Mohammed v. Stover

CourtDistrict Court, D. Connecticut
DecidedApril 23, 2024
Docket3:23-cv-00757
StatusUnknown

This text of Mohammed v. Stover (Mohammed v. Stover) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Connecticut primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Mohammed v. Stover, (D. Conn. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT ALEAH MOHAMMED, ) 3:23-CV-757 (SVN) Petitioner, ) ) v. ) ) WARDEN STOVER, FCI DANBURY, ) Respondent. ) April 23, 2024 ORDER ON RECONSIDERATION Sarala V. Nagala, United States District Judge. Petitioner Aleah Mohammed has moved for reconsideration of the Court’s decision denying a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and seeks to have Respondent credit her under the First Step Act (“FSA”) with three courses she took between the date of her sentencing and the date of her arrival at her designated Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) facility. Respondent Stover opposes on the grounds that he cannot, by statute, credit programming completed by Petitioner before her arrival at her designated BOP facility and the subsequent risk and needs assessment she underwent there. For the reasons described below, the Court disagrees with Respondent, but cannot grant Petitioner the relief she seeks. The Court orders additional briefing to address whether it should grant deference to BOP’s interpretation of the FSA time credits procedure. I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND The Court assumes the parties’ familiarity with its initial order denying Petitioner’s petition for a writ for habeas corpus. ECF No. 12. Accordingly, the Court discusses only the additional procedural background necessary for this ruling. On November 20, 2023, Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court’s order denying her habeas relief. ECF No. 16. Relevant here, Petitioner sought reconsideration of the Court’s ruling that she was ineligible to receive FSA time credits for programming she completed between the date her sentence commenced (April 13, 2022), and her October 4, 2022, arrival at Federal Medical Center Carswell (“FMC Carswell”). During this time period, although Petitioner was in custody of the U.S. Marshals Service, she was physically housed in BOP-operated facilities. Stokes Decl., ECF No. 8-3 ¶ 17.1 On her motion for reconsideration, Petitioner argued that the

BOP’s regulations providing that an inmate cannot earn FSA time credits until they have arrived at their official BOP detention facility conflict with the FSA and therefore are not due deference under Chevron USA, Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc. 407 U.S. 837 (1984). Respondent opposed the motion, arguing that Petitioner was ineligible by statute from receiving credit for programming that was not assigned to her by BOP as part of her FSA risk and needs assessment, which occurred on October 4, 2022. ECF No. 20 at 4–7; ECF No. 8-3 ¶ 19. On January 3, 2024, the Court granted in part the motion for reconsideration, appointed Petitioner counsel, and ordered counsel to file supplemental briefing “regarding whether the [BOP’s] regulations concerning when an inmate can begin to earn credits under the First Step Act are owed deference under Chevron.”

ECF No. 22. During a status conference with counsel and Petitioner, the Court ordered additional briefing. ECF No. 24. Respondent was directed to file a notice explaining his position why the programming Petitioner participated in prior to her arrival at FMC Carswell would not qualify for credit under the FSA or BOP regulations. ECF Nos. 24, 26. Petitioner then filed her response, arguing that the BOP regulations precluding inmates from receiving credit for programming completed after the commencement of his or her sentence violate clear Congressional intent, and

1 Petitioner was housed in the Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn, New York, and the Federal Transfer Center in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. asking the Court to award her credit for the three programs she completed between her sentencing date and the date of her arrival at FMC Carswell. ECF No. 27. II. LEGAL STANDARD A federal prisoner may petition for habeas relief if she is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). “A writ of habeas

corpus under § 2241 is available to a federal prisoner who does not challenge the legality of [her] sentence, but challenges instead its execution subsequent to [her] conviction.” Carmona v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 243 F.3d 629, 632 (2d Cir. 2001). Thus, § 2241 petitions are appropriately used to challenge FSA time credit calculations. See Dailey v. Pullen, No. 3:22-cv-1121 (SRU), 2023 WL 3456696, at *2 (D. Conn. May 15, 2023) (considering a challenge to First Step Act time credit calculation on a § 2241 petition). III. DISCUSSION Petitioner originally sought reconsideration of the Court’s ruling that, under BOP regulations, she was unable to receive FSA time credits on the date her sentence commenced

because she was not housed at her designated BOP facility. ECF No. 16 at 1–2. Part of her argument in seeking reconsideration was that BOP’s regulations contradicted clear congressional intent that an inmate begins accruing FSA time credits on the date his or her sentence commences. In opposing Petitioner’s motion, Respondent explained that he agrees with Petitioner that she was eligible to beginning earning credits on April 13, 2022—the date her sentence commenced. ECF No. 20 at 2.2 Respondent’s position is that when Petitioner’s sentence commenced, other FSA statutory provisions precluded Petitioner from accruing credits. Id. Thus, the parties do not dispute

2 This Court agrees with the reasoning of HuiHui v. Derr, No. CV 22-00541 JAO-RT, 2023 WL 4086073 (D. Haw. June 20, 2023), and Yufenyuy v. Warden, FCI Berlin, 659 F. Supp. 3d 213 (D.N.H. 2023), which found that BOP’s regulations precluding inmates from being eligible to earn FSA credits beginning on the date their sentences commenced contradicts clear congressional intent and are therefore due no deference. the starting premise that a federal inmate’s sentence must commence before he or she is eligible to receive FSA credits and that Petitioner meets this eligibility requirement. Rather, the central dispute is whether the statutes enacting the FSA time credits procedure unambiguously precluded Petitioner from earning FSA credits prior to BOP’s conducting her risk and needs assessment upon her intake at FMC Carswell, and its subsequent assignment of

evidence-based recidivism reduction programs (“EBRRs”) and productive activities (“PAs”) for her to complete. The parties also dispute whether the programs Petitioner completed after her sentencing but before her intake at FMC Carswell—a twelve-hour class on “soft skills,” a twelve- hour class on ethics, and a three-hour class on diabetes—qualify as an EBRR or PA under the FSA. Both remaining disputes are governed under the two-step framework set forth in Chevron. Under this framework, the Court first asks “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. If Congress’s intent is clear, the Court “must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” Id. at 843. If, however, “the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the

agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Id. For the reasons that follow, the Court finds that the FSA statutory scheme does not unambiguously preclude the BOP from crediting Petitioner’s programming completed between April 13, 2022, and October 3, 2022, while she was housed at BOP-operated facilities but in the custody of the U.S. Marshals Service.

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Bluebook (online)
Mohammed v. Stover, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mohammed-v-stover-ctd-2024.