Mohorn v. Ross

422 S.E.2d 290, 205 Ga. App. 443, 92 Fulton County D. Rep. 2089, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 1194
CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia
DecidedSeptember 9, 1992
DocketA92A1427
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 422 S.E.2d 290 (Mohorn v. Ross) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Mohorn v. Ross, 422 S.E.2d 290, 205 Ga. App. 443, 92 Fulton County D. Rep. 2089, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 1194 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992).

Opinion

McMurray, Presiding Judge.

Polly Mohorn, next friend and natural guardian of Terrika Receal Mohorn, filed an action against Carey Lesell Ross, alleging Terrika was injured as a result of the negligent operation of a vehicle by Ross. Ross filed a motion for summary judgment, contending Terrika’s claim is barred under the doctrine of parental immunity.

Terrika is the daughter of Polly Mohorn and Carey Lesell Ross. On December 16, 1988, Ross wrecked a vehicle in which Terrika was a passenger. During February of 1990, Polly Mohorn and Ross were married and Polly and Terrika moved in with Ross. On November 28, 1990, Polly Mohorn sued Ross for Terrika’s alleged injuries. In February of 1991, the couple separated without a divorce and Itoss moved out of the home. Ross periodically visits his daughter and provides support, paying the mortgage and assisting with transportation.

The trial court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment. This appeal followed. Held:

The doctrine of parental immunity is implemented to protect domestic tranquility, avoid fraud and collusion, preserve family resources, protect the family unit and preserve parental discipline. Clabough v. Rachwal, 176 Ga. App. 212, 213 (335 SE2d 648). These objectives become relevant after an action is filed, not at the time a cause of action accrues. See Morris v. Brooks, 186 Ga. App. 177, 178 (366 SE2d 777).

Polly Mohorn and Ross were married and their family resided in the same household when the case sub judice was initiated. The family separated less than three months later, Ross moving out of the home. Ross now periodically visits his daughter and provides financial support, paying the mortgage and assisting with transportation. These circumstances justify the trial court’s finding that Ross is immune from liability for injuries allegedly sustained by his daughter in the collision.

Although the family is separated, the child’s parents are not divorced and there is no evidence of domestic unrest. On the contrary, the undisputed evidence shows that Ross visits his daughter and supports his family. Consequently, the underlying objectives of preserving domestic tranquility, family resources and parental discipline remain. Further, there remains the possibility of salvaging the family unit. It follows that the trial court did not err in granting summary *444 judgment in favor of Ross based on the doctrine of parental immunity. Compare Segars v. Southern Guar. Ins. Co. of Ga., 192 Ga. App. 265 (1) (384 SE2d 426).

Decided September 9, 1992. Kendall, Dixon & Turk, Alvin L. Kendall, for appellant. Beck, Owen & Murray, Samuel A. Murray, for appellee.

Judgment affirmed.

Sognier, C. J., and Cooper, J., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Fields v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance
87 S.W.3d 224 (Supreme Court of Arkansas, 2002)
Renko v. McLean
697 A.2d 468 (Court of Appeals of Maryland, 1997)
Warren v. Warren
650 A.2d 252 (Court of Appeals of Maryland, 1994)
Queen v. Carey
435 S.E.2d 264 (Court of Appeals of Georgia, 1993)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
422 S.E.2d 290, 205 Ga. App. 443, 92 Fulton County D. Rep. 2089, 1992 Ga. App. LEXIS 1194, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mohorn-v-ross-gactapp-1992.