Mohammed Mazhar Mohiuddin v. godaddy.com, LLC.

• Court: Massachusetts Appeals Court
• Decided: March 5, 2025
• Docket: 24-P-0565
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

24-P-565

MOHAMMED MAZHAR MOHIUDDIN

vs.

GODADDY.COM, LLC.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The plaintiff, Mohammed Mazhar Mohiuddin, appeals from a

judgment of the Superior Court dismissing his amended complaint

for failure to state a claim, Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6), 365

Mass. 754 (1974). Agreeing with the motion judge that the

plaintiff's bare-bones complaint does not allege any unfair or

deceptive acts in Massachusetts, we affirm.

"We review the allowance of a motion to dismiss de novo."

Cubberley v. Commerce Ins. Co., 495 Mass. 289, 292 (2025),

quoting Curtis v. Herb Chambers I-95, Inc., 458 Mass. 674, 676

(2011). "In doing so, we accept 'as true all well-pleaded facts

alleged in the complaint, drawing all reasonable inferences

therefrom in the plaintiff's favor, and determining whether the allegations plausibly suggest that the plaintiff is entitled to

relief.'" Vita v. New England Baptist Hosp., 494 Mass. 824, 832

(2024), quoting Marsh v. Massachusetts Coastal R.R., 492 Mass.

641, 645-646 (2023), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 2519 (2024). "To

survive a motion to dismiss, the 'factual allegations must be

enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level."

Fairhaven Hous. Auth. v. Commonwealth, 493 Mass. 27, 30 (2023),

quoting Osborne-Trussell v. Children's Hosp. Corp., 488 Mass.

248, 253 (2021).

Whether alleged conduct "rises to the level of a chapter

93A violation is a question of law." H1 Lincoln, Inc. v. South

Washington St., LLC, 489 Mass. 1, 14 (2022), quoting Baker v.

Goldman, Sachs & Co., 771 F.3d 37, 49 (1st Cir. 2014). In

making this determination, "[c]ourts must consider whether the

nature, purpose, and effect of the challenged conduct is

coercive or extortionate." Beverly v. Bass River Golf Mgt.,

Inc., 92 Mass. App. Ct. 595, 606 (2018), quoting Diamond Crystal

Brands, Inc. v. Backleaf, LLC, 60 Mass. App. Ct. 502, 507

(2004). A breach of contract alone will not support a c. 93A

violation. See Boston Capital Funding, LLC v. BEK Winchester

Winning Farm LLC, 103 Mass. App. Ct. 573, 579 (2023). An action

under G. L. c. 93A, § 11 cannot be maintained unless "the unfair

or deceptive act or practice occurred primarily and

2 substantially within the commonwealth." G. L. c. 93A, § 11,

eight par. "The proper focus . . . is on where the wrongful

conduct occurred." FTI, LLC v. Duffy, 104 Mass. App. Ct. 484,

489 (2024).

Here, rather than file an ordinary civil complaint with

numbered paragraphs providing all relevant facts, the plaintiff

chose twice simply to file a letter complaint. The fact section

of that amended complaint letter consists of four paragraphs

that do not mention Massachusetts even once. The plaintiff

alleges that he paid for twelve months of web hosting services

in December 2021, that the defendant told him in February 2022

that all of his hosting data had been deleted, the defendant did

not respond to a communication from the plaintiff that month,

and that a conversation with the corporate office "yielded no

satisfactory resolution." Nothing in that meager statement of

facts reveals any conduct that is unfair or deceptive, much less

that is "coercive or extortionate." Bass River Gold Mgt., Inc.,

92 Mass. App. Ct. at 606, quoting Diamond Crystal Brands, Inc.,

60 Mass. App. Ct. at 507. Nor, where the complaint alleges that

the defendant's offices are in Arizona, is there any indication

that the defendant did anything of significance in

Massachusetts. See FTI, LLC, 104 Mass. App. Ct. at 489-490.

3 The plaintiff further objects to the dismissal being with

prejudice. Although leave to file an amended complaint is

granted liberally, Mass. R. Civ. P. 15 (a), 365 Mass. 761

(1974); Tocci v. Tocci, 490 Mass. 1, 24 (2022), the plaintiff

did not request leave to do so from the motion judge and does

not request such leave from us either. More to the point, the

plaintiff has not proposed any legally-adequate further amended

complaint or explained -- either to us or to the motion judge --

how he could remedy the deficiencies of his amended complaint.

See Padmanabhan v. Cambridge, 99 Mass. App. Ct. 332, 343 (2021),

quoting Johnston v. Box, 453 Mass. 569, 582 (2009) ("Even though

motions to amend are to be liberally allowed, a motion must at

least 'adequately describe the contemplated amendment in order

for [the] court to determine the merits of the motion'").

Accordingly, we discern no abuse of discretion in the motion

judge's decision to dismiss the plaintiff's lawsuit with

4 prejudice. See Ward v. Schnurr, 103 Mass. App. Ct. 308, 317

(2023).

Judgment affirmed.

By the Court (Ditkoff, Hand & Walsh, JJ.1),

Clerk

Entered: March 5, 2025.

1 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.