harms to Tiger Construction—albeit over a longer period. See id. ¶¶ 18 2, 4, 17. 19 Plaintiff’s reliance on Austin v. Univ. of Oregon, 925 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2019) to 20 support his standing claim is misplaced. Oppo. at 6. Plaintiff cites to Austin in his 21 Opposition in support of his argument that “Ninth Circuit precedent confirms that 22 individuals alleging discriminatory exclusion from government contracting processes may 23 assert personal constitutional harms.” Id. (citing Austin v. Univ. of Oregon, 925 F.3d at 24 1138-39). In Austin, the court held that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim for gender 25 discrimination under Title IX. Id. The plaintiffs were male students at the University of 26 Oregon. Id. at 1135. After a female student accused the plaintiffs of “forcing her to engage 27 in nonconsensual sexual sex,” the University “proceeded with a formal disciplinary 28 process” against the plaintiffs and ultimately suspended them. Id. at 1135-36. The 1 plaintiffs brought suit against the University, alleging that it discriminated against them on 2 the basis of their sex by “disciplin[ing] male students for sexual misconduct but never 3 female students.” Id. at 1136, 1138. The court held that the plaintiffs failed to adequately 4 state a claim for discrimination. The court explained that “the complaint does not claim 5 that any female University students have been accused of comparable misconduct, and thus 6 fails to allege that similarly situated students—those accused of sexual misconduct—are 7 disciplined unequally.” Id. at 1138. These facts are not relevant or applicable to the facts 8 in this case which require the Court to determine whether the FAC’s claims involve events 9 that implicate only the legal rights and interests of Plaintiff’s company or his own personal 10 legal rights and interests. 11 Additionally, courts in the Ninth Circuit have held that “[i]n general, shareholders 12 lack standing to assert an individual § 1983 claim based on harm to the corporation in 13 which they own shares.” RK Ventures, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 1045, 1057 (9th Cir. 14 2002); see also Erlich v. Glasner, 418 F.2d 226, 228 (9th Cir.1969) (holding a shareholder 15 of a corporation could not assert a claim on behalf of their business for injuries to the 16 company). The reasoning of these holdings has also been applied to limited liability 17 companies. See Elizabeth Retail Props. LLC v. KeyBank Nat. Ass’n, 83 F.Supp.3d 972, 986 18 (D. Or. 2015) (recognizing the “shareholder standing rule” has been applied to members 19 of LLCs); see also Woods View II, LLC v. Kitsap Cnty, 484 Fed. Appx. 160, 161 (9th Cir. 20 2012) (finding the sole member of an LLC lacked standing to bring claims against Kitsap 21 County because she was “not injured directly and independently of the limited liability 22 company.”); see also Balboa Cap. Corp. v. Innovix Med. PLLC, No. 8:19-cv-01145-JLS- 23 DLM, 2020 WL 1969763, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2020) (finding third-party plaintiff’s 24 allegations that she was personally induced to sign an agreement on behalf of the company 25 she owned insufficient to establish that the harm she suffered was independent of the harm 26 suffered by the company). 27 In sum, at this procedural posture, Plaintiff fails to successfully meet the threshold 28 for prudential standing because the allegations that form the basis of the operative 1 |} Complaint concern harms to his company, Tiger Construction, and not Plaintiff personally. 2 || Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED with leave to amend.’ 3 IV. CONCLUSION 4 For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that Plaintiff lacks prudential 5 ||standing to bring this action on behalf of Tiger Construction. Defendants’ Motion to 6 || Dismiss is GRANTED with leave to amend. Plaintiff may file an amended complaint to 7 || cure the deficiencies in this Order within twenty-one (21) days. Additionally, to the extent 8 ||that an amended complaint is filed, Plaintiff must sufficiently serve process on all 9 Defendants, including any individual-capacity defendants. If Plaintiff fails to file an 10 |}amended complaint by the deadline set herein, the Court may enter a final order dismissing 11 || this case. See Lira v. Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2005) (“If a plaintiff does not 12 ||take advantage of the opportunity to fix his complaint, a district court may convert the 13 || dismissal of the complaint into dismissal of the entire action.”). 14 IT IS SO ORDERED. 15 Dated: March 18, 2026 KO 16 CE) 17 Honorable Linda Lopez 8 United States District Judge 19 20 21 22 23 24 —_ SSS 25 ? To the extent that Plaintiff chooses to bring an amended complaint on behalf of Tiger Construction, 26 || Plaintiff is reminded that he cannot represent his company pro se. The Civil Local Rules provide that “To|nly natural persons representing their individual interests in propria persona may appear in court 27 || without representation by an attormey.... All other parties, including corporations, partnerships, and other 28 legal entities, may appear in court only through an attorney permitted to practice pursuant to Civil Local Rule 83.3.”